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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • INDIAN FOREST ACT 1927
  • 29 ) CRM-M-23190-2020 CRM-M-36757-2020 (i) Indian Forest Act 1927 : Section 52C
  • section 50(1)(c) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972
  • section 451 Cr.P.C.,
  • provisions of section 451 Cr PC or 457 Cr PC.
  • 33 ) CRM-M-23190-2020 CRM-M-36757-2020 RULE 106 RULE 115 106. Offences
  • Rule 106 and 115 of Mining Rules 2012,
  • Rule 101 of Mining Rules 2012,
  • Rule 106 and Rule 115,
  • Section 59A(3) of the Indian Forest Act
  • provisions of section 451 Cr PC and 457 Cr PC
  • rule 101 (10) of Mining Rules 2012
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • INDIAN FOREST ACT 1927
  • 29 ) CRM-M-23190-2020 CRM-M-36757-2020 (i) Indian Forest Act 1927 : Section 52C
  • section 50(1)(c) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972
  • section 451 Cr.P.C.,
  • provisions of section 451 Cr PC or 457 Cr PC.
  • 33 ) CRM-M-23190-2020 CRM-M-36757-2020 RULE 106 RULE 115 106. Offences
  • Rule 106 and 115 of Mining Rules 2012,
  • Rule 101 of Mining Rules 2012,
  • Rule 106 and Rule 115,
  • Section 59A(3) of the Indian Forest Act
  • provisions of section 451 Cr PC and 457 Cr PC
  • rule 101 (10) of Mining Rules 2012
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (CRM-M-23190-2020 / CRM-M-36757-2020)

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion arises from petitions concerning vehicles seized under the Mineral (Mining & Development) related provisions and the Mining Rules, 2012 (referred to in the text as "Mining Rules 2012" and MMDR Act). The petitions challenge the continued detention of vehicles seized after inspection carried out in terms of Rule 101 of the Mining Rules 2012 where authorities had not initiated FIRs, complaints, or confiscation proceedings. The matter refers to earlier orders passed by the National Green Tribunal (NGT) that had been challenged before the Supreme Court in related litigation; the opinion notes that the Supreme Court's judgment did not discuss any bar to release of vehicles on superdari. The Court examines the interplay between special enactments (including provisions in the Indian Forest Act and other statutes) and the powers of criminal courts under sections 451 and 457 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) in relation to interim release of seized vehicles.

The Court considers the stage at which release on superdari can be sought (immediately after seizure before any intimation to Court; during confiscation proceedings; and after intimation to Court or after an FIR/complaint is lodged), and issues directions to respondent authorities about initiating prosecution or confiscation proceedings and about dealing with vehicles seized for more than three months without further action. The final order disposes of the petitions with directions and records dates and acknowledgements including the judgment dated 04.02.2021 by (Gurvinder Singh Gill) Judge.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Mining Rules 2012 (and the MMDR Act) contain any specific provision ousting the jurisdiction of criminal courts to entertain applications for interim release of seized vehicles on superdari under section 451 CrPC or release under section 457 CrPC.
  2. At what stage after seizure can an application for release of a vehicle on superdari be entertained by the criminal court — i.e., (i) immediately after seizure but before intimation to Court or FIR, (ii) during confiscation proceedings (whether or not an FIR is lodged), and (iii) after intimation or after lodging of FIR where investigation or trial is pending.
  3. Whether provisions in other special enactments (for example, the Indian Forest Act as amended in some States or provisions under the Wild Life (Protection) Act or Delhi Excise Act) which oust court jurisdiction are applicable analogies to the Mining Rules 2012.
  4. What procedural directions should be given to respondent authorities in respect of vehicles seized under the Mining Rules 2012 that have remained detained beyond a reasonable period (identified in the opinion as three months).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Meghalaya Vs. All Dimasa Students Union, Dima-Hasao District Committee & Ors (2019) 8 SCC 177 The opinion notes the Supreme Court considered a bunch of NGT orders in that case. The Court records that the Supreme Court judgment contained no reference or discussion about any bar to release of vehicles on superdari; thus that judgment did not resolve the specific question addressed in the present opinion.
State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Uday Singh, 2019 AIR (SC) 1597 Interpretation of the Indian Forest Act (as amended by the State of Madhya Pradesh) and whether magistrate's jurisdiction under section 451 CrPC is available once Authorised Officer initiates confiscation proceedings under the Indian Forest Act. The Court records that in Uday Singh it was held that jurisdiction under section 451 CrPC was not available to the Magistrate once the Authorised Officer initiated confiscation proceedings under the Indian Forest Act 1927 (as amended by State of Madhya Pradesh).
State of West Bengal v. Sujit Kumar Rana, (2004) 4 SCC 129 Whether initiation of confiscation proceedings excludes jurisdiction of the criminal court; interpretation of provisions in Indian Forest Act (as amended by State of West Bengal). The Court notes Sujit Kumar Rana held that once confiscation proceedings are initiated, the jurisdiction of the criminal court stands excluded. The opinion emphasizes that these decisions dealt with statutory schemes that expressly ousted court jurisdiction.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors v. Madhukar Rao, (2008) 14 SCC 624 Whether a vehicle seized under section 50(1)(c) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 can be released by a Magistrate under section 451 CrPC during pendency of trial. The Court records that in Madhukar Rao the Supreme Court concluded there could be no bar on the power of the court to exercise powers under section 451 CrPC for interim release of seized vehicles by the Judicial Magistrate. The present Court relies on that principle to assess whether similar bars exist under Mining Rules 2012.
Nongstoin PS & others Vs. State of Meghalaya, 2019 CrLJ 4466 Application of section 451 CrPC to release of a seized truck (carrying coal illegally) where NGT mandated release only upon recovery of damages to extent of 50% of showroom price. The Court records that the Meghalaya High Court, relying upon Madhukar Rao, held that the NGT order would not take away the power and jurisdiction of the Magistrate/Criminal Court to adjudicate on release of seized vehicles under section 451 CrPC. The present Court cites this to support the proposition that orders of administrative/tribunal bodies do not automatically oust judicial power under section 451 unless statute clearly provides so.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis follows a comparative approach of prior decisions and statutory text. The main thrust of its reasoning, stated in the opinion, is:

  1. The pivotal question is whether the Mining Rules 2012 contain any specific provision that ousts the jurisdiction of criminal courts to entertain applications for interim release of seized vehicles under sections 451 or 457 CrPC. The Court repeatedly emphasizes that the existence of an express ouster in the special statute or rules is the "key" to whether courts are barred.
  2. The Court distinguishes earlier decisions: Uday Singh and Sujit Kumar Rana involved statutory schemes (Indian Forest Act as amended by certain States) that explicitly ousted court jurisdiction to make orders regarding custody, possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of property; hence courts there were held to be excluded. By contrast, Madhukar Rao (Wild Life Act context) held that there was no bar to the exercise of section 451 CrPC powers because the statute did not contain an ouster.
  3. Applying those precedents, the Court examined the Mining Rules 2012 and concluded that they do not contain any specific provision from which it could be inferred that the jurisdiction of criminal courts is ousted or that there is a specific bar against release of a vehicle on superdari.
  4. The Court analyzed the stage at which release may be sought and stated three distinct stages after seizure:
    • (i) Immediately after seizure but before any intimation to Court or before lodging of FIR/complaint — at this stage the court is not seized and sections 451/457 CrPC are not available; an application under section 451 is maintainable only during pendency of trial and section 457 only if seizure reported to Court.
    • (ii) During confiscation proceedings, whether or not any FIR is lodged — recourse to sections 451/457 may be available provided the Rules do not contain inconsistent provisions.
    • (iii) After intimation to Court or after lodging of FIR where investigation or trial is pending — recourse to sections 451/457 could be had, again subject to absence of inconsistency with the Rules.
  5. Because Mining Rules 2012 do not specifically oust court jurisdiction, the Court held that the powers under sections 451 and 457 CrPC cannot be ousted once the Court gets seized of the matter. However, when there is neither any FIR/complaint nor any application for confiscation by respondent authorities, the Illaqa Magistrate would not be competent to entertain an application for superdari.
  6. The Court noted that confiscation proceedings are independent and not subject to the three-month limitation that applies to taking cognizance under Rules 106 and 115; Rule 101(10) contains a rider that confiscation proceedings can be initiated after expiry of one month of imposition of penalty if penalty is not paid. The Court emphasized that authorities should not sit over the matter unreasonably, observed that three months is a reasonable period within which authorities should act, and directed the authorities to either initiate prosecution or file for confiscation.
  7. The Court issued specific procedural directions to respondent authorities about handling vehicles seized for more than three months where no FIR/complaint/confiscation proceedings have been initiated, about the ability of courts to entertain superdari applications once proceedings are initiated, and about conditions courts may impose (including requiring deposit of penalty amount or part thereof).
  8. The Court also identified typographical/semantic errors and overlaps in certain rules of the Mining Rules 2012 (e.g., cross-references in Rule 101(5), Rule 101(8), absence of a specific penalty provision for under-weighment in Rule 101(7), and duplication between Rules 106 and 115) and suggested respondent authorities consider amendments; additionally the Court encouraged continuing e-governance initiatives such as e-Ravaana transit passes/bills.

Holding and Implications

Holding: DISPOSED OF — both petitions stand disposed of with the directions specified by the Court.

Implications (direct consequences as stated in the opinion):

  • The Mining Rules 2012 do not contain any specific provision ousting the jurisdiction of criminal courts to entertain applications for release of seized vehicles on superdari under sections 451 or 457 CrPC; therefore, once the Court is seized of the matter (by intimation, FIR/complaint or initiation of confiscation proceedings), courts retain the power to consider such applications.
  • When there is neither any FIR/complaint nor any application for confiscation on behalf of respondent authorities, the Illaqa Magistrate is not competent to entertain an application for superdari; the bar imposed by earlier administrative orders relates to this situation where the court is not seized.
  • Respondent authorities are directed to take requisite steps — within a reasonable period (the Court identifies three months as reasonable) — to either prosecute the accused or initiate confiscation proceedings under Rule 101(10) where penalties are not paid. Vehicles detained for more than three months without initiation of FIR/complaint or confiscation proceedings shall be dealt with under Rule 101(10) immediately; the Director, Department of Mines and Geology, Haryana is directed to ensure compliance within two weeks from the order.
  • Upon the authorities initiating FIR/complaint or filing for confiscation under Rule 101(10), courts may entertain applications for release on superdari during pendency of such proceedings if there is likelihood of delay; courts shall decide such applications independently and may impose any strict conditions including requiring deposit of an amount equal to or part of the penalty imposed.
  • The opinion calls for the respondent authorities to consider amendments to the Mining Rules 2012 to rectify identified errors and duplications (specific provisions and rules are identified in the opinion) and to continue to expand e-governance measures for effective implementation.
  • The Court's directions are procedural and remedial for the parties; the opinion clarifies applicable principles but does so by applying existing precedents and the statutory text rather than laying down a novel precedent beyond those applications.

This summary is derived exclusively from the provided opinion text. Sections of the opinion that did not provide party-by-party argumentation have been noted as absent rather than supplemented.

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    K.C. Stone Crushing Co. And Others v. State Of Haryana And Others

    State of Meghalaya Vs. All Dimasa Students Union, Dima-Hasao District Committee & Ors (2019)8 SCC 177 In the said case, a bunch of orders passed by NGT had been challenged in Supreme Court. However, in the said judgement passed by Supreme Court, there is no reference and no discussion in respect of any bar to release of vehicles on superdari. Order dt. 7.5.2019 passed by Honble Supreme Court in In the said case, an order dated 10.1.2019 passed by NGT in

    I.A. No. 22/2019 in O.A. No. 670/2018 had been challenged. The order dated 10.1.2019 is a short order vide which the ( 25 ) CRM-M-23190-2020 CRM-M-36757-2020 C.A. 1590/2019 Atul Chauhan vs. State of respondents had been directed by NGT to furnish information with regard to taking steps for recovery of damages for the illegal mining and for regulating the release of vehicles carrying illegally mined material on the pattern dealt with by Tribunal vide order dated 04.01.2019. The appeal challenging the same was dismissed by Honble Supreme Court in limene without there being any reference to facts. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Uday Singh, 2019 AIR (SC) 1597 In Uday Singhs case it was held that jurisdiction under section

    451 of the CrPC, 1973 was not available to the Magistrate, once the Authorised Officer initiated confiscation proceedings under Indian Forest Act 1927. The said case dealt with amended provisions of Indian Forest Act 1927 (as amended by State of Madhya Pradesh). As per amended provisions of Section 52(1), the officer effecting the seizure, upon being satisfied that a forest offence has been committed, is empowered to confiscate the forest produce together with the tools, vehicles, boats and articles used in its commission. The order of confiscation under Section 52(3) is subject to an appeal and a revision. Section 52C (as amended by State of Madhya Pradesh) stipulates that no Court, Tribunal or authority, other than an Authorised Officer, an Appellate Authority or Court of Sessions (in revision) shall have jurisdiction to pass orders with regard to possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of the property. State of West Bengal

    v. Sujit Kumar Rana, (2004) 4 SCC 129 This Court in Sujit Kumar Ranas case held that once confiscation proceedings are initiated, the jurisdiction of the criminal court stands excluded. However, the provisions of the Act i.e. The Indian Forest Act 1927 were entirely different. Section 59A(3) of the Indian Forest Act (as amended by State of West Bengal) provides that if the authorised officer is satisfied that a forest offence has been committed, then irrespective of the fact whether a prosecution has been instituted or not, he may direct confiscation of the property used in committing the offence. Still further Section 59G(as amended by State of West Bengal) of the Act creates a bar on the jurisdiction of Court to make ( 26 ) CRM-M-23190-2020 CRM-M-36757-2020 orders with regard to the custody, possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of any property including vehicles seized under section 52 of the Act.

    36. The aforesaid judgements reveal that while the former two judgements neither dealt with nor laid any law with respect to release of vehicles on superdari, the latter two judgements do deal with said aspect and have held that jurisdiction of Courts is barred but the said judgements were delivered while interpreting a different set of Rules where the Rules specifically ousted the jurisdiction of Courts. The said judgements can not be made applicable in instant case under Mining Rules 2012 where there is no such specific provision for ouster of jurisdiction.

    37. Honble Supreme Court, while interpreting another set of Rules in (2008)

    14 SCC 624: State of Madhya Pradesh & ors v. Madhukar Rao has taken a different view. In the said case the Honble Supreme Court considered the question as to whether a vehicle or vessel etc. seized under section 50(1)(c) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 can be released by Magistrate during the pendency of trial in exercise of powers under section

    451 CrPC, 1973. After considering the provisions of Section 50(1)(c) of the Act and section 451 CrPC, it was concluded that there could be no bar on the power of the Court for exercise of powers under section 451 CrPC for interim release of the seized vehicles by the Judicial Magistrate.

    38. From perusal of judgements rendered by Honble Supreme Court in Uday Singhs case(supra) and Sujit Kumar Ranas case(supra) and also Madhukar Raos case(supra), it is borne out that it is the specific provision of the Rules which holds the key to the question of there being any bar or ( 27 ) CRM-M-23190-2020 CRM-M-36757-2020 not to release of vehicle on superdari. The Mining Rules 2012, however, do not contain any such provision from which it could be inferred that jurisdiction of Courts is ousted or that there is any specific bar against release of a vehicle on superdari.

    39. In Nongstoin PS & others Vs. State of Meghalaya 2019 CrLJ 4466, wherein release of truck, seized on account of carrying coal illegally, was being opposed on the strength of order passed by the NGT mandating release of seized vehicles only upon recovering damages to the extent of 50% of the showroom price of the vehicle, the Meghalya High Court, while relying upon Madhukar Raos case (supra) held that the order of NGT would not take away the power and jurisdiction of the Magistrate/Criminal Court to adjudicate on the issue of release of seized vehicles under section 451 CrPC.

    40. The legal position regarding application of section 451 Cr.P.C., being well settled, the question regarding release of a vehicle seized under provisions of MMDR or under the rules framed therein i.e. Mining Rules 2012, on superdari, or as regards there being any bar to such release also needs to be examined in context of the stage at which release of vehicle on superdari is sought. The following stages after seizure could be visualized:

    (i) Immediately after seizure of vehicle but before any intimation regarding such seizure is sent to Court or before lodging of FIR/complaint by authorities concerned;

    (ii) During the course of confiscation proceedings, whether or not any FIR is lodged. ( 28 ) CRM-M-23190-2020 CRM-M-36757-2020

    (iii) After any intimation regarding seizure of vehicle is sent to Court or after lodging of FIR where investigation or trial is pending;

    41. As far as stage (i) is concerned i.e. before any FIR is lodged or any intimation regarding seizure is sent to Court, the Court cannot be said to be seized of any matter pertaining to seizure of vehicle and as such resort cannot be had to provisions of section 451 Cr PC or 457 Cr PC. While an application for release of property in terms of section 451 could only be maintainable during the pendency of a trial, an application in terms of section 457 Cr.PC would be maintainable only if such seizure is reported to the Court by the authorities concerned. As regards stage (ii) and stage (iii), recourse to provisions of section 451 Cr PC and 457 Cr PC could be had provided there is nothing inconsistent to the said provisions in the Rules in question. The Mining Rules 2012, however, do not contain any such provision from which it could be inferred that jurisdiction of Courts is ousted or that there is any specific bar against release of a vehicle on superdari.

    42. The powers conferred by section 451 and 457 of Cr PC cannot be ousted once the Court gets seized of the matter in respect of which superdari is sought. No doubt MMDR is a special Act and the provision of Special Act override any general provisions contained in Cr.P.C. but in MMDR Act there is no such provision ousting the jurisdiction of Courts to invoke provisions of section 451 or 457 of Cr PC at appropriate stage unlike some other special Acts where it has specifically been ousted. Following are some of the instances, wherein jurisdiction is specifically ousted: ( 29 ) CRM-M-23190-2020 CRM-M-36757-2020

    (i) Indian Forest Act 1927 : Section 52C (as amended by State of Madhya Pradesh) stipulates that no Court, Tribunal or authority, other than an Authorised Officer, an Appellate Authority or Court of Sessions (in revision) shall have jurisdiction to pass orders with regard to possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of the property. Section 59G(as amended by State of West Bengal) of the Act creates a bar on the jurisdiction of Court to make orders with regard to the custody, possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of any property including vehicles seized under section 52 of the Act. Similar amendments have been made by other States as well.

    (ii) Delhi Excise Act 2009: Section 61 of the Act puts an embargo on jurisdiction of Courts, and provides that no Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, shall have jurisdiction to make any order with regard to any intoxicant, material, still, utensil, implement, apparatus or any receptacle, package, vessel, animal, cart, or other conveyance used in committing any offence, which is seized or detained under the Act.

    43. The MMDR Act, unlike some other enactments, however, does not impose any absolute bar on moving an application on superdari. In these circumstances, the bar as referred to in order dated 26.7.2019 as modified in order dated 19.2.2020(Annexure R-1) thus, can only be relatable to a situation when the Court is not seized of the matter in any manner. In other words when there is neither any FIR/complaint nor any application filed by behalf of the respondent authorities for confiscation, the Illaqa Magistrate would not be competent to entertain any application for superdari but would be competent when any FIR/complaint is lodged or any application for confiscation is filed on behalf of the respondent authorities. Question no. (iii) is answered accordingly. ( 30 ) CRM-M-23190-2020 CRM-M-36757-2020

    44. As an upshot of discussion made above, this Court is of the opinion that even if the Illaqa Magistrate may not be able to take cognizance of any offence under MMDR Act after expiry of 3 months in terms of Rule 106 and 115 of Mining Rules 2012, but the confiscation proceedings are independent proceedings and there is no such limitation provided for initiating the same and the only rider therein as per Rule 101(10) is that such proceedings can be initiated after expiry of one month of the imposition of penalty in case such penalty is not paid. Sitting over the matter for an unreasonable would be prejudicial to the owner inasmuch as not only the owner would be deprived of an opportunity to put forth his case against confiscation but he would remain deprived of use of his vehicle which rather would deteriorate on account of its disuse and vagaries of weather. The authorities, on their own certainly cannot confiscate the vehicle and as per Section 21(4A), it is only under the orders of the Court that the same can be confiscated and further disposed of. The respondent authorities should therefore take necessary steps for moving the Court concerned so as to seek permission to confiscate the vehicle in question after giving due opportunity to its owner/accused who may be able to successfully show that the same is not liable to be confiscated.

    45. The following directions are thus issued to the respondents:

    (i) The respondents are directed that in future all such cases where a vehicle is seized in terms of MMDR Act or Rules framed thereunder and the penalty imposed is not paid within a reasonable time, either the requisite steps, as per rules, shall be taken for prosecuting the accused or an appropriate application shall be filed for confiscation of the vehicle in terms of Rule 101(10). A period of 3 months can well be said to be a fairly reasonable time so as to enable the authorities concerned to take requisite steps in this direction. Once a ( 31 ) CRM-M-23190-2020 CRM-M-36757-2020 vehicle is ordered to be confiscated, further steps for auctioning the same may be taken immediately instead of retaining the vehicle in the police station where its condition is bound to deteriorate which would be a loss to the State as well as it will not be able to recover much amount from auction of the vehicle on account of deteriorated condition of the vehicle.

    (ii) All those vehicles, including the vehicles of the petitioners in both the cases, which are presently lying seized by respondent authorities for more than three months, pursuant to inspection carried out in terms of Rule 101 of Mining Rules 2012, and in respect of which the authorities have neither lodged any FIR nor instituted any complaint in the Court and have not even initiated confiscation proceedings shall be dealt with under provisions of Rule 101(10) immediately. The Director, Department of Mines and Geology, Haryana shall ensure that the needful in this regard is done within two weeks from today.

    (iii) Upon the respondent authorities either choosing to lodge a FIR/complaint or choosing to move an application under rule 101 (10) of Mining Rules 2012 for confiscation of vehicle, it shall be open to the Court concerned to entertain an application for release of the vehicle on superdari during the pendency of such proceedings if there is likelihood of delay in conclusion of such proceedings. The Court dealing with such application shall decide the same independently while considering all such pleas as may be raised by the parties. The Court concerned shall, however, endeavour to dispose of such applications at the earliest.

    (iv) While considering release of vehicle on superdari, the Court may choose to impose any such strict conditions as deemed fit. The Court concerned may even direct the applicant to deposit in Court an amount equal to the penalty imposed by the authorities concerned or part thereof, in addition to any other condition.

    46. Further, since some minor errors have been noticed in the Mining Rules 2012, which are there not only in the Rules published by private publishers ( 32 ) CRM-M-23190-2020 CRM-M-36757-2020 but are also present in copy of the notification which was furnished by the learned State counsel, the respondent authorities to consider the feasibility of having a relook at the Rules for carrying out necessary amendments, if deemed appropriate particularly in respect of the following issues which have been noticed :

    (i) In Rule 101(5), in the existing rule the authorised officers/officials in charge of a check post are required to take action as provided under rule 104 in respect of any violation pertaining to transit pass or transport permit whereas the consequences for such violations such violations are in fact prescribed in rule 102 and not in 104;

    (ii) Similarly in Rule 101(8) it is stated that a person found transporting any mineral in contravention of the provision of the rules would be liable for punishment under rule 105 whereas rule 105 does not prescribe any punishment and pertains to liability of all those persons who are In-charge and responsible to the company when an offence is stated to have been committed by company. Thus it needs to be clarified as to whether in terms of Rule 101(8), a person is to be penalized for illegal transportation or illegal mining and under which specific rule;

    (iii) While Rule 101(7) refers to certain action to be taken under the rules, when it is found to be a case of under-weighment of the mineral being transported, however there is no specific rule dealing with the penalty to be imposed in case of under-weighment of mineral. It needs to be specified as to whether in a case where the mineral being transported is found to be excess of the quantity which is mentioned in transit pass, the same has to be taken to be a case of illegal transportation or as to whether a lesser penalty is to be provided;

    (iv) There is an element of overlapping/duplicity as regards the provisions pertaining to cognizance inasmuch as there are two rules

    i.e. Rule 106 and Rule 115, dealing with the same issue. Said rules read as follows: ( 33 ) CRM-M-23190-2020 CRM-M-36757-2020 RULE 106 RULE 115

    106. Offences cognizable only on written complaint. No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under these rules except upon a complaint in writing made by the Director or any other officer authorised by him to the police in this behalf within three months of the date on which said offence is alleged to have been committed.

    115. Offences cognizable only on written complaint. No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under these rules except upon a complaint in writing made by the Director or any other officer authorised by him in this behalf within three months of the date on which said offence is alleged to have been committed. The aforesaid two rules are identical but for the words to the police which exist in Rule 106 but are missing in Rule 115 though both are in respect of offences punishable under these rules. The said duplicity needs to be resolved.

    (v) Since it has been informed that the department has taken initiatives for introducing e-governance processes which have led to a much more effective implementation of the Act particularly with the introduction of e-Ravaana transit passes/bills, the authorities shall continue with their endeavours of increasing e-governance in every sphere which may even be incorporated specifically and made a part of the rules.

    47. Both the petitions stands disposed of accordingly with the aforesaid directions. However before parting with the judgement, this Court places on record its appreciation for the invaluable assistance rendered by both the learned counsel and also by Shri Parvesh Sharma, State Mining Engineer and Shri R.S. Thakran, Mining Engineer, Department of Mines and Geology, Haryana. ( GURVINDER SINGH GILL ) 04.02.2021 JUDGE (kamal) Whether reasoned / speaking? Yes / No Whether reportable? Yes / No

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    K.C. Stone Crushing Co. And Others v. State Of Haryana And Others
    (Feb 4, 2021)