Attorney at Law, Liability for negligence. Negligence, Of attorney at law, Employer's liability. Evidence, Deposition. Practice, Civil, Exceptions, Deposition, Conduct of trial: judge's charge, Exceptions.
If, at the trial of an action against an attorney at law for damages alleged to have resulted from the defendant's negligence in conducting and trying an action for the enforcement of a claim of the plaintiff against his employer under the employers' liability act, to prosecute which the plaintiff had employed the defendant, there is evidence that there was at the trial of that action evidence available to the attorney at law upon which a finding would have been warranted that, if the proper statutory notice had been given, the employer was liable, that the attorney was unable to prove the giving of the statutory notice either because he had failed to see that it was given or because, if it was given, he had failed to preserve and perpetuate evidence of its having been given, so that in the former action a verdict was ordered for the employer, a verdict cannot be ordered for the attorney in the present action and a verdict for the plaintiff is warranted.
A defendant is not entitled, by reason of an exception to a refusal of a request to have a verdict ordered in his favor, to have determined and adjudicated by this court the accuracy and legal effect of certain statements of fact made by the judge in his charge to the jury, alleged by the defendant to be inaccurate, especially where he failed to call the judge's attention to the alleged inaccuracies at the close of the charge.
A deposition of a witness in an action at law, taken upon oral interrogatories on the ground that the witness was about to go out of the Commonwealth not to return in time for the trial, if it otherwise is admissible as evidence, is not inadmissible merely by reason of the fact that the notice that it was to be taken, given by the justice of the peace before whom it was to be taken to the party objecting to its admission, misspelled that party's name, if the notice was delivered to the right person and he attended with his counsel at the taking of the deposition and participated therein; and it is immaterial that, upon discovering the misspelling of the name, a second notice was given which, if it had been the only notice, would have been too late to satisfy the requirements of R.L.c. 175, § 29.
An error, at the trial of an action against an attorney at law for alleged negligence in conducting the trial of an action by the plaintiff against the plaintiff's employer, in the exclusion of a deposition of a witness offered by the defendant is prejudicial if it appears that the testimony given by the witness in the deposition materially and substantially differs from that given by him at the trial of the previous action and, if believed, would show that in that action justice would have been done only if, irrespective of the way in which the attorney conducted the plaintiff's case, a verdict had been found for the plaintiff's employer, who was the defendant in that case.
PIERCE, J.
The jury rightly might have found that at the first trial there was available to the defendant, Fuller, as attorney for the plaintiff, the testimony of Delia Lavalle, of Addie Puffer, of Margaret Frances Bean and of the plaintiff; that their testimony, if believed, established that the plaintiff was in the employ of the Moore Spinning Company; that one Ogley was an overseer exercising the duties of a superintendent; that the duty of the plaintiff required him to obey the reasonable orders of the overseer; that on March 29, 1905, he was directed by that officer to change over the gears on one of the spinning frames; that for that purpose the machine was stopped; that on receiving the order he took the gears to the end of the machine nearest the wall to adjust them to the spinning frame; that while he was thus engaged, with mind intent on his work, the machine started up without warning, or without any person's giving actual notice to him that it was to start; that he then received injuries; that the overseer, while standing by the side of the machine and observing the situation of the plaintiff, had ordered it to be started up; that there was a rule of the mill that before starting a machine at rest for repairs notice should be given to those working on it; that notice was not given by the person directed to start the machine; and that when the overseer gave the order for starting up he knew the rule was not obeyed by the starter and also knew that the plaintiff was in a situation of danger against which without warning he could not guard or protect himself and at the same time do the allotted work.
Under such conditions the jury would have been justified in finding that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care and that the defendant company was negligent. Davis v. New York, New Haven, Hartford Railroad, 159 Mass. 532. They might have found that the defendant Fuller was negligent in not putting before the jury at the first trial the testimony of the plaintiff; they also might have found him negligent in not giving the statutory notice, or, if they found that such notice was given, that he was negligent in not perpetuating testimony adequate to prove its service when proof thereof was required at the trial.
The rights of the defendant upon either hypothesis were carefully guarded in the judge's charge.
The defendant's first request, that "There is not sufficient evidence to justify a verdict for the plaintiff," for reasons stated could not have been given. The second request could not have been given because the question of the defendant's neglect to anticipate and provide against the death of his brother was not necessarily the only factor in the determination of the question of his due care. He might have been without fault in that regard and lacking in due care in other respects.
As the jury could have found the overseer superintendent negligent, the defence set up in the remaining requests is not open, that a fellow servant was negligent, or that without the concurring fault of a fellow servant the accident would not have happened. Myers v. Hudson Iron Co. 150 Mass. 125, 137. It follows that the judge rightly refused to give them.
The defendant in his brief states that the judge in his charge made assertions of fact not justified by testimony or agreement of parties, and argues that he is entitled as matter of law, because of his general request that a verdict be directed for the defendant, to have the accuracy of the statements determined and their legal effect adjudicated by this court, notwithstanding his omission to direct the attention of the trial judge specifically to his complaint or to allege exceptions. This is not the rule of law. Horrigan v. Clarksburg, 150 Mass. 218. And the facts do not create a right within the exceptions to the rule as indicated in such cases as Brightman v. Eddy, 97 Mass. 478, 481, Slater v. Rawson, 1 Met. 450, Lyon v. Prouty, 154 Mass. 488.
The defendant offered the deposition of Margaret Frances Bean, after having read to the jury the testimony given by this witness at the first trial. In that testimony, in connection with other statements not in conflict therewith, she said that at the moment of the accident she saw the overseer, Ogley, coming up the alley toward the place where the plaintiff was hurt. She made no statement as to who gave the order to start the machine, nor, except inferentially, as to Ogley's whereabouts at a time immediately preceding the accident. In her deposition she stated that she did not hear any one direct the machine to be started up, or call out that it was to be started; that she was beside the plaintiff and "in a position where she could have heard any one if they had hollered before starting up the machine."
She further deposed that she knew Ogley and did not hear him give any directions to any one to start the machine, and did not see him at the front of the machine.
This testimony contained in the deposition was of the greatest importance in that the jury, believing it, might accept it as a complete refutation of the charge that the overseer knowing the situation of the plaintiff ordered the machine to be started up without giving the customary warning.
A careful comparison of the testimony given at the trial with that set out in the proffered deposition shows the last to be more than merely corroborative of the first, and it should have been admitted in testimony unless rightly excluded on other grounds than that it was merely corroborative.
The facts in connection with the taking of this deposition show that on November 15, 1912, the defendant Fuller applied to Harold A. Varnum, justice of the peace, to take the deposition of Margaret Bean (Margaret Frances Bean) about to go out of the Commonwealth and not to return in time for the trial; that the justice issued a notice, in the form directed, to James C. McClellan; that this notice was duly and seasonably served in hand; that after service the officer found that the name of the defendant James C. McLellan, had been spelled in the notice McClellan rather than McLellan; that he notified counsel of the fact and thereafter on the same day the same justice of the peace issued another notice which was directed to James C. McLellan; that this last notice was left, but not seasonably, at the last and usual place of abode of the defendant; that on the next day, at the time and place appointed, the place being the office of the justice, all parties attended and participated in the taking of the deposition; that before the deposition was taken the plaintiff stated that he objected "for want of sufficient notice, in that the statutory allowance of time did not intervene between the giving of the notice and the time stated in the notice for the taking of the deposition; because of its being heard on Saturday and because of its being begun after four o'clock on Saturday afternoon." By an agreement "all informalities in form or manner of taking same" were waived except as above set out.
The original service was entirely good; the notice was delivered in hand to the defendant, and more than the statutory time intervened between the time of giving the notice and the time stated in the notice for the taking of the deposition; the fact that the officer, from an over abundance of caution, procured a new notice to issue did not make invalid the original service. All parties attended the hearing and an inspection of the deposition shows that they were fully heard. The objection taken to the taking of the deposition went to the limit of technical defence and should not be favored.
The exception to the refusal to admit in evidence the deposition must be sustained; all the others are overruled.
So ordered.