1. Deeds and Conveyances — Invalid Grants — Adverse Possession — Color — Occupation — Constructive Possession.
The plaintiff claims the land in dispute under a grant from the State which has been declared invalid, and also sets up and relies on a deed to a part of these lands, with evidence only of possession of the lands described in the deeds, and contained within the larger boundaries of the grant:
Held, the plaintiff's constructive possession will only extend to the outer lines of the deed, and could not ripen his title under "color" beyond them to the lands within the description of the grant; and title by adverse possession otherwise must be confined to the lands actually occupied.
2. Deeds and Conveyances — Color — Descriptions — Record — Appeal and Error.
In this case it is
Held, that a will relied upon by plaintiff cannot be construed as color beyond the boundaries in his deed, also introduced in evidence, the description of the lands devised not appearing in the record.
ALLEN, J., after stating the case:
The grant under which the plaintiff claims was declared invalid on the facts appearing in the record, upon the former appeal in this action ( Anderson v. Meadows, 159 N.C. 404), and therefore the plaintiff cannot recover any of the land outside of the Woodard deed upon a connected chain of title from the State.
She must then rely upon proof of title by adverse possession, with or without color.
If she relies upon adverse possession alone, her action must fail, because her actual possession has not extended beyond the Woodard (403) deed, and title acquired by adverse possession, without color, is confined to the land occupied. Malone Real Prop., 280.
It is true that some of the witnesses speak of entering into possession of Grant 2596, but the Woodard tract is within the bounds of the grant, and when the evidence is considered as a whole, it is evident they referred to possession of the Woodard land, and it is so treated in the brief of appellant.
The last position left open to the plaintiff is that the will of Jacob shope, which is the only paper title under which she claims, is color of title, and that her possession of the Woodard land extends to the boundaries of her color; but this contention cannot be maintained, for the reason that the description of the land devised does not appear in the record, and there is no evidence that the land in the will extends beyond the Woodard deed.
There is also no evidence of a claim by the plaintiff beyond the Woodard deed, and adverse possession does not extend beyond the claim, although this may fall short of the lines of a deed, under which one is in possession. Haddock v. Leary, 148 N.C. 382.
It also appears inferentially that the defendants have had possession for many years of the land outside of the Woodard deed.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the plaintiff could not, in any view of the evidence, recover more than the land in the Woodard deed, and this has been awarded to her.
No error.
(404)