Drayton v. State

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(2) Drayton lived with his sister in Pennsylvania but often stayed at Smith's apartment in Delaware. One summer evening, Drayton accused her of infidelity. The argument, which began in Smith's living room, escalated into a physical altercation. Smith testified that Drayton slapped and strangled her before attempting to rape her vaginally. Smith retreated to her bedroom and stayed there until Drayton fell asleep on the couch. She then left the apartment to seek help but, because of severe weather, returned. The next morning, Smith drove Drayton to his sister's home in Pennsylvania; after dropping him off, she contacted the police.

(3) Officers interviewed Smith and then accompanied her to Christiana Hospital where a forensic nurse, Kayla Williams, examined her. Williams observed that Smith had bloodshot eyes, neck swelling, and a bite mark on her tongue. Williams concluded that these findings were consistent with strangulation. Williams also performed a basic sexual-assault exam on Smith. Smith declined a comprehensive exam because she said Drayton had not penetrated her vagina.¹

(4) After the forensic exam, police interviewed Smith again. During that interview, Sergeant Eric Christopher learned that Smith had installed a motion- activated camera in her living room. The camera did not record continuously; instead, it recorded a short clip whenever it detected motion. Sergeant Christopher

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asked Smith to provide all clips recorded on the night of the alleged assault. Smith sent eight clips, but she did not provide any footage from before or after the alleged assault. Of the eight clips, some depicted Drayton strangling Smith; others depicted him, naked, removing her shirt and holding a pillow over her face. Sergeant Christopher did not inspect the camera or review its stored content.

(5) Two weeks later, officers arrested Drayton at his sister's home in Pennsylvania. Detective Sean Raftery, a member of the United States Marshals Task Force, which locates and apprehends fugitives, took part in the arrest. Detective Raftery recorded the arrest on his body-worn camera. Drayton was later extradited to Delaware.

(6) A grand jury indicted Drayton on one count each of strangulation, menacing, first-degree unlawful sexual contact, second-degree unlawful imprisonment, and sexual harassment. The case proceeded to a three-day jury trial.

(7) At trial, the State introduced the eight clips from Smith's living room camera. The State also played footage from Smith's initial interview with Sergeant Christopher, during which Smith identified Drayton as her assailant from a photograph. During trial, Sergeant Christopher and the prosecutor repeatedly referred to Smith as the "victim." Defense counsel did not object.

(8) The State also played Detective Raftery's body-worn-camera footage of Drayton's arrest in Pennsylvania. The video showed several Task Force officers

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surrounding Drayton and arresting him with their guns drawn. After the arrest, Drayton told the officers that his name was "Jaquan Jackson," to which Detective Raftery responded, "I know you're Kaseem Drayton. Don't even lie."

(9) Finally, the State presented testimony from Kayla Williams, the forensic nurse who examined Smith. Williams testified that trauma could impair a person's ability to recall the precise sequence of events. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the State had not laid the necessary foundation to offer that testimony. The court overruled the objection.

(10) Before closing arguments, Drayton requested a missing-evidence instruction. He argued that Sergeant Christopher failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence by allowing Smith to choose which living room clips to provide to the police. Drayton claimed that Sergeant Christopher should have accessed Smith's security camera application and reviewed the stored footage himself. The Superior Court denied the request. It concluded that Drayton's argument did not "rise to a level that [the Court] need[ed] to give the [missing-evidence] instruction. There [was] simply not sufficient evidence in this record that [the] State had evidence in its possession that it failed to turn over."

(11) The jury acquitted Drayton of first-degree unlawful sexual contact and second-degree unlawful imprisonment but convicted him of strangulation, menacing, and sexual harassment. This appeal followed.

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(12) We review the denial of a request for missing evidence instruction de novo.²We review a trial judge's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.³We review errors that were not raised at the trial level for plain error.⁴

(13) Drayton first argues that the Superior Court erred by declining to give a missing-evidence instruction. He contends that the police violated his due process rights by allowing Smith to decide which videos were relevant. Although the police have a "duty to collect and preserve material evidence that might exculpate a defendant," that duty does not extend to every piece of evidence that might later prove useful to the defense.⁵Rather, "the police must have had a reason, at the time, to believe the specific evidence might be exculpatory."⁶When the State bears responsibility for the loss of material evidence,⁷the jury may be instructed that it may infer the missing evidence would have tended to show the defendant's innocence.⁸

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(14) We recently addressed a similar issue in Boulden v. State.⁹There, the police reviewed doorbell-camera footage that captured an exchange between the complaining witness and the defendant.¹⁰After concluding that the recording did not visually capture the incident, police preserved only its audio by recording it on an officer's body-worn camera.¹¹The defendant sought a missing-evidence instruction based on the State's failure to preserve the video component of the footage.¹²The Superior Court denied the request because it found that the police had no duty to collect the video footage at the time.¹³The court reasoned that the body-worn camera recording of the audio preserved the relevant evidence.¹⁴We affirmed.¹⁵

(15) This case is similar to Boulden. Sergeant Christopher testified that he

"felt confident that [the police] received everything from that night based on [his] review of the video itself." He also testified that he "didn't have any reason to think"

that Smith had withheld material evidence because "[t]hings were lining up as far as the video that [he] watched." Sergeant Christopher had no reason to believe that

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additional exculpatory footage existed and therefore had no reason to seek additional clips from Smith.¹⁶The Superior Court did not err by declining to give a missing-evidence instruction under these circumstances.

(16) Drayton also challenges several of the trial court's evidentiary rulings, which he claims were errors that, individually and cumulatively, deprived him of a fair trial.¹⁷We assess each claim individually and then determine whether the purported errors cumulatively deprived Drayton of a fair trial.

(17) Drayton first argues that the Superior Court erred by admitting the video of Smith's initial interview with police, in which she identified Drayton as her assailant. He contends that the video's risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value under Delaware Rule of Evidence ("D.R.E.") 403. Relatedly, Drayton argues that the State had no need to offer additional identification evidence because he did not dispute Smith's in-court identification.

(18) A trial judge has broad discretion under D.R.E. 403 to balance the probative value of the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice.¹⁸Here,

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although Smith identified Drayton in court, she referred to him as "Jaquan Jackson,"

an alias Drayton had used. The State explained that it bore the burden of connecting that name to Drayton and offered the out-of-court identification to corroborate Smith's in-court identification. Because Drayton's identity was at issue, the Superior Court acted within its discretion by admitting the evidence.¹⁹

(19) Drayton argues in the alternative that the identification video improperly bolstered Smith's credibility. The record does not support that claim. The State offered the video as substantive evidence to link Smith's use of "Jaquan Jackson" to Drayton—not to bolster her credibility. Because Drayton's identity remained at issue, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the identification video.

(20) Drayton next argues that the Superior Court erred by allowing the State to play Detective Raftery's body-worn camera footage of his arrest. The State began playing the video without objection. Defense counsel objected about two minutes and thirty-two seconds into the recording, which is when Drayton began discussing prior contacts with law enforcement. The Superior Court sustained the objection danger of unfair prejudice is a matter which falls particularly within the discretion of the trial court[.]").

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and stopped the video. Because Drayton received the relief he requested, there is no error for us to review.²⁰

(21) Drayton also argues that the Superior Court erred by allowing Kayla Williams to testify about trauma-related biological responses because she is a forensic nurse—not a psychologist. A witness may testify as an expert if she is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education and when the testimony will assist the factfinder.²¹The trial judge has discretion to assess the witness's qualifications and the testimony's relevance to the issues in dispute.²²

(22) Here, the State laid an adequate foundation for Williams's expertise on trauma-related symptoms. Williams testified about her education, professional certification, and clinical experience. She also received specialized training in helping victims of violence, including victims of sexual assault, domestic violence, and strangulation. After considering that background, the Superior Court overruled

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Drayton's objection. On this record, the court acted within its discretion in permitting the testimony.²³

(23) Drayton contends next that the Superior Court erred by allowing Sergeant Christopher and the prosecutor to repeatedly refer to Smith as the "victim."

Drayton did not object at trial, so we review for plain error. Plain errors are "material defects which are apparent on the face of the record, which are basic, serious, and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice."²⁴

(24) In Jackson v. State,²⁵this Court cautioned against referring to the complaining witness as the "victim" when the defendant disputes that a crime occurred based on a justification or consent defense.²⁶But Jackson did not impose a categorical ban on the term.²⁷Instead, we recognized that law enforcement officers often use "victim" as shorthand for "complaining witness" and held that, absent an objection, the prosecutor's use of the term was not plain error.²⁸We likewise

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declined to find plain error in a case where the defense was that no crime occurred and three police officers referred to the complaining witness as the "victim" eleven times.²⁹

(25) Drayton's claim raises the same concern we addressed in Jackson. Drayton's defense was that no sexual contact occurred or, alternatively, that any sexual contact was consensual. Sergeant Christopher referred to Smith as the

"victim" seventeen times during his testimony. As Jackson recognized, law enforcement officers often use "victim" as a term of art for a "complaining witness."³⁰Absent a contemporaneous objection, that usage does not constitute plain error.³¹The prosecutor used the term "victim" four times. Although repeated use of the term warrants caution given the nature of Drayton's defenses, the references here did not create a material defect that was basic, serious, and fundamental, clearly deprived Drayton of a substantial right, or resulted in manifest

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injustice.³²The jury heard competing accounts and was instructed that it alone was responsible for determining the facts and assessing the credibility of the witnesses. The parties presented the disputed events to the jury through testimony, the 911 call, forensic evidence, and video footage. Nothing in the challenged terminology prevented the jury from resolving the disputed issues for itself.³³

(26) Finally, Drayton claims that the alleged errors cumulatively resulted in an unfair trial. Where there are multiple errors at trial, we weigh their cumulative effect to determine whether, combined, they were "prejudicial to substantial rights [so] as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process."³⁴Because all of Drayton's claims of error are without merit, his claim of cumulative error fails.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice