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AHMAD YUSUF ALI, Plaintiff, v. BERNEY KESZLER, ET AL., Defendant.

ORDER

EDWARD C. PRADO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

On this date the Court considered the Plaintiff's motion to reopen this case on the basis of newly discovered evidence and in the interest of justice. After careful consideration of the motion and the evidence presented at today's hearing on the motion, the Court will grant the requested relief.

Ahmad Yusuf Ali filed a civil rights lawsuit in this Court on November 20, 1998, claiming that the Defendants in this case (who include several medical personnel at the John B. Connally Unit) violated his Eighth Amendment right to be protected from cruel and unusual punishment. Ali claimed that, although doctors at the facilities where he had been incarcerated prior to coming to the Connally Unit had discovered back disorders and had classified him as work-restricted, these restrictions were lifted by Connally personnel without appropriate medical evidence, and Ali was forced to resume heavy manual labor.

During the course of litigation, the Defendants continued to deny Ali's requests for medical examinations that he asserted would reveal the extent of his back disorders. The summary judgment evidence suggested that the determination to lift Ali's records was based solely on a brief visual examination of Ali's bent spine. Although Ali complained frequently of back pain and, eventually, numbness and tingling of his extremities, the evidence suggests that no further diagnostic assessments were made of his back and that, eventually, his primary physician refused to see Ali, except on an "emergency basis." Ali testified that he was informed that an "emergency" was defined as an inability to get himself out of bed.

In addition to making requests to the Defendants, Ali applied to this Court for a more thorough objective evaluation of his condition. Ali requested relief in the form of the appointment of counsel, the appointment of an independent medical expert, and an order that the Defendants themselves provide the MRI. This Court denied all requested relief. In July 1999, Ali's new prison physician, Steven Mercado, requested and was denied an MRI for Ali. This request was either directly denied, or denial was approved, by one of the former Defendants, Dr. Own Murray, who was also an appointed expert in this case.

After this denial, Ali sought, and was granted, permission to add Murray as a Defendant.

This Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on February 7, 2000, holding that Ali had presented no evidence beyond his own subjective sensations of pain that his Eighth Amendment rights had been violated. In addition, the Court found no evidence of deliberate indifference to Ali's medical condition. Several months later, on May 24, 2000, Ali received the requested MRI, which revealed that he had spinal stenosis in his cervical spine as the result of bulging discs. In addition, Ali had a mild disc bulge. He received surgery on August 3, 2000, and on August 10, he filed a motion for relief from judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence. This Court appointed an attorney for Ali, and set a date for a hearing on the motion.

Discussion

Ali seeks relief for judgment on three grounds, each provided for by Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. First, Ali argues that the MRI results and subsequent surgery constitute "newly discovered evidence" that Ali, through the exercise of due diligence could not have discovered before trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) Second, Ali argues that the Defendants in this case engaged in "misconduct" in rebuffing Ali's attempts to gamer evidence of his back disorder. FED. R.Civ.P.60(b)(3) Finally, Ali contends that relief is appropriate under Rule 60's "catch-all" provision, which allows a court to rescind an order for "any other reason." FED.R.Civ.P.60(b)(6). The Court finds that relief is appropriate on the first and third bases.

The Court has given serious thought to the appropriateness of the appointment of experts who have the level of interest in a case that Dr. Murray has. Dr. Murray was a named defendant in this case who was dismissed, and then reinstated, as a defendant. Dr. Murray was also an employee of the Connally Unit and in a unique position to hinder Ali's attempts to garner evidence on his hehalf. Certainly, any expert testimony offered by Dr. Murray, especially if impeached, could have been challenged on grounds of credibility and thus should have been heard by a jury. In the end, the Court will not make a determination regarding the appropriateness of Dr. Murray's actions in this matter. The Court must acknowledge the unique circumstances of prison life and must also acknowledge the difficulties and expense of judicial insistence on disinterested experts in every case. Moreover, the Court is cognizant of its own oversights when reviewing the facts and record of this particular case and denying the initial requests for a medical evaluation.

Newly Discovered Evidence

To successfully obtain relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a movant must demonstrate that (1) he exercised due diligence in obtaining the information; (2) the evidence is material and controlling; and (3) the evidence clearly would have produced a different result if presented before the original judgment. New Hampshire Co. v. Martech USA, Inc., 993 F.2d 1195, 1200-1201 (5th Cir. 1993). The evidence must be evidence of facts existing at trial.

The Court finds that Ali exercised due diligence in attempting to secure evidence of a serious medical condition. As Ali notes, he made various attempts to obtain medical attention and diagnoses from the Defendants and to get this Court to appoint a medical expert and legal counsel and to provide injunctive relief in the form of ordering the Defendants to perform the MRI. As a prisoner, these were the only real vehicles available to him for the collection of evidence. Ali's medical records and medical care is in the complete control of the State. He had no choice but to ask the State — and this Court — for assistance, and he had no recourse when that assistance was denied.

The Court also finds that the MRI results are material and controlling evidence so that they could have changed the outcome of this matter. It is important to remember that the challenged "outcome" is merely the Court's ruling on a summary judgment motion. Thus, the question is whether the admission of the MRI results would have prevented summary judgment by raising a fact issue on Ali's claims. The Government apparently concedes that the results constitute evidence that Ali suffered from a serious medical condition. In this Court's summary judgment Order, this Court concluded that no evidence had been presented on this allegation; thus, the results are clearly material and might have changed the result, at least as to that finding.

The Government argues, however, that there is no newly discovered evidence on the question of whether the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to that medical condition. The Court must concede that this evidence was present in the summary judgment record and not given appropriate attention by this Court. For this reason, the Court bases it decision to vacate that Order in part of Rule 60(b)(3), which permits judicial reversal when the Court deems such reversal necessary.

The Defendants argue that, the MRI results notwithstanding, Ali's suit alleges nothing more than that the Defendants were negligent in their treatment of him. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, Ali must demonstrate deliberate indifference to his pain and suffering. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). As Ali points out, however, there is evidence sufficient to raise a fact issue on whether the Defendant's treatment of Ali exceed that of mere negligence or medical malpractice. There is evidence in this record that these Defendants had more than Ali's mere subjective complaints of pain on which to make their medical determinations. Ali had been x-rayed and diagnosed at two facilities prior to coming to the Connally Unit. He had been placed on work restrictions based on objective diagnoses of back disorders. There is at least some evidence that these Defendants disregarded this objective evidence in light of an extremely cursory examination of the curve of Ali's spine.

There is also some evidence that one Defendant, Dr. Keszler, made a false entry in Ali's record. Ali asserted in his pleadings before this Court that, after Ali began experiencing numbness and tingling sensations, he was again referred to Keszler. According to Ali, Keszler refused to see him because of the "only-in-an-emergency" notation in Ali's records. However, Ali's records include a notation that he was seen by Keszler on that date and presented no abnormalities.

In addition, there is at least some evidence that these Defendants disregarded the request of Dr. Mercado that Ali receive more thorough and reliable testing. There is evidence that Dr. Berney Keszler refused to see Ali for anything but what Dr. Keszler believed to be an emergency, in spite of new neurological symptoms that Ali professed to be experiencing. There is evidence that Ali sought medical attention again and again and was again and again dismissed with an observation that there was no evidence of a condition beyond his testimony of pain. The Defendants seek to avoid Ali's requested relief by pointing out that there was no objective evidence of a medical problem. However, it cannot be that the State can continually disregard subjective evidence, thereby shielding itself from liability, especially in a case such as this, where objective evidence had, in fact, been gathered and was simply disregarded.

The Defendants point out the denial was not definitive; this raises a fact issue that may be explored at trial.

The Defendants argue that there can be no finding of deliberate indifference where the record reflects that the prisoner was seen for his medical complaints. The case cited for this proposition, McCord v. Maggio, is not broad enough to support the Government's claims here, however. See 910 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1990) ( Maggio I). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Maggio held that, under the facts presented to it, the plaintiff had not made out an Eighth Amendment claim, in part because the record documented "assessment and treatment of McCord's medical complaints by medical practitioners which the magistrate credited." Id. at 1251. This holding is at least two steps removed from the facts before the Court. In the first place, it is precisely the questions of assessment and treatment that Ali is contesting here. Surely the Government does not argue that any visit to a medical practitioner, no matter how perfunctory, is sufficient to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. See Sappington v. Ulrich, 868 F. Supp. 194, 200 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (inadequate medical care cannot be reduced to mere quantification; it also involves consideration of quality of care). Second, Maggia was decided after a trial had been held on the merits, and factual and credibility determinations had been made. See Maggio v. McCord, 927 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991) ( Maggio II). There has been no credibility determination at this stage of these proceedings; nor could there have been.

Whether these defendants had subjective awareness of Ali's medical condition is, and should have been, a fact question. of course, whether a defendant had subjective knowledge is often a fact question. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. The Court rejects the Defendants' argument that this acknowledgment necessitates a trial in each and every Eighth Amendment case. A trial is only necessary where there is evidence to raise a question of knowledge of risk and disregard for that risk. In this case, there is sufficient evidence, at least, for a jury to conclude that two prior objective diagnoses and Ali's own assertions that he was in pain put these Defendants on notice of a problem. In addition, a hospital employee, Dr. Mercado, testified that he believed there was some problem.

The Defendants argue that Mercado's testimony proved that there was nothing more than Ali's subjective sensations on which to base Mercado's suspicions (or caution). While Mercado's testimony was not conclusively supportive of Ali's claim, it should be considered in its entirety. Mercado testified that, at the time he began investigating Ali's complaints, he knew that Ali had been diagnosed by two other facilities with back disorders and placed on work restrictions and that Ali had been complaining for more than a year of back pain with no relief. Thus, Mercado had more than Ali's subjective assertions to guide his judgment. In addition, while Mercado did testify that he did not suspect that a neck disorder was causing Ali's lower back pain, he also testified that it was entirely possible that the lower back pain was caused by such a disorder. The Eighth Amendment does not require Ali to prove that these Defendants knew the precise cause of his pain, only that they showed deliberate indifference to his suffering.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Ali has offered new evidence on the question of his medical condition sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim. In addition, the Court finds that it erred in concluding that no fact issues existed at summary judgment on the question of whether these Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to Ali's medical condition. Ali has not proven his case, but he has established his entitlement to a trial on its merits.

ACCORDINGLY, it is ORDERED that the request for relief is GRANTED, the Order granting summary judgment and the judgment itself are VACATED, and this case be REINSTATED on this the Court.

SIGNED and ENTERED this 1st day of December, 2000.

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AHMAD YUSUF ALI v. BERNEY KESZLER
(Dec 1, 2000)