Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

A/103/2023

Disposition

dismissed

Advocates

Acts

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1986
Section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019
Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 151 CPC read with section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: FA/103/2023 — WINGS BOUTIQUE v. MR. IZHARDUDDIN

Factual and Procedural Background

This is First Appeal No. 103/2023 filed by Wings Boutique (through its partner Mr. Arjun Singh) against Mr. Izharduddin, arising from Complaint CC No.59/2021. The impugned order was passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (North-District), GNCTD on 02.01.2023 and a certified copy of that order was received by the appellant on 07.01.2023. The appeal was instituted on 10.03.2023 and an application for condonation of delay (IA No.553/23) was filed along with the appeal seeking condonation of an alleged delay (the application described an 18-day delay; the Commission's calculation found a 22-day delay). The appeal and IA were considered by a Bench comprising Justice Sangita Dhingra Sehgal (President), Ms. Pinki (Member (Judicial)) and Mr. J.P. Agrawal (Member (General)). Mr. Apurv Parashari appeared as counsel for the appellant. The decision was pronounced on 19.04.2023.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the delay in filing the appeal after the statutory period could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 151 CPC and Section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (i.e., whether the appellant has shown "sufficient cause").
Whether the appellant complied with the statutory requirement in Section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 to deposit fifty per cent of the decretal amount (or follow the prescribed manner) for the State Commission to entertain the appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellant stated that the impugned order was pronounced on 02.01.2023 and the certified copy was received on 07.01.2023, such that the limitation period for filing the appeal expired on 21.02.2023.
On 20.02.2023, the appellant's counsel sent a clerk to file the appeal but the registry required the complete trial record and a Demand Draft for the decretal amount.
The appellant requested the bank on 21.02.2023 to prepare the Demand Draft; due to a technical failure the Demand Draft could not be prepared that day and was handed over on the evening of 22.02.2023.
On 23.02.2023, when the clerk approached the registry, the registry informed them that instead of a Demand Draft, a Fixed Deposit Receipt (FDR) for half the decretal amount should be filed.
Despite efforts, on 06.03.2023 the appellant's bank informed them that the request for the Fixed Deposit in favour of the Registrar had been rejected by the bank head office. The appellant said the bank head office in Mumbai was closed on 07.03.2023 and the branch in Delhi was closed on 08.03.2023.
On 09.03.2023, counsel requested the registry to register the appeal and tender a Demand Draft for Rs. 14,000 in favour of the Registrar, undertaking to file the Fixed Deposit on or before the first hearing.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments

The provided judgment does not set out any specific or detailed arguments advanced by the respondent in opposition to the IA or appeal within the text of the decision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Basawaraj and Ors. v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746	Definition and explanation of "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay — meaning of "sufficient" and the requirement that the party must not have acted negligently or want of bona fides; the applicant must show they were prevented by sufficient cause.	The Commission reproduced the relevant paras from this judgment and applied the definition to assess whether the appellant had shown a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The court used this precedent as the primary exposition of "sufficient cause."
Anil Kumar Sharma v. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., IV (2015) CPJ 453 (NC)	Emphasis that courts should not be satisfied with inadequate explanations for long delays; caution in condoning very belated appeals in consumer matters which have special periods of limitation.	The Commission relied on this National Commission decision to underscore that belated appeals, if not properly explained day-to-day, should not be condoned and that expeditious adjudication in consumer matters is a relevant consideration.
Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC)	While deciding condonation applications in consumer matters, courts must bear in mind the special period of limitation under the Consumer Protection Act and the objective of expeditious adjudication; disfavour condoning highly belated appeals.	The decision was cited (via the Anil Kumar Sharma passage) to reinforce the statutory policy favoring strict adherence to limitation in consumer disputes and the reluctance to condone unexplained delays.
Lingeswaran Etc. v. Thirunagalingam, SLP (C) Nos.2054-2055/2022 (decided 25.02.2022)	If delay is not properly explained and there are no merits in the condonation application, the application should be dismissed; condoning delay where explanation is absent would reward negligence and laches.	The Commission relied on this Supreme Court view to support its conclusion that absence of proper explanation and lack of merits in the condonation plea necessitated dismissal.
Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765	Law of limitation is to be applied strictly when statute prescribes; courts have no power to extend limitation on equitable grounds; statutory provisions must be enforced even if harsh.	The Commission cited this authority (as discussed in Lingeswaran) to justify strict enforcement of limitation rules and to reject equitable pleas for extension of limitation in the absence of sufficient cause.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Commission began by identifying the governing statutory provision, Section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, which prescribes a 45-day period to prefer an appeal from a District Commission order and permits the State Commission to entertain an appeal after that period if satisfied that there was sufficient cause for the delay. Section 41 additionally provides that no appeal by a person required to pay any amount under the District Commission's order shall be entertained unless the appellant has deposited fifty percent of that amount in the prescribed manner.

The Commission examined the timeline: the impugned order was pronounced on 02.01.2023, the certified copy was received on 07.01.2023, and the appeal was filed on 10.03.2023. The Commission calculated that the appeal was filed after the expiry of the limitation period — specifically noting a delay of 22 days from the relevant cut-off.

To assess whether the delay should be condoned, the Commission applied the authoritative formulation of "sufficient cause" taken from Basawaraj (AIR 2014 SC 746) and related authorities. The court emphasized that a party must not have acted negligently or lacked bona fides, and must provide a satisfactory explanation demonstrating they were prevented by sufficient cause from prosecuting the appeal.

The Commission then considered the appellant's factual averments (paras 2–8 of the application): difficulties in obtaining a Demand Draft due to a technical failure, registry's requirement for an FDR, the bank's alleged rejection of an FDR application, and temporary closure of bank offices. The Commission found deficiencies in the proof: no affidavit from the clerk or his identification was filed, and no affidavit from the appellant was on record to substantiate the narrative. The Commission observed that it is the duty of learned counsel to be aware of the statutory requirement of filing an FDR and described the explanations as a "lame excuse."

The Commission also relied on prior decisions (Anil Kumar Sharma; Anshul Aggarwal; Lingeswaran; Popat Bahiru Goverdhane) to underscore that consumer-law limitation periods are special and must be enforced strictly, that unexplained day-to-day delays are not acceptable, and that courts should not condone delay where explanations are unsatisfactory. Applying these principles to the facts, the Commission concluded that the appellant failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding:

The application for condonation of delay (IA No.553/23) was dismissed because the appellant failed to show sufficient cause for filing the appeal after the prescribed period.
Consequently, the appeal (First Appeal No. 103/2023) filed beyond the statutory period was also dismissed.

Implications:

The immediate effect is that the appeal will not be admitted and the impugned order passed by the District Commission stands unchallenged in the State Commission pursuant to this dismissal.
The Commission made no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.
The file is to be consigned to the record room.
The opinion does not assert or purport to lay down any new, general precedent beyond applying existing authorities; it enforces the established position that limitation provisions in consumer matters are to be strictly applied and that "sufficient cause" must be satisfactorily established.

Disposition pronounced on 19.04.2023 by a Bench comprising Justice Sangita Dhingra Sehgal (President), Ms. Pinki (Member (Judicial), who authored/per the judgment), and Mr. J.P. Agrawal (Member (General)).

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WINGS BOUTIQUE v. SH. IZHARDUDDIN

FA/103/2023 WINGS BOUTIQUE V/S SH. IZHARDUDDIN DOD:-19.04.2023 DISMISSED Page 1 of 7

IN THE DELHI STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL

COMMISSION

Date of Institution:10.03.2023 Date of hearing : 23.03.2023 Date of Decision :19.04.2023 FIRST APPEAL NO. 103/2023

IN THE MATTER OF

WINGS BOUTIQUE

(THROUGH ITS PARTNER MR. ARJUN SINGH)

AT 17 A/30-31, AJMAL KHAN ROAD,

KAROL BAGH,

NEW DELHI-110005.

ALSO AT:

THE HEAD OFFICE OF WINGS SHOES (WINGS FOOTWEAR)

M-9, MAIN MARKET, M-BLOCK

GREATER KAILASH 1, DELHI-110048

…APPLICANT/APPELLANT

VERSUS

MR. IZHARDUDDIN

S/O MR. MOINUDDIN R/O 3158, KUCHA TARA CHAND,

DARYA GANJ,

NEW DELHI-110002 ....NON-APPLICANT/ RESPONDENT

CORAM:

HON'BLE JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL (PRESIDENT) HON'BLE MS. PINKI, MEMBER (JUDICIAL) HON'BLE MR. J.P. AGRAWAL, MEMBER (GENERAL) Present : Mr. Apurv Parashari, counsel for the appellant.

PER: HON'BLE MS. PINKI, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)

1. The present appeal has been filed on 10.03.2023 challenging the impugned order dated 02.01.2023 vide which CC No.59/2021

was allowed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (North-District), GNCTD, Ground Floor, Court Annexe-2 Building, Tis Hazari Court Complex, Delhi-110054.

2. This order will dispose off an application bearing IA No.553/23 seeking condonation of delay of 18 days in filing the appeal, filed alongwith the appeal.

3. The record has been carefully and thoroughly perused.

4. The application has been moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 151 CPC read with section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

5. Application for condonation of delay has been filed on the various grounds. Para No. 2 to Para No.8 read as under:

(2.) That on 02.01.2023, the judgment was reserved in the matter titled "Izaharduddin vs. Wings Boutique" bearing Complaint No. CC/59/2021 and the certified copy of the impugned order and judgment dated 02.01.2023 was received by the Appellant on 07.01.2023. Therefore, the limitation for filing the present appeal was expiring on

21.02.2023.

(3.) It is stated that on 20.02.2023, the Counsel for the Appellant sent her clerk to file the present Appeal, then it was informed by the registry that the complete trail record and the Demand Draft of the decretal amount is required to be attached with the present appeal.

(4.) That immediately on 21.02.2023, the appellant requested its bank to prepare a demand draft on behalf of Appellant in favour of the Registrar, State Commission, Delhi but due to some technical failure the said Demand Draft could not be prepared same day and it has been handed over to the Appellant by its bank later in the evening of 22.02.2023. (5.) On 23.02.2023, the Clerk of the Counsel for the Appellant approached the Registry for filing the present appeal, but the same was not entertained by the registry and it was informed that instead of Demand Draft, the Fixed Deposit of half of the Decretal Amount shall be filed along with the appeal.

(6.) It is stated that despite the best efforts of the Appellant, in the evening of 06.03.2023, the bank of Appellant informed the appellant that his request for the Fixed Deposit in favour of Registrar, State Commission, Delhi has been rejected or denied by the bank head office.

(7.) It is submitted that on 07.03.2023, the head offices of the appellant's bank was closed in Mumbai and 08.03.2023, the branch bank office was closed in Delhi.

(8.) On 09.03.2023, the Counsel for the Appellant, approached and requested the registry to register the Appeal and take the Demand Draft for an amount of Rs.14,000/- in favour Registrar, State Commission and also hereby undertake to file the Fixed Deposit on or before the first hearing in the matter."

6. To adjudicate this issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to Section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which provides as under:-

"Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission on the ground of facts or law within a period of forty-five days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed.

Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:

Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Commission, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited fifty percent of that amount in the manner as may be prescribed"

7. A perusal of the aforesaid statutory position reflects that the appeal against an order should be preferred within a period of forty-five days from the date of impugned judgment. On perusal of

record before us, it is clear that the impugned order was pronounced on 02.01.2023 and the present appeal was filed on 10.03.2023 i.e. after a delay of 22 days.

8. In order to condone the delay, the Appellant has to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the stipulated period. The term 'sufficient cause' has been explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under:-

"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context,

"sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive".

However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"

from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose."

9. We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. Reported in IV(2015)CPJ453(NC), wherein the Hon'ble NCDRC held as under:

"12. ………we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority ., IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained."

10. We further deem it appropriate to refer to Lingeswaran Etc. Versus Thirunagalingam in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.2054-2055/2022 decided on 25.02.2022, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: -

"5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of

PopatBahiruGoverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.

11. From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble National Commission, it is clear that 'sufficient cause' means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and the applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.

12. Reverting to the material available before us, we find that the impugned order was passed on 02.01.2023 and the period of limitation starts from the date of order which had expired on 16.02.2023. However, the Appellant could not file the Appeal within the stipulated time.

13. Regarding averments made in Para No.2 to Para No.8 of the application, neither the name of clerk of the counsel nor his affidavit has been filed. Even, no affidavit has been filed by the appellant alongwith the application. Regarding statutory deposit, it is the duty of the learned counsel to be aware of the filing of the FDR. It is a lame excuse.

14. Having regard to the statutory position discussed in paras supra and the facts of the case, the applicant/appellant has failed to show any sufficient cause for the delay in filing the present

appeal. Therefore, the application filed by the appellant seeking condonation of delay cannot be admitted and accordingly, the same is dismissed on the above grounds.

15. Consequently, the present appeal filed beyond the statutory period also stands dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.

16. File be consigned to record room.

JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL

(PRESIDENT)

PINKI

MEMBER (JUDICIAL)

J.P. AGRAWAL

MEMBER (GENERAL)

Pronounced on 19.04.2023.

WINGS BOUTIQUE v. SH. IZHARDUDDIN

Case Summary: FA/103/2023 — WINGS BOUTIQUE v. MR. IZHARDUDDIN

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

WINGS BOUTIQUE v. SH. IZHARDUDDIN

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