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Docket Number

A94A1418.

Attorney(S)

Howard Delaney, Stephen A. Delaney, for appellant. Garry T. Moss, District Attorney, A. Dee Morris, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Judges

POPE, Chief Judge.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: In re Hasty, A94A1418 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, Nov. 28, 1994)

Factual and Procedural Background

Attorney Jason R. Hasty was appointed to represent indigent defendant Perry Rhames. At arraignment on November 12, 1993, Rhames pled not guilty. The case was placed on the trial calendar for January 24, 1994. Hasty received timely notice and appeared at a preliminary calendar call on January 5, 1994.

On January 24, 1994, Hasty appeared at the regular calendar call and announced that he was not ready and filed several motions, including a motion for continuance. On January 25, 1994, the trial court denied the motion for continuance and held a hearing on the other motions. At the conclusion of that hearing the trial judge specifically asked Hasty whether any negotiations with the State were underway that could lead to a guilty plea. Hasty answered that no negotiations were underway and that the case would be tried. The district attorney agreed there were no negotiations but expressed concern Rhames might change his plea before trial; Hasty again denied any impending plea change. The judge informed Hasty that jurors would be summoned for January 26 specifically for Rhames' trial and instructed Hasty to be present and ready at 8:30 a.m.

That night Hasty continued to prepare for trial. On the morning of January 26, however, Hasty advised his client to consider changing his plea. At 8:30 a.m., before the case had been called and before jury selection began, Hasty informed the judge and the district attorney that Rhames wanted to plead guilty, despite there having been no negotiations with or recommendation from the district attorney. The trial court accepted Rhames' guilty plea. When questioned by the judge about when the decision to plead guilty was made, Rhames stated he had discussed pleading guilty with Hasty early in the case; Hasty's response to the judge's question about timing and reasons was described in the record as vague. At the conclusion of the judge's questioning, Hasty was held in criminal contempt and fined $500. Hasty's request for a separate, full hearing on the contempt charge was denied by the trial court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in finding attorney Hasty in criminal contempt.
Whether the trial court erred in denying Hasty a separate hearing on the contempt charge.
Whether the trial judge should disqualify himself from further proceedings because his impartiality might reasonably be questioned or because he was likely to be a material witness.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Hasty's) Arguments

Hasty argued that the trial court erred in finding him in contempt.
Hasty contended the court erred in failing to allow him a separate hearing on the contempt charge.
Hasty also asserted that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of criminal contempt.

Appellee's (State's) Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellee's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Moody v. State, 131 Ga. App. 355, 206 S.E.2d 79 (1974)	States that direct summary criminal contempt which arises in the presence of the court and tends to scandalize it or hinder or obstruct the orderly administration of justice is exempt from due process requirements of notice and hearing.	The court cited Moody to identify the narrow category of contempts that can be punished summarily without a separate hearing, then concluded Hasty's conduct did not fall within that category.
Spruell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 99, 250 S.E.2d 807 (1978)	Reiterates the principle regarding summary criminal contempt and the exception to notice and hearing requirements when the contempt occurs in the court's presence and tends to scandalize or obstruct administration of justice.	The court cited Spruell along with Moody to show the established standard for when summary contempt procedures are permissible, and used those authorities to conclude summary action was not warranted here.
In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 324 S.E.2d 443 (1985)	Holds judges should disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including instances where the judge is likely to be a material witness.	The court applied In re Crane to conclude the trial judge should disqualify himself from further proceedings because he was likely to be a material witness at Hasty's contempt hearing.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeals declined to resolve the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the contempt finding and instead focused on procedural protections and judicial impartiality. The court began by identifying the narrow exception that permits summary criminal contempt without notice and hearing (cases that arise in the court's presence and tend to scandalize the court or obstruct the administration of justice), citing Moody and Spruell for that proposition.

The court then compared Hasty's conduct to that narrow category and concluded Hasty's actions did not "tend to scandalize the trial court" nor did they "interfere with the preservation of order or decorum" in the courtroom. Because his conduct was not of the type that must be dealt with summarily, the appellate court held that Hasty was entitled to a separate hearing on the contempt charge rather than summary punishment at the conclusion of the judge's questioning.

Separately, the court analyzed judicial impartiality concerns. Relying on In re Crane, the court stated that judges should disqualify themselves where their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including when the judge is likely to be a material witness. The appellate court concluded that the trial judge was likely to be called as a material witness at any contempt hearing concerning the events described and therefore should not preside over further proceedings.

Based on these analyses, the court determined the proper procedural remedy was to reverse and remand for a separate contempt hearing conducted by a different judge.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's proceedings and remanded the matter for a separate hearing on the contempt charge to be conducted by a judge other than the one who originally presided. (The opinion states "Judgment reversed and remanded with instruction.")

Implications:

The immediate practical effect is that Hasty is entitled to a separate hearing on the contempt charge and the original trial judge should be disqualified from conducting that hearing.
The appellate court expressly did not decide whether the evidence was sufficient to support a contempt finding; accordingly, the court left that question open for determination at the remanded hearing.
The opinion applies established precedent on summary contempt and judicial disqualification but does not announce a new rule of law; its decision is limited to the remedies required under the specific facts presented (reversal and remand for a hearing before a different judge).

Source: In re Hasty, A94A1418, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided November 28, 1994. Opinion authored by Chief Judge Pope. Judgment reversed and remanded with instruction. McMurray, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.

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IN RE HASTY.

POPE, Chief Judge.

Attorney Jason R. Hasty was appointed to represent indigent defendant Perry Rhames. At the arraignment held on November 12, 1993, Rhames pled not guilty. The case was subsequently placed on the trial calendar for January 24, 1994. It is undisputed that Hasty received timely notice of the trial calendar and he in fact appeared at a preliminary calendar call on January 5, 1994.

On January 24, 1994, Hasty appeared at the regular calendar call and announced not ready. At the same time he filed numerous motions, including a motion for a continuance. On January 25, 1994, the trial court denied the motion for continuance and held a hearing with regard to the other motions. At the conclusion of the hearing, it is undisputed that the trial judge specifically asked Hasty whether there were any negotiations underway with the State that might lead to Rhames changing his plea to guilty. In response to this question Hasty said that no negotiations were underway and that the case would be tried. According to the trial judge, the district attorney agreed that no negotiations were underway but expressed concern that Hasty's client might change his plea before the trial began. In response to this, Hasty again denied that there would be a change in his client's plea. The judge informed Hasty that jurors would be summoned the following day, January 26, specifically for his defendant's trial and that no back-up cases would be called. Moreover, the judge informed Hasty that he should be present and ready for trial at 8:30 a.m.

According to Hasty, he continued to attempt to prepare for trial during the night of January 25, 1994. On the morning of the trial, however, it is undisputed that Hasty advised Rhames that he should consider changing his plea. At 8:30 a.m., before the case had been called and jury selection started, Hasty told the judge and the district attorney that his client wanted to change his plea to guilty, even though it is undisputed that there had been no negotiations with or recommendation from the district attorney. The trial judge accepted Rhames' guilty plea and subsequently asked Rhames at what point he had begun to consider changing his plea. Rhames told the court that he had discussed pleading guilty with Hasty early on in the case. The judge then asked Hasty when the decision to change his client's plea was made and what prompted it in light of the assurances Hasty had given to the court on the previous day. The record shows that Hasty's response to this question was vague at best. At the conclusion of the questioning, Hasty was held in criminal contempt and fined $500. Hasty's request for a full hearing on the matter also was denied.

On appeal, Hasty argues that the trial court erred in finding him in contempt and in failing to allow him a separate hearing. Additionally, Hasty contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of criminal contempt.

Although we do not address the issue of whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to warrant a finding of contempt, we do conclude that Hasty should have been given a separate hearing on the matter. It is true that "[d]irect summary criminal contempt which arises in the presence of the court and tends to scandalize it and hinder or obstruct the orderly processes of the administration of justice, the preservation of order and decorum in the court, etc. is exempt from the due process requirements of notice and hearing. Moody v. State, 131 Ga. App. 355 ( 206 S.E.2d 79) (1974)." (Emphasis supplied.) Spruell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 99, 102 ( 250 S.E.2d 807) (1978). In this case, however, Hasty's conduct does not rise to such a level as to necessitate or warrant summary action by the trial court. Hasty's conduct did not tend to scandalize the trial court or interfere with the preservation of order or decorum in that court. His conduct was not of the type that must be dealt with summarily. Consequently, we believe that the appropriate method of handling this matter is to provide Hasty with a separate hearing.

Additionally, we hold that the trial judge should disqualify himself from officiating over any further proceedings in this matter. "Judges should disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where the judge is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 668 ( 324 S.E.2d 443) (1985). Here, disqualification is appropriate because it is clear that the trial judge is likely to be called as a material witness at Hasty's contempt hearing.

In light of the above, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Hasty a separate hearing on the issue of contempt. Therefore we remand the case back to the trial court for said hearing with the instruction that the hearing be conducted by a judge other than the one who originally presided over this matter.

Judgment reversed and remanded with instruction. McMurray, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.

DECIDED NOVEMBER 28, 1994.

IN RE HASTY