JAMES D. CAIN, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY
MEMORANDUM RULING
JAMES D. CAIN, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the court are Motions to Dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by, respectively, defendants Cameron LNG LLC [doc. 110] and McDermott International, Ltd.; CB&I, LLC; and Chiyoda International Corporation [doc 111]. The motions relate to the second amended complaint filed by plaintiffs Kendrick Bennett and Courtlande Collins, and are both opposed. Docs. 119, 120.
I.
Background
This suit arises from plaintiffs' employment at the Cameron LNG Liquefaction Project (“LNG Project”) in Hackberry, Louisiana. Doc. 15. Bennett and Collins brought suit against the defendants as their employers, alleging that they were required to ride on employer-provided buses between designated parking lots and the job sites and that they were owed compensation for the time spent on this commute under the Louisiana Wage Payment Act (“LWPA”), Louisiana Revised Statute § 23:631 et seq., and the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Doc. 15. They also sought certification as a collective action under the FLSA and enrolled hundreds of opt-in plaintiffs who had been employed at the LNG Project. In their first amended complaint, Bennett and Collins alleged “upon information and belief” that other, unidentified “employees are, at times, required to accept work calls and/or discuss job duties for the particular day while on the buses.” Doc. 15, ¶ 73. They admitted that they themselves performed no work until they arrived at the job sites. Id. at ¶ 9.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the court granted in part and denied as moot in part. The court held that the LWPA claims failed because there was no agreement or legal duty to pay plaintiffs for their commute time. It also held that the FLSA claims were barred under the general exclusion for commute time applied by the Portal to Portal Act, despite plaintiffs' arguments that the mandatory nature of the system made the activity “integral and indispensable” to the plaintiffs' work. Doc. 97. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed same but found that the court ought to have granted plaintiffs' open-ended request to amend in order to give them “another bite at the FLSA apple.” Doc. 102, pp. 16-17. Accordingly, the panel remanded the matter to this court.
The judgment of dismissal was then amended to reflect that plaintiffs' claims were dismissed without prejudice and plaintiffs were granted leave to file their second amended complaint. Doc. 107. Here plaintiffs claim entitlement to overtime wages based on “[t]ime spent working during use of the Defendants' mandatory transportation system” and “[t]ime spent participating in . . . required prestart safety meetings.” Id. at ¶¶ 109-20, 180-81. They also allege that defendants failed to pay them a minimum wage based on these additional hours, despite their respective hourly compensation rates of $41.50 and $30.00. Id. at ¶¶ 157-72, 91 & 93.
Under the section “Work Performed on the Buses, ” plaintiffs describe the following allegedly compensable activities: (1) placing and accepting work calls, (2) meeting and discussing the upcoming day's job duties and schedule, (3) transporting personal tools and other work-related belongings, (4) transporting personal protective equipment, and (5) completing “various work-related documents, including, but not limited to, Job Safety and Environmental Analyses (JSEAs).” Id. at ¶¶ 120-25. Under the section “Prestart Safety Meetings, ” plaintiffs also allege that they often arrived at the Cameron LNG site before the start of their scheduled shifts and that defendants required them to participate in prestart meetings lasting on average between 15 and 45 minutes before they could approach their designated work areas, with some to all of the meeting taking place before the scheduled start time. Id. at ¶¶ 146-48. Because defendants' computerized time recording system automatically records employees' start time as the scheduled start time, they further allege, they were not compensated for any portion of the safety meeting that took place before their shifts began. Id. at ¶¶ 150-51.
Plaintiffs then continue on with several paragraphs about the alleged necessity and burdens of the transportation system. Doc. 107, ¶¶ 126-45.
Defendants have now filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants CB&I LLC, Chiyoda International Corporation, and McDermott International, Ltd. assert that (1) any claims for overtime pay based on time spent on the mandatory busing system must be dismissed based on prior rulings of this court and the Fifth Circuit, (2) Fifth Circuit precedent precludes plaintiffs' inadequately pled minimum wage claims, (3) plaintiffs do not plead plausible ‘off-the-clock' FLSA claims, (4) plaintiffs fail to plausibly plead that defendant Chiyoda is a joint employer, (5) plaintiffs' collective action allegations are overbroad and implausible, and (6) under the Mandate Rule, plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed with prejudice. Doc. 111, att. 1. Defendant Cameron LNG, LLC has filed a separate motion, raising the same general concerns on the merits of plaintiffs' claims and asserting that plaintiffs have not shown that they are a joint employer. Doc. 110, att. 1.
II.
Law & Application
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standards
Rule 12(b)(6) allows for dismissal of a claim when a plaintiff “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When reviewing such a motion, the court should focus on the complaint and its attachments. Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 2012). The court can also consider documents referenced in and central to a party's claims, as well as matters of which it may take jud 5 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2021). Doc. 107, p. 8 n. 4. The Fifth Circuit has affirmed a denial of joinder when plaintiffs in a de-certified collective action attempt to join the prospective class members as plaintiffs. Acevedo, 600 F.3d at 522. Here the defendants have not had the opportunity to test plaintiffs' collective allegations through the certification process. But the court finds it highly improbable that the 1305 plaintiffs who opted into this suit based on entitlement to compensation for their entire commute are likewise so similarly situated with regard to work performed on the bus and shift briefing requirements that the court should forego Swales and FLSA's procedures and instead allow all plaintiffs to join their claims individually in what amounts to a de facto collective action. Accordingly, the opt-in plaintiffs' claims will be dismissed without prejudice. Named plaintiffs Bennett and Collins may instead proceed with a collective action for their FLSA overtime claims, and seek certification of any collective action subject to the procedures laid out in Swales.
For many years, courts in the Fifth Circuit used a two-step process of conditional certification, discovery, and then a final determination as to whether the opt-in plaintiffs in a FLSA collective action were similarly situated and could proceed to trial as a collective. See Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987). In Swales, the Fifth Circuit rejected this approach and instead adopted a framework through which “a district court must rigorously scrutinize the realm of ‘similarly situated' workers, and must do so from the outset of the case, not after a lenient, step-one ‘conditional certification.' Only then can the district court determine whether the requested opt-in notice will go to those who are actually similar to the named plaintiffs.” 985 F.3d at 434. Accordingly, under Swales plaintiffs face a steeper burden to proceeding with a collective action under the FLSA.
5. Dismissal with prejudice
Plaintiffs request that the court provide them with an opportunity to amend or provide a more definite statement in lieu of dismissing any claims in this matter. Defendants urge that no such leave be given, in light of the prior attempts at amendment.
The court notes that only the named plaintiffs' minimum wage claims are being dismissed with prejudice, and that there is no way for plaintiffs to cure the defects in those claims. The court's ruling as to the opt-in plaintiffs allows them to return as such if this action is certified as a collective action under the FLSA. Accordingly, there is no basis for granting plaintiffs an open-ended leave to amend at this point.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Motions to Dismiss [docs. 110, 111] will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The claims of all opt-in plaintiffs are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and the minimum wage claims of plaintiffs Bennett and Collins will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Otherwise, plaintiffs Bennett and Collins' FLSA overtime claims and collective action allegations survive to the extent they claim they are due compensation for pre-start safety briefings and mandatory work performed during their commutes.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED.