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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners sought to convert the partnership firm Gopal Print Pack into a limited company under Section 366 of the Companies Act, 2013. The original lease deed had already been stamped. Following incorporation, the petitioners obtained permission to amend the lease, executed an amended lease deed, and presented it for registration. The stamp authorities subsequently issued notices under Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, alleging deficit stamp duty, and passed an impugned order dated 5 March 2026. [1][2][3][4]

The petitioners filed the writ petition seeking quashing of the impugned order and a direction to register the amended lease without requiring further stamp duty. The petition was heard on admission. [5][6][7][8]

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the writ petition could be entertained despite the statutory appellate remedy under Section 40(1)(d) of the Indian Stamp Act. [9][10]
  2. Whether conversion of the partnership firm into a company resulted in a transfer of the leasehold property requiring stamp duty. [9][11][12]
  3. Whether the amended lease deed was merely consequential to statutory vesting and name conversion, or constituted a conveyance attracting stamp duty. [11][13]
  4. Whether the petitioners were entitled to registration of the lease amendment without insisting on payment of stamp duty. [14][15]

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The conversion was undertaken under Section 366 of the Companies Act, 2013, with the original partners' liability remaining unchanged; the Registrar of Companies subsequently issued the certificate of incorporation. [1]
  • No transfer of assets or conveyance occurred because the property vested statutorily in the company, and the partners and shareholders remained the same. [16][17]
  • The amended deed fell within Article 32 of Schedule 1-A of the Stamp Act as a document correcting or amending a previously registered deed without material alteration. [16]
  • The impugned order was without jurisdiction, particularly because a similar document had previously been registered without additional stamp duty. [16]
  • The writ petition was maintainable under recognized exceptions to the alternative-remedy rule, including lack of jurisdiction and a purely legal issue. [16][10]
  • The petitioners relied on the authorities listed in the table below and sought allowance of the petition. [17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27]

State and Respondent No. 3's Arguments

  • The petitioners had an efficacious statutory appeal before the Revenue Commissioner under Section 40(1)(d) of the Indian Stamp Act and had approached the High Court to avoid depositing 25% of the stamp duty. [9]
  • The amended deed transferred property from the partnership firm, governed by the Partnership Act, to a distinct company governed by the Companies Act, and was therefore a transfer deed chargeable with stamp duty. [9]
  • The substance of the instrument, rather than its nomenclature, showed a transfer of ownership, and the amended lease deed was chargeable under Article 25 of the Stamp Act. [9][11]
  • The contention that the property vested by operation of law was argued to be an attempt to avoid stamp duty because the instrument reflected a transfer by the act and will of the parties. [11]

Respondent No. 2's Arguments

  • The permission granted on 7 July 2025 was limited to updating lease records and did not direct execution of an amended deed or determine its stamp-duty consequences. [28]
  • Stamp duty, valuation, impounding, penalty and registration were matters for the independent statutory authorities, since respondent No. 2 had no power under the Stamp Act or Registration Act to decide them. [29]

Respondent No. 4's Arguments

  • HDFC Bank stated that it had sanctioned commercial credit facilities aggregating Rs. 40 crores, but had only a limited, pro forma role because no relief was sought against it. [30][31]

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Alok Kumar Choubey Vs. State of MPExceptions to the alternative-remedy rule.The Court relied on the exceptions relating to jurisdiction, purely legal questions and arbitrary State action. [16][10][32][33]
Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade MarksAlternative remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction.The Court held that the petition could be entertained because the case involved recognized exceptions. [34][35][36][37]
State of H.P. And Others v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Limited and AnotherWrit jurisdiction may be exercised despite an alternative remedy where jurisdictional error or palpable injustice is shown.The Court used the principle to support entertaining the petition. [38][39]
Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India vs. Devi Ispat LimitedMandamus may issue in contractual matters where State action is unfair or arbitrary.The decision supported maintainability in appropriate contractual or statutory circumstances. [40][41]
Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India and OthersThe State must act fairly in contractual matters; disputed facts requiring evidence may make writ proceedings unsuitable.The Court considered the present dispute sufficiently legal for writ adjudication. [42]
State of Gujarat Vs. JP INN Pvt Ltd.Conversion of a partnership firm into a company, without change in business, share ratio or assets, does not constitute a transfer requiring conveyance duty.The Court applied the reasoning that statutory vesting without consideration does not attract conveyance duty. [43][44][45][46]
Anup Industries Vs. State of GujaratStamp-duty computation provisions must operate with the charging provisions; absent consideration, conveyance duty cannot be computed.The Court relied on this principle in concluding that the amended lease was not chargeable. [47][48][49][13]
M/s Sozin Flora Pharma LLP Vs. State of Himachal PradeshStatutory vesting on conversion does not require a separate conveyance or stamp duty.The Court relied extensively on its conclusions concerning statutory vesting and absence of a transferable instrument. [50][51][52][53][54][55]
Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Texspin Engg. & Mfg.Vesting of firm property in a company on statutory conversion is not a transfer or conveyance.The Court used the decision to characterize the conversion as statutory vesting. [51][56][57]
Vali Pattabhirama Rao and another Versus Sri Ramanuja Ginning and Rice Factory (P.) Ltd. and othersPartnership property vests in the incorporated company without a separate conveyance when conversion occurs under the Companies Act.The Court relied on the principle that statutory registration produces vesting without transfer by deed. [52][58][59][60]
Jai Narain Parasrampuria (Dead) and others Versus Pushpa Devi Saraf and othersApproval of the principle of statutory vesting without a separate conveyance.The Court noted the Supreme Court's approval of Vali Pattabhirama Rao. [58][61]
Commissioner of Income Tax, Udaipur Versus M/s. Chetak Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.On statutory vesting, property vests in the company without conveyance and the firm is succeeded by the company.This was a principal basis for granting the petition. [62][63][13][64]
Reckitt Benckiser (India) Private Limited Versus State of H.P. & AnotherMere change of name without transfer of assets does not attract stamp duty or registration charges.The Court relied on the absence of an instrument transferring assets. [65][66][67]
M/s. Jupiter Wagons Ltd. Vs. Board of Revenue and othersChange of company name does not transfer rights or title in immovable property.The Court used the principle to reject stamp duty based solely on conversion or name change. [68][69][70][71]
M/s. S.K. Industries Vs. State of Chattisgarh and OrsStamp duty and registration apply only where a specified document transfers rights in immovable property for consideration.The principle supported the conclusion that no duty was payable absent transfer. [72][73]
Ingersoll Rand Wadco Tools Ltd. Vs. U.P.S.I.D. Corpn., KanpurChange in company identity does not necessarily create a transfer or justify transfer charges.The Court cited the decision in support of continued legal identity and absence of transfer. [74][75][70]
State of Gujarat Vs. JP INN Pvt Ltd.Conversion without change in composition or consideration does not attract conveyance duty.The Court treated the cited Gujarat decision as supporting the petitioners' position. [43][45]
M/s. Godwin Construction Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner Meerut DivisionThe substance, not nomenclature, determines an instrument's stamp-duty character.The Court referred to the principle while examining the nature of the amended lease deed. [76][77][78]
Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing AuthorityAlternative remedy is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion, not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction.The Court relied on the decision to entertain the petition under Article 226. [79][80][81][12]
State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohd. NoohCertiorari may issue despite a statutory appeal where requisite grounds exist.The decision supported the discretionary nature of the alternative-remedy rule. [82][83]
Assistant Commissioner of State Tax vs. M/s. Commercial Steel LimitedExceptions permitting writ jurisdiction despite an alternative remedy include jurisdictional excess and violation of fundamental rights or natural justice.The Court applied the exceptional-circumstances approach. [84][85][86][87]
State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. vs. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd.A purely legal issue may be decided in writ jurisdiction without requiring statutory appeals.The Court relied on this principle in treating the dispute as legal rather than fact-dependent. [85][81]
Union of India vs. State of HaryanaPure questions of law may justify direct writ adjudication.The Court cited the decision in support of entertaining the petition. [85][81]
Cit v. B.C Srinivasa SettyCharging and computation provisions form an integrated code; where computation is impossible, the charging provision does not apply.The principle was applied to the absence of consideration for stamp-duty computation. [48]
Soloman v. Soloman & Co. Ltd.A company is a distinct legal entity from its shareholders.The decision was cited in the discussion of corporate identity. [88]
R.C. Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union Of IndiaSeparate legal identity of a company from its shareholders.The decision was cited alongside Soloman in the discussion of corporate identity. [88]

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

  1. The Court acknowledged that an alternative appellate remedy existed, but held that the rule was discretionary rather than an absolute jurisdictional bar. The alleged lack of jurisdiction and the essentially legal nature of the controversy justified entertaining the writ petition. [10][34][35][89][12]
  2. Sections 366 and 368 of the Companies Act were material. Section 368 provides that property belonging to or vested in the entity at registration passes to and vests in the company incorporated under the Act. [90][91][92]
  3. The Court treated the conversion as statutory vesting rather than a voluntary transfer of property. Because the directors and shareholders had the same profit-sharing and ownership proportions as the partners, the transaction did not amount to a transfer of assets to a different beneficial owner. [49][13]
  4. The Court emphasized that stamp duty is chargeable on specified instruments. Even assuming that the amended deed could be viewed as a conveyance, the absence of consideration prevented computation of conveyance duty. [93][94][67][13]
  5. The amended lease deed was viewed as consequential to the conversion and the permission granted for updating the lease records, not as a new transfer of assets. [28][29][13]
  6. Accordingly, the authority had failed to consider the statutory vesting provisions and the legal effect of conversion correctly. The impugned order under Section 33 of the Stamp Act therefore could not stand. [92][13][14]

Holding and Implications

ALLOWED. The Court set aside the impugned order dated 5 March 2026 passed under Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Respondent No. 3 was directed to register the lease amendment without insisting on stamp duty, preferably within 15 days of receiving the order. There was no order as to costs. [14][15][95]

The direct consequence was that the petitioners obtained registration of the amended lease without further stamp-duty payment. The Court applied existing principles concerning statutory vesting, absence of consideration and exceptions to the alternative-remedy rule; the opinion did not state that it was creating a new precedent. [13][64][15]

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    Pacmor Flexible Limited Company Through Authorised Representative Hiran Solanki Hiran Solanki v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh

    1

    NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:20954

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

    AT I N D O R E

    BEFORE

    HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANDEEP N. BHATT WRIT PETITION NO. 11806 of 2026 PACMOR FLEXIBLE LIMITED COMPANY & ANOTHER

    Versus

    THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & OTHERS Appearance:-

    Ms. Bhakti Vyas, advocate for the petitioners. Shri Kushagra Singh, Government Advocate for respondents No. 1 and 3/State. Shri Rishabh Singh Suryavanshi, advocate for respondent No.2. Shri Amit Tatke, advocate for respondent No.4.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (Reserved on : 21.07.2026) (Delivered on: 31.07.2026) ….....................................................................................................................................

    ORDER

    Heard counsel for the parties on admission.

    2. By way of this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for following reliefs:-

    A. This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of certiorari or other appropriate writ to set aside the impugned order dated 5.3.2026 issued under Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (Annexure P-1). B. This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ, direction or order in teh nature of certiorari or other appropriate writ directing the respondent No. 3 to

    2

    register the lease amendment. C.For such other and further relief as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper be granted.

    3. Counsel for the petitioners has drawn my attention towards the fact that on 1.3.2014. a partnership deed was executed in the name of Gopal Print Pack and on 20 th October 2020, lease deed executed by Gopal Print Pack for the plot in the Smart Industrial Park Indore and the entire stamp duty on the lease deed was paid at the relevant point of time. She has submitted that on 23.1.2025, supplementary agreement was executed by Gopal Print Pack to convert the partnership firm into limited company as per Section 366 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the liability of the original partners in the partnership firm remained unchanged. She has further submitted on 10.2.2025, the Registrar of Companies has issued the certificate of incorporation and the petitioner has also a lease land at GIDC and the same was amended on the basis of the conversion without any objection as regards stamp duty. She has submitted that on 7.7.2025, the petitioner applied for lease amendment permission pursuant to name change on conversion which was granted by MPIDC. She has further submitted that on 25.7.2025, the amended lease deed was executed and on 30thJuly, 2025, the amended deed was presented for registration with the Sub Registrar. On 14.8.2025, the respondent no. 2 had issued the notice under Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act for the deficit stamp duty. The petitioners have replied the said notice on 21.8.2025 and had placed the relevant documents before respondent No.3. The respondent No.3 thereafter issued several notices and on 15.1.2026 the respondent No.3 for the reasons best known to him, though he is not having any jurisdiction, had conducted spot verification despite there being no document to establish transfer of the assets or conveyance deed. On 28.1.2026, again notice was issued. By drawn attention towards Annexure P-13, counsel

    3

    submitted that the identical case was registered on 29.5.2025 without asking any further stamp duty. It is also contended that the impugned order is passed on 5.3.2026 which is without jurisdiction and against the settled position of law. In support of her contention, she has further submitted that the petitioners are challenging the impugned order on the ground of malafide intention of the authority as respondent No.3 has already registered the document which is of the similar nature which is Annexure P-13 in May 2025. She has relied on para 16 of the judgment dated 5.1.2021 passed in Writ Petition No. 1874 of 2019 of this Hon'ble High court in the matter of Alok Choubey Vs. State of MP in respect of the contention raised by counsel for respondents regarding the maintainability of the writ petition. She has submitted that in the present case also the condition laid down in para 16 more particularly conditions no. 2,3, 5 and 6 are applicable. She has further submitted that Section 2(1) of Stamp Act defines a conveyance as an instrument that transfers property between two living persons and since the partners and shareholders are the same people, no such transfer has taken place. Referring to Section 3 of Stamp Act, learned counsel submits that this section applies duty only to instruments that actually create or transfer rights in property. In this case, there was no new transfer instrument and only a statutory conversion. She has further referred to Article 25 of Schedule 1A of the Stamp Act and submitted that conveyance not being a transfer, charged or exempted under No. 61. She has submitted that explanation for the purposes of this Article market value of an property which is subject matter of conveyance executed by or on behalf of the Central Government or the State Government shall be the value shown in the instrument. She has further referred to Article 32 of the Stamp Act and has submitted that the case of petitioners falls under this Article of the Schedule 1A of Stamp Act as she has contended that the document amending or correcting previously registered deed but not making any material

    4

    alterations. She has submitted that Section 366 of the Companies Act which was amended in 2017, unregistered entities like LLPs, partnership firms, societies, etc. with seven or more members can with effect from 15thAugust 2018 onwards opt for conversion into a company limited by shares or guarantee or with unlimited liability in accordance with the provisions of Part XXI of the Act, 2013. She has further referred to Section 368 of Companies Act and has submitted that all property, movable and immovable (including actionable claims), belonging to or vested in a company at the date of its registration in pursuance of this part, shall, on such registration, pass to and vest in the company as incorporated under this Act for all the estate and interest of the company therein. She has lastly relied upon the following judgments in support of her contentions.

    (i) Order dated 5.1.2021 passed in Alok Kumar Choubey Vs. State of MP (WP No. 1874/2019);

    (ii) Order dated 26.8.2025 passed in Jupiter Wagans Ltd. Vs. Board of Revenue (WP No. 24955/2018) by this Hon'ble High court;

    (iii) Order dated 26.11.2019 passed by Hon'ble High court of Gujarat in JP INN Vs. State of Gujarat SC 1226/2018 which was affirmed by Division Bench in LPA No. 413/2021;

    (iv) Order dated 3.7.2022 passed by Hon'ble High court of Gujarat in Anup Industries Vs. State of Gujarat SCA 10795/2001;

    (v) Order dated 7.1.2021 passed by Hon'ble High court of Himachal Pradesh in the matter of M/s Sozin Flora Pharma LLP Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh in CWP No. 4019/2020;

    (vi) Valli Pattabhiram Rao and Another Vs. Sri Ramanuja Ginning & Rice Factory (P) Ltd AIR 1984 AP 176;

    (vii) CIT Vs. Texspin Engineering & Manufacturing Works, reported in (20030

    263 ITR 345(Bom.)

    (viii) Hindustan Lever Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2004) 9 SCC 438;

    5

    (ix) State of Rajasthan Vs. Basant Agrotech (India) Ltd. (2013) 2 SCC 273;

    (x) Commissioner of Income Tax, Udaipur Vs. M/s Chetak Enterprises Pvt Ltd.

    She has prayed that the present petition deserves to be allowed as impugned action is perse illegal.

    4. Counsel for the State has strongly opposed the submission by referring to the affidavit in reply filed by HDFC Bank as well as State/ respondents No. 1,and 3 and has contended that under Section 40(1)(d) of the Indian Stamp Act, against the impugned order, the petitioners are having alternative efficacious remedy of preferring an appeal before the Revenue Commissioner. He has further submitted that the petitioner to avoid the deposition of 25% of the stamp duty for filing an appeal have directly approached this court and therefore, the petitioner cannot be permitted to surpass the legal remedy, which is efficacious as well. He has further submitted that the contention raised by the petitioner that it is a conversion of partnership firm into a company and therefore, no stamp duty is chargeable is entirely wrong. Learned counsel submits that if it is merely a conversion of partnership firm into a company, no separate instrument is required, but in the present case, the partners have entered into an agreement by which the transfer of property is being taken place by executing amended deed, which in fact is a transfer deed as per Transfer of Property Act since the property is being transferred by partnership firm into a company and the partnership firm is governed by Partnership Act, whereas the company is governed by Companies Act and both are two separate entities. He has further submitted that while looking into an instrument, the contents of the instrument are important and if instrument purports to be in a manner to transfer of property and, therefore, all the documents are important while deciding the aspect of the stamp duty. He has submitted that there is a notification of the

    6

    State Government dated 2.1.2015 which clarifies such instruments are required to be stamped. He has submitted that the original deed which is now sought to be amended is a lease by which only lease hold rights were granted to the lease, but by way of amendment ownership is being transferred and, therefore, the entire nomenclature of the original deed is being changed and by way of amending lease deed the ownership of the property is being transferred and, therefore, such amendment in this manner cannot be permitted and therefore, the said instrument is chargeable by stamp duty under Article 25 of the Indian Stamp Act. He has further submitted that the contention of petitioners that it is not a transfer of property but statutory vesting of property by operation of law, is merely an eye wash as bare perusal of the instrument would show that it is not a statutory vesting of property by operation of law, but in fact is a transfer of property by act and will of parties and it is apparent that to avoid the stamp duty, the nomenclature of the document has been set forth as amendment, which is not actually idea behind the instrument. He has further submitted that when there is alternative efficacious remedy available to the petitioners, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy.

    5. Counsel for respondent No.2 has also drawn attention of this Court towards the reply filed by respondent No.2 and has submitted that respondent No. 2 has granted permission on 7.7.2025 for the limited purpose of updating the lease records in accordance with the applicable industrial land management rules. The said permission was an administrative permission granted on the petitioner's own request, it was not an insistence or direction by respondent No.2 for execution of an amendment deed, nor was it intended to decide the legal effect and the stamp duties of any document which the petitioner may thereafter choose to execute. He has further submitted that after the

    7

    said permission the amendment deed was executed and presented by the petitioner before the competent registration authority. The proceedings thereafter undertaken before the competent registration authority. The proceedings thereafter undertaken in relation to impounding of the document, determination of stamp duty, valuation, penalty and registration arise under the independent statutory framework administered by the concerned stamp and registration authorities. The respondent No. 2 does not exercise powers under the Indian Stamp Act or the Registration Act and has no authority to determine whether an instrument is chargeable to stamp duty, to assess its market value, or impose any penalty and therefore, he has submitted that the respondent no.2 has limited role to play and considering the submission of counsel for petitioner regarding the reliance in case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Udaipur Vs. M/s Chetak Enterprises Pvt Ltd., counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that the said submission is regarding statutory vesting and the present respondent has neither disputed nor adjudicated the principle sought to be relied upon by petitioners and present respondent has no authority to determine the impact of such principles under the Stamp Act and Registration Act and therefore, he has submitted that this Hon'ble court may pass appropriate order.

    6. Counsel for respondent No.4/HDFC Bank has submitted that HDFC bank has granted commercial credit facility of aggregating to Rs. 40 crores by sanction letter dated 20.8.2025 to the petitioners and some of the amount is yet to be disbursed and some of amount is already disbursed and therefore, the respondent No.4 has limited role to play in the present matter and as such huge finance is involved in the matter and therefore, counsel submitted that the respondent No. 4 is as such proforma party to the present petition and no relief or direction has been sought against the bank by the

    8

    petitioners and it is further submitted that the core dispute rests entirely between the petitioners company and respondent No. 3 regarding the alleged deficiency of stamp duty on the amendment deed executed for release of all properties situated at plot No. 75 admeasuring 25010 sq.mt. at Smart Industrial Park Near Natrip District Dhar. Therefore, he has submitted that the Court may consider the submission made at the bar and pass appropriate orders.

    7. I have considered the rival submissions made at the bar. It is relevant to note the chronology of events as under:-

    8. On 1.3.2014, a partnership deed was executed in the name of Gopal Print Pack and on 20thOctober 2020, lease deed executed by Gopal Print Pack for the plot in the Smart Industrial Park Indore and the entire stamp duty on the lease deed was paid at the relevant point of time. On 23.1.2025, supplementary agreement was executed by Gopal Print Pack to convert the partnership firm into limited company as per Section 366 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the liability of the original partners in the partnership firm remained unchanged. On 10.2.2025, the Registrar of Companies has issued the certificate of incorporation and the petitioner has also a lease land at GIDC and the same was amended on the basis of the conversion without any objection as regards stamp duty. Thereafter on 7.7.2025, the petitioner applied for lease amendment permission pursuant to name change on conversion which was granted by MPIDC. On 25.7.2025, the amended lease deed was executed and on 30thJuly, 2025, the amended deed was presented for registration with the Sub Registrar. On 14.8.2025, the respondent no. 3 had issued the notice under Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act for the deficit stamp duty. The petitioner has replied the said notice on 21.8.2025 and had placed the relevant documents before respondent No.3. The respondent No.3 thereafter

    9

    issued several notices and on 15.1.2026 the respondent No.3 for the reasons best known to him, though he is not having any jurisdiction, had conducted spot verification despite there being no document to establish transfer of the assets or conveyance deed. On 28.1.2026, again notice was issued. It is also contended that the impugned order is passed on 5.3.2026 which is without jurisdiction and against the settled position of law.

    9. Considering the submission made at the bar, there is no doubt that alternative remedy is available to the petitioners but looking to the subject matter of petition and the judgments which are cited at the bar, more particularly the judgment passed in case of Alok Kumar Choubey (supra), the writ court should entertain a petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India rather than requiring the petitioner to avail alternative remedy. Relevant Para 16 of the judgment reads as under:-

    "16. Seven well recognized exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, which can be culled out from the afore-discussed judgments of the Supreme Court for entertaining a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, can be summarized thus: (i) where the writ petition has been filed for enforcement of fundamental rights; (ii) where there has been violation of principle of natural justice; (iii) where the order of proceedings is wholly without jurisdiction; (iv) where the vires of any Act is under challenge; (v) where availing of alternative remedy subjects a person to very lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment;

    (vi) where the writ petition can be entertained despite alternative remedy if the question raised is purely legal one, there being no dispute on facts; and (vii) where State or its intermediary in a contractual matter acts against public good/interest unjustly, unfairly, unreasonably and arbitrarily. Despite afore-noted exceptions, especially fifth and seventh of the above, whether or not in a particular case the writ court should entertain a petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India rather than requiring the petitioner to avail alternative remedy, would always depend on the facts situation of a given case, upon the petitioner making out a strong case. If it is shown that the facts of the case are not disputed and the Government or its instrumentality has been found acting unjustly, unfairly and unreasonably even in

    10

    regard to its contractual obligations, the High Court would be justified in entertaining the writ petition despite availability of alternative remedy."

    10. From the above paragraph and considering the celebrated judgment in the case of Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1, cited by counsel for petitioner, is helpful and prima facie matter requires consideration for the reason that though there is equally efficacious remedy it seems that the categories which are carved as an exception for exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India where the writ petition can be entertained despite alternative remedy if the question raised is purely legal one and there being no dispute on facts and also considering the criteria that where State or its intermediary in a contractual matter acts against public good/interest unjustly, unfairly, unreasonably and arbitrarily and where the petition is filed for enforcement of fundamental rights.

    11. Considering the judgment in case of Alok Kumar Choubey (supra) and the judgment in case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra) on the question of maintainability of writ petition despite availability of alternative remedy, in that case also, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the High Court having regard to the facts of the case has discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions, one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction but the alternative remedy has been consistently held by the Supreme Court not to operate as a bar in at least four contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or where the vires of an Act is challenged.

    11

    12. In State of H.P. And Others v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Limited and Another - AIR 2005 SC 3936, the Supreme Court while considering the objection of alternative remedy of filing of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, held that despite existence of alternative remedy, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. But normally the High Court should not interfere if there is efficacious alternative remedy is available. If somebody approaches the High Court without availing alternative remedy provided, the High Court should ensure that he has made out a strong case that there exists good ground to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction. Following observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced herein for the facility of reference :-

    "Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by this Court in I. Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly ., Bareilly, AIR (1971) SC 33 that if the High Court had entertained a petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be desirable to deal with them in a writ petition."

    13. In Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India vs. Devi Ispat Limited, (2010) 11 SCC 186, the Supreme Court held that writ of mandamus can be issued even in contractual matters and in paragraph- 28 of the said judgment, the apex Court held as under:-

    "28. It is clear that (a) in the contract if there is a clause for arbitration,

    12

    normally, a writ court should not invoke its jurisdiction; (b) the existence of effective alternative remedy

    provided in the contract itself is a good ground to decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226; and (c) if the instrumentality of the State acts contrary to the public good, public interest, unfairly, unjustly, unreasonably discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in its contractual or statutory obligation, writ petition would be maintainable. However, a legal right must exist and corresponding legal duty on the part of the State and if any action on the part of the State is wholly unfair or arbitrary, writ courts can exercise their power. In the light of the legal position, writ petition is maintainable even in contractual matters, in the circumstances mentioned in the earlier paragraphs."

    14. In Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India and Others, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 728, the Supreme Court held that the State in its executive capacity, even in the contractual field, is under obligation to act fairly and cannot practice some discrimination. If the facts of such case are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, Involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    15. In case of State of Gujarat Vs. JP INN Pvt Ltd. passed in LPA No. 413 of 2021, the Gujarat High Court by order dated 20.9.2023 in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 has held as under:-

    "6. In the present case, the partnership firm has converted itself into a private limited company. There is no change in the business, no change in the ratio of shares and all the assets, liabilities, existing contracts, engagements, obligations of the partnership firm came to be vested in the Private Limited company on and from the date of its incorporation. All the partners of the partnership firm have become the directors of the Private Limited Company in accordance with their ratio in the partnership firm. There is no transfer of the

    13

    property from the partnership firm to any individual person or to any individual director in the new company. The partner firm itself has become a new entity as private limited company by getting itself registered under the provisions of Companies Act, 2013. It would be pertinent to note that the property of the partnership firm has vested in the Private Limited company, and no consideration has been paid for the same. Therefore, Article 20(1) of Schedule I to the Stamp Act as relied upon by the appellants would not apply in the present case. The provisions of the Stamp Act have to be read together with the charging sections of the Stamp Act so as to arrive at the computation of the stamp duty. The present case would not fall under the charging sections of the Stamp Act, as there is no consideration mentioned in the instruments of Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association, and therefore, it will not be possible to compute the stamp duty under Article 20(1) of Schedule-I of the Stamp Act. The stamp duty in the present case will have to be computed in relation to the amount of consideration as would be mentioned in the instruments of conveyance, which, in the present case, are Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association. On conversion from the partnership firm to a Private Limited Company, in the present case, there is no change of composition and no any consideration has been transferred to any of the parties.

    7. With reference to the judgment relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellants in the case of M/s Mahalaxmi Saw Mills P. Ltd. (supra) the same is not applicable in the present case, as in the said case before the Delhi High Court, the constitution of the Partnership firm had changed from time to time and no intimation thereof was given to the relevant authority. The property sought to be transferred to the company in said case was a leasehold property, which had undergone change of composition of the partners till its conversion from partnership firm into a company, and certain persons, who were not partners at the time of acquiring the leasehold rights, had also become the partners on the date when the said firm changed into a company. Therefore, the reliance placed on said decision will be of no avail to all the appellants herein.

    8. The reliance placed by the learned advocate for the respondents in the case of Anup Industries (supra) is squarely applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

    16. It is also relevant to refer to the judgment dated 3.7.2001 passed by Single Bench of Gujarat High Court in case of Anup Industries Vs. State of

    14

    Gujarat in Special Civil Application No. 10795 of 2001, wherein following observations were made:-

    5. Having heard both the sides, it is apparent that the impugned notices cannot be allowed to be stand. Articles 20 and 57 of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 which respectively deal with 'Conveyance' and 'Transfer of Lease' specifically require that stamp duty has to be computed in relation to the amount of the consideration for conveyance. Even if for the purpose of argument the contention on behalf of the respondents is accepted that the declarations fall within the meaning of conveyance, in absence of any consideration the computation provisions fail. It is an admitted position as can be seen from the declarations that as per Paragraph 3, it is specifically stated in unequivocal terms that no consideration is paid. If this be the position the provisions on which reliance has been placed by the respondents cannot be invoked against the petitioner. The provisions of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 have to be read together i.e. the charging section and the computation provisions constitute an integrated code. When there is a case to which the computation provisions cannot apply at all, it is evident that such a case was not intended to fall within the charging section. [Cit v. B.C Srinivasa Setty ., 1981 (128) ITR 294 (SC)].

    6. In support of the various contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, the learned Advocate relied upon decisions of (i) Sotvex Oils and Fertilizers v. Bhandari Cros-Fields (P.) Ltd., 1978 Comp. Cases, 260; (ii) Pioneer Protective Glass Fibre Pvt. Ltd, v. Fibre Glass Pilkington Ltd., 1986 Comp. Cases 707.

    17. It is also relevant to refer to the judgment dated 7.1.2021 passed by High Court of Himachal Pradesh in case of M/s Sozin Flora Pharma LLP Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh in CWP No. 4019 of 2020:

    4. Observations:-

    4(i)(a). First and foremost, nature and concept of conversion of a partnership firm to a Limited Liability Partnership, is to be seen. Reference in this regard can be made to Section 58 of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, relevant portion whereof reads as under:-

    15

    "58. Registration and effect of conversion. (1) to (3) ......................................... (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, on and from the date of registration specified in the certificate of registration issued under the Second Schedule, the Third Schedule or the Fourth Schedule, as the case may be,-

    (a) there shall be a limited liability partnership by the name specified in the certificate of registration registered under this Act;

    (b) all tangible (movable or immovable) and intangible property vested in the firm or the company, as the case may be, all assets, interests, rights, privileges, liabilities, obligations relating to the firm or the company, as the case may be, and the whole of the undertaking of the firm or the company, as the case may be, shall be transferred to and shall vest in the limited liability partnership without further assurance, act or deed; and

    (c) the firm or the company, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be dissolved and removed from the records of the Registrar of Firms or Registrar of Companies, as the case may be."

    4(i)(b). Upon conversion, all tangible and intangible assets of a registered partnership firm shall get automatically transferred to and shall vest in the limited liability partnership. The transfer and vestment of property of erstwhile partnership firm in favour of a converted LLP is statutory. Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Texspin Engg. & Mfg., (2003) 180 CTR Bom 497, while dealing with a case where partnership firm was being treated as a company under the statutory provisions of the Companies Act, held that when a firm is treated as a company, there is no conveyance of the property executable in favour of the Limited Company. The vesting of property of firm in the Limited Company was not incidental to a transfer but statutory. Therefore, there was no question of capital gain. Relevant extracts from para 6 of the judgment are as under:-

    "6. ......................... Now, in the present case, it is argued on behalf of the department before the Tribunal, for the first time, that in this case, on vesting of the properties of the erstwhile Firm in the Limited Company, there was a transfer of capital assets and, therefore, it was chargeable to income-tax under the head

    "Capital gains" as, on such vesting, there was extinguishment of all right, title and interest in the capital assets qua the Firm. We do not find any merit in this argument. In the present case, we are concerned with a Partnership Firm being treated as a company under the statutory provisions of Part IX of the Companies Act. In such cases, the Company succeeds the Firm. Generally, in the case of a transfer of a capital asset, two important ingredients are : existence of a party and a counterparty and, secondly, incoming consideration qua the transferor. In our view, when a Firm is treated as a Company, the said two

    16

    conditions are not attracted. There is no conveyance of the property executable in favour of the Limited Company. It is no doubt true that all properties of the Firm vests in the Limited Company on the Firm being treated as a Company under Part IX of the Companies Act, but that vesting is not consequent or incidental to a transfer. It is a statutory vesting of properties in the Company as the Firm is treated as a Limited Company. On vesting of all the properties statutorily in the Company, the cloak given to the Firm is replaced by a different cloak and the same Firm is now treated as a Company, after a given date. In the circumstances, in our view, there is no transfer of a capital asset as contemplated by Section 45(1) of the Act. Even assuming for the sake of argument that there is a transfer of a capital asset under Section 45(1) because of the definition of the word "transfer" in Section 2(47) (iii), even then we are of the view that liability to pay capital gains would not arise because Section 45(1) is required to be read with Section 48, which provides for mode of computation................................"

    Reference in this regard can also be made to a judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in

    Vali Pattabhirama Rao and another Versus Sri Ramanuja Ginning and Rice Factory (P.) Ltd. and others, AIR 1984 AP 176. The Court was considering a situation where a previous firm was converted into company under the provisions of Companies Act. The Court held that there was statutory vesting of title of all the property of the previous firm in the newly incorporated company, therefore, there was no need for any separate conveyance. The relevant para from the judgment reads as under:- .

    "18. We have already held that the partnership firm in which the original lessee is partner was legally constituted, and the firm continues to be lawful and the properties belonging to all the partners have become the properties of the firm. The question is whether the property of the said firm had vested in the first defendant company when the firm was registered under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. For that it is necessary to notice the terms of section 263 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, that corresponds to section 575 of the present Companies Act, 1956. Section 263 reads as follows:

    "S. 263. All property, movable and immovable, including all interests and rights in, to and out of the property, movable and immovable, and including obligations and actionable claims as may belong to or be vested in a company at the date of its registration in pursuance of this part, shall, on registration, pass to and vest in the company as incorporated under this Act for all the estate and interest of the company therein."

    The word 'company' occurring in section 263 is not a company registered under the Act. It is used in the sense of a group, assembly or association of persons. In fact, throughout the Act the word "company" was used in several sections in the general sense of association of

    17

    persons. In fact, section 11 of the present Companies Act (section 4 of the previous Act) itself which enacted the prohibition of associations exceeding certain members for carrying on trade starts with saying that no company or association or partnership consisting of more than ten members shall be formed. Section 253 of the previous Act corresponds to section 565 of the present Act. Section 565(1) (b) of the present Act corresponds to section 253(1) (ii) of the 1913 Act, which permits any company otherwise duly constituted according to law consisting of seven or more members to be registered as a company. A partnership must be one such. This is made clear by the provisions of section 255 of the 1913 Act (present Act section 567) and section 256 of the 1913 Act (present Act section 568) where under a deed of partnership has to be filed before the Registrar before seeking the registration. Hence, a partnership which was treated as a company for the purposes of the Companies Act can be registered under Part 8 of the previous Act (Part 9 of the present Act) and the vesting is provided by section 263 of the 1913 Act (section 575 of the present Act). The provision is mandatory and there will be statutory vesting in the corporation so incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act. The Registrar is bound to give a certificate of registration under section 262 (present section 574) which is a conclusive proof of incorporation, vide section 35 of the present Act that corresponds to section 24 of the previous Act. Hence, it is clear that no conveyance is necessary when a partnership is converted and registered as a company. However, it is not possible to acquire such title statutorily under this section if the previous firm purports to convey title to the company in which event a separate deed of conveyance is necessary. Thus, we hold that if the constitution of the partnership firm is changed into that of a company by registering it under Part 9 of the present Act (Part 8 of the previous Act), there shall be statutory vesting of title of all the property of the previous firm in the newly incorporated company without any need for a separate conveyance. A similar view was taken in Ramasundari Ray v. Syamendra Lal Ray, ILR [1947] 2 Calcutta 1. D.W. 2 deposed that in 1920 the partnership was converted into a private limited company and filed the articles of association, exhibit B-54. This evidence stood uncontradicted. In fact, the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-title treated the first defendant as successor- in- interest of the previous firm and hence we are of the opinion that the leasehold interest that has become firm's property by virtue of the original lessee bringing into the firm has vested in the first defendant company after its registration."

    The above judgment was quoted with approval by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Jai Narain Parasrampuria (Dead) and others Versus Pushpa Devi Saraf and others, (2006) 7 SCC 756, in following manner:-

    "26. The said decision has been followed by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vali Pattabhirama Rao v. Sri Ramanuja Ginning & Rice Factory (P) Ltd. wherein it was held: (AIR pp. 184-85) "

    Thus we hold that if the constitution of the partnership firm is changed into that of a company by registering it under Part 9 of present Act (Part 8 of previous Act), there shall be statutory vesting of title of all the property of the previous firm in the newly

    18

    incorporated company without any need for a separate conveyance."

    In Commissioner of Income Tax, Udaipur Versus M/s. Chetak Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2020 SC 4305, Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the effect of conversion of partnership firm into a company under Part IX of Companies Act, held that on statutory vesting all properties of the firm, in law, vest in the company and the firm is succeeded by the company. Para 7 of the judgment reads as under:-

    "7. The question is: what is the effect of conversion of partnership firm into a company under Part IX of the Companies Act? That can be discerned from Section 575 of the Companies Act, which reads thus:

    "575. Vesting of property on registration. All property, movable and immovable (including actionable claims), belonging to or vested in a company at the date of its registration in pursuance of this Part, shall, on such registration, pass to and vest in the company as incorporated under this Act for all the estate and interest of the company therein."

    It is manifest that all properties, movable and immovable (including actionable claims) belonging to or vested in a company at the date of its registration would vest in the company as incorporated under the Act. In other words, the property acquired by a promoter can be claimed by the company after its incorporation without any need for conveyance on account of statutory vesting. On such statutory vesting, all the properties of the firm, in law, vest in the company and the firm is succeeded by the company. The firm ceases to exist and assumes the status of a company after its registration as a company."

    In view of provisions of Section 58(4)(b) of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, consequent upon conversion of firm to limited liability partnership, there is automatic vesting/transfer of all assets of firm to the LLP. Sub-section (4) of Section 58 of LLP Act starts with non-obstante clause 'notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force'. Therefore, principles of statutory vesting of properties will apply to the instant case as well.

    4(ii)(a). Next arises the question about necessity of execution of an instrument upon conversion of a partnership firm to limited liability partnership. In the judgments cited above, it has been held that noseparate conveyance or instrument of transfer etc. is required to be executed in cases of statutory vesting. LLP is required to notify the concerned authority about the conversion. After the conversion, firm getting converted into LLP does not remain in existence. Clauses 7 and 9 of 'The Second Schedule' relatable to Section 55 of LLP Act provide as under:-

    "7. Effect of registration.- On and from the date of registration specified in the certificate of registration issued under paragraph 5,-

    (a) there shall be a limited liability partnership by the name specified in the certificate of registration registered under this Act;

    19

    (b) all tangible (movable and immovable) property as well as intangible property vested in the firm, all assets, interests, rights, privileges, liabilities, obligations relating to the firm and the whole of the undertaking of the firm shall be transferred to and shall vest in the limited liability partnership without further assurance, act or deed; and

    (c) the firm shall be deemed to be dissolved and if earlier registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932) removed from the records maintained under that Act.

    9. Pending proceedings.- All proceedings by or against the firm which are pending in any Court or Tribunal or before any authority on the date of registration may be continued, completed or enforced by or against the limited liability partnership." Second Schedule ensures continuity of the firm after its dissolution and conversion to LLP. The words 'shall be transferred to-shall vest' in the LLP Act are to be read harmoniously to give it purposive interpretation in tune with the object and provisions of the Act. The transfer of assets is only by way of statutory vesting requiring no other separate instrument of transfer. There is automatic vesting and divesting. Thus, no further act or deed is required. This is also evidnced by Clause 7(b) of Second Schedule (extracted above).

    4(ii)(b). Section 3 of the Indian Stamp Act pertains to charging stamp duty on certain instruments. The section starts with following words:-

    "3. Instruments chargeable with duty.- Subject to the provisions of this Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I, the following instruments shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in that Schedule as the proper duty therefore, respectively, that is to say....................."

    Section 3 of the Indian Stamp Act talks about the instruments, which are chargeable with duties.Once there is no instrument of transfer of assets of erstwhile partnership firm to LLP, then question of payment of stamp duty and registration charges on it does not arise. In this regard, it will be profitable to refer to a judgment passed by this Court in CWP No.1293 of 2019, titled Reckitt Benckiser (India) Private Limited Versus State of H.P. & Another,

    decided on 29th February, 2020. In that case, name of petitioner (therein) was changed from public limited company to a private limited company in accordance with the provisions of Companies Subsequent to change of name, the petitioner therein intended to transfer its assets and for that purpose, it Act moved an application for reflecting change of its name in the revenue record. The approval was granted by the State, but subject to the condition of payment of stamp duty and registration fee on account of addition of word 'Private' in its name. The question before the Court was whether on such change of name of the Company, transfer of its immovable property takes place, which is chargeable to stamp duty and registration fee or not. Noticing the instructions of respondent No.2, dated 16.02.2012 (already extracted above), the provisions of the Act and facts, it was held that mere change of name of company not accompanied by any transfer of assets would not warrant payment of stamp duty or registration charges. It was also observed that there being no instrument of transfer of assets and property in

    20

    existence, therefore, there was no question of any instrument requiring compulsory registration. The Court thus concluded that for these reasons, change of name of the company does not entail payment of stamp duty and registration fee. Relevant paras from the judgment are extracted hereinafter:-

    "16) The stand of the respondents that the present is not a case of mere change of name and rather a case of conversion of public limited company to private limited company, hence stamp duty is chargeable under Section 3 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 though has been taken by the respondents-State to make an attempt just to mislead this Court and confuse the whole issue, however, unsuccessfully. Section 3 of the Stamp Act speaks about the instruments, which are chargeable with duties, subject to the exemptions contained in Schedule-I. The instrument referred to herein and also Schedule-I, nowhere show that on mere addition of word 'private' in the name of a company without transfer of its assets and liability, is an instrument, which is chargeable thereunder. So far as the Registration Act is concerned, only that instrument is chargeable, which needs registration.

    17) In the case in hand, land and building remained with the petitioner-company, even after addition of word 'private' to its name. Therefore, there is no question of existence of an instrument of transfer of its assets and property and the compulsorily registration thereof. The respondents though have made an attempt to draw the distinction between a public limited and private limited company from its definition finds mentioned in Section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013 and has canvased that two companies are quite different and distinct However, learned Senior Additional Advocate General has failed to satisfy this Court about the justifiability of such distinction drawn and how the addition of word 'private' in the name of the petitioner company amount to transfer of its assets and liability and consequently levying of stamp duty and Registration charges. The respondent-State rather seems to have taken such stand in reply filed to the writ petition merely for rejection.

    18) It is worth mentioning that the circular dated 16.2.2012 Annexure P-2 clearly distinguishes between cases pertaining to change of name simplicitor under the provisions of Companies Act 1956 and for that matter Companies Act 2013 and those with transfer of assets. The second category of cases cover transaction like merger, demerger and amalgamation etc., which involve two separate entities and transfer of assets from one entity to another. Annexure P-2 clearly postulates that no stamp duty or registration fee is payable in a case of change of name of the Company. In the case in hand since no transfer of assets occurred on account of change of the name of the petitioner Company, hence neither stamp duty nor registration charges is payable on such change of name of the petitioner and its name is required to be entered in the revenue record pertaining to the land and building in question. The respondents, therefore, are under an obligation to update the entries in the revenue record pertaining to the land with the new name of the petitioner Company by addition of word 'private'

    21

    without payment of any stamp duty and registration charges."

    The registration fee is payable on an instrument compulsorily registerable under Section 17 of the Registration Act. Once there is no transfer of immovable property under an instrument, then the question of compulsory registration of that non-existent instrument and payment of stamp duty on it is not warranted. Neither the stamp duty nor the registration fee, therefore, is payable in such circumstances.

    4(iii). Another facet to be determined is whether conversion of firm to LLP involves change in constitution. Conversion of petitioner-firm to LLP is admittedly without any consideration. Neither any sale deed nor any conveyance deed has been executed. Transfer of assets of erstwhile partnership firm to LLP is by operation of law. Conversion to LLP is normally undertaken for restructuring exercises. One of the object of Limited Liability Partnership Act is to view it as an alternative corporate business vehicle providing the benefits of limited liability, while allowing its members the flexibility of organizing their internal structure as a partnership, based on a mutually arrived agreement. Owing to flexibility in its structure and operation, LLP has been considered a suitable vehicle for small enterprises. Petitioner firm's legal entity is not changed after conversion. Only the identity of the petitioner firm as a legal entity gets changed without any change in the constitution of petitioner-firm.

    4(iv). Reliance placed by the respondent-State on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Nalwa Sons Investment Ltd. and Another, 2019 SCC Online SC 586, is misplaced as the controversy involved in that case did not pertain to conversion of a partnership firm to a Limited Liability Partnership. The question involved before the Hon'ble Apex Court in that case was "if the original lessee (respondent No.1, a public limited company) in respect of the plot given on lease by the appellant, transfers the same to another public limited company, albeit an alter ego of the former, consequent to an order of arrangement and demerger passed by the Company Judge, then whether it is liable to pay 50% unearned increase (UEI) on the market value of the plot to the appellant (lessor)".

    5. Conclusion:- From the above discussion, following conclusions are drawn:-

    5(a) Upon conversion of a registered partnership firm to an LLP under the provisions of the Limited Liability Partnership Act all movable and immovable properties of erstwhile registered partnership firm, automatically vest in the converted LLP by operation of Section 58(4)(b) of the Limited Liability Partnership Act.

    5(b). The transfer of assets of firm to the LLP is by operation of law. Being statutory transfer, no separate conveyance/instrument is required to be executed for transfer of assets.

    5(c). Since there is no instrument of transfer of assets of the erstwhile partnership firm to the limited liability partnership, the question of payment of stamp duty and registration charges does not arise as these are chargeable only on the instruments indicated in Section 3 of the Indian Stamp Act and Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act.

    5(d). Partnership firm's legal entity after conversion to limited liability partnership does not

    22

    change. Only the identity of the firm as a legal entity changes. Such conversion or change in the name does not amount to change in the constitution of partnership firm.

    5(e) Stamp duty and registration fee cannot be levied upon conversion of a partnership firm to LLP. Therefore, permission under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act for recording such change of name in the revenue documents, i.e. M/s Sozin Flora Pharma to M/s Sozin Flora Pharma LLP cannot be made dependent upon deposit of stamp duty and registration fee.

    For the foregoing discussion, we allow the instant writ petition. The impugned Annexures P- 8, dated 28.08.2017 and P-10 dated 23.08.2019, insofar they direct the petitioner to deposit the stamp duty and registration fee consequent upon change of its name from M/s Sozin Flora Pharma to M/s Sozin Flora Pharma LLP, are quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to enter the name of the petitioner as 'M/s Sozin Flora Pharma LLP' in the revenue record within a period of four weeks from today.

    The writ petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.

    18. It is also fruitful to refer to the order dated 26.8.2025 passed by this Hon'ble court in WP No. 24955/2018 in the matter of M/s Jupiter Wagons Ltd. Vs. Board of Revenue and others, wherein it has been held as under:-

    09. In the case of Professor P.C. Mahajan Foundation (Supra) which was a case as regards change of name in one of the property in respect of a company whose name had been changed, this Court held that change of company name does not result in transfer of any right, title and interest in any immovable property. It has been held as under:-

    "6. Section 23 of Companies Act, 1956 the Central Government may direct the companies to change its name or new name as the case may be. The company shall apply to the Registrar who shall carry out the necessary changes in certificate of incorporation and the memorandum. It not affect any debts, liabilities, obligations or contracts incurred or entered into, by or on behalf of the company before conversion and such debts, liabilities, obligations and contracts may be enforced in the manner as if such registration had not been done, therefore, the Writ Court has rightly held in case of change of company name will not result in transfer of any right or title and interest in any immovable property, hence, the registration under Section 17 of Registration Act is not required."

    10. In the decision of the Single Bench which had been affirmed by the Division Bench as aforesaid, it was held as under :-

    "In light of Section 23 and Sub-section 3 of the Companies Act, mere change of name of the company does not require registration of title deed in respect of change of name of the property already owned by the company. The Apex Court in the case of M/s. S.K. Industries Vs. State of Chattisgarh and Ors, reported in AIR 2013 Chhattisgarh (8) in paragraph No. 17 has held as under:-

    23

    "17. It is a settled principle of law relating to payment of stamp duty and registration of any document under the provisions of the Stamp Act and Registration Act that only those documents require registration and payment of stamp duty which are specified in the Acts. Equally well settled principle of law is that unless the execution of any document results in transfer of any right, title and interest in any immovable property by the act of the parties in lieu of consideration ie. price, for such transfer, the documents cannot be subjected to payment of stamp duty and registration as a document of sale/transfer as defined under the Transfer of Property Act." In light of the aforesaid, as there is no transfer of any right or title in respect of the immovable property, the question of payment of stamp duty and fresh registration duty does not arise.

    The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Ingersoll Rand Wadco Tools Ltd. Vs. U.P.S.I.D. Corpn., Kanpur, reported in 2004 AIHC, 2389 has taken a similar view. Paragraph Nos. 12 to 15 has held as under:-

    "12. We do not agree with the respondents. There is nothing in clause 2 (p) of the lease deed which permits demand of transfer charges. On the contrary, if a company in reconstituted then it has to enter into a binding contract with the lessor to carryout the same terms, conditions, stipulations as mentioned in the agreement. We agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned demand of transfer charges has no statutory sanction nor can it be charged under the lease deed copy of which is Annexure 4 to the writ petition.

    13. Moreover, the change in the name of the company does not mean that it became a different legal entity. Even the change of share-holders will not make the company a different legal entity because it is well settled that a company is a distinct legal entity separate from its shareholders vide Soloman v. Soloman & Co. Ltd., 1897 AC 22; R.C. Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union Of India ., AIR 1970 SC 564 (para 13), etc. 13-A. In M/s. Economic Investment Corporation Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1970 Calcutta 389, it was held that the change of name of the company does not occasion any substitution or succession. In M/s. Gur Narain Jagat Narain & Co. v. M/s. Motor & General Sales Ltd., 1980 ALJ 508, the Allahabad High Court held that the change in the name of a company does not change its rights and obligations.

    14. In Pioneer Protective Glass Fibre (P) Ltd. v. Fibre Glass Pilkington Ltd., (1985) 3 Comp. L.J. 309, the Calcutta High Court held that despite change in the name of a company the legal entity continues, and such change does not result in dissolution of the company and incorporation of a new company. Hence, to a fresh certificate of the corporation under section 23 of the companies act on a change of the name of the company does not imply that a new company has come to in existence.

    15. So far as the alleged guidelines of the corporation copy of which is Annexure 14 to the writ petition is concerned, it may be mentioned that these guidelines have no statutory force and hence they cannot justify imposition of transfer charges. Any such charge or fee must have statutory backing, as held by a Division Bench of this Court in Shaukat Ali 7-2003."

    In light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that mere change of name of the company in light of Section 23 of the Companies Act, does not require the fresh registration or execution of fresh deed, title deed as observed by the District Registrar."

    11. In M/s. Om Metals Infra Projects Ltd. (Supra), the issue before the Rajasthan High

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    Court was whether mere change in the name of a company tantamounts to an assignment of the lease held by it to attracts stamp duty under the Stamp Act. It was held as under:-

    "In the above context of law, the merits of the case at hand, show that the demand for stamp duty against the petitioner Company for mere change of its name by resort to Section 21 of the Act of 1956 is patently illegal, arbitrary and ultra vires the Act of 1998. The foundation of that demand is the circular No.6/2009 issued by the DIG (Stamps and Registration). Even the Circular whatever its legal standing; does not cover the situation where a mere change in the name of the company by resort to the provisions of Section 21 of the Companies Act without any change of shareholders, memorandum of associations, directors of the Company or its management would entail a demand for stamp duty. The said circular only provides that there would be a transfer of lease by way of assignment in situations where the legal character of the company is altered or partnership is changed by induction of new partners following which an amended deed has been executed qua the immovable assets of the company/ firm. In the instant case, the change visualized under the Circular dated 6/2009 has not been made inasmuch as the "legal character" of the Company has not changed. A legal character entails certain legal incidents, rights and liability. There is nothing to show nor was it even alleged that by change of the name of the petitioner company by resort to Section 21 of the Act of 1956, any of its rights or liabilities were altered and/lor entailed legal incident/s not earlier attracting to it in its earlier avtar. Further under Article 55 of the Act of 1998 stamp duty is leviable on a conveyance / transfer which by its very definition will entail giving away of immovable property by one to another. This court fails to fathom, and counsel for the respondent-State department is of little assistance to show, as to how a company which alone is involved in a change of its name, can transfer immovable property to self. It obviously cannot. Aside of the aforesaid, the Apex Court in the case of Prasad Technology Park (P) Ltd. (supra) held that "only because the name of the Company was changed, the same would not mean a fresh transaction took place." The Apex Court proceeded to point out that it was weli settled that the real and true meaning of the instrument must be ascertained for the purpose of levy of stamp duty and if there was no conveyance, from one to another, stamp duty was not leviable. Even otherwise, an assignment entails a conveyance from one to another— two entities natural born or juristic have to obtain - such a situation does not obtain on a mere change in the name of the company."

    12. In the case of Reckitt Benckiser (India) Private Limited (Supra) the Division Bench of the Shimla High Court which was considering asimilar issue held as under:-

    "17. The stand of the respondents that the present is not a case of mere change of name and rather a case of conversion of public limited company to private limited company, hence stamp duty is chargeable under Section 3 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 though has been taken by the respondents-State to make an attempt just to mislead this Court and confuse the whole issue, however, unsuccessfully. Section 3 of the Stamp Act speaks about the instruments, which are chargeable with duties, subject to the exemptions contained in Schedule-I. The instrument referred to herein and also Schedule-I, nowhere show that on mere addition of word 'private' in the name of a company without transfer of its assets and liability, is an instrument, which is chargeable thereunder. So far as the Registration Act is

    25

    concerned, only that instrument is chargeable, which needs registration.

    18. In the case in hand, land and building remained with the petitioner-company, even after addition of word 'private' to its name. Therefore, there is no question of existence of an instrument of transfer of its assets and property and the compulsorily registration thereof. The respondents though have made an attempt to draw the distinction between a public limited and private limited company from its definition finds mentioned in Section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013 and has canvased that two companies are quite different and distinct However, learned Senior Additional Advocate General has failed to satisfy this Court about the justifiability of such distinction drawn and how the addition of word 'private' in the name of the petitioner company amount to transfer of its assets and liability and consequently levying of stamp duty and Registration charges. The respondent-State rather seems to have taken such stand in reply filed to the writ petition merely for rejection.

    19. It is worth mentioning that the circular dated 16.2.2012 Annexure P-2 clearly distinguishes between cases pertaining to change of name simplicitor under the provisions of ompanies Act 1956 and for that matter Companies Act 2013 and those with transfer of assets. The second category of cases cover transaction like merger, demerger and amalgamation etc., which involve two separate entities and transfer of assets from one entity to another. Annexure P-2 clearly postulates that no stamp duty or registration fee is payable in a case of change of name of the Company. In the case in hand since no transfer of assets occurred on account of change of the name of the petitioner Company, hence neither stamp duty nor registration charges is payable on such change of name of the petitioner and its name is required to be entered in the revenue record pertaining to the land and building in question. The respondents, therefore, are under an obligation to update the entries in the revenue record pertaining to the land with the new name of the petitioner Company by addition of word 'private' without payment of any stamp duty and registration charges."

    13. The principles which have been laid down in the aforesaid cases are to the effect that mere change of name of the company in light of the provisions of the Companies Act does not require fresh registration or execution of fresh deed or title deed in respect of the property held by the company hence registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act is not required, nor is stamp duty required to be paid thereupon. Change of name of Company does not result in transfer of any right, title and interest in anyimmovable property. The impugned orders have also been passed only for the reason of change of name of the petitioner company from M/s Commercial Engineers and Body Builders Company Private Limited to Commercial Engineers and Body Builders Company Limited, on the basis of which it has been held that the amended lease deed presented by the petitioner for registration requires stamp duty thereupon as directed. The same in view of the aforesaid judgements cannot be upheld.

    19. In the recent judgment of Hon'ble Apex court in the matter of M/s Godwin Construction Pvt Ltd. Vs. Commissioner Meerut Division, 2025 INSC 1207, it has been held as under:-

    26

    14. It is trite that, in matters of stamp duty, the decisive factor is not the nomenclature assigned to the instrument, but the substance of rights and obligations it embodies. The Court is duty- bound to ascertain the true legal character of the instrument. In the instant case, the appellant has executed a "Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed" in favour of the Meerut Development Authority. Unless the nature and effect of such an instrument are conclusively identified, the application of any provision for the determination of stamp duty on instruments under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, cannot be undertaken. It is necessary to have regard to the operative recitals and clauses of the deed executed by the appellant. For this purpose, the relevant portions of the "Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed dated 19.12.2006 are extracted below:

    "STAMP DUTY RS 100/- IMPROVEMENT TRUST DUTY NILL TOTAL RS 100/- THIS SECURITY Bond CUM MORTGAGE DEED is being executed by surety to secure due performance of contract and for due discharge of liability. The stamp duty is being paid under Article 57 of the schedule I-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1989, as amended in its application of Uttar Pradesh.

    THIS INDENTURE IS MADE at Meerut on the 19th day December 2006.

    BETWEEN

    Godwin Construction Pvt. Ltd. through Director Shri Jitender Bajwa R/o A-151, Defence Colony, Meerut hereinafter called SURETIES of the one part which expression shall, unless repugnant to the context or in consistent with the subject, include their heirs, executors and administrators etc.

    AND

    MEERUT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Vikas Bhawan, Meerut hereinafter called MDA of the other part, which expression, unless repugnant to the context or inconsistent with the subject shall include its interest assigns, transferees in interest etc. WHEREAS M/S Godwin Construction Pvt. Ltd., A-151, Defence Colony, Meerut hereinafter referred to as the COLONIZER is developing a colony, under the name and style of Global City, Abdullapur Meerut hereinafter referred to as colony and, WHEREAS MDA has agreed to approve the lay out plan of the colony and colony itself provided to Colonizer discharges all the liability to develop and colony together with all required amenities and for due discharge of the liabilities of the Colonizers the MDA has asked to furnish security of Rs. 1,15,44,000/- for external development charge which will be released after the payment of external development charge of the colony as per terms and conditions and bye laws (sic) of the MDA And.

    WHEREAS the sureties or the Guarantors have in consideration of approving the lay out of colony by the MDA has agreed to give security of 1,00,44,000/- in the manner hereinafter mentioned & have deposited Rs. 15,00,000/- as advance in the shape of

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    Demand Draft.

    NOW THIS DEED WITNESSES :-

    1. THAT the sureties to secure the due performance the contract and for due discharge of the liability to pay of external development charge of the colony Global City, Abdullapur, Meerut and all amenities, work of the Colony, the surety hereby transfer to MDA all their interests in the property detailed in the schedule here to with intent that the same shall remain and be charged by way of mortgage.

    2. THAT the Sureties declare that:-

    a. THAT Sureties are the absolute owners of the property and free from encumbrances of any kind.

    b. THE SURETIES are entitled to sell, transfer or alienate the said property. c. THAT SURETIES have not deposited delivered that the title deed/s of the property with any one else and have not created any charge by way of mortgage or any other encumbrance on the property.

    3. THAT SURETIES undertake not be create charge or mortgage or transfer or part with possession of the said property without the consent of the MDA in writing.

    4. THAT SURETIES hereby authorise and appoint the Colonizer as agent to acknowledge on behalf of the Sureties the liability and security hereby created. SURETIES covenant in case of non-discharge of the liability by the Colonizer within the stipulated period, the MDA shall be within its rights so cause the property mortgaged to be sold for the realization of the amount to the extent of Rs. 1,00,44,000/-. NOW THIS CONDITIONS of the written bond are such that if the colonizer performs and fulfills the obligations and discharge all the liability regarding Completion of the said company, the said surety under the above said written bond and obligation shall be void and of no effect otherwise the same shall be and remain in full force. .....

    18. With the nature and substance of the deed thus established, we now turn to the pivotal question of chargeability of the instrument under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. In light of its nomenclature as a "Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed", the relevant provisions for determining the stamp duty are confined to Articles 40 and 57 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The relevant provisions are reproduced below for ready reference:

    "40. MORTGAGE-DEED, not being an AGREEMENT RELATING-TO DEPOSIT OF TITLE-DEEDS, PAWN OR PLEDGE (NO. 6), BOTTOMRY BOND (NO. 16),

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    MORTGAGE OF A CROP (NO. 41), RESPONDENTIA BOND (No. 56), OR SECURITY BOND (NO. 57)—

    (a) when possession of the property or any part of the property comprised in such deed is given by the mortgagor or agreed to be given;

    (b) when possession is not given or agreed to be given as aforesaid; Explanation.—A mortgagor who gives to the mortgagee a power-of-attorney to collect rents or a lease of the property mortgaged or part thereof, is deemed to give possession within the meaning of this Article.

    (c) when a collateral or auxiliary or additional or substituted security, or by way of further assurance for the abovementioned purpose where the principal or primary security is duly stamped— for every sum secured not exceeding Rs.1,000 and for every Rs. 1,000 or part thereof secured in excess of Rs. 1,000.

    Exemptions

    (1) Instruments, executed by person taking advances under the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883 (XIX of 1883), or the Agriculturists' Loan Act, 1884 (XII of 1884), or by their sureties as security for the repayment of such advances.

    (2) Letter of hypothecation accompanying a bill of exchange. ***

    57. SECURITY-BOND OR MORTGAGE-DEED, executed by way of security for the due execution of an office, or to account for money or other property received by virtue thereof or executed by a surety to secure the due performance of a contract,—

    (a) when the amount secured does not exceed Rs. 1,000;

    (b) in any other case......"

    28. This Court finds that the instrument satisfies the essential characteristics of a mortgage deed as defined under Section 2(17) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The nomenclature "Security Bond or Mortgage Deed" is not determinative; the substance of the instrument governs its character while assessing stamp duty.

    29. As observed by us in the preceding paragraphs, the second limb of Article 57 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, is confined to instruments executed by a surety to secure the obligations of another. In the present case, although clause III of the deed stipulates that the mortgagor shall be personally liable to repay the loan, a careful reading of the deed makes it manifestly clear that Shri Naveen Mittal executed the deed solely in his capacity as the director of the company M/s Ajay Forging Pvt. Ltd, acting on behalf of the company. No distinct surety exists apart from the principal debtor. Accordingly, reference to personal liability in the deed pertains to the director acting on behalf of the company and does not transform the instrument

    29

    into a security bond under Article 57 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. In substance and effect, the deed constitutes a mortgage executed by the principal debtor itself, thereby attracting the provisions of Article 40 of the Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, for the purposes of stamp duty.

    20. At this stage, it is relevant to quote Sections 366 and 368 of Companies Act as under:

    366. Companies capable of being registered.—(1) For the purposes of this Part, the word "company"includes any partnership firm, limited liability partnership, cooperative society, society or any other business entity formed under any other law for the time being in force which applies for registration under this Part.

    (2) With the exceptions and subject to the provisions contained in this section, any company formed,whether before or after the commencement of this Act, in pursuance of any Act of Parliament other than this Act or of any other law for the time being in force or being otherwise duly constituted according to law, and consisting of 1[two or more members], may at any time register under this Act as an unlimited company, or as a company limited by shares, or as a company limited by guarantee, in such manner as may be prescribed and the registration shall not be invalid by reason only that it has taken place with a view to the company's being wound up:

    Provided that—(i) a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882 (6 of 1882) or under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (7 of 1913) or the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), shall not register in pursuance of this section;

    (ii) a company having the liability of its members limited by any Act of Parliament other than this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, shall not register in pursuance of this section as an unlimited company or as a company limited by guarantee;

    (iii) a company shall be registered in pursuance of this section as a company limited by shares only if it has a permanent paid-up or nominal share capital of fixed amount divided into shares, also of fixed amount, or held and transferable as stock, or divided and held partly in the one way and partly in the other, and formed on the principle of having for its members the holders of those shares or that stock, and no other persons;

    (iv) a company shall not register in pursuance of this section without the assent of a majority of such of its members as are present in person, or where proxies are allowed, by proxy, at a general meeting summoned for the purpose;

    (v) where a company not having the liability of its members limited by any Act of Parliament or any other law for the time being in force is about to register as a limited company, the majority required to assent as aforesaid shall consist of not less than three-fourths of the members present in person, or where proxies are allowed, by proxy, at the meeting;

    (vi) where a company is about to register as a company limited by guarantee, the assent to its

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    being so registered shall be accompanied by a resolution declaring that each member undertakes to contribute to the assets of the company, in the event of its being wound up while he is a member, or within one year after he ceases to be a member, for payment of the debts and liabilities of the company or of such debts and liabilities as may have been contracted before he ceases to be a member, and of the costs, charges and expenses of winding up, and for the adjustment of the rights of the contributories among themselves, such amount as may be required, not exceeding a specified amount.

    [(vii) a company with less than seven members shall register as a private company.]

    (3) In computing any majority required for the purposes of sub-section (1), when a poll is demanded, regard shall be had to the number of votes to which each member is entitled according to the regulations of the company.

    368. Vesting of property on registration.—All property, movable and immovable (including actionable claims), belonging to or vested in a company at the date of its registration in pursuance of this Part, shall, on such registration, pass to and vest in the company as incorporated under this Act for all the estate and interest of the company therein. Section 33 of Indian Stamp Act reads as under:

    33. Examination and impounding of instruments. — (1) Every person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, and every person in charge of a pubic office, except an officer of police, before whom any instrument, chargeable, in his opinion, with duty, is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, shall, if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same.

    21. It is also relevant to refer the contention raised by the State Government that petitioner is having alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal. There is no quarrel for normally the Court will not entertain such petition where alternative efficacious remedy is available more particularly under particular statute, however, in the facts and circumstances of present case in view of the above mentioned sections of the Companies Act and looking to the chronology of events in the matter, it seems that vesting of property in the company who is converted from partnership firm to private limited company in view of the settled provision of law, the impugned action by the respondent authority squarely falling under the criteria of Alok Kumar Choubey (supra) as well as the judgment of Whirlpool Corporation (supra). It is also relevant to refer to the later judgment in later point of time of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter

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    of Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 95. Paragraphs 4, 5,6, 7 and 8 are relevant, which are reproduced as under:-

    4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the high courts holding writ petitions as "not maintainable" merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self- imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition "not maintainable". In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the "maintainability" of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that "entertainability" and "maintainability" of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to

    "maintainability" goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of "entertainability" is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.

    5. A little after the dawn of the Constitution, a Constitution Bench of this Court in its decision

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    reported in 1958 SCR 595 (State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohd. Nooh) had the occasion to observe as follows:

    "10. In the next place it must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute, (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 11, p. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. ***"

    6. At the end of the last century, this Court in paragraph 15 of the its decision reported in (1998)

    8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others) carved out the exceptions on the existence whereof a Writ Court would be justified in entertaining a writ petition despite the party approaching it not having availed the alternative remedy provided by the statute. The same read as under:

    (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights;

    (ii) where there is violation of principles of natural justice;

    (iii) where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or

    (iv) where the vires of an Act is challenged.

    7. Not too long ago, this Court in its decision reported in [2021] SCC OnLine SC 884 (Assistant Commissioner of State Tax vs. M/s. Commercial Steel Limited) has reiterated the same principles in paragraph 11.

    8. That apart, we may also usefully refer to the decisions of this Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724 (State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. vs. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd.) and (2000) 10 SCC 482 (Union of India vs. State of Haryana). What appears on a plain reading of the former decision is that whether a certain item falls within an entry in a sales tax statute, raises a pure question of law and if investigation into facts is unnecessary, the high court could entertain a writ petition in its discretion even though the alternative remedy was not availed of; and, unless exercise of discretion is shown to be unreasonable or perverse, this Court would not interfere. In the latter decision, this Court found the issue raised by the appellant to be

    33

    pristinely legal requiring determination by the high court without putting the appellant through the mill of statutory appeals in the hierarchy. What follows from the said decisions is that where the controversy is a purely legal one and it does not involve disputed questions of fact but only questions of law, then it should be decided by the high court instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy being available.

    22. It is also relevant to refer another judgment of Hon'ble Apex court in the matter of Assistant Commissioner of State Tax Vs. Commercial Steel Limited reported in (2022) 16 SCC 447, para 10 of the judgment reads as under:-

    10. The respondent had a statutory remedy under section 107. Instead of availing of the remedy, the respondent instituted a petition under Article 226. The existence of an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. But a writ petition can be entertained in exceptional circumstances where there is:

    (i) a breach of fundamental rights;

    (ii) a violation of the principles of natural justice;

    (iii) an excess of jurisdiction; or

    (iv) a challenge to the vires of the statute or delegated legislation.

    23. The Court has consistently not entertained the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative efficacious remedy, but in the facts and circumstances like present one, the Court has consistently held that there is no absolute bar to entertain writ petition even there any statutory remedy available with the petitioner. Therefore, in this background the contention raised by respondent authority is not required to be accepted and in view of the above mentioned discussion, the petition is required to be entertained under Article 226 of Constitution of India as it is falling under the exception carved out by the various judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court.

    24. Considering these relevant Sections and considering the fact that when the directors/shareholders of petitioner company are having same profit and sharing ratio as that of the partnership firm, it cannot be said that there is transfer of any asset by partnership to the petitioner company and considering the judgment of Anup Industries

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    (supra) and other judgments of other High Courts, the case is with regard to the change in ownership/title to the leasehold rights of the erstwhile partners of the partnership firm to the private limited company. Whereas in the facts of the case, the stamp duty has to be computed in relation to the amount of consideration as mentioned in the instrument of conveyance. Even if for the sake of arguments, the contention raised on behalf of respondents is accepted that the document will fall within the meaning of conveyance but in absence of any consideration the computation provision for levy of stamp duty would fail and therefore, considering the above mentioned settled position of law and considering that there is no as such transfer of any asset which can be considered under the conveyance or any other provision which can attract the payment of stamp duty under the provisions of Stamp Act, therefore, in view of the fact that authority concerned has failed to consider these aspects in proper perspective and therefore, the prayers made in the present petition are required to be granted. It is evident from record of this petition that there is statutory vesting of the property of partnership firm in the company registered under the provisions of Companies Act and the amended lease deed is executed by the petitioners, is only in view of conditions indicated by the respondent no. 2 authority and can not be considered as new transfer of assets. Therefore, considering the above totality of facts and circumstances and considering the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Udaipur Vs. M/s Chetak Enterprises Pvt Ltd. reported in AIR 2020 SC 4305

    (para 7), the prayers are required to be granted.

    25. Therefore, the petition is required to be allowed in terms of para 7A by setting aside the impugned order dated 5.3.2026 by respondent authority which is passed under Section 33 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and respondent No. 3 is also

    35

    directed to register the lease amendment in appropriate manner without insisting for any stamp duty, as expeditiously as possible, but preferably within 15 days from receipt of copy of this order.

    26. The writ petition is allowed accordingly to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.

    (SANDEEP N. BHATT)

    JUDGE

    BDJ

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