GEORGE O'TOOLE JR., District Judge
Plaintiffs have moved for reconsideration of this Court's order granting partial summary judgment to FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. and FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. d/b/a FedEx Home Delivery (collectively "FedEx") as to the plaintiffs' claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). After consideration of the parties' submissions, the motion for reconsideration (dkt. no. 63) is DENIED.
First, the argument in favor of reconsideration based on the enactment of the SAFETEA-LU Technical Corrections Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-244, 122 Stat. 1572 (2008) ("H.R. 1195") is not an argument that was unavailable during the briefing of the defendants' partial summary judgment motion. As the defendants point out, the bill had passed both Houses of the Congress at the time of the hearing on the motion for partial summary judgment and was awaiting the President's signature, which was affixed about a month later. There is no reason the present argument could not have been made at oral argument or by request for a supplemental submission after the bill became law. A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity to present an argument that could have been, but was not, presented on original consideration of the underlying issue. See Emmanuel v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 25, 426 F.3d 416, 422 (1st Cir. 2005); Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 1997).
In any event, the plaintiffs' argument lacks merit. The Motor Carrier Act Exemption exempts from the FLSA's overtime requirements "any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service." 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) (2004). Before the SAFETEA-LU amendments were enacted in 2005, the Secretary of Transportation had that power with respect to safety-related employees of a "motor carrier," who was defined to be "a person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation." See 49 U.S.C. §§ 31502(b), 13102(12) (2000). SAFETEA-LU narrowed the definition of "motor carrier" to exclude, at least, persons who did not provide "commercial motor vehicle" transportation for compensation — that is, persons who did not provide transportation by means of vehicles having a gross weight of at least 10,001 pounds. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 13102(14), 31132(1)(A)-(D) (2005). In other words, at least as to persons who, though providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation, did so using only vehicles weighing less than 10,001 pounds, the Secretary of Transportation no longer was given the power to regulate maximum hours of service. Those persons thus fell outside the scope of the Motor Carrier Act Exemption.
The SAFETEA-LU amendments did not expressly answer the question that was presented on the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment: after the amendments, did the Secretary of Transportation retain the power to regulate the maximum hours of service of all employees of "a person providing commercial motor vehicle . . . transportation for compensation," 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14), so that the Motor Carrier Act Exemption continues to exempt that motor carrier's employees, including employees who may regularly or occasionally be limited to vehicles that are not "commercial motor vehicles"?
The recent enactment of H.R. 1195 does not address that question either. Rather, the new law cuts the knot by providing explicitly that the FLSA's overtime provisions apply to an employee of a motor carrier "who performs duties on motor vehicles weighing 10,000 pounds or less." SAFETEA-LU Technical Corrections Act § 306(c)(3), 122 Stat. at 1621. This provision has the effect of modifying the scope of the Motor Carrier Act Exemption so that even if the Secretary of Transportation has the power to set the maximum hours of service for such employees — because they are safety-related employees of a "motor carrier" (now defined, again, with reference to "motor vehicles" and not "commercial motor vehicles") — nonetheless the overtime provisions of the FLSA apply to them. This change does not benefit the plaintiffs, however, because the statute is clear that the new provision is to be applied only from and after the date of the enactment of H.R. 1195, and they have not been employed in the qualifying time period.
The limitation of liability provision of § 306(b) does not alter the analysis. As the defendants point out, there is a class of "motor carriers" as to whom, after SAFETEA-LU, the Motor Carrier Act Exemption no longer applied because they did not operate "commercial motor vehicles." The limitation of liability provision aids such carriers. There is no need to torture more meaning into that provision than is necessary.
Reconsideration is DENIED.
It is SO ORDERED.