GARRY, J.
James E. Long, Public Defender, Albany (Christopher J. Ritchey of counsel), for appellant.
P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Michael C. Wetmore of counsel), for respondent.
Before: LAHTINEN, J.P., McCARTHY, GARRY, ROSE and AARONS, JJ.
GARRY, J. Appeal from an order of the County Court of Albany County (Lynch, J.), entered March 4, 2014, which classified defendant as a risk level III sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.
In 2010, defendant pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of receipt of child pornography (see 18 U.S.C. § 2252A [a] as well as the extent and duration of defendant's habit, the People recommended an upward departure to risk level III. Following a hearing, County Court agreed with the RAI submitted by the People as to all but one factor, presumptively assessed defendant as a risk level II sex offender, granted the People's request for an upward departure and classified defendant as a risk level III sex offender. Defendant now appeals, arguing that an upward departure was not warranted.
As an initial matter, County Court's order fails to satisfy the requirement that County Court issue a written order setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law (see Correction Law § 168–n [3 ] ). “The court's single-page form order merely concluded that defendant be assigned a final risk level of three and alludes to the findings of fact and conclusions of law made on the record in open court” (People v. Zayas, 57 A.D.3d 1179, 1179–1180, 870 N.Y.S.2d 495 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Hemmes, 110 A.D.3d 1387, 1388, 973 N.Y.S.2d 875 [2013] ). Despite this error, remittal is unnecessary where the court makes “oral findings and conclusions that are clear, supported by the record and sufficiently detailed to permit intelligent review” (People v. Labrake, 121 A.D.3d 1134, 1135, 993 N.Y.S.2d 193 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ), “or the record is sufficient for this Court to make its own factual findings and conclusions” (People v. Hemmes, 110 A.D.3d at 1388, 973 N.Y.S.2d 875 ; see People v. Young, 108 A.D.3d 1232, 1233, 969 N.Y.S.2d 372 [2013], lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 853, 2013 WL 5658386 [2013] ; People v. Urbanski, 74 A.D.3d 1882, 1883, 903 N.Y.S.2d 648 [2010], lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 707, 2010 WL 3583295 [2010] ). Here, the record is sufficient to permit us to review the grounds upon which that upward departure was based.
Turning to the merits, an “upward departure from the presumptive risk level is justified when an aggravating factor, high-risk sex offender and that an upward departure was therefore warranted (see People v. Adam, 126 A.D.3d at 1170–1171, 5 N.Y.S.3d 592 ; People v. Labrake, 121 A.D.3d at 1135–1136, 993 N.Y.S.2d 193 ).
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.
LAHTINEN, J.P., McCARTHY, ROSE and AARONS, JJ., concur.