LOVELL, District Judge, and BATTIN, Senior District Judge:
This matter came on for hearing September 3, 1991, before a three-judge-court composed of United States Circuit Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, United States Senior District Judge James F. Battin, and United States District Judge Charles C. Lovell, on cross-motions for summary judgment and also on Defendants' motion to review Judge Lovell's August 15, 1991, order. Plaintiffs were represented by Marc Racicot, Clay Smith, and Elizabeth S. Baker; and Defendants were represented by Susan L. Korytkowski and Mark H. Murphy. Having fully considered the presentations of the parties and the briefs filed in response to these motions, the court now enters its Opinion and Order.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs commenced this action on May 22, 1991, by filing their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, motions for preliminary injunction and for convening of three-judge-court, and affidavits and briefs in support thereof. After considering Plaintiffs' motion for convening of three-judge-court, Judge Lovell, on May 24, 1991, notified the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that the matter was appropriate for consideration by a three-judge-court.
A status conference with counsel was conducted on June 24, 1991, and the court set down a schedule for the filing and briefing of potentially dispositive motions. During that conference, the parties agreed that this matter could ultimately be submitted for decision on cross-motions for summary judgment. On July 9, 1991, the parties were notified that the other two judges had been designated and that the court intended to set the motion for preliminary injunction for hearing on September 3, 1991.
After denying Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint and to dissolve the three-judge-court, by order of August 15, 1991, Judge Lovell set a schedule for the filing and briefing of cross-motions for summary judgment and also the motion to review the August 15, 1991, order. Those motions all came on regularly for hearing before the three-judge-court on September 3, 1991.
ARGUMENTS
Plaintiffs seek to prohibit Defendants from effecting a reapportionment of the United States House of Representatives for the 1992 congressional election based on the method prescribed by Title 2, United States Code, section 2a. Plaintiffs Stephens, Racicot, and Cooney bring this claim on behalf of all voters of the state of Montana, claiming that the latest apportionment unconstitutionally denies Montana voters equal representation as required by Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution. Plaintiffs Baucus, Burns, Williams, and Marlenee (Congressional Delegation Plaintiffs) claim that the automatic apportionment method deprives them of the opportunity to vote on the decennial apportionment.
Defendants contend that this case is not appropriate for submission to a three-judge-court because it involves apportionment among the states rather than within the states. Defendants also argue that the complaint raises a nonjusticiable political question and that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring either the first or second claims for relief in the complaint. Finally, Defendants argue that even if the court proceeds to the merits of Plaintiffs' claim, the court should find 2 U.S.C. § 2a constitutional. Defendants contend that Congress should not be held to the same exacting standard in apportioning representatives among the states as state legislatures in apportioning representatives within states. Defendants further argue that the court should approve Congress' choice of an apportionment method so long as Congress had a rational basis for that choice.
REVIEW OF AUGUST 15, 1991, ORDER
Before addressing the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, the three-judge-court initially reviews the order previously entered by Judge Lovell. Defendants seek review of the order denying their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants first raised their justiciability and standing arguments in that motion to dismiss. The motion also requested that the three-judge-court be dissolved, claiming that the issues raised by Plaintiffs are not appropriate for submission to a three-judge-court. The three-judge-court has reviewed the briefs submitted by the parties relating both to Defendants' original motion to dismiss and to Defendants' motion to review the order entered by Judge Lovell, and has considered the arguments raised at the hearing.
A. Three-Judge Court
Section 2284 of Title 28, United States Code, provides:
A district court of three judges shall be convened when otherwise required by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of Congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.
Plaintiffs filed this action challenging the constitutionality of Congress' apportionment of Congressional districts among the states. Therefore, this matter is appropriate for submission to a three-judge-court.
B. Political Question
The three-judge-court has reviewed the formulations traditionally employed to describe nonjusticiable political questions, and has determined that Plaintiffs' claims do not fall within any of those formulations. Plaintiffs' complaint calls upon this court to interpret the constitution and to decide whether the 1990 apportionment of representatives among the states meets the standards established by Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution. Constitutional interpretation is the responsibility of the judiciary, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 82 S.Ct. 691, 706, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), and this court will not shirk that responsibility.
C. Standing
Plaintiffs allege, in the first count of their complaint, that the current apportionment deprives voters in the state of Montana of equal representation in the House of Representatives. This injury to Plaintiffs' voting power can be traced to the use of an allegedly unconstitutional apportionment method, and there is a substantial likelihood that the injury will be redressed if Congress is forced to adopt a constitutional method.
Congressional Delegation Plaintiffs allege, in the second count of their complaint, that the automatic apportionment method deprives them of their opportunity to vote on legislation effecting the decennial census. This injury can be traced to the automatic nature of the current apportionment statute, and there is a substantial likelihood that the injury will be redressed if the court grants Plaintiffs the relief sought and declares the automatic apportionment statute unconstitutional. Plaintiffs have established their standing as to both counts of their complaint.
For the forgoing reasons, the three-judge-court hereby approves and adopts Judge Lovell's August 15, 1991, order denying Defendants' motion to dismiss and to dissolve three-judge-court.
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is properly granted under Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if "the pleadings and supporting materials show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." California Architectural Building Products, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006, 108 S.Ct. 698, 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988). Both parties having agreed that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, the court must now decide the legal issues raised by the parties.
One of the greatest controversies during the Constitutional Convention of 1787 concerned the issue of how representation would be apportioned in the new government's legislative body. 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 321 (Farrand ed. 1911) (hereinafter Farrand). The more populous states argued that representatives should be apportioned according to population, and the less populous states argued that each state should have equal representation. When the inability to resolve this issue threatened to end the convention without formulating a constitution, Benjamin Franklin proposed what has become known as the "Great Compromise." Id. at 488. That compromise resulted in the creation of the two houses which make up this nation's current legislative branch. According to the framers, the House of Representatives would be apportioned on the basis of population and would represent the people, and each state would be represented equally in the Senate which would therefore represent the states. Id. at 462. As summed up by William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut,
[i]n
one branch the
people, ought to be represented; in the
other, the
States.
Id. (emphasis in original).
It is evident from the record of the debates at the Convention that "when the delegates agreed that the House [of Representatives] should represent `people' they intended that . . . the number [of Congressional seats] assigned to each State should be determined solely by the number of the State's inhabitants." Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 13, 84 S.Ct. 526, 533, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964).
If the power is not immediately derived from the people, in proportion to their numbers, we may make a paper confederacy, but that will be all.
Id. at 10 (citing
Farrand, at 472).
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, one of the products of the "Great Compromise," provides for the apportionment of representatives to the House of Representatives among the several states "according to their respective [n]umbers." Section 2 also provides for a decennial determination of the number of people in each state, and thus of the number of representatives to which each state is entitled.
The method of apportioning representatives among the states has been a source of continuing controversy. In accordance with the mandate of Article I, Section 2, Congress debated and chose the method to be used for each decennial apportionment until 1920, when Congress failed to enact a reapportionment measure. That failure led Congress to enact a reapportionment statute in 1941 which specifies the statistical "method of equal proportions," also known as the "Hill method," as the chosen apportionment formula, and makes the reapportionment process self-executing. 2 U.S.C. § 2a. Congress determined that the apportionment of the seats remaining after the assignment of one seat to each state shall be based on the equal proportions method, 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a), and delegated the function of apportioning House seats to the Secretary of Commerce, who takes the decennial census. 13 U.S.C. § 141(a). Although there has been extensive congressional debate following most of the decennial censuses conducted since the adoption of the automatic method in 1941, Congress has not since conducted such inquiry before the decennial processes began. Here, the current apportionment was ordered without consideration of its merits by Congress.
In 1990, the Secretary of Commerce conducted the decennial census and notified the President of the results of that census. The President transmitted the results to Congress, and the Clerk of the House of Representatives notified each state of the number of representatives to which its residents were entitled. The state of Montana was notified that it is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives. That determination led the state of Montana to file the instant suit, challenging the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 2a.
According to the Census results, Montana has a population of 803,655. Montana was formerly apportioned two representatives. This reapportionment designates one representative for Montana as a single district. Thus, this single representative would represent 803,655 people. This single Congressional district contains the largest number of persons per representative in any district.
No state has heretofore turned to the judicial branch to challenge the method employed by Congress to apportion representatives among the several states. This case therefore raises an issue of first impression. Courts have frequently been faced with challenges to the apportionment of congressional seats within states. The Supreme Court developed the principle of equal representation for equal numbers of people as the standard for deciding such challenges in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). Plaintiffs contend that the apportionment principles announced in Wesberry and other cases involving intrastate redistricting apply to Congress' duty to apportion seats among the states. The Defendants, however, contend that Wesberry and its progeny, which interpret Article I, § 2 in the context of intrastate redistricting, do not apply to the national apportionment issue. They argue that the "one person, one vote" standard is a mathematical impossibility with respect to the interstate apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives because Congress must adhere to existing state boundaries and each state must have at least one representative. The court agrees with Plaintiffs that there is no principled reason why the standards set forth in Wesberry should not apply to the apportionment of representatives by Congress, despite this mathematical impossibility.
Article I, Section 2 provides no textual basis upon which to distinguish the duties of Congress from the duties of the state legislatures in this regard. Article I as a whole concerns the powers and responsibilities of the federal legislative branch, rather than state legislatures. The plain language of Article I, Section 2 specifically refers to apportionment among the several states. Clearly, any duty imposed upon state legislatures by Article I, Section 2 is also imposed upon Congress.
The principles set forth in Wesberry apply with equal force to Congress' apportionment of representatives among the several states. The Supreme Court in Wesberry construed Article I, Section 2 in light of the history of the debates leading to the "Great Compromise" and determined that "equal representation for equal numbers of people" is the "fundamental goal for the House of Representatives." Id. at 17, 84 S.Ct. at 535. That debate centered on the issue of how seats should be apportioned to states, not on how state legislatures should draw districts within states. Thus, when James Wilson of Pennsylvania stated that "equal numbers of people ought to have an equal number of representatives . . .," and representatives "of different districts ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their respective constituents hold to each other," 1 Farrand 180, quoted in Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 11, 84 S.Ct. at 531, he was referring to apportionment of House seats among the states rather than within the states. See also Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 31, 84 S.Ct. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he statements approving population-based representation were focused on the problem of how representation should be apportioned among the States in the House of Representatives. The Great Compromise concerned representation of the States in the Congress.")
The rationale underlying the Wesberry opinion actually has more relevance to the national apportionment issue than to intrastate redistricting. In essence, the Supreme Court simply precluded any state from indirectly violating the national standard of "equal representation for equal numbers of people" through its intrastate redistricting actions, stating that
It would defeat the principle solemnly embodied in the Great Compromise — equal representation in the House for equal numbers of people — for us to hold that, within the States, legislatures may draw the lines of congressional districts in such a way as to give some voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than others.
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 14, 84 S.Ct. at 533. Clearly, the Supreme Court's decision in
Wesberry with regard to intrastate redistricting was premised upon the notion that the "one person, one vote" standard ultimately governs, both at the national and the state levels. Therefore, Defendants' argument that the principles of
Wesberry do not apply to congressional apportionment among the states is without merit.
In fact, in Federation for American Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, the court emphasized that while the mathematical notion of "one person, one vote" is not strictly applicable to the national issue, the underlying Constitutional principle of equal representation for equal numbers of people applies to both national apportionment and to intrastate redistricting. 486 F. Supp. 564, 577 (D.D.C. 1980). As Daniel Webster stated in his address to Congress in 1832,
The Constitution . . . must be understood, not as enjoining an absolute relative equality, because that would be demanding an impossibility, but as requiring
of Congress to make the apportionment of Representatives
among the several States according to their respective numbers,
as near as may be. That which cannot be done perfectly must be done in a manner as near perfection as can be.
M. Balinski and H. Young, Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote, at 31 (1982) (first and second emphases added, third emphasis in original). Congress itself has recognized that the "one man, one vote" principle set forth in intrastate districting cases has at least some application to national reapportionment decisions. See The Decennial Population Census and Congressional Apportionment, H.R. Rep. No. 1314, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 5-6 (1970).
Article I, Section 2 imposes upon Congress the same duty to "meet the standard of equal representation for equal numbers of people as nearly as is practicable," Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 544, 89 S.Ct. 1234, 1236, 22 L.Ed.2d 535 (1969), when apportioning Congressional districts that it imposes upon state legislatures.
Population equality between districts is the "preeminent, if not the sole, criterion on which to adjudge constitutionality." Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 11, 23, 95 S.Ct. 751, 764, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975). "That is the high standard of justice and common sense which the Founders set for us." Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18, 84 S.Ct. at 535. "Adopting any standard other than population equality . . . would subtly erode the Constitution's ideal of equal representation." Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 731, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 2659, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983) (citation omitted).
The "as nearly as is practicable" standard requires that a "good-faith effort [be made] to achieve precise mathematical equality" between districts. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 1229, 22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969). Only population variances which "are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown" are tolerated by Article I, Section 2. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 2352, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973) (quoting Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531, 89 S.Ct. at 1229). In making this determination, the Supreme Court has stated that a "court must consider whether the population differences among districts could have been reduced or eliminated altogether by a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population." Karcher, 462 U.S. at 730, 103 S.Ct. at 2658. Good faith is lacking when the use of a different apportionment scheme could easily reduce population variances. Doulin v. White, 528 F. Supp. 1323, 1329 (E.D.Ark. 1982).
A party challenging the apportionment of Congressional districts bears the burden of demonstrating that the population differences among districts could have been avoided. If the party challenging the apportionment scheme establishes "that the population differences were not the result of a good-faith effort to achieve equality," the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove "that each significant variance between districts was necessary to achieve some legitimate goal." Karcher, 462 U.S. at 730-31, 103 S.Ct. at 2658. "[N]either history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation. Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579-80, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1391, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964).
Plaintiffs contend that the goal of equal representation for equal numbers of people can only be met by adopting a reapportionment method which results in the smallest absolute difference between the number of persons per representative. Plaintiffs have presented expert testimony that the Dean method, also known as the method of harmonic means, best achieves that goal because it was expressly designed to, and does in fact, calculate reapportionment to result in the smallest absolute difference between numbers of persons per representative. (Tiahrt Affidavit at p. 3. See also Declaration of Ernst at p. 6.) The Dean method also best accomplishes the goal of creating districts closest to the ideal district size. (Tiahrt Affidavit at p. 5.) The Hill method can never meet the criteria proposed by Plaintiffs, because its express objective is to minimize the relative difference between the number of persons per representative and the relative difference between each person's share of a representative.
By arguing that proportions and percentages are the proper criteria, rather than absolute numbers, Defendants ignore the fact that each number represents a person whose voting rights are potentially impacted by the population disparities. There is "no excuse for ignoring our Constitution's plain objective of making equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives." Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18, 84 S.Ct. at 535.
The criteria used by Plaintiffs have been used by other courts applying the equal population standard to intrastate apportionment. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 728, 103 S.Ct. at 2657 (variances between the actual districts and the ideal district size and total population difference between largest and smallest districts — range); Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 527, 89 S.Ct. at 1227 (variance between actual districts and ideal); White, 412 U.S. at 785, 93 S.Ct. at 2350 (variances between the largest and smallest district and the ideal district size, average deviation from the ideal district size, and total population difference between largest and smallest districts — range); Wells, 394 U.S. at 540-41, 89 S.Ct. at 1233-34 (maximum deviation above and below the mean district size). No court has actually used the criteria proposed by Defendants to decide whether a good faith effort has been made to achieve equal representation among congressional districts. More importantly, the criteria proposed by Plaintiffs recognizes that the goal of Article I, Section 2 is equal representation, not relatively equal representation.
Courts traditionally look to variances from the ideal district size to determine whether a district is under or over represented. In determining whether avoidable and unjustified variances exist, the court looks to the entire apportionment plan. The court analyzes the disparities between states by comparing the districts in those states to the ideal district, and not to each other.
The ideal district reflects the size of each district if it were possible to truly achieve equal representation for equal numbers of people — the goal mandated by the Constitution. Any difference from the ideal reflects unequal representation. Thus, absolute difference from the ideal district is the proper criterion to use in determining whether Congress has met the goal of equal representation for equal numbers of people. Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that another recognized and accepted statistical method, besides the Hill method, would more closely meet the constitutional mandate of absolute population equality among districts. The burden therefore shifts to Defendants to demonstrate that the greater disparity under the Hill method is necessary to achieve some legitimate goal.
The court recognizes that two factors are present in interstate apportionment which mandate differences in district size — the need to maintain state boundaries and to award each state at least one representative. The Dean method complies with those requirements and results in smaller disparities between districts than the Hill method.
Defendants attempt to justify the variances in district size under the Hill method, contending that Congress considered and rejected the Dean method in 1941 when it chose the method of equal proportions. However, a review of the House debates prior to the enactment of 2 U.S.C. § 2a discloses that the Dean method was not given serious consideration by Congress. The debates centered on choosing between the method of major fractions and the method of equal proportions, and there was little or no discussion of other available methods. 87 Cong.Rec. 1071, 1084 (1941). The legislative history does not support Defendants' argument that Congress deliberately chose the Hill method over the Adams and Dean methods since the only choice offered was between Hill and major fractions.
The court is not including the Adams method in its discussion, since it results in "quota violations," as recognized by the dissent, and therefore does not appear to be a viable alternative.
Defendants also contend that Congress determined that relative difference was a better measure of the inequity between district size than absolute population variances. If Congress indeed made that decision it did so without benefit of the Supreme Court's interpretation of Article I, Section 2, since the method of equal proportions was adopted prior to Wesberry. Moreover, Congress initially adopted the Hill method in 1941 because it allowed. Arkansas to retain its existing congressional seats. Defendants admit that Congress' efforts to deal with reapportionment have been political in nature, involving compromises among the states. Defendants cannot justify the population variances based on Congress' past "considerations of practical politics." Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 533, 89 S.Ct. at 1230.
During the debate one congressional delegate, Mr. Cox, presented the issue for discussion as being "whether Arkansas shall lose a representative and losing one, shall Michigan gain one." 87 Cong.Rec. at 1078.
Defendants actually compare Congress' efforts to select an apportionment method to the exercise the framers undertook — the Great Compromise. This comparison effectively demonstrates the fallacy of Defendants' entire argument. The House of Representatives was the result of the Great Compromise — one house to be chosen by the people based on population. The Constitution decrees that one house should be chosen on the basis of population, (persons per representative) and Congress cannot ignore that mandate by choosing a method which considers each person's share of a representative.
Finally, Defendants argue that considerations of equity and fairness supported the selection of the Hill method in 1941. This position reflects the historical congressional concern with finding a " mathematically defensible way to apportion Representatives among the States in compliance with the Constitution." See The Decennial Population Census and Congressional Apportionment, H.R. Rep. No. 1314, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., App. B. at 15 (1970) (emphasis added). However, Congressional apportionment is not an issue to be governed by subjective mathematical or equitable concerns; it is strictly a Constitutional matter. Population equality within each district is the goal under the Constitution, not a goal, as Defendants argue. The Constitution mandates apportionment "among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers," not "according to their respective Numbers and whatever other considerations Congress or its mathematicians may deem appropriate at any given time."
While it is theoretically possible to establish a justification for failure to comply, as far as is practicable, with the constitutional mandate of absolute population equality among districts, see e.g. Doulin, 528 F. Supp. at 1330 (projected population changes might, in some circumstances, be a justification that the Supreme Court would accept), it is difficult, if not impossible, to do so. This narrow construction of the constitutional apportionment mandate prompted one Supreme Court justice to complain "that the Court rejected `every type of justification that has been — possibly, every one that could be — advanced.'" Id. quoting Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 537, 89 S.Ct. at 1232 (Fortas, J., concurring). The justifications offered by Defendants do not satisfy the stringent criteria applied by the United States Supreme Court.
Assuming that Congress's selection of the Hill method was rational in 1941, as defendants argue, the court is not bound to uphold its constitutionality today, as applied to the 1990 census. A statute which was once validly enacted and constitutional may be rendered unconstitutional by a change in the facts or circumstances upon which it was based. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 38 n. 68, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 1549 n. 68, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969); United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153, 58 S.Ct. 778, 784, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938); Nashville, C. S.L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 415, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949 (1935); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547, 44 S.Ct. 405, 406, 68 L.Ed. 841 (1924).
In this case, the Supreme Court's ruling in Wesberry (interpreting Article I, Section 2) and demographic changes in the United States' population since 1941 constitute sufficient changes in circumstances to call into question the rationality of 2 U.S.C. § 2a today.
At any rate, Defendants cannot claim that Congress made a good faith effort to achieve the goal of equal representation for equal numbers of people before instituting the most recent reapportionment of representatives because the reapportionment process was automatic, and Congress, in its role as law and policy maker, had no part in the process. Congress, by enacting 2 U.S.C. § 2a in 1941, did not relieve itself of any further obligation to inquire into the Constitutionality of each apportionment decision. It does not place an undue burden upon Congress to require that, once every decade, it apply various accepted statistical methods to the census results and determine which method best meets the Constitutional mandate for population equality among the districts.
This view somewhat overlaps the issues raised by Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, concerning the automatic nature of the present apportionment statute. The court believes that Count II may have some merit, but will not address those issues since 2 U.S.C. § 2a has been declared unconstitutional on other grounds.
By complacently relying, for over fifty years, on an apportionment method which does not even consider absolute population variances between districts, Congress has ignored the goal of equal representation for equal numbers of people. The court finds that unjustified and avoidable population differences between districts exist under the present apportionment, and
HEREBY ORDERS that Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Defendants' motion is DENIED as to Count I of Plaintiffs' complaint. Judgment shall enter declaring section 2a of Title 2, United States Code unconstitutional and void, and permanently enjoining Defendants from effecting reapportionment of the House of Representatives under the provisions of that statute. Having decided Count I in favor of Plaintiffs and granted Plaintiffs' request for declaratory and injunctive relief, it is unnecessary for the court to further consider the merits of Count II.