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184–188 CLAREMONT INVESTORS, LLC, Petitioner–Landlord–Respondent, v. Austin Ira NELSON, Respondent–Tenant–Appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Final judgment (Lynn R. Kotler, J. and jury), entered May 19, 2014, affirmed, with $25 costs. Appeal from order (Lynn R. Kotler, J.), dated March 19, 2014, dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the final judgment. The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the final judgment (see CPLR 5501[a][1] ).

The jury's finding that tenant did not primarily reside at the stabilized Manhattan apartment here at issue comports with the weight of the trial evidence, which showed that tenant was absent from the apartment for no less than nine months in 2009, eight months in 2010, and the first six months of 2011 (returning shortly before landlord's commencement of this proceeding), during which time he lived predominantly in Argentina and permitted others to occupy the premises in his absence. That tenant may have been “working on ... and performing” music or otherwise employed during his lengthy stays in Buenos Aires does not serve to excuse his prolonged physical absences from the subject apartment, or so the jury reasonably could find. Nor was landlord required to prove that tenant had a specific alternative primary residence elsewhere (see TOA Constr. Co. v. Tsitsires, 54 AD3d 109 [2008] ), particularly “where as here, tenant is shown to spend considerable amounts of time at several different [locales]” (Emel Realty Corp. v. Carey, 188 Misc.2d 280 [2001], affd 288 A.D.2d 163 [2001] ).

Nor does the record disclose any evidentiary error warranting reversal. In the particular circumstances here presented, the court providently exercised its discretion in limiting the temporal scope of the evidence to the two-year period prior to the expiration of tenant's most recent lease (see TOA Constr. Co., Inc. v. Tsitsires, 54 AD3d at 114–116 ; 45th St. Assoc. v. Spence, 180 Misc.2d 93 [1993] ; cf. 615 Realty Co. v. Mikeska, 75 N.Y.2d 987 [1990] ), especially given the absence of any offer of proof by tenant as to the substance or relevance of any prior events (see generally Brown v. Psycho Inc., 213 A.D.2d 271 [1995] ).

I concur.

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184-188 Claremont Investors, LLC v. Nelson
(Mar 2, 2015)