RICHARD DORR, District Judge
Plaintiff Robert D. Burnett seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of his request for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act Act. Plaintiff has exhausted all of his administrative remedies, and judicial review is now appropriate. After carefully reviewing the record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (the "ALJ").
Because the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision and that the ALJ applied the correct standard of law, the Court adopts much of Defendant's brief without quotation or citation.
BACKGROUND
The parties present complete facts and arguments in their briefs. The ALJ's decision also sets forth comprehensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. The parties' facts and arguments and the ALJ's findings and conclusions are repeated herein only as necessary to explain the Court's decision.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court's review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct standard of law and whether the Commissioner's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) (2009); Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as sufficient to support the Commissioner's conclusion. See Warburton, 188 F.3d at 1050. In making this determination, the Court considers evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as well as evidence that supports it. See id. The Court may not reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because substantial evidence supports a different result. See Pierce v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1999). This is true even if the Court might have weighed the evidence differently and reached a different result if a de novo review were applied. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir. 2001).
To receive disability benefits a claimant must show: (1) a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that has lasted, or can be expected to last, for not less than twelve months; (2) an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity; and (3) the inability results from the impairment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(2) (2009); see also Timmerman v. Weinberger, 510 F.2d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 1975). The Court reviews the ALJ's decision to determine whether the ALJ followed the Commissioner's implementing regulations, which set out a five-step, burden-shifting process for determining whether the claimant has a "disability" within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
The five steps are: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaging in "substantial gainful activity," (2) whether the claimant is severely impaired, (3) whether the severe impairment is, or is comparable to, a listed impairment precluding substantial gainful activity as a matter of law, (4) whether the claimant, with his current Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") can meet the demands of his past work, and if not; (5) whether the claimant retains the capacity to perform any other work that exists in significant numbers in the economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2009); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (discussing the five-step analysis). In the first four steps, the burden is on the claimant to prove that he is disabled. If the claimant is not able to perform his past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform, although the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the claimant. See Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 931 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24, 28 (2003) (noting that the existence of jobs in the national economy must be proved only at step five).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff generally argues substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's findings and the ALJ did not use the correct legal standard, pursuant to the Social Security Act, regulations, and case law, in determining Plaintiff was not disabled. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred by not considering four medical opinions, including the opinion of a treating physician. Plaintiff second contends the ALJ erred by not asking the vocational expert (the "VE") if the occupations the VE indicated Plaintiff was able to perform conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (the "DOT").
Plaintiff's initial brief contained three arguments. In his reply brief, Plaintiff explicitly abandoned his second argument.
The ALJ considered all medical evidence in assessing Plaintiff's limitations
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by ignoring the opinions of James A. Stuckmeyer, M.D., Charles Orth, M.D., P. Brent Koprivica, M.D., and treating physician Michael Johnson, M.D. While an ALJ must consider all medical evidence of record, the ALJ is not required to mention each medical opinion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has recognized that an ALJ's failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate the evidence was not considered. Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 966 (8th Cir. 2010). For that reason alone, Plaintiff's argument fails.
In addition, the ALJ had reason to disregard the opinions of Dr. Stuckmeyer and Dr. Orth, considering they were formulated before the alleged onset date. Plaintiff contends the ALJ should have considered Dr. Koprivica's opinion that Plaintiff was "permanently and totally disabled." This opinion was properly disregarded, as it was on an issue reserved to the Commissioner. Plaintiff's final assertion is that the ALJ ignored Dr. Johnson's opinion that Plaintiff's "angina prevents him from physically stressful work." However, the ALJ's RFC assessment was consistent with Dr. Johnson's opinion because the ALJ found Plaintiff only able to do limited light work. Accordingly, the Court finds no err.
The VE's findings did not conflict with the DOT
Plaintiff also asserts the ALJ should have asked the VE whether her findings conflicted with the DOT. The Court finds no err because there was no apparent conflict between the VE's testimony and the DOT. See Renfrow v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating, "In sum, the ALJ's error in failing to ask the vocational expert about possible conflicts between his testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles was harmless, since no such conflict appears to exist.").
Plaintiff contends there was a conflict between the VE's testimony that Plaintiff's past relevant work as a plastic mold machine tender was "light" and the DOT, which characterized a similar job as heavy. However, the DOT classifies the occupation of "Injection-Molding-Machine Tender" as light. DOT 556.685-038. The DOT describes this job as tending to "injection-molding machines that form plastic or rubber products . . ." Id. Because this described Plaintiff's relevant past work as a plastic mold machine tender, and because the DOT classified the job as light, there was no conflict between the DOT and the VE's testimony that Plaintiff's past work was light work.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court affirms the ALJ.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 1, 2011