RICHARD ALAN ENSLEN, District Judge.
In accordance with the Court's Opinion of this date;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Ingham County and Gene Wriggelsworth's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 77) is GRANTED and Judgment is entered in favor of those Defendants as to all of Plaintiff's claims against them.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Susan Russell's Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 66) is GRANTED and Judgment is entered in her favor as to all of Plaintiff's claims against her.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Timothy Keeley's Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 67) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against said Defendant is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Robert Ott's Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 68) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against said Defendant is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Matthew Watters' Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 69) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against said Defendant is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant James Hannon's Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 70) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against said Defendant is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Roger Lewis' Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 71) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against said Defendant is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Kay VanElls' Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 72) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against said Defendant is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Gary Marshall's Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 73) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against said Defendant is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Robert Farmer's Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 74) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment-claim, against said Defendant is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Greg Harris' Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 75) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against said Defendant is DISMISSED.
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the several motions, filed by Defendants County of Ingham, James Hannon, Timothy Kenney, Robert Farmer, Matthew Watters, Gary Marshall, Roger Lewis, Robert Ott, Kay VanElls, Susan Russell, Greg Harris and Gene Wriggelsworth, seeking dismissal and/or summary judgment. The motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
This suit is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Plaintiff, the Estate of Norman C. Droste, alleges that Defendants violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by failing to provide emergency medical care to Norman C. Droste while a pre-trial detainee of Ingham County. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants' conduct constituted gross negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct, for which Defendants are liable under state law.
According to the documentary evidence filed by the parties, Droste was arrested on May 25, 1999 at 10:00 p.m. for having alcohol in an open container in a public place and was lodged in the Lansing Police Department Detention Facility. At the time, Droste stated that he was a hard-core drinker and suffered from delirium tremens. At 4:00 p.m. on May 26, 1999, Droste was transferred to the Ingham County Jail. The next morning Droste complained of chest pains and was sent to the Ingham County Regional Medical Facility for evaluation. He was returned to the Jail at 5:20 p.m. on May 27, 1999, in apparent good health.
Droste did not receive proscribed medication. including Ativan, upon his return to the Jail, according to the Jail's medication logs. Ativan is an anti-anxiety drug used to treat delirium tremens. Between 9:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., custody officers observed Droste become agitated, hallucinate, and slam his forehead forcefully and repeatedly into the glass of the observation cell. Medical assistance was not offered at that time, though officers did handcuff Defendant. Defendant remained in handcuffs for a 14-hour period. At 11:45 a.m. the next day, Defendant was observed by nurse Susan Russell to be incontinent and non-responsive, according to her contemporary notes. Russell then requested an ambulance and Droste was taken to the Ingham County Regional Medical Center where medical staff reported multiple contusions and abrasions on Droste's body, right forehead contusions, pupils 4 m.m. and non-reactive, negative verbal response, ketone breath odor, dried laceration bands, dehydration and responsive only to sternal rub. He was then transferred to Sparrow Hospital, where he died on May 29, 1999.
Laurence M. Simson, Jr., M.D., is a forensic pathologist who was previously employed by the Medical Examiner for Ingham County. He conducted an autopsy of Droste. He then opined that Droste died of subdural hematoma and complications of the hematoma, including swelling of the brain. Simson is also of the opinion that the subdural hematoma was caused by Droste's banging of his head against the observation cell, and that had officers offered medical treatment within several hours of the incident, Droste's life would have been saved.
Plaintiff's expert R. Scott Jacobs, M.D., is a medical doctor specializing in emergency medicine. He opined that the hematoma was caused by Droste's banging of his head against the cell, that the condition of Droste when found by nurse Susan Russell at 11:45 a.m. likely had persisted for six to ten hours, and that during the six to ten hours Droste's need for emergency treatment would have been readily apparent to any casual and lay observer.
Plaintiff's expert Joseph Viglotti, M.D., is a Harvard-educated physician specializing in emergency medicine. He opined that Droste banged his head against the observation glass because of disorientation associated with alcohol withdrawal, and that the force of those blows caused a subdural hematoma. He further opined that the hematoma would have caused, within a few hours, profound changes in Droste's behavior which should have prompted even a casual and lay observer to seek immediate emergency medical care.
Plaintiff's expert David E. Smith, M.D., is a physician specializing in addiction. He is the president and founder of the Haight-Asbury Free Clinics located in San Francisco, California. He is also a past president of the American Society of Addiction Medicine. He opined that regardless of whether Droste's hallucinations and erratic behavior were caused by a blow to the head or alcohol withdrawal, his medical condition at the time was a serious one requiring an immediate emergency medical response.
Plaintiff's expert Kenneth Katsaris is a licensed law enforcement officer, police trainer and expert in police administration. He opined that the Defendant officers were all inadequately trained to recognize and respond to obvious medical emergencies. There is no information in the record supporting a conclusion that similar incidents had occurred in the past or that the Sheriff or County were on notice of similar incidents involving denial of emergency medical care. The official written policies of the Sheriff and the County at the time of these events also favored the delivery of emergency medical care to prisoners in need of such services and the training of officers to recognize the need for those services and to deliver those services.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). However, the credibility of witnesses and the weighing of disputed evidence must be left for the jury. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Furthermore, all legitimate inferences from the evidence must be drawn in the non-movant's favor. Id.
Based on the above record, it appears that Defendants (other than Ingham County. Sheriff Wriggelsworth and Susan Russell) were present at the Ingham County Jail between 9:30 p.m., May 27, 1999 and 11:45 a.m., May 28, 1999, and were assigned at those times to monitor the observation cell and deliver care to Droste. It further appears that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendants (other than Ingham County, Sheriff Wrigglesworth and Susan Russell) knew that Droste was experiencing serious medical conditions requiring treatment, and whether they acted with deliberate indifference in failing to deliver or summon medical assistance. Therefore, summary judgment in their favor is inappropriate and the motions requesting summary judgment will be denied with four exceptions, which are explained below.
First, the County and the Sheriff are entitled to summary judgment as to section 1983 claims against them because there has been no showing that unconstitutional conduct resulted from a policy of the County or Sheriff, or that the County or Sheriff exercised deliberate indifference as to training concerning the provision of emergency medical care to prisoners. See Howard v. Calhoun County, 148 F. Supp.2d 853, 890-91 (W.D.Mich. 2002) (citing Bd. of Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 502 U.S. 397 (1997); Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 865 (6th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 507-8 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Second, since Droste was a pre-trial detainee rather than a convicted person at the time of his incarceration, his constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants are based on the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and not the Eighth Amendment. See Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)); Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1992); Napier v. Madison County, 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 n. 10 (1989).
Therefore, summary judgment will be granted in favor of all Defendants with respect to the Eighth Amendment claims. This is not, however, a significant ruling since the substance of those claims will be pursued under the substantive protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Third, as agreed by the parties, Defendants Ingham County and Sheriff Gene Wriggelsworth are immune from state law claims pursuant to the state governmental immunity statute, Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407, and state court rulings, see, e.g., Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing), 363 N.W.2d 641 (Mich. 1985) and Payton v. City of Detroit, 536 N.W.2d 233 (Mich.Ct.App. 1996). Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to those claims.
Fourth, according to all of the record evidence, Defendant Susan Russell did not learn of Droste's medical condition until 11:45 a.m. and shortly thereafter summoned emergency medical care. Therefore, summary judgment will be granted in her favor since the record fails to support an inference that she was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need or that she acted in a grossly negligent or wilful and wanton fashion in failing to deliver or summon emergency medical care.
Accordingly, an Order and Partial Judgment shall enter consistent-with this Opinion.