nd supervising assistant district
attorneys and detectives with regard to sexual assault investigations and abuse of power. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants "disregarded and concealed exculpatory evidence and disregarded clearly established criminal investigation training, practices and/or techniques." (
Id. ¶ 4). They allege that DA Christine was a policymaker and administrator "responsible for the formulation and/or implementation of all practices, policies and procedures of the office; the discipline, assignment, training and supervision of staff, including assistant district attorneys and detectives; and all other day-to-day operations, oversight, command and control of the office." (
Id. ¶¶ 26, 174). They further allege that DA Christine was responsible for the "assignment, control, command, oversight and supervision of assistant district attorneys and detectives involved in rape and assault investigations." (
Id. ¶ 176). Finally, plaintiffs allege that DA Christine "demonstrated a deliberate indifference to the rights of potential criminal suspects" by failing to adopt policies "against the unbridled exercise and abuse of power by assistant district attorneys and/or detectives within the county's jurisdiction" or to supervise against the same. (
Id. ¶ 177).
The plaintiffs have alleged plausible claims of failure to train and supervise. They have not made allegations based on any prosecutorial act of DA Christine. Thus, the plaintiffs have taken care only to allege acts or omissions of DA Christine for which the County may be liable. We note that the training and supervision alleged to be improper relates to investigative techniques, not to prosecutorial decisions or techniques. See Wallace, 2010 WL 785253, *5. Therefore, the plaintiffs have properly pleaded a claim of municipal liability under Monell against the County. The defendants' motion to dismiss will be denied with respect to the County.
2. Defendant DA Christine
Defendants argue that claims brought by the plaintiffs against DA Christine in his official capacity should be dismissed because a suit against an individual defendant in his official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the municipality. The court agrees. "[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. . . ." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 n. 55. Such a suit is properly treated as a suit against the entity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 167 n. 14 (1985) ("There is no longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, for under Monell . . . local government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief."). Accordingly, the court will dismiss the claim against DA Christine, because it is brought against him in solely his official capacity, and duplicates the surviving claim against Monroe County.
Though plaintiffs' complaint did not clearly indicate whether DA Christine was being sued in his official or individual capacity, the plaintiffs have definitively stated in their briefs that Count VII sues Christine "solely in his official capacity as a final policymaker of Monroe County. Plaintiffs have not sued District Attorney Christine in his personal capacity." (Pls.'s Br. Opp. at 15 (Doc. 21 at 19); Compl. ¶ 174).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted, in part, and denied, in part. The motion will be granted with respect to Defendant Monroe County District Attorney's Office, having been voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs. The motion will be granted with respect to Count VII against Defendant District Attorney Christine. Accordingly, DA Christine will be dismissed from the case. The motion will be denied with respected to all other parties and counts. An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, to wit, this 26th day of July 2010, upon consideration of the motion to dismiss (Doc. 10) filed by Defendants Monroe County, the Monroe County District Attorney's Office, District Attorney E. David Christine Jr., Assistant District Attorney Michael Rakaczewski, and Detective Wendy Bentzoni, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as follows: 1. The motion is GRANTED as unopposed with respect to Defendant Monroe County District Attorney's Office. Defendant Monroe County District Attorney's Office is HEREBY DISMISSED from the case. 2. The motion is GRANTED with respect to Defendant District Attorney E. David Christine. Defendant District Attorney E. David Christine is HEREBY DISMISSED from the case. 3. The motion is DENIED with respect to Defendants Monroe County, Assistant District Attorney Michael Rakaczewski, and Detective Wendy Bentzoni.