WOODS, Acting P. J.
SUMMARY
After a jury trial, Jose Garcia was found guilty of second degree murder with gang and firearm allegations also found true. The trial court sentenced him to a term of 40 years to life in state prison. Garcia appeals, claiming the trial court erred in admitting his statement to police and instructing the jury under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SYNOPSIS
On June 9, 2006, around 11:00 p.m., Francisco Ruiz, his nephew Antonio Castaneda and Castaneda’s friend Fernando Cornelio were leaving a party in Wilmington. Before they could cross the street to where Ruiz had parked, another car pulled up in front of them. Castaneda saw two men get out of the front and back seats on the driver’s side. The man who got out of the back seat wearing a black hooded sweatshirt approached Ruiz and asked, “Where are you from?” Ruiz said he was going home. The man in the sweatshirt raised his arm and pointed a gun at Ruiz, shooting five or six times. Ruiz fell to the ground.
The shooter then dropped his knee onto Ruiz’s head. The two men wrestled for the gun. Castaneda heard his friend (Cornelio) say something like, “He’s the older homie from the Westside.” After that statement, the shooter had an expression like “Oh, shit,” and the driver said, “Hey, Cisco, let’s go.” The shooter pulled up his hood, and he and the driver ran back to the car and drove off.
Castaneda (then 14) and Cornelio helped Ruiz to the car. Ruiz was bleeding from his jaw and back but was able to drive to a relative’s house. Someone called for an ambulance, and Ruiz was admitted to the hospital with a gunshot wounds to his jaw and abdomen.
After receiving a call to investigate the shooting, police officers spoke with Cornelio and recovered four shell casings from the same.22 caliber semiautomatic handgun.
One of the bullets had torn through Ruiz’s intestine, and he died ten days later because of complications (peritonitis and sepsis) from the gunshot wound to his abdomen.
Los Angeles Police Detective Michael Falvo was assigned to investigate Ruiz’s death. Based on Castaneda’s statement that during the shooting someone had said, “Hey, Cisco, let’s go,” Falvo checked the Cal Gangs computer system in which gang members are documented and found that, in that area, Franscisco Espinoza was linked to the moniker “Cisco.” As a result of speaking with Espinoza, Falvo contacted Garcia at his house. Garcia was then interviewed at the police station.
Initially, Garcia told Falvo and his partner (David Cortez) he had heard about the shooting but didn’t know anything because he wasn’t there. As the interview progressed, however, Garcia told the detectives he had been a member of the Westside Wilmas gang since the age of 12 and identified gang tattoos on his stomach and the back of his neck. Garcia said he “was just looking out for my homies, you know.” On the night of the shooting, Garcia said, he, Cisco (Espinoza) and “Gauge” were “kicking it.” They heard about a party and decided to drive by. Garcia had let Cisco borrow his Wilmington sweatshirt before going out because “[s]omething was going to come up.”
Gauge was driving, and Garcia and Cisco (with a girl) were in the backseat. When they got to the party, they saw some guys coming out and thought they were Eastsiders so “we hit them up.” Eastsiders had been going to their parties so they were going to “[b]eat them up real quick, you know, kick them out of the hood. Something, you know.” Cisco had a “strap,” too.
Gauge got out of the car, followed by Cisco (with the hood of the sweatshirt pulled up meaning he was going to shoot) and Garcia, and asked where they were from. The one Gauge asked said he was from Westside Wilmas, but Cisco was in the other one’s face. That “other guy” “didn’t want no trouble” and said he was from “nowhere,” but Cisco started shooting. Garcia was “right there” with Cisco, he said, but behind both Cisco and Gauge; he hadn’t seen the gun. After the man got shot, Cisco and the man were fighting on the ground, but then Cisco got up, and they ran back to the car and drove off. They realized the man Cisco had shot was a Westsider and “got paranoid.”
The week after the shooting, Garcia said, he got rid of the gun. First, he said he threw it into the water in Palos Verdes. Then he said he had put it in a trash can on the street near Avalon and Carson. Also, after going through and repeating his detailed account of events without mentioning a knife, Garcia said the man Cisco shot had pulled a knife, and he (Garcia) picked it up at the scene but did not know what had happened to it; Garcia also said he first heard about the knife the day after the shooting. He hadn’t mentioned the knife before, he said, because he never thought the police would ask about it; he never thought Cisco was going to talk about it.
Garcia and Espinoza were charged jointly with murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) [all further statutory references are to the Penal Code].) It was further alleged the murder was carried out to further the activities of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and Espinoza personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) and (e)(1)). The trial court granted Garcia’s motion to sever his case from Espinoza’s. His pretrial motion to exclude his post-arrest statement to police was denied.
At trial, the People presented evidence of the facts summarized above, including Garcia’s one-hour tape recorded statement to police. (Jurors also received copies of the transcript of Garcia’s police interview to review as the tape played.) A gang expert (Los Angeles Police Department Officer Mark Maldonado) testified there were three major gangs in Wilmington: Westside Wilmas, Eastside Wilmas and Eastside Pain Bloods. The two Wilmas gangs were rivals. He testified regarding the various crimes comprising the Westside Wilmas’ primary activities and testified to convictions for attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon committed by Westside Wilmas gang members. He identified Espinoza (whose moniker is Cisco), Jerome Moreno (known as Gauge) and Garcia (based on his tattoos and clothing) as Westside Wilmas gang members and opined that Ruiz’s shooting was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of and in association with the Westside Wilmas gang.
The jury found Garcia guilty of second degree murder and also found true the gang and firearm allegations. The trial court sentenced Garcia to a state prison term of 40 years to life (15 years to life for murder plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the gun allegation). He appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Admitting Garcia’s Statement to Police.
According to Garcia, the trial court erred in allowing the admission of his police interview because he never waived his right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, there was no implied waiver, and he later invoked his right to remain silent. More particularly, according to Garcia, two separate statements he made required suppression of his police interview. First, he notes, when asked if he wanted to speak to the detectives after receiving his Miranda warnings, he said, “I don’t know.” Not long thereafter, he stated, “[T]hat’s the only thing I have to say.” Without seeking clarification or further explaining his rights at either time, he argues, the detectives improperly continued their interrogation when questioning should have ceased, and his statement was inadmissible as a result. We disagree.
Under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pages 473-474, “If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” “[W]here a defendant expresses ambiguous remarks falling short of an invocation of his Miranda rights, the officers may continue talking for the purpose of obtaining clarification of his intentions.” (People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 239, citation omitted [no Miranda violation where defendant stated “I don’t know if I wanna talk anymore” and officers continued talking to clarify the defendant’s intentions]; see also People v. Turnage (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 201, 211, initial italics in original, further italics added [Case law “permits clarifying questions with regard to the individual’s comprehension of his constitutional rights or the waiver of them”].) “‘Whether the suspect has indeed invoked that right [to remain silent], however, is a question of fact to be decided in the light of all the circumstances....’” (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1238, citation omitted.)
At the hearing regarding the admissibility of Garcia’s statement, Detective Falvo testified he wanted to speak with Garcia and contacted him at his house because Espinoza “ha[d] given up [Garcia] as somebody who was there.” Detective Falvo and his partner asked Garcia to come to the police station, and he “came along voluntarily.” He was not handcuffed or restrained in any way and was transported in an unmarked detective vehicle with no barrier between the detectives and passengers. When they arrived at the police station, Detectives Falvo and Cortez and Garcia went into the interview room. Detective Falvo testified he asked Garcia if he was nervous being at the police station. “[Garcia] said he had been there before and he wasn’t nervous.”
According to the record, the detectives were accompanied by a Spanish-speaking officer. It appears Garcia (who was 23 at the time) did not require an interpreter, but his mother (who was also at the house when police contacted Garcia there) did.
As reflected in the transcript of the recorded interview, one of the detectives got Garcia a drink and he thanked the detective for it. Detective Falvo said, “[A]ll right. So you know you’re not under arrest, right? Garcia said, “Uh huh.... Yeah, I know that.” He acknowledged on tape he had come in voluntarily and “fe[lt] okay about talking with [the detectives].” Detective Falvo confirmed that the door was unlocked, saying he just wanted to make sure there was no confusion, and Garcia said, “No, I’m not confused. I know—I know what’s going on. I know—.” Detective Falvo said, “Just relax[. T]ake it easy.” Although he was not under arrest, Garcia was told, the detectives would read him his rights.
“Detective Falvo: Okay. You have the right to remain silent. Do you understand?
“[Garcia]: Yeah.
“Detective Falvo: Anything you say may be used against you in a court of law. Do you understand?
“[Garcia]: Yes.
“Detective Falvo: You have the right to the presence of an attorney before and during questioning.
“[Garcia]: Yes.
“Detective Falvo: Do you understand?
“[Garcia]: Yes.
“Detective Falvo: If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you free of charge before any questioning if you want. Do you understand?
“[Garcia]: Yes.
“Detective Falvo: Okay. Do you want to talk about—we’re going to ask you some questions. Do you want to talk to us?
“[Garcia]: Well, I don’t know. (Italics added.)
“Detective Cortez: This is about what we were saying out there on the—when we talked to you at the house. Basically about Francisco’s [Cisco’s] thing.
“[Garcia]: Uh-huh.
“Detective Cortez: The shooting at Sandison and Gulf.
“[Garcia]: Uh-huh.
“Detective Falvo: That’s all.
“Detective Cortez: So do you want tell [sic] us about that—talk to us about that?
“[Garcia]: I don’t really know anything about it because I was not with them, you know. I was—I think I was in somewhere else in the party, I think. And then—and we’re—I heard about it.”
Detective Cortez said, “Okay Luis, before you get going to[o] much... I want you to be honest, okay.... You came here of your own free will.” Garcia agreed. Cortez continued, “[W]e’re just after the truth.” He said they had spoken with Espinoza already; he was “completely honest,” and “we were... able to check [his statement] out against what other people told us.” “I want you to be honest with us [b]ecause... we’ll be over and done.... We won’t have to sit here and talk for, you know, a couple of hours. Just tell us the truth and we’ll be on our way.”
“[Garcia]: Yeah. That’s what I’m telling you, I mean, I just heard about it. I mean, we—I just heard that, you know, there was a shooting and then that’s it.
“Detective Cortez: Uh-huh.
“[Garcia]: I mean, I was not involved in it, you know, I don’t know who was involved in it, you know, I don’t know nothing, you know, I guess that’s—that’s about it. I mean, I just heard it was a shooting on Gulf, and I read it from the newspaper too. And I didn’t know who was the one that got shot. I don’t know the person, you know, and I was not right there.
“Detective Cortez: Uh-huh.
“[Garcia]: So you know. I know my brother was not right there either. He was not there.
“Detective Cortez: We’re not concerned about your brother.
“[Garcia]: Oh, all right. You know, that’s the only thing I have to say.” (Italics added.)
“Detective Cortez: Well, we talked to Francisco already.
“[Garcia]: Uh-huh.
“Detective Cortez: And, you know, to be honest with you, he told us something altogether different than what you’re telling us.
“[Garcia]: Well, I don’t know what Francisco told you guys.
“Detective Cortez: He told us the truth really.
“[Garcia]: He told you guys the truth, but I mean, but I’m telling you guys, you know, I just heard—I read it from the newspaper, you know.
“Detective Cortez: Well Luis, here’s... the deal so you know.”
Detective Cortez went on to tell Garcia he wanted him to listen because it was important that he understood. When he suggested Garcia was “probably” a little nervous being in a police station, Garcia said he had been in a police station “a couple of times.” The detective asked how long Garcia had been a part of Westside, and Garcia said, “[S]ince I was little[,] since I was 12,” pointing out his gang tattoos on the back of his neck and stomach. Detective Cortez commented, “[S]ometimes you—you get caught up in things that maybe you had no idea was going to happen.... Or you just happened to be there when it happened....”
He told Garcia, “We’ve talked to a lot of people about what happened... including Cis[c]o” and have “already done our full work on this case.” He told Garcia Cisco had told them about borrowing Garcia’s sweatshirt, that Jerome (“Gauge”) was driving, that Cisco had a girl on his lap—“he went over everything that happened. Otherwise, I won’t know that.” He told Garcia he “need[ed] to be honest.” Garcia said, “Yeah, I know what you’re saying. I know where you’re going through [sic] too.”
“Detective Cortez: All right. So go ahead. Just tell us from the get go, what happened that day.”
“[Garcia]: All right then. Yeah. We were kicking it. We were—the homie was driving,” his name was “Gauge,” and Garcia and Cisco (with the girl on his lap) were in the back. He went on to recount the shooting, as described in the foregoing factual summary, at length for about an hour.
After reviewing the entirety of Garcia’s police interview (which comprised 85 pages of clerk’s transcript), discussing applicable case law, including People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, among other cases, and hearing oral argument, the trial court determined, “based on the totality of the circumstances test,” the record established an implied waiver of Garcia’s right to remain silent, and, in context, Garcia’s further comment “that’s the only thing I have to say” was not an invocation of his right to remain silent.
“‘Once it is determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.’” (People v. Whitson, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 247, citing Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 422-423, fn. omitted.) “California law involving the implied waiver of a defendant’s Miranda rights is in accord with [this and other] federal authorities....” (People v. Whitson, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 247, citations omitted.)
“‘Once the defendant has been informed of his [Miranda] rights, and indicates that he understands those rights, it would seem that his choosing to speak and not requesting a lawyer is sufficient evidence that he knows of his rights and chooses not to exercise them.’” (People v. Whitson, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 248, quoting People v. Johnson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 541, 558, disapproved on another point in People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 899, fn. 8; see also People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1233 [the defendant impliedly waived his Miranda rights when, after being admonished of these rights, responded that he understood them and gave a tape-recorded statement to police]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 823-826 [16-year-old defendant impliedly waived his Miranda rights when, after being advised of these rights, and responding that he understood them, he made statements to investigating officers leading to his arrest].)
“In reviewing defendant’s claim that his Miranda rights were violated, we must accept the trial court’s resolution of the disputed facts and inferences, as well as its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses where supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 667.) “Although we independently determine whether, from the undisputed facts and those properly found by the trial court, the challenged statements were illegally obtained [citation], we “‘give great weight to the considered conclusions’ of a lower court that has previously reviewed the same evidence.”’” (People v. Whitson, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 248, citations omitted.)].)
“[T]he State need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Whitson, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 248, citation omitted.)
Here, after being advised of each of his Miranda rights, and specifically confirming his understanding of each one, the detectives asked Garcia, “Do you want to talk to us?” Garcia responded, “Well, I don’t know.” The detective then clarified as follows: “This is about what we were saying... when we talked to you at the house. Basically about Francisco’s thing.... The shooting at Sandison and Gulf.... That’s all.” Then, the detective again specifically asked Garcia, “So do you want [to] talk to us about that?” Garcia responded substantively, saying he didn’t really know anything because he “was not with them” but was somewhere else at the party and then he heard about the shooting. “[A]n express waiver is not required where a defendant’s actions make clear that a waiver is intended.” (People v. Whitson, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 25, also citing Terrovona v. Kincheloe (9th Cir.1990) 912 F.2d 1176, 1180 [where the defendant gave detectives no indication that he wished to remain silent, instead offering an alibi, an implied waiver of his Miranda rights was valid]; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1194, citations omitted [“If a suspect’s... invocation of the right to remain silent is ambiguous, the police may ‘continue talking with him for the limited purpose of clarifying whether he is waiving or invoking those rights’”].)
In response to the detective’s further questioning, Garcia elaborated that he did not really know anything because he had not been with the others, he was not involved, he did not know who was involved, he did not know the person who got shot; he just heard there was a shooting and read about it in the newspaper. He added, “So you know. I know my brother was not right there either....” After the detective said he was not concerned about his brother, he said, “Oh all right. You know, that’s the only thing I have to say.” Under the case law, a desire to halt an interrogation may be indicated in a variety of ways, but “the words here must be construed in context.” (In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, 515.) The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that, rather than seeking to halt the conversation, in the context of his repeated claims that he had not been there and did not know anything, Garcia’s words (“[T]hat’s the only thing I have to say”) essentially indicated, “‘That’s all I have to say as far as my story. That’s all I know.’” (In re Joe R., supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 516 [“That’s all I have to say” did not amount to invocation of Miranda right to remain silent, but rather indicated, “That’s my story. I’m going to stick with it.”].)
As our Supreme Court stated in People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1216, “There are a number of cases in which this court and the Court of Appeal have reviewed the findings of the trial court that what is claimed, post hoc, to be a suspect’s attempt to invoke his Miranda right to remain silent and cut off further questioning is something less or other than that.” (Id. at pp. 1239-1240, citing People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 977-978 [defendant’s statement insisting, “‘I’m not going to talk’.... ‘That’s it. I shut up’” reflected “only momentary frustration and animosity” toward one of the officers and was not an invocation of the right to remain silent]; In re Joe R., supra, 27 Cal.3d 604, 629 [in context, defendant’s statement, “‘That’s all I got to say’” or “‘That’s all I want to tell you,’” did not amount to assertion of Miranda right to remain silent]; People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 629 [defendant’s statement, “‘I really don’t want to talk about that,’” did not amount to invocation of right to remain silent].)
“‘“[T]he trial court’s ruling on a Miranda issue may not be set aside by us unless it is ‘palpably erroneous.’ A ruling palpably erroneous is one lacking support of substantial evidence. [Citation.]”’” (People v. Nitschmann (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 677, 683, citing In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 527.) Evaluating the circumstances of Garcia’s police interview in its totality, we find no error in the trial court’s admission of Garcia’s statement to police. (See People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1239-1240.)
The cases on which Garcia relies are distinguishable. For example, in People v. Carey (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 99, 103-104, after a detective advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and asked the defendant whether he wanted to talk, the defendant unequivocally asserted from the outset, “I ain’t got nothin’ to say.” The detective continued to ask the defendant three more times if he would answer some questions, and the defendant responded three more times, “I ain’t got nothing to say....” Ultimately, however, the defendant essentially confessed to all crimes with which he was charged. Rejecting the contention that the detective was merely attempting to clarify the defendant’s intentions, the Carey court found it “difficult, if not impossible, to square appellant’s emphatic unwillingness to say anything with anything other than an invocation of the right to remain silent,” noting “were we to sanction the police procedures here challenged, the ‘clarification’ exception would swallow the Miranda rule.” (People v. Carey, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at pp. 104-105 [“[H]ow many times must a defendant exclaim, ‘I ain’t got nothin’ to say’ to invoke his privilege to remain silent?”].)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Prejudicial Error in Instructing the Jury with CALJIC No. 3.02.
According to Garcia, the trial court violated his constitutional rights by instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 3.02 based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Because of this erroneous instruction, he says, the jury was told he could be found guilty of murder “absent the element of malice on his part, by simply aiding and abetting an assault or disturbance of the peace.” He notes he raises this argument to preserve it for further review. As Garcia acknowledges, our Supreme Court rejected this argument in People v. Coffman (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 107-108, and we are bound by this decision. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
The jury was instructed as follows:
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: ZELON, J., JACKSON, J.
“One who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime or crimes is not only guilty of that crime, but is also guilty of any other crime committed by a principal which is a natural and probable consequence of the crime originally aided and abetted. “In order to find the defendant guilty of the crime of murder, as charged in Count 1, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that: “1. The crime of murder was committed; “2. That the defendant aided and abetted that crime; “3. That a co-principal in that crime committed the crime of murder; and “4. The crime of murder was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the crimes of assault and disturbing the peace. “In determining whether a consequence is ‘natural and probable,’ you must apply an objective test, based not on what the defendant actually intended, but on what a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence would have expected likely to occur. The issue is to be decided in light of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. A ‘natural’ consequence is one which is within the normal range of outcomes that may be reasonably expected to occur if nothing unusual has intervened. ‘Probable’ means likely to happen. “You are not required to unanimously agree as to which originally contemplated crime the defendant aided and abetted, so long as you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agree that the defendant aided and abetted the commission of an identified and defined target crime and that the crime of murder was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of that target crime.” (CALJIC No. 3.02.)