SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 8th day of July, 2026. ____________________________________________________________________________
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against two utility providers, the City of Auburn ("Auburn") and Shawnee County Solid Waste ("SCSW"), and a debt collection agency, Hollins & McVay ("Hollins"), alleging all three were either attempting to collect pre-petition debt or "improperly"
trying to collect debt that accrued during the Chapter 13 repayment period.1Now before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement (the "Motion"),2the Court must decide whether this debt resulted from pre-petition or post-petition charges and whether the conduct of Auburn and Hollins (collectively, the
"Defendants") violated either the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) or the discharge injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). Because there is no genuine dispute of material fact that (1) the debt Auburn was attempting to collect accrued post- petition, (2) Auburn, as a utility provider, did not violate the automatic stay by billing Plaintiff for services rendered during the Chapter 13 repayment period, and (3) no debt collection efforts were made until after the final discharge order was entered, summary judgment must be granted to Auburn. Summary judgment must also be granted to Hollins with respect to the debt it attempted to collect on behalf of Auburn because it was post-petition debt and no collection efforts on said debt by Hollins were made until after the final discharge order was entered. The Court will enter a
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separate judgment regarding SCSW and the remaining allegations against Hollins for its collection efforts on behalf of SCSW.
I. Procedural Posture3 Plaintiff filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code4 on October 30, 2019.5On January 31, 2020, Plaintiff's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed.6Plaintiff's Chapter 13 plan payments were completed on September 11, 2023,7the final discharge order was entered on October 11, 2023,8and the bankruptcy case was closed on December 14, 2023. Defendants were given notice of the discharge injunction on October 13, 2023.9Plaintiff filed this adversary proceeding on May 13, 2025, alleging "willful violations of the discharge injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2), as well as violations of Chapter 13 procedural requirements" by Defendants.10Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing all the debt they attempted to collect is post-petition debt, and thus not a violation of the discharge injunction.11A status conference was held on December 11, 2025,12and supplemental materials from the parties regarding billing records were due on January 26, 2026.
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II. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires a court to grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."13When analyzing a summary judgment motion, the Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.14An issue is "genuine" if "there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way."15"Material facts"
are those that are "essential to the proper disposition of [a] claim" under applicable law."16
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating—by reference to pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits—the absence of genuine issues of material fact.17If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot prevail by relying solely on its pleadings.18
"Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegation."19Under this Court's Local Bankruptcy Rules, "[t]he court will deem admitted . . . all material facts contained in the statement of the movant
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unless the statement of the opposing party specifically controverts those facts."20
III. Analysis and Conclusions of Law A. Pre-vs Post-Petition Distinction and Billing Records When an entity, such as an individual person, commences a bankruptcy case, it is called a petition.21The date in which the petition is filed is called the "petition date," meaning anything that occurred before the petition date has occurred
"prepetition," and anything that occurs after the petition date occurs "post-petition."
The Fourth Circuit in Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Kirkland (In re Kirkland) provides a clear explanation of how this pre- and post-petition divide operates in the context of post-petition interest:
Post-petition interest, by definition, is interest that accrues on an obligation during the pendency of the bankruptcy estate, but after the bankruptcy petition is filed. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) prohibits post-petition interest--that is, interest that has not matured at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed--from being included in a proof of claim against the bankruptcy estate. See Kielisch v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kielisch), 258 F.3d 315, 321-22 (4th Cir. 2001) (observing that § 502 prohibits creditors from claiming post-petition interest from bankruptcy estates). Thus, the debtor's obligation to pay post-petition interest pre-exists the bankruptcy petition, does not become part of the bankruptcy proceeding, and is an obligation that survives the debtor's discharge. Once the bankruptcy estate is closed, the debtor remains personally liable for post-petition interest. See id. at 325 (citing Bruning
v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 363, 84 S. Ct. 906, 11 L. Ed. 2d 772, 1964-
2 C.B. 500 (1964)).22
Therefore, interest can accrue on charges that occur post-petition.
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Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy on October 30, 2019, meaning anything that occurred before October 30, 2019, is pre-petition conduct and anything that occurred after October 30, 2019, is post-petition conduct. In his response to the Motion, Plaintiff admits "City of Auburn filed state action Case No. SN-2024-LM-8799 seeking $1,325.44, including $1,019.57 for services [from 2020 to June 2022] and $305.87 in fees" but disputes this amount is post-petition, asserting it includes "fees added during the Court-Supervised Repayment Period without court approval."23He also argues $634.20 of this amount was carryover from a pre-petition balance, in violation of the discharge injunction.24
On December 20, 2019, Auburn wrote off $1,866.60 for pre-petition sewer services rendered to Plaintiff.25In the supplemental briefing, Auburn explains that the City of Auburn changed billing systems on October 1, 2021, and the $634.20 carryover balance resulted from the transfer of Plaintiff's balance on the old system to its new system.26Auburn produced the monthly billing logs from before and after the system transition27and submitted an accompanying affidavit from the City of Auburn City Clerk, Darby Magwire, to explain those records.28Auburn correctly asserts the $634.20 amount represents unpaid charges for services rendered post- petition from November 1, 2019 through September 2021.29
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Despite the bill for services rendered during the month of November 2019 being labeled as beginning October 20, 2019, the City of Auburn's city code mandates that no bill for sewer services is considered due and owing until the first of the following month.30Therefore, the bill showing a service period of October 20, 2019, to November 20, 2019, would not be pre-petition debt because it was not considered due and owing until after the petition date; although labeled differently, the bill reflects services rendered beginning November 1, 2019, and ending November 30, 2019.31 Thus, this amount and all amounts charged thereafter are post-petition debts.32 Because Auburn's debt is post-petition, the amounts Hollins is attempting to collect on Auburn's behalf is also post-petition as a matter of law, since any pre-petition debt owed to Auburn was written off.33Accordingly, summary judgment is granted for Hollins insofar as it relates to its attempted collection of the Auburn debt. B. Creditors' Conduct Did Not Violate the Automatic Stay under § 362(a) Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated Chapter 13 procedural requirements by not closing his utility account and adding "unauthorized charges" such as late fees and interest while Plaintiff's Chapter 13 case was pending.34While not styled as such, the Court recognizes Plaintiff to be arguing that Defendants' conduct violated the
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automatic stay under § 362(a).35 Section 366 prohibits utility providers from altering, refusing, or discontinuing service to a debtor solely on the basis of filing bankruptcy or that the debtor had past due payments prior to filing.36However, if 20 days has passed since the petition date, and neither the debtor nor trustee has provided adequate assurance of payment to the utility servicer, only then can the utility alter, refuse or disconnect service.37 Here, the reason Auburn, as a utility provider,38did not close Plaintiff's account and continued to charge for sewer service is twofold: (1) during the first 20 days of Plaintiff's bankruptcy, Auburn was statutorily required to continue providing sewer service and (2) sections 15-402(d) and 15-403(e) of Auburn's city code require all occupied residences to have sewer services provided by the City of Auburn,39 therefore sewer service "cannot and will not be terminated for lack of payment."40 Since Auburn wrote off all pre-petition debt and was statutorily required to continue providing sewer services to Plaintiff, Auburn's post-petition billing was not a violation of the automatic stay. And since Plaintiff did not pay the post-petition utility bills as
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they became due, Auburn was within its right to charge late fees on these past due amounts. Additionally, the collection statement Plaintiff received from Hollins on November 28, 2023, shows interest and fees that accrued after the discharge order was entered.41Since the automatic stay terminates when the final discharge order is entered,42Hollins did not violate the automatic stay by attempting to collect these charges.
C. Neither Defendant Violated Section 524(a)(2)'s Discharge Injunction Section 524(a)(2) bars creditors from pursuing action against debtors in violation of the discharge injunction. In Plaintiff's response to the Motion, he correctly states the "discharge injunction operates as a permanent injunction against any act to collect a discharged debt."43Plaintiff continues, "[t]hat includes continuing to bill, sending collection letters, or suing on debt already subject to the plan" (emphasis added) and asserts that "interest and late fees accrued during the Court-Supervised Repayment Period" fall within the discharge.44However, the post-petition charges, including late fees, were not subject to Plaintiff's Chapter 13 plan,45and therefore not subject to the discharge injunction as Plaintiff asserts.
From the exhibits submitted by both parties, neither Auburn nor Hollins attempted to collect any of the post-petition debt until after Plaintiff's discharge was
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entered on October 11, 2023. The lawsuits were filed in 2024, past due notices from Auburn are dated August of 202446and September of 2024,47and the sewer bills from Auburn are dated 2024 and 2025, well after Plaintiff's 2023 discharge.48Likewise, Hollins did not send its first collection notice about the amount owed to Auburn until November 28, 2023, over a month after Plaintiff's final discharge order was entered.49 Because none of the debt at issue was subject to Plaintiff's Chapter 13 plan, the actions taken by Defendants to collect said debt after Plaintiff's discharge was entered did not violate the discharge injunction.
D. Creditors Were Not Required to File a Proof of Claim
Plaintiff also contends Defendants were required to file a proof of claim for these post-petition amounts.50However, as Defendants correctly note in their support brief, § 1305(a) does not require this-it merely states that a creditor may file a proof of claim.51
IV. Conclusion and Order Defendants' motion for summary judgment52is granted as to the City of Auburn and granted to Hollins & McVay with respect to its effort to collect debt on behalf of the City of Auburn.53Auburn has met its burden to show there is no genuine
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dispute of material fact the debt it attempted to collect was all post-petition debt and it did not violate § 524(a)(2), § 362(a), nor any Chapter 13 procedural requirement as a matter of law. Hollins has met its burden to show there is no genuine dispute of material fact the debt it attempted to collect on behalf of Auburn was all post-petition debt and it did not violate § 524(a)(2), § 362(a), nor any Chapter 13 procedural requirement as a matter of law.
For these reasons, the Motion is granted as it relates to Defendant City of Auburn and is granted to Defendant Hollins & McVay with respect to its conduct on behalf of the City of Auburn.
It is so ordered. ###
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