Ordered that the order entered September 14, 1994, and the orders dated December 12, 1994, and February 22, 1995, are affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated January 11, 1995, is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that the respondent is awarded one bill of costs.
The Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant's admitted default with respect to the financial obligations he agreed to pursuant to a stipulation agreement which was incorporated into the judgment of divorce was willful ( see, Domestic Relations Law § 245; Stempler v. Stempler, 200 A.D.2d 733; Demchuk v. Demchuk, 181 A.D.2d 756; Rogers v. Rogers, 94 A.D.2d 764), and that less drastic measures to enforce the agreement than holding the defendant in contempt would be ineffectual ( see, Domestic Relations Law § 245; Snow v. Snow, 209 A.D.2d 399; Farkas v. Farkas, 209 A.D.2d 316; Demchuk v Demchuk, supra; Bell v. Bell, 181 A.D.2d 978; Richter v. Richter, 156 A.D.2d 653). In addition, the court correctly denied the defendant's cross motion for a downward modification of his support obligations inasmuch as he failed to demonstrate that the continued enforcement of his support obligations would create an extreme hardship for him ( see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [9] [b]; Matter of Zinkiewicz v. Zinkiewicz, 222 A.D.2d 684; Didley v. Didley, 194 A.D.2d 7, 10; Katz v. Katz, 188 A.D.2d 827).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Bracken, J.P., Rosenblatt, O'Brien and Goldstein, JJ., concur.