Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The petitioner, a provisional employee, contends that she was improperly dismissed from her position with the respondent and that the respondent subsequently failed to appoint her to another position for which she was certified as eligible on a civil service list. After the respondent answered the petition, the petitioner sought a stay of the proceeding to permit discovery on those claims in the petition which were based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We agree with Special Term that the petitioner failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she had a valid cause of action and find that the denial of the stay and dismissal of the proceeding were proper.
As a provisional employee, the petitioner could be dismissed without a hearing and without cause (see, e.g., Mitchell v. Town Bd., 97 A.D.2d 500; Sirohi v. Merges, 58 A.D.2d 645). Although such a dismissal may be challenged on the grounds that it is contrary to law or for an impermissible purpose, the petitioner has failed to allege facts necessary to show that her dismissal was improper. The respondent submitted convincing documentary evidence that the petitioner was dismissed due to her poor work performance.
The petitioner also failed to allege facts to establish that the respondent acted improperly in not selecting her for the new appointment. Civil Service Law § 61 gives the appointing agency the authority to select one of the three persons highest on the eligibility list, and the petitioner had no right to the appointment (see, Matter of Cassidy v. Municipal Civ. Serv. Commn., 37 N.Y.2d 526; Porto v. Town/Village of Harrison, 100 A.D.2d 870).
While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a means to redress a deprivation of constitutional rights, whether or not the petitioner has a protected property right in her employment must be determined under State law (see, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564). Under New York law, provisional employees have no property right in continued employment and can be dismissed at any time absent an impermissible purpose. The petitioner failed to allege facts to show an impermissible purpose. In addition, the petitioner had no property right with regard to the new appointment but merely an expectation of a property right (see, Matter of Cassidy v. Municipal Civ. Serv. Commn., supra). Based on the foregoing, the petitioner's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were properly dismissed. Although the petitioner alleged a deprivation of liberty, she has not requested a name-clearing hearing (see, Board of Regents v. Roth, supra), and has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she is entitled to such a hearing (see, Bishop v. Wood, supra; Mitchell v. Town Bd., supra). Lawrence, J.P., Kunzeman, Kooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.