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Vincent M. Casey, with him Charles J. Margiotti, of Margiotti, Pugliese Casey, for appellants. James S. Berger, for appellee.

Judges

OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE DREW, June 30, 1944:

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Case Summary: Potter County Commissioners' Salary Case (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, June 30, 1944)

Factual and Procedural Background

These consolidated appeals arise from an auditors' report and a subsequent order of the Court of Common Pleas of Potter County (June Term, 1943, No. 61). The appellants are former commissioners of Potter County, an eighth class county of Pennsylvania. After assuming office the first Monday of January, 1940, the commissioners paid themselves annual salaries of $1,900 each. During an audit of county expenditures for 1942 the county auditors concluded each commissioner's lawful salary for that year should have been $800, and they surcharged the commissioners a total of $3,300 (representing an alleged overpayment of $1,100 to each of the three commissioners). The Court of Common Pleas sustained the auditors' surcharge, and the commissioners appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The auditors' report had expressly exonerated the commissioners from fraud or concealment; accordingly, earlier years' salary payments were treated as final and not open to collateral challenge in the present proceeding.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the lawful annual salary of a Potter County commissioner for the year 1942 was $1,900 (as paid by the commissioners) or $800 (as determined by the auditors).
Whether Section 2 of the Act of June 9, 1931, P.L. 401 — authorizing the Court of Common Pleas in a county reduced in classification to fix the salaries of county commissioners (not to exceed former salaries) — is constitutionally permissible or whether it violates Article XIV, § 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by impermissibly delegating the legislature's power to regulate county officers' compensation.
How statutory changes (notably the Act of June 7, 1917, and the Act of June 24, 1937) determining county classification and the status/compensation of the office of director of the poor affect the proper computation of commissioners' salaries.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Riehl v. Miller, 319 Pa. 201, 178 A. 495	Auditors' reports for earlier years, when they exonerate officers of fraud or concealment, are conclusive and cannot later be collaterally attacked to recover alleged overpayments.	The court relied on Riehl v. Miller to explain that salaries paid in prior years (and covered by auditors' reports that exonerated the commissioners) could not now be challenged; thus the court limited its review to the 1942 year at issue.
County of Crawford v. Nash, 99 Pa. 253	Article XIV, § 5's statement that "The compensation of county officers shall be regulated by law" requires that compensation be ascertained and defined by the legislature (i.e., compensation regulation is a legislative function).	The court cited this case to support the principle that the legislature must determine county officers' compensation and that this power is not delegable to the judiciary.
Petition of Drake, 106 Pa. Super. 383, 163 A. 37	The determination of county officers' compensation is a legislative matter and the legislature may not delegate that power.	The court cited Petition of Drake as authority reinforcing the proposition that the legislature cannot delegate the power to fix compensation to the courts (supporting the conclusion that Section 2 of the 1931 Act is unconstitutional).
Rosenfield v. Drake, 112 Pa. Super. 1, 170 A. 414	Same principle as Petition of Drake: legislative determination of compensation is nondelegable.	The court cited Rosenfield v. Drake as additional supporting authority for the nondelegation principle applied to county officers' compensation statutes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by noting there were no disputed facts and that the sole legal question was whether the lawful annual salary for each commissioner in 1942 was $1,900 or $800. It framed the analysis by recounting the statutory and classificatory history relevant to compensation:

Prior to 1931, Potter County had been a seventh class county, and commissioners (who also acted as directors of the poor) received annual compensation totaling $1,800: $1,000 for commissioner duties plus $800 as director of the poor.
The 1930 census reduced Potter County's classification to eighth class. Under the Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 570, §1, an eighth class county commissioner received $500, plus $300 for acting as director of the poor — totaling $800.
Section 2 of the Act of June 9, 1931, P.L. 401 amended the General County Law so that when a county was reduced in classification, the Court of Common Pleas could, by written order, fix the salaries of county commissioners (and the district attorney) at amounts not exceeding the salaries formerly paid. Pursuant to such authority, the Court of Common Pleas of Potter County, on November 2, 1931, fixed commissioners' salaries at $1,600; commissioners were paid under that order through 1941 without objection.
The Act of June 24, 1937, P.L. 2017 abolished the office of director of the poor and made county commissioners the executive and administrative directors of the institution district, with an entitlement to an additional $300 for service in that capacity.

Applying these statutes and facts, the court concluded that for 1942 the lawful salary was $800 (composed of the eighth-class commissioner salary of $500 plus the $300 for service as executive and administrative director of the institution district created by the 1937 Act). The court explained that the commissioners' decision after 1937 to add the $300 provided by the 1937 statute to the $1,600 they had been receiving (thus treating their pay as $1,900) was erroneous — when the office of director of the poor was abolished, "the salary went with it."

Separately, the court addressed the constitutionality of Section 2 of the 1931 Act, which had authorized the Court of Common Pleas to fix salaries when a county was reduced in classification. The court held that this provision impermissibly delegated the legislature's constitutional duty to regulate county officers' compensation (Article XIV, § 5), citing County of Crawford v. Nash and related authorities to support the proposition that compensation must be ascertained and defined by the legislature and that such power cannot be delegated.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order of the Court of Common Pleas. It held that the lawful annual salary of a Potter County commissioner for 1942 was $800 (not $1,900), and it held that Section 2 of the Act of June 9, 1931, P.L. 401 — authorizing the Court of Common Pleas to fix commissioners' salaries upon reduction in county classification — violated Article XIV, § 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The auditors' surcharge of $3,300 (an alleged overpayment of $1,100 to each of the three commissioners) was sustained by the courts and the appeals were dismissed; the commissioners' lawful salary for 1942 is fixed at $800.
Statutory/constitutional principle reaffirmed: Compensation of county officers must be determined by legislative enactment and the legislature cannot delegate that power to the courts. The opinion identifies Section 2 of the 1931 Act as unconstitutional on that ground.
The opinion does not purport to set aside auditors' reports for prior years that exonerated the commissioners of fraud or concealment; those prior reports were treated as conclusive in accordance with cited authority.

Disposition: Order of the Court of Common Pleas affirmed.

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Potter County Commissioners' Salary Case.

Municipal corporations — Counties — Commissioners — Compensation — Acts of June 7, 1917, P. L. 570, and June 24, 1937, P. L. 2017.

1. Under the Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 570, the salary of the commissioners of an eighth class county is $500, and, under the Act of June 24, 1937, P. L. 2017 (which abolished the office of director of the poor), the county commissioners are executive and administrative directors of the institution district and entitled to additional compensation of $300 as such officers. [142-3]

Constitutional law — Municipal corporations — Counties — Commissioners — Compensation — Determination by courts — Legislative power — Delegation — General County Law — Act of June 9, 1931, P. L. 401.

2. Section 2 of the Act of June 9, 1931, P. L. 401 (which amended the General County Law of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1278), authorizing the court of common pleas of any county reduced in classification to fix the salaries of county commissioners, violates section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution. [143-4]

3. Article XIV, section 5, which provides that "The compensation of county officers shall be regulated by law", means that the compensation shall be ascertained and defined by the legislature; and this power of the legislature cannot be delegated. [143-4]

Argued May 24, 1944.

OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE DREW, June 30, 1944:

The facts and law of these three appeals are identical. Appellants are former commissioners of Potter County, an eighth class county of Pennsylvania. After they took office the first Monday of January, 1940, they had paid to themselves as salaries $1900 a year. The county auditors in auditing the county expenditures for the year 1942 became convinced that the salaries of each of the county commissioners for that year should have been $800, instead of $1900, and accordingly surcharged them $3300, being $1100 overpayment to each of the three. This was sustained by the learned court below, and these appeals followed.

There are no disputed questions of fact involved, and, therefore, nothing to submit to a jury. Since the auditors' report exonerated the commissioners from any fraud or concealment, we are not concerned with salaries paid them in prior years of their terms because, under these circumstances, the auditors' reports for the earlier years are conclusive and cannot now be challenged: Riehl v. Miller, 319 Pa. 201, 178 A. 495.

There is but one question for our decision, whether $1900 or $800 was the lawful annual salary of a commissioner of Potter County for the year 1942.

Prior to 1931, Potter County was a seventh class county of Pennsylvania and its commissioners, acting also as directors of the poor drew annual salaries of $1800. This amount was made up of a salary of $1000 for acting as commissioner and $800 for services as director of the poor. The census of 1930 showed that the population of the county was under 20,000 and therefore it should become an eighth class county, in which the salary of commissioner was $500, plus $300 for acting as director of the poor: Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 570, § 1. By the provisions of the Act of June 24, 1937, P. L. 2017, however, the office of director of the poor was abolished and the county commissioners became executive and administrative directors of the institution district entitled to additional compensation of $300 for service as such officers. For the year in question, 1942, the lawful salary of appellants was $800.

The General County Law of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1278, § 301, provides that the salaries and compensation of county officers shall be as now or hereafter fixed by law. Section 32 of this statute provides that classification of counties shall be ascertained and fixed according to population. This latter section was amended by section 2 of the Act of June 9, 1931, P. L. 401, so that in any case where a county was reduced in population and it should become a county of a lower class, the Court of Common Pleas of that county might by written order, fix the salaries of the county commissioners, and of the district attorney at an amount not exceeding the salaries formerly paid to such officers. Pursuant to a petition by the then commissioners, on November 2, 1931, the Court of Common Pleas of Potter County made an order fixing the salaries of its commissioners at $1600. The county commissioners of Potter County received salaries in accordance with the order of court up to and including the year 1941, without objection.

Following the passage of the Act of 1937, supra, the commissioners of Potter County made their first mistake by adding the $300 provided by that statute for acting as executive and administrative directors of the institution district, and retained the $1600 they had been receiving, $1000 for acting as commissioners, and $600 for acting as directors of the poor. When the office of poor director was abolished the salary went with it.

Section 2 of the Act of 1931, supra, authorizing the court of common pleas of any county reduced in classification to fix the salaries of county commissioners is clearly violative of section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. It cannot be denied that the intent and purpose of this provision in the statute was to permit the court to fix the salaries of county officers, and this regardless of the fact the Constitution says: "The compensation of county officers shall be regulated by law." This plainly means that the compensation shall be ascertained and defined by the legislature. County of Crawford v. Nash, 99 Pa. 253. There is no question but that the determining of such compensation for such officers is a legislative matter, and one the legislature cannot delegate: Petition of Drake, 106 Pa. Super. 383, 163 A. 37; see also Rosenfield v. Drake, 112 Pa. Super. 1, 170 A. 414.

Order affirmed.

POTTER CO. COMMISSIONERS' SALARY CASE