Woodward v. Lahm

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Docket Number

No. S-15-928.

Attorney(S)

David W. Jorgensen, of Nye, Hervert, Jorgensen & Watson, P.C., Kearney, for appellant. Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Milissa D. Johnson-Wiles, Lincoln, for appellee.

Judges

Stacy, J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Joel D. Woodward was convicted twice of driving under the influence (DUI), in 2010 and 2013, and sentenced to probation each time. Following his second DUI conviction, the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) issued an order revoking his commercial driver's license (CDL) for life pursuant to Nebraska statutes requiring lifetime disqualification for a second DUI offense. Woodward did not appeal the lifetime revocation at that time.

After completing probation, Woodward obtained court orders setting aside both DUI convictions, which, under state law, removed all civil disabilities and disqualifications resulting from those convictions. Subsequently, Woodward requested the DMV director to reinstate his CDL or allow him to reapply, arguing that the set-aside convictions should not count towards the lifetime disqualification.

The DMV director denied the request in a letter, stating that the lifetime disqualification was based on valid convictions and that applicable laws did not permit lifting the disqualification even if the convictions had been set aside. Woodward then filed a "Petition on Appeal" in the district court, seeking review of the director's denial under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-4,105.

The district court dismissed the appeal, holding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the director's letter was not a "final decision or order" under § 60-4,105. The court also found the appeal barred by sovereign immunity and substantively correct. Woodward appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear Woodward's appeal from the DMV director's April 10, 2015 letter under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-4,105.
Whether the director's letter constituted a "final decision or order" authorizing appeal under § 60-4,105.
Whether the appeal was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Whether the district court erred in dismissing the appeal on the merits.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Woodward argued that because his DUI convictions were set aside and all resulting civil disabilities removed, those convictions should not be counted for purposes of the lifetime CDL disqualification under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-4,168.
He contended that the lifetime disqualification was a civil action and that, with the convictions set aside, he had only one administrative adjudication affecting his CDL, making him eligible for reinstatement.
Woodward asserted that the director's April 10 letter denying reinstatement was a final decision or order from which he could appeal under § 60-4,105.

Appellee's Arguments

The DMV director argued that the lifetime CDL disqualification was based on valid convictions and federal and state laws requiring disqualification regardless of whether convictions were later set aside.
The director maintained that no law permitted lifting a CDL disqualification once imposed due to valid convictions, even if those convictions were set aside.
The DMV contended that the April 10 letter was not a final decision or order under § 60-4,105 and thus the district court lacked jurisdiction.
The DMV also argued that the appeal was barred by sovereign immunity and that the petition failed to state a claim for relief.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Buettner v. Sullivan, 191 Neb. 592, 216 N.W.2d 872 (1974)	A letter from the DMV referencing a prior revocation is not a final decision or order from which appeal can be taken under predecessor statute to § 60-4,105.	The court analogized the April 10, 2015 letter to the letter in Buettner, concluding it was not a final decision or order for purposes of appeal jurisdiction.
Kroll v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 256 Neb. 548, 590 N.W.2d 861 (1999)	A DMV letter notifying of potential revocation is not a formal, final administrative order and does not confer jurisdiction on the district court under § 60-4,105.	The court relied on Kroll to support the conclusion that the director's letter was not a final order and thus the district court lacked jurisdiction.
Brook Valley Ltd. Part. v. Mutual of Omaha Bank, 281 Neb. 455, 797 N.W.2d 748 (2011)	Determination of jurisdictional issues not involving factual disputes is a question of law reviewed independently by appellate courts.	The court applied this standard in independently reviewing whether jurisdiction existed over the appeal.
Klug v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 291 Neb. 235, 864 N.W.2d 676 (2015)	Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed independently by appellate courts.	The court applied this principle in interpreting § 60-4,105 and related statutes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by emphasizing its duty to determine jurisdiction before addressing the merits. It reviewed § 60-4,105, which authorizes appeals only from a "final decision or order" of the DMV director or department concerning cancellation, suspension, revocation, or refusal to issue or renew an operator's license.

The court found no statutory definition of "final decision or order" beyond this language. It relied on its precedents in Buettner and Kroll, which held that letters from the DMV that merely communicate or reference prior revocations are not final, appealable orders. These letters are not formal administrative actions but are instead informational or conditional communications.

Applying this reasoning, the court determined that the April 10, 2015 letter denying reinstatement was not a final decision or order under § 60-4,105. The letter did not cancel, suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue or renew Woodward's CDL but merely explained the DMV's position regarding the legal effect of the set-aside convictions on the lifetime disqualification.

Because the letter was not an appealable final order, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Woodward's appeal. Consequently, the appellate court also lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal without reaching the other grounds for dismissal, including sovereign immunity and the substantive correctness of the DMV's position.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

The court held that the letter from the DMV director was not a "final decision or order" under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-4,105, and therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. As a result, the appeal was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The direct effect is that Woodward's appeal cannot proceed, and the lifetime revocation of his CDL remains in place. The court did not set any new precedent beyond reaffirming the established interpretation that only formal final orders canceling, suspending, revoking, or refusing to issue or renew licenses are appealable under § 60-4,105.

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Joel D. WOODWARD, appellant, v. Rhonda K. LAHM, Director, Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles, appellee.

Stacy, J.

David W. Jorgensen, of Nye, Hervert, Jorgensen & Watson, P.C., Kearney, for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Milissa D. Johnson-Wiles, Lincoln, for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Kelch, and Funke, JJ.

Stacy, J.SUMMARY

Joel D. Woodward asked the director of the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to reinstate his commercial driver's license (CDL). The director refused, and Woodward filed an appeal pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-4, 105 (Reissue 2010). The district court dismissed the appeal on several grounds, including that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the appeal was not from a "final decision or order." We agree with the district court and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

See § 60-4,105.

FACTS

In 2010, Woodward was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) and sentenced to probation. He was convicted of DUI a second time in 2013, and again was sentenced to probation.

After Woodward's second DUI, the DMV issued an order revoking his CDL for life. The lifetime revocation was imposed pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 60-4, 168(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2012) and 60-4, 169 (Reissue 2010). Section 60-4,169 requires the director to "summarily revoke ... the [CDL] and privilege ... to operate a commercial motor vehicle" whenever it comes to the director's attention that the person has "committed an offense for which disqualification is required." Section 60-4,168(3) provides: "A person shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for life if ... he or she: (a) Is convicted of ... a second or subsequent violation of any of the offenses described in subsection (1) ...." DUI is among the offenses listed in subsection (1). One may appeal from a lifetime revocation, but Woodward did not do so.

See id.

After Woodward completed both terms of probation, he filed motions asking the sentencing court to set aside both DUI (b) Remove all civil disabilities and disqualifications imposed as a result of the conviction." The sentencing court set aside both DUI convictions in separate orders entered January 8, 2015.

On March 30, 2015, Woodward's attorney wrote a letter to the director of the DMV, advising that Woodward's DUI convictions had been set aside and asking either that his CDL be "reinstated" or that he be deemed eligible to reapply for a CDL. Woodward explained the basis for his request as follows:

Woodward's position is that if a conviction is set aside and nullified and that all civil disabilities and disqualifications resulting from the conviction are removed, that conviction cannot be counted for purposes of a life time disqualification [under § 60-4,168]. The Director's action in entering the life time disqualification of ... Woodward's CDL is of course a civil action. Thus, at this time, [Woodward] has only a single [administrative] adjudication which will affect his [CDL] which was the refusal [of a chemical test] adjudication on November 30, 2010. [Woodward] should be eligible for reinstatement.

In a letter dated April 10, 2015, the director responded:

The lifetime CDL disqualification is based on valid convictions for offenses as provided in Neb.Rev.Stat. [§] 60-4,168, and 49 CFR 383.51 which has been adopted by Nebraska pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. [§] 60-462.01. These are laws with specific application to CDL holders and which require the state to disqualify CDL holders with a history of unsafe driving demonstrated by convictions for the offenses enumerated in the statute. Nothing

in the applicable laws allows the state to lift a CDL disqualification imposed as a result of valid convictions even if the conviction is [s]et [a]side.... Woodward's lifetime CDL disqualification will not be removed.

On May 6, 2015, Woodward filed what he captioned a "Petition on Appeal" in the district court for Buffalo County, seeking to appeal from the director's April 10 letter. Woodward asserts the appeal was authorized by § 60-4,105, which sets forth the appeal procedure for "any person aggrieved by a final decision or order of the director or the [DMV] to cancel, suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue or renew any operator's license." Woodward's petition alleged he was eligible for reinstatement of his CDL because his DUI convictions had been set aside, and further alleged the director had denied his request for reinstatement in the April 10 letter, a copy of which was attached to the petition.

The DMV filed a timely answer generally denying the allegations of Woodward's petition and raising the affirmative defense that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal and that Woodward's petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

After a hearing, the district court dismissed Woodward's petition. The court generally agreed with the DMV's argument that the director's letter did not constitute a "final decision or order" under § 60-4,105, and the court concluded the petition failed to allege facts establishing subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. The court also agreed with the DMV's position that Woodward's petition was seeking declaratory relief and was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Finally, the court agreed with the DMV that the director's letter, if considered appealable, was substantively correct, because any removal of civil disabilities Woodward was entitled to as a result of having the DUI convictions set aside would be prospective only, not retrospective.our statutory authority to regulate the caseloads of the appellate courts of this state.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2016).

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Woodward assigns that the district court erred in (1) failing to set aside the lifetime disqualification and revocation of his CDL, (2) failing to enter an order requiring the director to reissue his CDL, (3) finding it did not have jurisdiction over his appeal, (4) finding his appeal was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and (5) finding the appeal was not taken from a final order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of law which requires an appellate court to reach its conclusions independent from a trial court.

Brook Valley Ltd. Part. v. Mutual of Omaha Bank, 281 Neb. 455, 797 N.W.2d 748 (2011) ; Kroll v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 256 Neb. 548, 590 N.W.2d 861 (1999).

Statutory interpretation is a question of law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.

Klug v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 291 Neb. 235, 864 N.W.2d 676 (2015).

ANALYSIS

Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.

Kroll v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra note 4.

Section 60-4,105(1) provides for appeals from certain orders of the DMV:

[A]ny person aggrieved by a final decision or order of the director or the [DMV] to cancel, suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue or renew any operator's license ... may

appeal to either the district court of the county in which the person originally applied for the license or the district court of the county in which such person resides or, in the case of a nonresident, to the district court of Lancaster County within thirty days after the date of the final decision or order.

Woodward appealed from the letter dated April 10, 2015. To determine whether his appeal is authorized by § 60-4,105, we must decide if he has appealed from a "final decision or order" of the DMV to "cancel, suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue or renew" his CDL.

The Legislature has not defined a "final decision or order" for purposes of § 60-4,105 beyond specifying that it must "cancel, suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue or renew" an operator's license. However, in Buettner v. Sullivan, we held that a letter from the DMV referencing a prior revocation is not a final decision or order from which appeal can be taken. In that case, a driver was notified his operator's license had been revoked for a period of 1 year because he accumulated too many points. The driver's most recent offense was a speeding violation. He originally paid a fine for this violation, but after receiving notification that his license had been revoked, he approached a justice of the peace and somehow obtained an amended abstract of conviction indicating he was given 90 days of probation for the speeding The driver attempted to appeal from this letter under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-420 (1943), a predecessor to § 60-4,105. At that time, § 60-420 provided: " ‘Any person who feels himself aggrieved because of any order of the director on account of his refusal to issue any license contemplated under sections 60-418 and 60-419, may appeal therefrom to the district court ....’ " The procedure under § 60-420 required the appellant to file a $200 cost bond within 20 days of the order from which appeal was being taken, a requirement we held was jurisdictional. The driver did not file his bond until 23 days after the order of revocation, so he argued the appeal was not from the order of revocation, but, rather, from the DMV's letter notifying him the revocation was still in effect. We held the DMV's letter was not an appealable order within the meaning of § 60-420, and concluded the district court correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Buettner v. Sullivan, 191 Neb. 592, 216 N.W.2d 872 (1974).

Id. at 593, 216 N.W.2d at 874.

Id. at 594, 216 N.W.2d at 874, quoting § 60-420.

Buettner, supra note 7.

In Kroll v. Department of Motor Vehicles, we again considered whether a driver could appeal from a letter sent by the DMV. The driver received a letter from the DMV notifying him that because his Georgia operator's license had been revoked or suspended, his recently issued Nebraska operator's license would be summarily revoked if he did not take certain action by a specified date. The driver filed an appeal from this letter in the district court pursuant to § 60-4,105. The district court entered an order affirming the DMV's action. The driver appealed, and we dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We concluded the letter from the DMV was not "a formal, final action by the Department," but instead was conditional and contemplated further action by the parties. We reasoned that because "there was no final, appealable administrative order, the district court never acquired [subject matter] jurisdiction" under § 60-4,105.

Kroll v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra note 4.

Id. at 552, 590 N.W.2d at 863.

Id.

Like the letters in Buettner and Kroll, the DMV's April 10, 2015, letter to Woodward was not a "final decision or order" for purposes of § 60-4,105. The letter did not affect or change the status of Woodward's operator's license, but instead merely explained the DMV's position that the applicable laws did not permit it to either remove Woodward's lifetime CDL disqualification or permit reinstatement of his CDL. Even if the letter could fairly be characterized as a "final decision" of the director or the DMV in that regard, it was not one which pertained to "cancel[ing], suspend[ing], revok[ing], or refus[ing] to issue or renew" any operator's license. Rather, the April 10 letter pertained to the reinstatement of a lifetime revocation or disqualification, and that is not one of the decisions from which the Legislature has authorized an appeal under § 60-4,105.

See § 60-4,105.

Here, the district court correctly concluded it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Woodward's appeal under § 60-4,105 and dismissed the appeal. When a lower court does not have jurisdiction over the case before it, an appellate court also lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of the claim. And, because we lack jurisdiction over the appeal, we do not reach the merits of the alternative grounds on which the district court dismissed the appeal.

Kroll v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra note 4.
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CONCLUSION

The letter from which Woodward appeals is not a "final decision or order" of the director or the DMV under § 60-4,105. The district court correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and we dismiss the appeal for the same reason.

APPEAL DISMISSED .