DAVIS v. VITTER

CARL BARBIER, District Judge

Before the Court is a Motion to Remand, filed by Plaintiff, Alan Davis. The motion is opposed. After reviewing the motion, opposition, record and applicable law, the Court finds that Plaintiff's motion should be GRANTED and this case should be remanded to state court.

Alan Davis ("Plaintiff") alleges that he was employed by Vitter For Congress under a written agreement entered into between Vitter For Congress and Plaintiff on February 18, 2003. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Vitter For Senate is the alter ego and/or successor entity to Vitter For Congress, and that David Vitter is a principal and member of Vitter For Congress and, as such, is jointly liable to Plaintiff for monies owed under the employment contract. According to Plaintiff's employment contract, Plaintiff was to be compensated for his efforts by receiving a salary as well as a commission on the money he actually raised.

Plaintiff alleges that he was owed $36,750.00 under the terms of his employment agreement. He further alleges that he was only paid $15,649.00. Plaintiff has made demand on the defendants for the difference between the amount he believes he is owed and the amount actually paid to him, but, according to Plaintiff, the defendants failed to pay the sums allegedly due. Consequently, Plaintiff filed suit in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana, to collect the amount he alleges is owed. In addition, Plaintiff also seeks attorney's fees and costs.

On April 19, 2004, Defendants removed the matter to this Court. Defendants allege that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter as it involves a federal question under the Federal Elections Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 431, et. seq ("FECA" or "the Act"). Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand the case to state court alleging that this court lacks jurisdiction over this case because there is no federal question at issue.

According to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." The removing party bears the burden of proving that federal jurisdiction exists at the time of removal.

Defendants assert that federal jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331. Section 1331 states that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." In other words, for removal of this case to be proper, the plaintiff's claim must arise under federal law.

A claim arises under a federal law if the federal law creates the cause of action relied upon by the plaintiff. Further, a claim may arise under a federal law if the determination of a state law claim necessarily involves construction of a federal law. As explained by the Supreme Court, "the question whether a claim "arises under" federal law must be determined by reference to the "well-pleaded complaint." However, a defense that merely raises a federal question is insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction. Thus, for removal to be proper under Section 1331, Plaintiff's complaint must involve a federal question.

Defendants argue that this Court has jurisdiction under FECA. Defendants submit that Vitter for Congress and Vitter for Senate were organized under FECA and David Vitter is a federal candidate under FECA. Defendants maintain that since FECA regulates all disbursements and expenditures of federal political committees, it also confers subject matter jurisdiction on this Court. This argument is without merit.

FECA is a statute that regulates the activities of federal political campaign committees. FECA's primary purpose is to regulate campaign contributions and expenditures to eliminate influence over candidates, either actual or perceived. Among other things, the Act regulates all disbursements and expenditures of the committees. To this end, it requires that the committees file reports listing all disbursements. Notably, the statute does not mention any regulation of employment contracts with campaign fundraisers.

Furthermore, FECA creates the Federal Election Commission whose function is to enforce the provisions of the Act. The Act provides that the Commission has the exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the provisions contained within. Notably, the only way that any provision of the Act may be enforced is by the Commission filing a civil complaint. Therefore, FECA only regulates the activities of federal campaign committees through the Commission.

Since FECA is a regulatory statute, it does not transform Plaintiff's suit for breach of contract into a federal question. Plaintiff could not file suit against Defendants under this statute and the statute does not give rise to his cause of action. Moreover, resolution of Plaintiff's breach of contract claim does not, in any way, involve the construction of FECA. FECA only preempts state law to the extent that state law attempts to regulate the activities of federal campaign committees.

Thus, Plaintiff's claim does not involve a federal question nor is it preempted by FECA. Rather, Plaintiff has filed suit for past due wages he alleges he is owed under a written agreement with the defendants. Plaintiff's claim is for breach of contract — a state law claim. Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter and this case should be remanded to state court.

Plaintiff has also made a request for attorney's fees and costs associated with the improper removal of this action. It is within the Court's discretion to award the Plaintiff costs and fees incurred as a result of removal. After considering Plaintiff's motion and request for attorney's fees, the Court finds that plaintiff's request for attorney's fees should be denied. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand should be and hereby is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's request for fees and costs associated with filing this motion should be and hereby are DENIED.