MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her following a jury trial of grand larceny in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 155.30) and endangering the welfare of a child (§ 260.10 [1]). Contrary to defendant's contention, County Court's Sandoval ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court properly balanced the probative value of defendant's prior larceny convictions against their potential for undue prejudice ( see People v. Walker, 83 N.Y.2d 455, 459; People v. Matta, 286 A.D.2d 944, lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 731; People v. Laraby, 219 A.D.2d 817, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 849, 937). Inquiry into prior criminal conduct is not barred merely because it is similar to the conduct underlying the instant charges ( see People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 292; People v. Castaldi, 209 A.D.2d 961, lv dismissed 84 N.Y.2d 1029). Moreover, the court did not err in permitting inquiry into the nature of the prior convictions or their underlying facts ( see People v. Hayes, 97 N.Y.2d 203, 207-208).
The court did not err in admitting in evidence the price tags on the stolen merchandise or the testimony of two store employees concerning the aggregate value of the merchandise ( see e.g. People v. Wandell, 285 A.D.2d 736, 737; People v. Smith, 275 A.D.2d 673, 673, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 969; People v. Wynn, 176 A.D.2d 375, 377).
The final order of protection, granted in favor of a witness to the act of grand larceny of which defendant was convicted ( see CPL 530.13), is legally permissible in duration. In the case of such felony conviction, the duration of the order of protection may extend for three years from the date of the expiration of the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment actually imposed ( see 530.13 [4] [ii]). Thus, the order of protection issued in this case could validly extend until March 15, 2008.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the statements of defendant were elicited in violation of her Miranda rights and therefore should have been suppressed, we conclude that any error in the admission of those statements is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ( see People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237; People v. Snyder, 281 A.D.2d 894, lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 868; People v. Ruben, 267 A.D.2d 961, 961-962, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 924).
Defendant's remaining contentions were raised on the appeal of a codefendant and were determined to be without merit ( see People v. Banks, 294 A.D.2d 934 [May 3, 2002]).