Per K.S.A. 38-2364, upon finding a violation of the juvenile sentence, the court here was required to revoke that juvenile sentence, impose the adult sentence, and transfer the case to adult criminal court. At that point, D.J. stood convicted of felony murder and subject to a hard 25 sentence. K.S.A. 22-3716, which governs violations of adult nonprison sanctions, was still inapplicable to D.J.'s prison sentence. The district court made no error when it imposed the original adult sentence.
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Constitutional proportionality claims Through counsel, D.J. argues for the first time on appeal that the imposition of his adult sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. He presents a case-specific proportionality claim under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and a categorical proportionality claim under the Eighth Amendment. We begin with a discussion of relevant law. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. This includes sentences that are disproportionate to the offense or to the offender. Gulley, 315 Kan. at 99. Similarly, section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights prohibits the imposition of "cruel or unusual punishment," and "[t]his prohibition includes any punishment that 'although not cruel or unusual in its method . . . [is] so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.'" State v. Riffe, 308 Kan. 103, 108-09, 418 P.3d 1278 (2018) (quoting State v. Funk, 301 Kan. 925, 933, 349 P.3d 1230 [2015]).
In challenging a sentence as disproportionate, a litigant may advance a case- specific challenge or a categorical challenge. A case-specific challenge alleges a punishment is disproportionate to the offense or offender in that case based on the specific facts. Its resolution requires factual findings in the district court and, generally, may not be presented for the first time on appeal. State v. Dull, 302 Kan. 32, 38, 351 P.3d 641 (2015); State v. Patterson, 311 Kan. 59, 72, 455 P.3d 792 (2020) (declining to review case-specific Eighth Amendment claim for the first time on appeal when challenger failed to show why their case was an exception to general rule that such challenges may not be raised for first time on appeal); State v. Cervantes-Puentes, 297 Kan. 560, 565, 303 P.3d
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258 (2013) (declining to review case-specific section 9 challenge when party did not ensure adequate factual findings in the district court).
A categorical challenge alleges that a punishment is always disproportionate to a broad category of offenses or offenders, regardless of particular facts. This kind of challenge is not case specific but a question of law and, therefore, an appellate court may consider the claim for the first time on appeal under some circumstances. See Dull, 302 Kan. at 39; Patterson, 311 Kan. at 72 (reviewing unpreserved categorical challenge that is only a question of law).
Case-specific challenge
D.J. argues that the mandatory imposition of his hard 25 sentence was unconstitutional under both the Eighth Amendment and section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights because such a harsh sentence was disproportionate to the facts of this case. He points out he was only 15 at the time of the original crime and asserts that he was not the shooter and has largely complied with the conditions of his juvenile sentence. He argues that other jurisdictions give courts more discretion before imposing a lengthy adult sentence upon revoking a juvenile sentence in an EJJP-style proceeding.
We need not venture any further into D.J.'s claim. We have repeatedly explained that case-specific challenges are inherently factual and, consequently, have held they generally may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Patterson, 311 Kan. at 72; State
v. Cervantes-Puentes, 297 Kan. 560, 565, 303 P.3d 258 (2013) (citing cases).
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D.J. insists his case is different because the facts relevant to his challenge are established by the record, so this court should apply a preservation exception and consider his claim.
We disagree. The State contests many of the factual allegations upon which D.J. relies, like whether D.J. was the shooter in the original crime. We cannot settle these disputes on appeal, especially in light of D.J.'s no contest plea. Even if we could resolve D.J.'s factual assertions in his favor, we would not entertain this case-specific challenge because the State had no opportunity to develop a factual record supporting its opposing position. See Patterson, 311 Kan. at 72 ("addressing [a case-specific proportionality] issue for the first time on appeal deprives the State of the opportunity to develop a record").
Because D.J. fails to show that "his case is an exception to the general rule that case-specific challenges may not be raised for the first time on appeal," his claim fails. See Patterson, 311 Kan. at 72.
Categorical proportionality claim
D.J. also presents a categorical argument, claiming that the mandatory imposition of a lengthy sentence is always disproportionate to the broad category of offenders to which he belongs. The "broad" category he describes includes juvenile offenders prosecuted under EJJP-style proceedings who were very young when they committed the original offense, had a low level of culpability, and were largely compliant with their juvenile sentences. Notably, he does not litigate the proportionality of the sentence he received but instead attacks the sentencing process dictated in K.S.A. 38-2364(b). According to D.J., requiring the district court to revoke a juvenile sentence and impose
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the original adult sentence without leaving room for discretion is "disproportionate" to the category of offenders he names.
We question whether D.J. has asserted a true categorical proportionality analysis in attacking a sentencing process rather than the sentence itself and in defining an exceptionally narrow class of offenders. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) (casting doubt on traditional categorical proportionality analysis when litigant challenged mandatory sentencing process rather than actual sentence); Patterson, 311 Kan. at 73 (litigant fails to frame valid categorical challenge when named class of offenders is too narrow). But we need not answer these questions today, because D.J. has failed to preserve his challenge for our review. While we can consider categorical claims for the first time on appeal in some circumstances, we do not do so here because D.J. did not comply with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36). When D.J. presented his categorical claim in his appellate brief, he failed to explain where the issue was preserved below or why we should apply a preservation exception, as required by Rule 6.02(a)(5). See Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (appellate brief must contain record cite to where issue was raised and ruled on below or, if it was not, explanation why the issue is properly before the court).
The State pointed out this omission in its brief, arguing that D.J.'s omission was fatal to his claim.
D.J. responded in a reply brief, asserting for the first time that this court should review his unpreserved claim because it is a question of law that is finally determinative of the case.
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Ww reject D.J.'s attempt to cure the deficiency in a reply brief. When a lawyer fails to discuss preservation in their opening brief, they fail to comply with Rule 6.02(a). Schutt v. Foster, 321 Kan.__, Syl. ¶ 2, __P.3d__ (No. 126,555 filed July 25, 2025). Due to this preservation error, we do not review D.J.'s categorical proportionality argument. D.J.'s constitutional proportionality claims fail.
Ineffective assistance of counsel
In his final argument, D.J. claims that his counsel at the revocation hearing was ineffective because he failed to present a case-specific proportionality challenge to his sentence. D.J. urges us to therefore reverse the district court order revoking his juvenile sentence and imposing the adult sentence.
Generally, we do not review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the district court has held a hearing and ruled on the claim. State v. Zongker, 319 Kan. 411, 431, 555 P.3d 698 (2024). Instead, when a party argues for the first time on appeal that counsel in the lower court was ineffective, "'[t]he usual course is a request by appellate counsel for remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance claim, commonly called a "Van Cleave hearing."'" Zongker, 319 Kan. at 431 (quoting State v. Hilyard, 316 Kan. 326, 338, 515 P.3d 267 [2022]). D.J. has not requested remand for a Van Cleave hearing, either in his briefing or at oral argument. We have ruled that, "[w]hen no Van Cleave hearing is requested, we need not order one sua sponte." Zongker, 319 Kan. at 431.
It is sometimes possible for an appellate court to review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim without a Van Cleave hearing "'when the merit or lack of merit of an
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ineffectiveness claim about trial counsel is obvious.'" Zongker, 319 Kan. at 431 (quoting Dull, 298 Kan. at 839). But "these circumstances are 'extremely rare.'" Zongker, 319 Kan. at 431 (quoting Dull, 298 Kan. at 839).
D.J. insists we can review his ineffective assistance of counsel claim without remanding for a hearing. He argues his trial counsel was deficient as a matter of law when they did not assert a case-specific proportionality challenge because this prevented him from raising it on appeal. He claims the record shows the failure was prejudicial because the district judge described the mandatory hard 25 as "harsh," and "unforgiving,"
indicating they would have ruled in D.J.'s favor had the claim been presented. D.J.'s arguments miss the mark. To show counsel was ineffective, D.J. must show
(1) counsel's performance was deficient, i.e. it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the result below, i.e. there is a "'reasonable probability that the deficient performance affected the outcome of the proceedings, based on the totality of the evidence.'" State v. Guebara, 318 Kan. 458, 476,
544 P.3d 794 (2024) (quoting Khalil-Alsalaami v. State, 313 Kan. 472, 485-86, 486 P.3d
1216 [2021]).
We explained in Khalil-Alsalaami that a litigant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on a lawyer's omission faces a unique hurdle in establishing these two prongs. 313 Kan. at 472-73. In such a case, the litigant must prove that the issue the lawyer failed to pursue would have been meritorious. This is because, if the omitted issue
"is not meritorious, then trial counsel's failure to litigate [it] cannot be characterized as objectively unreasonable" and its "omission cannot be prejudicial." 313 Kan. at 499-500. The same principle applies here. We have explained that we cannot evaluate D.J.'s case-specific proportionality claim in the absence of factual development in the district
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court. And if we cannot assess the merits of the claim, we cannot begin to discern whether its absence was unreasonable or prejudicial.
Because D.J. fails to show that his case is one of those rare instances when we can evaluate whether counsel was ineffective based on the record alone, we decline review of his claim. See Zongker, 319 Kan. at 432 (declining review of unpreserved ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
We affirm the district court.
WILSON, J., not participating.
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