REILLY, J.
Defendant pleaded guilty of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, in exchange for dismissal of a charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Genesee Circuit Judge Robert Ransom originally sentenced defendant to a prison term of eight to twenty years. This Court, MICHAEL J. KELLY, P.J., and DOCTOROFF and CAVANAGH, JJ., in an unpublished memorandum opinion, decided October 18, 1991 (Docket No. 127477), vacated the sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing in light of People v Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630, 656; 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990). Defendant was resentenced to a prison term of seven to twenty years, and again appeals as of right. We affirm.
This case arises from a robbery that occurred on October 21, 1989. Defendant waited in his car as two of his friends robbed a gas station at gunpoint in Flint Township, Michigan. In a separate, unrelated case, defendant pleaded guilty of armed robbery in exchange for dismissal of two counts of assault with intent to murder and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and was sentenced by Genesee Circuit Judge Valdemar Washington to a prison term of six to twenty years' imprisonment.
Defendant and his friends also robbed another establishment on October 20, 1989.
In this case, the sentencing guidelines' recommended minimum sentence was from eighteen to sixty months. At resentencing, the court explained that it was departing from the guidelines because
[t]he factors that are not considered in the Guideline range are the plea bargain which resulted in the dismissal of some six charges and a pattern of conduct that involved multiple life-threatening situations with the presence of a gun.
As additional reasons for departure, the court also indicated on the departure form that a structured environment was necessary beyond the guideline period for rehabilitation and the protection of the community.
On appeal, defendant contends that the court improperly exceeded the sentencing guidelines' recommendation. We disagree.
Sentences must be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender. Milbourn, supra. The sentencing guidelines are intended to assist the court in assessing the appropriate sentence and to promote statewide consistency in sentencing. People v Stone, 195 Mich. App. 600, 608; 491 N.W.2d 628 (1992). Departures from the sentencing guidelines' range are suspect and subject to careful scrutiny on appeal. Id. Departures are appropriate only where the guidelines do not adequately account for important factors legitimately considered at sentencing, or where the recommended range is disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense. Milbourn, supra at 657, 661; People v Rosales, 202 Mich. App. 47, 49; 507 N.W.2d 776 (1993).
This Court finds the reasons given by the sentencing court for departing from the guidelines adequate to justify the departure. A sentencing court is allowed to consider the facts underlying uncharged offenses, pending charges, and acquittals. People v Ewing (After Remand), 435 Mich. 443, 446 (opinion by BRICKLEY, J.), 473 (opinion by BOYLE, J.); 458 N.W.2d 880 (1990); People v Parr, 197 Mich. App. 41, 46; 494 N.W.2d 768 (1992). Further, this Court has recognized that a sentencing court may consider the nature of a plea bargain and the charges that were dismissed in exchange for the plea for which the court is sentencing. People v Brzezinski (After Remand), 196 Mich. App. 253, 256; 492 N.W.2d 781 (1992).
We see no reason why a sentencing court in a subsequent case may not also consider the uncharged offenses. None of the cases cited above suggest that uncharged criminal acts, or criminal acts that are the subject of dismissed charges, once considered by a sentencing court, may not be considered again at a subsequent sentencing provided the defendant is given an opportunity to test the accuracy of the factual allegations.
If the rationale of the dissent is carried to its logical conclusion, a sentencing court is precluded from taking into account prior criminal acts that previously have been considered by a prior sentencing court. We believe this conclusion is contrary to the intent of Ewing, supra at 446 (opinion by BRICKLEY, J.), and 473 (opinion by BOYLE, J.).
Affirmed.
R.M. DANIELS, J., concurred.