[Cite as Young v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2025-Ohio-5506.]
IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO
{¶1} Plaintiff brought this action alleging negligence on the part of Defendant, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC), related to physical injuries he incurred as a result of Defendant's failure to keep him safe from an attack by a fellow inmate.1
1 Plaintiff's Complaint ultimately presents only state law negligence claims for trial. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to directly challenge Defendant's execution of internal policy and procedure, "ODRC is generally immune from tort liability arising from decisions regarding its policies and procedures. This immunity, commonly referred to as sovereign or discretionary immunity, provides that 'the state cannot be sued for its legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.'" Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2010-Ohio-4736, ¶ 16-17 (10th Dist.), quoting Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 70 (1984); Peters v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2015-Ohio-2668, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.); see also Wolfe v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2015-Ohio-3985, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.) ("Prison inmates, therefore, have no right to recover against ODRC when it violates administrative code provisions.
. ."). Furthermore, it has been consistently held that prison regulations, including those contained in the Ohio Administrative Code (OAC), "are primarily designed to guide correctional officials in prison administration rather than to confer rights on inmates." State ex rel. Larkins v. Wilkinson, 79 Ohio St.3d 477, 479 (1997), citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-482 (1995). "A breach of internal regulations in itself does not constitute negligence." Moore v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2019-Ohio-767, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.), citing Horton v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2005-Ohio-4785, ¶ 29 (10th Dist.). "Thus, those violations will not support a cause of action by themselves, even though violations of internal rules and policies may be used to support a claim of negligence." Triplett v. Warren Corr. Inst., 2013-Ohio-2743, ¶
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{¶2} The case proceeded to trial before the undersigned Magistrate. For the following reasons, the Magistrate recommends that this case be dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2).
{¶3} Plaintiff presented testimony on his own behalf as a sworn witness under oath. Plaintiff did not present any other witness testimony and did not move during his direct testimony for the admittance of exhibits into evidence.
{¶4} On January 12, 2024, Plaintiff, an inmate then in the custody and control of Defendant at its Corrections Reception Center (CRC), was assaulted by another inmate after his cell door was opened. Defendant had unit staff present that day while Plaintiff was struggling with Defendant to get help with his mental health issues. Plaintiff testified that Defendant's policy requires that no other inmates have access to his cell door for safety reasons. However, an inmate obtained access to his cell to assault him.
{¶5} Upon the close of Plaintiff's case-in-chief, Defendant moved for dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2). Upon review of the evidence presented in Plaintiff's case-in- chief, Defendant's Motion was well-taken.
{¶6} Civ.R. 41(B)(2) states, in relevant part:
After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant, without waiving the right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
{¶7} "To establish negligence, a plaintiff must show the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and injury resulting proximately therefrom." Taylor v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2012-Ohio-4792, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). "In the context of a custodial relationship between the state and its prisoners, the state owes a common-law duty of reasonable care and protection from unreasonable risks." Jenkins v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2013-Ohio-5106, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.). "Reasonable care is that degree of caution and foresight an ordinarily prudent person would employ in similar circumstances, and includes the duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent an inmate from being injured
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by a dangerous condition about which the state knows or should know." McElfresh v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2004-Ohio-5545, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.). "However, while 'prison officials owe a duty of reasonable care and protection from unreasonable risks to inmates,
. . . they are not the insurers of inmates' safety.'" Morris v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2021-Ohio-3803 (10th Dist.), quoting Phelps v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2016-Ohio- 5155, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.).
{¶8} "When one inmate attacks another inmate, 'actionable negligence arises only where prison officials had adequate notice of an impending attack.'" Skorvanek v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2018-Ohio-3870, ¶ 29 (10th Dist.), quoting Metcalf v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2002-Ohio-5082, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). "'Whether ODRC had or did not have notice is a question that depends on all the factual circumstances involved.'"
Skorvanek at ¶ 29, quoting Frash v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2016-Ohio-3134, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.).
{¶9} "Notice may be actual or constructive, the distinction being the manner in which the notice is obtained rather than the amount of information obtained." Watson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2012-Ohio-1017, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). "Actual notice is notice obtained by actual communication to a party." Barnett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2010-Ohio-4737, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.). "Constructive notice is that notice which the law regards as sufficient to give notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice."
Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2010-Ohio-4736, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.).
{¶10} Upon review, Plaintiff's testimony, the only evidence currently before the Magistrate, does not provide any statements regarding Defendant's notice, actual or constructive, of an impending attack against Plaintiff before the attack. See Watson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2012-Ohio-1017, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.) ("The law is well-settled in Ohio that ODRC is not liable for the intentional attack of one inmate by another, unless ODRC has adequate notice of an impending assault.").
{¶11} Given the absence of any testimony regarding Defendant's notice in this action, Plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Accordingly, it is recommended that this action be dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2).
{¶12} A party may file written objections to the magistrate's decision within 14 days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision during that
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14-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). If any party timely files objections, any other party may also file objections not later than ten days after the first objections are filed. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion within 14 days of the filing of the decision, as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).
ADAM Z. MORRIS
Magistrate
Filed November 12, 2025 Sent to S.C. Reporter 12/11/25
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