ANDRIAS
Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., Chestnut Ridge (Michael L. Braunstein of counsel), for appellants. John L. Buckheit, Suffern, for respondent.
ANDRIAS, J.P., FRIEDMAN, DeGRASSE, FREEDMAN, ABDUS–SALAAM, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Norma Ruiz, J.), entered January 27, 2012, which, in an action to recover for personal injuries sustained in a trip and fall at the entrance of defendants' building, denied defendants' motion to vacate the default judgment entered against them after inquest, and for leave to serve an answer, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Relief under CPLR 317 is not warranted where, as here, defendants' failure to obtain proper notice was the result of a deliberate attempt to avoid such notice ( see Pena v. Mittleman, 179 A.D.2d 607, 610, 579 N.Y.S.2d 359 [1st Dept. 1992] ). The individual defendant averred that neither he nor the corporate defendant received actual service of the summons and complaint, or of the supplemental summons and amended complaint, or of any of the notices served by plaintiff following commencement of the action. However, this conclusory denial of receipt is insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to proper service in the face of plaintiff's submission of affidavits from a process server, which constitute prima facie evidence of proper service ( see Grinshpun v. Borokhovich, 100 A.D.3d 551, 552, 954 N.Y.S.2d 520 [1st Dept. 2012]; Matter of de Sanchez, 57 A.D.3d 452, 454, 870 N.Y.S.2d 24 [1st Dept. 2008] ). Moreover, the record demonstrates that the corporation's designated agent for service signed the certified mail return receipt acknowledging it had received the notice of entry of the default judgment as to liability against the individual defendant, and of an order directing the Clerk of New York County to accept a notice of pendency regarding the building where plaintiff's accident occurred. Under these circumstances, defendants have failed to rebut the presumption of receipt of service ( see Lugo v. H.B.T. Hous. Co., 1 A.D.3d 119, 766 N.Y.S.2d 836 [1st Dept. 2003] ).
The court properly determined that the portion of defendants' motion seeking vacatur of the default judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) is untimely. The record demonstrates that the corporate defendant's designated agent acknowledged receipt of the notice of entry on September 25, 2008, yet defendants did not seek vacatur until May 3, 2011 ( see Matter of Orange County Dept. of Social Servs. v. Germel Y., 101 A.D.3d 1019, 1019–1020, 957 N.Y.S.2d 240 [2d Dept. 2012]; DeLisca v. Courtesy Transp., 6 A.D.3d 646, 657, 775 N.Y.S.2d 553 [2d Dept. 2004] ). Further, defendants failed to provide a reasonable excuse for their default. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether they have a meritorious defense ( see Matter of Amirah Nicole A. [Tamika R.], 73 A.D.3d 428, 429, 901 N.Y.S.2d 178 [1st Dept. 2010], lv. dismissed15 N.Y.3d 766, 906 N.Y.S.2d 810, 933 N.E.2d 209 [2010]; J.P. Equip. Rental & Materials v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 288 A.D.2d 187, 732 N.Y.S.2d 354 [2d Dept. 2001] ).