As both the trial court and Appellate Term correctly found, the evidence overwhelmingly established that appellant-tenant spent almost no time in the subject premises, having stayed there only seven nights over a period of at least thirteen months. Moreover, prior to this period the premises were consistently used by persons other than appellant. Under these circumstances, appellant did not have the type of "`ongoing, substantial, physical nexus with the controlled premises for actual living purposes' . . . that would justify affording the tenancy continued protection under the rent stabilization laws" (Berwick Land Corp. v. Mucelli, 249 A.D.2d 18, quoting Emay Props. Corp. v. Norton, 136 Misc.2d 127, 129). Both the trial court and Appellate Term properly rejected as incredible appellant's assertion that she was absent from the apartment due to fear of asbestos contamination, since she never made any such complaint during the period in question and she allowed others to spend extended periods of time living at the apartment. Nor does appellant's purported singing career satisfactorily explain her absences from the apartment. There was no objective evidence of any such career, and, even if such a career existed and caused appellant to travel, it would not explain why she did not stay at the apartment when she was in New York for extended periods (compare, Coronet Props Co. v. Brychova, 122 Misc.2d 212, affd 126 Misc.2d 946). The documentary indicia of residency relied upon by appellant are outweighed in this case by the overwhelming, uncontested evidence of appellant's failure to use the premises for actual living purposes. This is particularly true since at least part of them were created after her counsel advised her to establish a "paper trail".
Appellant's remaining arguments are unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.