HARRIS v. CITY OF SEATTLE, (W.D.Wash. 2004)

MARSHA PECHMAN, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss her remaining RICO claims against the City and the Washington Firm upon the condition that the Court remand the remaining state claims to state court. (Dkt. No. 58.) All of the Defendants oppose remand of this case. The Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff does not merely want to dismiss her remaining RICO claims. Instead, she seeks a remand. Dismissal of her RICO claims is merely the means she has chosen to achieve this goal. Even if the remaining RICO claims were dismissed, remand is not appropriate at this juncture. A district court has the discretion to retain jurisdiction over the remaining state claims, even after the basis for federal question removal jurisdiction has been dismissed. A district court should consider the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness to the parties, and comity in deciding whether to exercise such discretion. Plaintiff's case has been before this Court for over two years. The Court has already ruled on numerous motions and is very familiar with the relevant facts and legal issues. Defendants have expended much effort in litigating the case in this forum. All of these weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction. In contrast, Plaintiff has not presented any justification for remand other than a preference for a state court forum.

The Court notes that Plaintiff is granted leave to dismiss her remaining RICO claims if she so chooses. Doing so, however, will not result in remand.

Plaintiff Ruby Dell Harris was Secretary and Chief Examiner of the City of Seattle's ("City") Public Safety Civil Service Commission. Ms. Harris has alleged a racially motivated conspiracy involving many City employees to undermine her authority and the Commission itself. As part of this conspiracy, she alleges that KING Broadcasting Company ("KING") aired two broadcasts and a series of promos that were defamatory, invaded her privacy, placed her in a false light, and resulted in severe emotional distress.

Plaintiff's first complaint arising out of these facts alleged various state law claims and federal civil rights claims. The case was removed and assigned to Judge Rothstein. Judge Rothstein dismissed with prejudice all of the federal civil rights claims and remanded the case to state court. Approximately six months later, Plaintiff amended her complaint in state court to add new federal RICO claims. Defendants again removed and assigned to Judge Pechman, where it has remained since October, 2002. In March, 2003, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's RICO claim, among other claims, against KING.

Lastly, the Court noted that, at this time, there are currently three pending summary motions by the various Defendants that are fully briefed and ripe for the Court's consideration.

It is well settled law that a federal court has the discretion to retain jurisdiction over state law claims even after the federal question basis for removal jurisdiction is dismissed. Harrell v. 20^th Century Insurance Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 2001), Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach Associates, 903 F.2d 709, (9th Cir. 1990). The decision to retain jurisdiction or to remand depends upon "what will best accommodate the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. . . . :" Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988). Carnegie-Mellon noted that remand is particularly appropriate in the early stages of litigation. Id. This clearly implies that in the later stages of litigation, remand is less appropriate. Judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties weigh in favor or retaining jurisdiction when the issue arises late in the litigation.

In Harrell, the plaintiffs had filed a federal RICO claim in addition to state law claims in state court. After the case was removed, they stipulated to dismissal of their RICO claim. The court declined to disturb the district court's decision to retain jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Noting that a some of the legal issues had already been fully briefed, the court concluded that retaining jurisdiction was in the interests of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. 934 F.2d at 205-06. In Nishimoto, the district court had already decided three of plaintiff's pendant state claims before plaintiff stipulated to dismiss her federal claim. The Ninth Circuit held that it was in the interests of judicial economy for the district court to retain jurisdiction over the remaining state claims. 903 F.2d at 715.

The only case which might support Plaintiff's position is a district court case from the Northern District of California, which Plaintiff did not even cite in her brief. Millar v. Bay Area Rapid Transit District, 236 F. Supp.2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2002). The court granted plaintiff's request to dismiss his federal claim and to remand the remaining state claims. Central to the court's decision was the fact that the court had not done anything substantively on the case beyond doing a pre-trial order and two case management conferences.Id. at 1119.

Here, the interests of judicial economy, fairness, and convenience to the parties all weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction even if Plaintiff's RICO claims were dismissed and there were no remaining federal questions. First, this Court is already very well acquainted with the facts and many of the relevant legal issues. The Court has ruled on various issues in this case including KING'S motion to dismiss, the City's motion to compel, and Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's jury demand. Three summary judgment motions are fully briefed. Trial is scheduled for March 22, 2004. At such a late date, it would not be fair to the Defendants to remand this case. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any reason why fairness demands otherwise. It would not serve the interests of judicial economy to remand this case back to state court at such a late date. Because this motion is not presented at an early stage in the litigation,Millar is distinguishable.

Second, Plaintiff's motion is unabashedly an attempt to forum shop. Defendants contend that Plaintiff's ultimate purpose is to gain more time to conduct discovery. Whether true or not, this Court does not countenance such blatant forum shopping. Apart from its vague and unsupported claim that remand would "promote judicial economy," Plaintiff has not presented any reason why remand is necessary.Carnegie-Mellon directs district courts to consider a plaintiff's obvious attempt to manipulate the forum in exercising its discretion to retain jurisdiction. 484 U.S. at 375.

Plaintiff does not just want to dismiss her remaining RICO claims; she only wants to dismiss her remaining RICO claims if the case is remanded. However, even if there were only state claims remaining, the Court would exercise its discretion to retain jurisdiction. The interests of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Consequently, because the Court will not remand, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.

The clerk is directed to provide copies of this order to all counsel of record.