Loading..
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Acts
  • section 143(3) read with section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act')
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Acts
  • section 143(3) read with section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act')
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from final assessment orders framed under section 143(3) read with section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for assessment years 2016-17 and 2017-18, pursuant to directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP). The assessee, Dow Jones & Company Inc., a non-resident corporate incorporated in the United States engaged in providing information products and services (including databases, newswires, publications and related products), entered into an agreement with Dow Jones Consulting India Pvt. Ltd. (DJCIPL) under which DJCIPL distributed the assessee's products in the Indian market. In the years under consideration, the assessee received payments from DJCIPL under that distribution agreement.

During assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO) treated the amounts received as 'royalty' both under the Income-tax Act and the India–USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA). The assessee objected, contending the payments were not royalty (arguing a principal-to-principal transaction and that the treaty definition did not apply). The AO retained the royalty character in the draft assessment order; the assessee objected before the DRP which, following directions given in the assessee's own earlier case for assessment year 2015-16, upheld the AO's view. Final assessment orders were passed accordingly, and the assessee appealed to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Delhi Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the amounts received by the non-resident assessee from DJCIPL under the distribution agreement for distributing products in India constitute "royalty" under Article 12 of the India–USA DTAA and, correspondingly, under the Income-tax Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The payments received from DJCIPL are not in the nature of royalty under the Income-tax Act or under the India–USA DTAA.
  • The commercial arrangement was on a principal-to-principal basis (i.e., a distribution arrangement), and therefore did not transfer any copyright or right to use copyright to DJCIPL.
  • The amounts do not fit within the treaty definition of "royalty" because there was no grant of a right to use or right to exploit any copyright; the assessee retained legal title and all rights, title and interest in the copyrighted material/database.

Respondent's / Revenue's Position

  • The Assessing Officer took the view that the payments received by the assessee from DJCIPL were taxable as royalty.
  • The DRP, on objections, upheld the AO's characterisation and directed finalisation of assessment treating the amounts as royalty (following the DRP's earlier direction in the assessee's own case for 2015-16).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dow Jones & Company Inc. Vs. ACIT [2022] 135 taxmann.com 270 (Delhi - Trib.) (Coordinate Bench decision in assessee's own case for AY 2015-16) Held that payments received from DJCIPL for access to the assessee's database were not "royalty" under Article 12 of the India–USA DTAA; explained that Article 12 covers payments for the use of, or the right to use, a copyright and that payments for access to a product without transfer of rights in the copyright are not within Article 12. The Court followed this Coordinate Bench decision as directly determinative of the identical issue in the impugned assessment years and, on that basis, set aside the AO's findings and directed deletion of the impugned additions.
Union of India Vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan, 263 ITR 706 (Supreme Court) Supported the proposition that, under section 92 of the Act, an assessee may invoke the provisions of a tax treaty to the extent they are more beneficial (i.e., the beneficial treaty provisions can be applied). The Court relied on this authority to justify considering the beneficial provisions of the India–USA DTAA when determining whether the payments constituted royalty.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Tribunal commenced by acknowledging that the common issue in both appeals — whether the payments constituted royalty — was already decided by a Coordinate Bench in the assessee's own case for assessment year 2015-16. The Tribunal relied on the Coordinate Bench's detailed reasoning and the Supreme Court's authority in Azadi Bachao Andolan to apply the beneficial provisions of the India–USA DTAA.

The key analytical steps, as reflected in the Tribunal's reliance on the Coordinate Bench, were:

  • Interpretation of Article 12 of the India–USA DTAA: Article 12, as quoted by the Coordinate Bench, brings within "royalty" payments that are consideration for the use of, or the right to use, copyrights (including information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience). Thus, the Tribunal read Article 12 narrowly to apply where a payer acquires a right to use or exploit a copyright.
  • Distinction between (a) a payment for the right to use copyright in a programme (or other copyrighted work) and (b) a payment for the right to use the programme/product itself: The Tribunal (through the Coordinate Bench reasoning) emphasized that payments that merely grant access to a copyrighted product without granting any right to the copyright are not "royalty" under Article 12.
  • Application to facts: The Coordinate Bench's factual findings (adopted by the Tribunal) were that the assessee retained legal title, rights, title and interest in the licensed software/database; DJCIPL had no authority to reproduce, translate or adapt the data; and end users did not acquire rights in the copyright. In that factual matrix, the payments were analogous to the sale of a book — the purchaser enjoys the contents but does not acquire rights to exploit the underlying copyright.
  • Conclusion from analysis: Because the transactions were limited to granting access to the database (without transfer of copyright or right to use the copyright), the payments did not fall within Article 12's definition of royalty. Consequently, the impugned additions characterized as royalty were incorrect.

Having found the factual and legal basis identical to the Coordinate Bench decision, the Tribunal respectfully followed that decision and deleted the additions made by the Assessing Officer in both assessment years.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEALS ALLOWED.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The Tribunal set aside the Assessing Officer's treatment of the amounts received from DJCIPL as "royalty" and directed deletion of the impugned additions in both assessment years under consideration.
  • Other grounds raised by the assessee concerning the existence of a permanent establishment (PE), applicable tax rates and similar issues were rendered infructuous by this ruling and were dismissed.
  • The Tribunal's decision was explicitly based on and aligned with a prior Coordinate Bench decision in the assessee's own case (AY 2015-16) and the Supreme Court's authority allowing invocation of beneficial treaty provisions; the Tribunal followed that precedent rather than announcing a novel principle in this judgment.

Order pronounced in open court on 29th September, 2022. Members: (N.K. Billaiya) Accountant Member; (Saktijit Dey) Judicial Member.

    Dow Jones & Company Inc., Mumbai v. ACIT (International Taxation) 1(2)(2), New Delhi

    IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL,

    DELHI BENCH: 'D' NEW DELHI

    BEFORE SHRI SAKTIJIT DEY, JUDICIAL MEMBER

    AND

    SHRI N.K. BILLAIYA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER

    ITA No.120/Del/2021

    Assessment Year: 2016-17

    With

    ITA No.121/Del/2021

    Assessment Year: 2017-18

    Dow Jones & Company Inc., Vs. ACIT, (Intl. Taxation)-1(2)(2), C/o- Pricewaterhousecoopers New Delhi

    Pvt. Ltd., PWC House, Plot

    No. 18-A, Guru Nanak Road,

    Bandra,

    Mumbai

    PAN :AAFCD3315H

    (Appellant) (Respondent) Appellant by Sh. Ravi Sharma, Advocate Sh. Anubhav Rastogi, Advocate Respondent by Sh. R.D. Burman, CIT(DR) Date of hearing 29.09.2022

    Date of pronouncement 29.09.2022

    ORDER

    PERSAKTIJIT DEY, JM:

    Captioned appeals by the assessee are against the final assessment orders passed under section 143(3) read with section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') in

    1

    pursuance to the direction of the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) pertaining to assessment years 2016-17 and 2017-18.

    2. The common issue arising for consideration in both the appeals relate to taxability of amount received by the assessee from Dow Jones Consulting India Pvt. Ltd. (DJCIPL) for distributing its products in the Indian market as royalty.

    3. Briefly, the facts are, the assessee is a non-resident corporate entity incorporated in United States of America (USA) and engaged in the business of providing information products and services, containing global and financial news to organizations worldwide. It offers information through newspapers, newswires, websites, applications, newsletters, magazines, proprietary databases, conferences, and radio etc. The assessee has entered into an agreement with DJCIPL for distribution of products in Indian market. In the assessment years under consideration, the assessee received certain amount from DJCIPL under the distribution agreement. In the assessment proceeding, the Assessing Officer called upon the assessee to explain, why the amount received should not be treated as royalty both under the Act as well as under the provisions of India - USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement 2 | P a g e

    2

    (DTAA). In response, assessee submitted that the amount received is not in the nature of royalty under the provisions of the Act, as, the transaction with DJCIPL is on principal-to-principal basis. Further, it was submitted, the amount received does not fit into the definition of royalty as per the Treaty Provisions. The Assessing Officer, however, did not accept the submissions of the assessee and while framing the draft assessment order, treated the amount received by the assessee as royalty. Against the draft assessment order, the assessee raised objections before learned DRP. Following their directions in assessee's own case in assessment year 2015-16, learned DRP upheld the decision of the Assessing Officer. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer passed the final assessment orders.

    4. Before us, it is a common point between the assessee and the Revenue that the issue is squarely covered by the decision of the Coordinate Bench in assessee's own case inassessment year 2015-16.

    5. Having considered rival submissions and perused the materials on record, we find that while deciding identical issue in assessee's own case in assessment year 2015-16, the Coordiante Bench in the case of Dow Jones & Company Inc. Vs. ACIT [2022] 3 | P a g e

    3

    135 taxmann.com 270 (Delhi - Trib.) [14.12.2021] has decided the issue in favour of the assesse by holding that the amount received from DJCIPL is not in the nature of royalty under Article 12 of the India - USA DTAA. The relevant observtions of the Coordinate Bench in this regard are as under:

    "10. We have given thoughtful consideration to the orders of the authorities below. At the very outset, we have to state that basis the provisions of section 92 of the Act, the assessee is entitled to invoke the provisions of India -USA DTAA to the extent it is more beneficial. Our view is fortified by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Azadi Bachao Andalon 263 ITR 706. Accordingly, we will consider the beneficial provisions of the tax treaty to see whether the contention of the assessee that the alleged payment from DJCIPL is not royalty income.

    11. As per Article 12 of the Tax Treaty, 'Royalty" is defined as under:

    "10.1.4.1 (a) "payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of a literary, artistic, or scientific work, including cinematograph films or work on film, tape or other means of reproduction for use in connection with radio or television broadcasting, any patent, trademark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience; and

    (b) payments of any kind received as consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, other than income, derived by an enterprise of a Contracting State from the operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic.

    10.1.5 Thus, Article 12 of the Tax Treaty brings within the ambit of the definition of royalty, a payment made for the use of or the right to use a copyright of a literary, artistic or scientific work. Thus, only those payments that allow a payer to use / acquire a right to use a copyright in a literary, artistic or scientific work arc covered within the definition of royalty. Payments made for acquiring the right in use the product it sell, without allowing any right to use the copyright in the product, are not covered within the scope of royally winch 4 | P a g e

    4

    may gel covered under the term 'Royalty' as per the Act. Further, unless the payments are made towards acquiring the right to use a copyright in a literary, artistic, or scientific work, definition of Royalty would not get attracted.

    10.1.6 In the current case, there is no transfer of legal title in the copyrighted article as the same rests with the Applicant. All rights, title and interest in the licensed software, which is being claimed to be copyrighted article, are the exclusive property of the Applicant. DJCIPL has no authority to reproduce the data in any material form, to make any translation in the data or to make any adaptation in the data. Further, the end user cannot be said to have acquired a copyright or right to use the copyright in the data and accordingly, the payments made by DJCIPL for accessing the database would not qualify as payments for the use of copyright.

    10.1.7 The Applicant submits that the payments made by DJCIPL is not for the transfer of all or any rights in respect of the database Under the agreement, DJCIPL does not acquire any right in relation to the. products.

    10.1.8 Thus in view of the above arguments, n shall be possible to conclude that the payment received by the Applicant cannot be treated as a consideration for the transfer of any 'copyright'. The transaction under consideration is tor the provision of accessing the database of the

    Applicant/financial pr oducts license, the same cannot he considered as 'royally' under Article 12 of the India-US DTAA. 10.1.9 Furthermore, in determining whether or not a payment is for the use of copyright, it is important to distinguish between a payment for the right to use the copyright in a programme and the right to use the programme itself. We have outlined below our detailed submission on the distinction between copyright and the copyrighted article:"

    12. A perusal of the above Article shows that it brings within the ambit of the definition of 'Royalty' the payment made for use of, or the right to use any copyright of a literary, artistic, or scientific work. In our understanding of the Article, only those payments that allow a payer to use/acquire a right to use copyright in literary, artistic or scientific work are covered within the definition of 'Royalty'. In our considered view, the payments made for acquiring right to use product itself, without allowing any right to use the copy right in the product are not covered with the scope of 'Royalty' which may get covered under the term under Royalty as per the Act. 5 | P a g e

    5

    13. The facts of the case in hand show that there is no transfer of legal title in the copyrighted article as the same rests with the assessee. All rights, title and interest in the licensed software which is being claimed to be copyrighted article are the exclusive property of the assessee. DJCIPL has no authority to reproduce the date in any material form to make any translation in the date or to make adaptation in the data.

    14. We further find that the end user cannot be said to have acquired a copy right or right to use the copy right in data. A perusal of the agreement with DJCIPL shows that DJCIPL does not acquire any right in relation to the products. In our considered view, in determining whether or not a payment is for use of copyright, it is important to distinguish between 'a payment for right to use the copy right in a program' and 'right to use the program itself'.

    15. In the case in hand, the revenue derived by the assessee from granting limited access to its data base is akin to sale of book, wherein purchaser does not acquire any right to exploit the underlying copyright. In the case of a book, the publisher of the book grants the purchaser certain rights to use the content of the book, which is copyrighted. The purchaser of the book does not acquire the right to exploit the underlying copyright. When the purchaser reads the book, he only enjoys the contents. Similarly, the user of the database does not receive the right to exploit the copyright in the database he only enjoys the product in the normal course of his business.

    16. In the present case, the appellant is only granting access to its database to DJCIPL. In our considered opinion, the payments received cannot be said to be 'Royalty' in nature. The transaction under consideration is for provision of accessing database of the assessee. Hence the same cannot be considered as 'Royalty' under Article 12 of the India-US DTAA. We, therefore, set aside the findings of the Assessing Officer and direct the Assessing Officer to delete the impugned addition. Ground No. 1 is, accordingly, allowed."

    6. Facts in the impugned assessment year being identical, respectfully following the decision of the Coordinate Bench, as mentioned above, we delete the additions made by the Assessing Officer in both the assessmment years under dispute. 6 | P a g e

    6

    7. In view of our decision above, the other grounds raised by the assessee on the existence of PE, applicable tax rates etc., having become infructuous are dismissed.

    8. In the result, appeals are allowed, as indicated above. Order pronounced in the open court on 29th September, 2022 Sd/- Sd/-

    (N.K. BILLAIYA) (SAKTIJIT DEY)

    ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER

    Dated: 29th September, 2022. RK/-

    Copy forwarded to:

    1. Appellant

    2. Respondent

    3. CIT

    4. CIT(A)

    5. DR

    Asst. Registrar, ITAT, New Delhi 7 | P a g e

    7

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Dow Jones & Company Inc., Mumbai v. ACIT (International Taxation) 1(2)(2), New Delhi
    (Sep 29, 2022)