Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In determining whether to permit late service of the petitioner's notice of claim, the Supreme Court properly considered whether there was a reasonable excuse for the delay, whether the respondents acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the respondents' defense would be substantially prejudiced by the delay ( see, Matter of Resto v. City of New York, 240 A.D.2d 499; Matter of Pruden v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 235 A.D.2d 426). The petitioner failed to come forward with a valid and reasonable excuse for the delay in this case, since his ignorance of the filing requirement constituted an inadequate explanation ( see, Matter of Ragin v. City of New York, 222 A.D.2d 678; Weber v. County of Suffolk, 208 A.D.2d 527). Moreover, the petitioner's recent immigration to the United States, his purported limited ability to speak English, and his infancy all failed to justify the delay under the circumstances of this case ( see, Ribeiro v. Town of N. Hempstead, 200 A.D.2d 730; Matter of D'Anjou v. New York City Health Hosp. Corp., 196 A.D.2d 818). Indeed, even after the respondents rejected an untimely notice of claim served by the petitioner approximately eight months after the incident, the petitioner delayed approximately four additional months before seeking permission to serve a late notice.
Moreover, the petitioner failed to establish that the respondents acquired knowledge of the nature of his claim within a reasonable time ( see, Matter of DiBella v. City of New York, 234 A.D.2d 366; Matter of Dunlea v. Mahopac Cent. School Dist., 232 A.D.2d 558), and the petitioner has not come forward with evidence to rebut the respondents' assertion that the extensive delay in this case has substantially prejudiced their ability to investigate and defend against the claim ( see, Matter of DiBella v. City of New York, supra; Matter of Deegan v. City of New York, 227 A.D.2d 620). Accordingly, we discern no improvident exercise of discretion in the Supreme Court's denial of the petition.
Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Friedmann and McGinity, JJ., concur.