Morris v. State

Robb, Judge.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Donald R. Shuler
Barkes, Kolbus, Rife & Shuler, LLP
Goshen, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana Justin F. Roebel
Supervising Deputy
Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court The Honorable Gretchen S. Lund, Judge The Honorable Eric Ditton, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 20D04-1708-CM-1593 Robb, Judge.

Case Summary and Issues

[1] After Jason Morris was convicted and sentenced in city court, he sought a trial de novo in superior court. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Morris guilty of public indecency, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced him to one year executed. This case presents three issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Morris' conviction; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a harsher sentence than the city court; and (3) whether Morris' sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Concluding the evidence is sufficient to support Morris' conviction, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Morris, and Morris' sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In April 2016, Morris picked up fourteen-year-old M.Mc. for an arranged sleep over with his stepdaughter, M.M. Morris was accompanied by a friend, Leann, and his younger daughter. Before returning to his house, Morris dropped his younger daughter off at a class and then drove to Goshen General Hospital so Leann could drop something off. Morris parked near the main entrance of the hospital and Morris and M.Mc. remained in his truck while Leann went inside. M.Mc. asked Morris for a cigarette and he asked M.Mc. what she was "going to do for it[?]" Transcript, Volume II at 41. Morris began discussing a 2015 pool party that Morris, his wife, M.Mc., and M.M. attended where Morris' wife had "pantsed him[,]" and M.Mc. caught a glimpse of Morris' penis. Id. at 40. M.Mc. testified, the trial court found Morris guilty and sentenced him to one year executed in the county jail. Morris now appeals.

Discussion and Decision I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[5] Morris challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Specifically, he contends his conviction was based solely on M.Mc.'s testimony, which he alleges was "not substantively corroborated by other evidence in the record" and her "mere allegations[,]" absent corroborating evidence, do not satisfy the burden of proof. Appellant's Brief at 10. [6] Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled. D.J. v. State, 88 N.E.3d 236, 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Upon review, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Purvis v. State, 87 N.E.3d 1119, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We will affirm a defendant's conviction if "there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Stewart v. State, 866 N.E.2d 858, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). [7] To convict Morris, the State was required prove each element of public indecency beyond a reasonable doubt. Ind. Code § 35-41-4-1(a). "A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place . . . appears in a state of nudity with the intent to arouse the sexual desires of the person or another person . . . commits public indecency, a Class A misdemeanor." Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1(a)(3). [8] After the bench trial, the trial court found:

Considering all of the evidence, the credible testimony of [M.Mc.] and her mother, and the inconsistent and contradictory explanations provided by [Morris], the Court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Morris] committed the crime of Public Indecency. The Court finds that the parking lot of the Goshen Hospital is a 'public place' under Indiana Code § 35-45-4-1. The Court observed many different individuals in the parking lot, going in and out of the hospital, and driving around near [Morris'] red truck. The Court also finds that in exposing his penis, [Morris] had the intent to arouse the sexual desires of himself or of [M.Mc.].

Appellant's Appendix, Volume 2 at 106. [9] Morris argues M.Mc.'s testimony, without corroborating evidence, is not sufficient to support his conviction and that reliance solely upon M.Mc.'s testimony is problematic under the incredible dubiosity rule. The incredible dubiosity rule allows this court to "impinge upon a [fact finder's] responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses only when confronted with 'inherently improbable' testimony." Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 754 (Ind. 2015). The rule is applied in limited circumstances, namely where there is "1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence." Id. at 756. Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is "rare and the standard to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it." Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002). [10] In applying these factors, we conclude the incredible dubiosity rule is inapplicable to the present case as there were multiple testifying witnesses and M.Mc.'s testimony was not inconsistent within itself. See Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d 1211, 1221 (Ind. 2015) (explaining that the second prong is satisfied "only when the witness's trial testimony was inconsistent within itself, not that it was inconsistent with other evidence or prior testimony"). After hearing the evidence, the trial court explained in its order that it found M.Mc.'s testimony credible:

[Morris] wants the Court to believe that [M.Mc.] made up a story that [Morris] exposed his penis to her; told the false story to her therapist at the Bowen Center; told the same false story to a detective during a formal interview; lied under oath to the Judge of the Goshen City Court during the first bench trial; then lied again, under oath, to this Court. Such a conclusion is not reasonable.

Appellant's App., Vol. 2 at 105. [11] Moreover, M.Mc.'s testimony cannot be considered "inherently improbable" because evidence presented at trial corroborated her testimony. First, M.Mc.'s mother testified that M.Mc. was "distraught," shaking, and crying when she picked M.Mc. up and drove her to the Bowen Center to see her therapist where [14] The record reveals "substantial evidence of probative value" supporting each element of public indecency from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found Morris guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Stewart, 866 N.E.2d at 862. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support Morris' conviction.

II. Sentencing A. Abuse of Discretion

[15] Morris contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a harsher sentence than what the city court imposed because doing so is contrary to Indiana law and violates due process. Sentencing decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court and this court reviews only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is "clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom." Stokes v. State, 947 N.E.2d 1033, 1036 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. [16] Morris relies on three Indiana cases from the 1970s which "stand for the proposition that the trial court's imposition of a more severe sentence than the Goshen City Court sentence in this case is improper and should be corrected." Appellant's Br. at 17. Although the cases Morris cites precluded the imposition of a greater sentence on retrial after an appeal from a lower court, these cases were decided prior to our supreme court's adoption of the Indiana Trial De Novo Rules, effective January 1, 1998. These rules were adopted pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-8-1-3, which authorizes the supreme court to

adopt, amend, and rescind rules of court that govern and control practice and procedure in all the courts of Indiana. These rules must be promulgated and take effect under the rules adopted by the supreme court and thereafter all laws in conflict with the supreme court's rules have no further force or effect.

[17] A defendant is entitled to appeal a city court judgment to "the circuit, superior, or probate court of the county and [be] tried de novo." Ind. Code § 33-35-5-9(a); see also Ind. Trial De Novo Rules. Under the Trial De Novo Rules, following a misdemeanor trial in city or town court, "[a] defendant who has a statutory right to an appeal after a trial for a misdemeanor in a city or town court may request and shall receive the trial de novo as provided in this Rule." Ind. Trial De Novo Rule 3(A). The court to which the case is assigned has "full jurisdiction of the case and of the person" once the request for a trial de novo is filed. Ind. Trial De Novo Rule 3(C)(2). [18] The adoption of the Indiana Rules of Evidence guides our interpretation of the relationship between the Trial De Novo Rules and common law. After our supreme court adopted the Rules of Evidence in 1994, our supreme court acknowledged that the Rules of Evidence "generally superseded previously existing common law[.]" Specht v. State, 734 N.E.2d 239, 240 (Ind. 2000) (explaining that when the supreme court's committee proposed the adoption of a particular rule of evidence, the committee specifically stated its proposed rule "preserves prior Indiana Law" on that issue). Similarly, we conclude the Trial De Novo Rules supersede existing case law as it pertains to trials de novo. Well aware of the existing case law, the court adopted the Trial De Novo Rules, which do not bar a court from imposing a greater sentence than an inferior court after retrial on appeal. [19] Common sense reinforces this conclusion. The very definition of a trial de novo trial means a "new trial on the entire case - that is, on both questions of fact and issues of law - conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Restraining a court's ability to sentence a defendant by prohibiting the court from imposing a greater sentence is inherently inconsistent with the nature and definition of a trial de novo. Therefore, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a greater sentence than the city court.

B. Inappropriate Sentence

[20] Alternatively, Morris argues the nature of the offense and his character do not warrant his one-year sentence, which is the maximum possible sentence for a Class A misdemeanor. See Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2. Morris contends his sentence is inappropriate because his criminal history is minor and his offense was brief and non-violent. gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense." Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). As to Morris' character, his criminal history is comprised of a felony conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor, charges for disseminating obscene materials, and check deception. While this matter was pending, Morris pled guilty to theft and check deception and entered into a diversion agreement for violating the compulsory school attendance requirement. The record reveals that Morris also failed to satisfactorily complete probation for the theft charge. [25] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court focused on the gravity of Morris' criminal history:

It's troubling to me, sir, that when I look at your record, you were charged with possession of obscene material and literature and sexual misconduct with a minor in the late 90s and you were convicted as a felon of sexual misconduct with a minor. And the victim in this case was a minor and that's very, very troubling. In addition, you have those two charges for check deception and you have a conviction for theft . . . .
As you stand here right now, according to your records check, you've got a pending compulsory school attendance violation case . . . . While all of this is going on, you go out and pass a bad check to Menards and now you're here today on that and on the displaying your genitals to a 14-year-old. I echo some of the comments by the State. This is serious. Yes, you can say this is just a misdemeanor. This is a very serious offense; I take this very seriously. It is absolutely inappropriate for you to engage in that behavior; to sit in a truck and expose your penis to a 14-year-old. And it's inappropriate, especially, in the light of the fact that

you have the prior conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor.

Tr., Vol. II at 155. [26] Morris attempts to minimize the significance of his previous conviction of sexual misconduct with a minor by arguing that it was his only felony conviction and is remote, occurring "nearly twenty (20) years ago, mere months after [he] turned eighteen (18)." Appellant's Br. at 19. Despite these factors, however, the trial court found this prior offense significant in relation to the current offense. In addition to his previous criminal history, the trial court noted that while this matter was pending, Morris committed additional crimes to which he plead guilty. Despite Morris' history with our justice system and his previous felony conviction for a similar crime against a juvenile, he was not deterred from committing the current offense. See Rutherford, 866 N.E.2d at 874. The trial court sentenced Morris within the statutory range, a task within its discretion, and Morris has failed to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

Conclusion

[27] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the evidence sufficiently supports Morris' conviction, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Morris to the maximum possible sentence, and his sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm. [28] Affirmed. Baker, J., and May, J., concur.

See Whited v. State, 256 Ind. 618, 271 N.E.2d 513 (1971); Eldridge v. State, 256 Ind. 113, 267 N.E.2d 48 (1971); and Anderson v. State, 155 Ind. App. 465, 293 N.E.2d 222 (1973).