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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2018 INSC 730
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection (5) of this Act
  • Section 176, Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994
  • Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • The Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994
  • Representation of the People Act, 1951
  • Section 82 or Section 117 of the Act
  • the Constitution of India
  • Section 176 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994
  • Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act
  • Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Section 86(1) of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2018 INSC 730
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection (5) of this Act
  • Section 176, Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994
  • Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • The Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994
  • Representation of the People Act, 1951
  • Section 82 or Section 117 of the Act
  • the Constitution of India
  • Section 176 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994
  • Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act
  • Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Section 86(1) of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant and the first respondent contested elections for Ward No. 18 of the District Council, Mahendergarh. Results were declared on 28-1-2016, with the appellant returned as the successful candidate.

On 10-2-2016 the first respondent filed Election Petition No. 9 of 2016 under Section 176 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. When the appellant sought its rejection under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for non-presentation in person, the first respondent withdrew the petition on 1-3-2016, obtaining liberty to file afresh.

A second election petition (CS No. 361 of 2016) was instituted on 2-3-2016. The appellant again invoked Order 7 Rule 11, contending that the fresh petition was time-barred. In response, the first respondent applied under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to exclude the period spent prosecuting the earlier petition.

By judgment dated 19-7-2016 the trial court rejected the second petition as beyond the statutory 30-day limit. The District Judge, Narnaul allowed the first respondent’s appeal on 18-1-2017. The Punjab and Haryana High Court, by order dated 11-8-2017 (Suman Devi, 2017 SCC OnLine P&H 4793), dismissed the appellant’s civil revision. The present Supreme Court judgment addresses the appellant’s further appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the 30-day period prescribed in Section 176(1) of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 for filing an election petition is absolute and incapable of extension.
  2. Whether Sections 5 or 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked to save an election petition presented after the statutory period by excluding the time spent on an earlier, withdrawn petition.
  3. Consequently, whether the second election petition filed on 2-3-2016 was liable to be rejected as time-barred under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Haryana Panchayati Raj Act forms a complete code; Section 176 mandates presentation of an election petition within 30 days of result declaration, leaving no scope for condonation of delay.
  • Section 14 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable; any petition not conforming to Section 176 must be summarily rejected.
  • Punjab & Haryana High Court precedents (Joginder Singh, Rashpal Singh, Chet Ram, Darshan Singh, Parkasho, Deepak Mangla) consistently support this interpretation.

First Respondent's Arguments

  • The matter required trial because the appellant allegedly filed a false matriculation certificate; therefore the High Court’s order merited no interference.
  • Time spent diligently pursuing the first petition should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133 Limitation Act provisions do not apply to election petitions under a self-contained special statute. Used to support exclusion of Section 5 Limitation Act from election disputes.
Charan Lal Sahu v. Nandkishore Bhatt (1973) 2 SCC 530 Right to challenge an election is purely statutory; statutory requirements must be strictly complied with. Reinforced that Section 176’s time limit is mandatory.
Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Lal (1999) 8 SCC 532 Representation of the People Act is a complete code; non-compliance with filing period mandates dismissal. Analogous reasoning applied to Panchayati Raj Act to hold limitation absolute.
Joginder Singh v. Baldeep Singh 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 10293 Punjab & Haryana High Court precedent mandating strict adherence to 30-day period in Section 176. Cited by appellant; Supreme Court noted High Court ignored its own line of authority.
Rashpal Singh v. Jasvir Singh 2010 SCC OnLine P&H 1565 Same principle of strict limitation under Section 176. Referenced as supporting authority.
Chet Ram v. State of Punjab 2010 SCC OnLine P&H 8035 Strict application of limitation in Panchayati Raj elections. Referenced by appellant.
Darshan Singh v. Karamjit Singh 2012 SCC OnLine P&H 6533 Reiteration of mandatory 30-day period. Supportive precedent.
Parkasho v. Bholi Devi 2012 SCC OnLine P&H 10582 Election petition beyond limitation not maintainable. Cited to bolster appellant’s position.
Deepak Mangla v. Nanakchand 2015 SCC OnLine P&H 3261 Continued affirmation that delay in election petitions is incurable. Part of consistent High Court line ignored by impugned judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court observed that Section 176(1) expressly fixes a 30-day period from declaration of results for filing an election petition and contains no power to extend or condone delay. Drawing on Hukumdev Narain Yadav, the Court held that where the legislature creates a self-contained election code, provisions of the Limitation Act—including Section 14—stand excluded.

It noted that earlier Supreme Court cases (Charan Lal Sahu; Lachhman Das Arora) and a consistent body of Punjab & Haryana High Court precedent had taken the same view. The High Court erred in treating the filing of a separate Section 14 application as curing the defect; withdrawal of the first petition could not circumvent the statutory bar because limitation had already run out by the time the second petition was presented.

Consequently, the second election petition, filed after expiry of 30 days, was incurably time-barred and amenable to rejection under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed – High Court order dated 11-8-2017 set aside; the first respondent’s election petition is dismissed.

Immediate Effect: The appellant’s election to Ward No. 18 stands affirmed, and no costs are awarded.

Implications: The judgment reinforces that Section 176 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act creates an inflexible 30-day limitation period and that Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act have no application to election petitions under the Act, thereby solidifying certainty and finality in local-body election disputes.

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    Suman Devi v. Manisha Devi And Others

    Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, J.— The appellant and the first respondent contested elections for the post of Ward Councillor, from Ward No. 18 of the District Council of Mahendergarh. The results of election were declared on 28-1-2016. The appellant was declared to be the elected candidate. On 10-2-2016, the first respondent filed an election petition, namely, Civil Suit No. 9 of 2016 (CS No. 1086 of 2016) under Section 176 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 challenging the election of the appellant. Upon service of the election petition, the appellant filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the petition on the ground that the first respondent had failed to present it in person as required by Section 176. Notice was issued on the application. The respondent filed her reply. On 1-3-2016, the first respondent moved an application for withdrawal of the election petition. The application was allowed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division on the same day and the first respondent was permitted to withdraw the election petition with liberty to institute a fresh petition.

    2. Subsequently on 2-3-2016 the first respondent filed a second election petition, Civil Suit No. 361 of 2016 (CS No. 1106 of 2016). The appellant filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 for rejection of the election petition on the ground that it was barred by limitation. An application was thereupon filed by the first respondent purportedly under Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act submitting inter alia that if the limitation for filing the election petition had expired, the period spent between the filing of the earlier petition and its withdrawal may be excluded since the first respondent was bona fide espousing her remedies. The appellant opposed the application.

    3. By a judgment dated 19-7-2016 the trial court allowed the application under Order 7 Rule 11 on the ground that the fresh election petition was presented after the expiry of 30 days prescribed for the institution of an election petition. The first respondent preferred an appeal which was allowed by the District Judge, Narnaul on 18-1-2017. The appellant challenged the order of the District Judge before the High Court. The civil revision has been dismissed by the impugned order of the High Court dated 11-8-2017 2017 SCC OnLine P&H 4793. The High Court has observed thus: (Suman Devi case 2017 SCC OnLine P&H 4793, SCC OnLine P&H para 19)

    “19. The application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act was filed subsequently when the petitioner herein raised an objections [sic]. Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not provide for filing of a separate application. In any case, now application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act has already been filed, therefore, the irregularity, if any, stands cured.”

    4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 is a complete code for the presentation and adjudication of election petitions. The counsel submitted that an election petition has to be instituted under Section 176 within 30 days from the date of the declaration of the results of the elections. An election petition which does not comply with Section 176 must be rejected outright. The learned counsel submitted that this view has consistently been followed in several decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, to which a reference was made. These are: Joginder Singh v. Baldeep Singh 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 10293, (2010) 1 PLR 769, (2010) 1 RCR (Civil) 78, Rashpal Singh v. Jasvir Singh 2010 SCC OnLine P&H 1565, (2010) 2 RCR (Civil) 408, Chet Ram v. State of Punjab 2010 SCC OnLine P&H 8035, (2010) 4 PLR 718, Darshan Singh v. Karamjit Singh 2012 SCC OnLine P&H 6533, (2012) 2 PLR 831, Parkasho v. Bholi Devi 2012 SCC OnLine P&H 10582, (2012) 3 PLR 541 and Deepak Mangla v. Nanakchand 2015 SCC OnLine P&H 3261.

    5. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent submitted that a triable case arises against the appellant for submitting a false certificate of matriculation and hence, the order of the High Court may not be interfered with.

    6. Section 176 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides as follows:

    “176. Determination of validity of election enquiry by Judge and procedure.—(1) If the validity of any election of a member of a Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad or Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Chairman or Vice-Chairman, President or Vice-President of Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad respectively is brought in question by any person contesting the election or by any person qualified to vote at the election to which such question related, such person may at any time within thirty days after the date of the declaration of results of the election, present an election petition to the civil court having ordinary jurisdiction in the area within which the election has been or should have been held, for the determination of such question.
    (2) A petitioner shall not join as respondent to his election petition except the following persons—
    (a) where the petitioner in addition to challenging the validity of the election of all or any of the returned candidates claims a further relief that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected, all the contesting candidates other than the petitioner and where no such further relief is claimed, all the returned candidates;
    (b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practices are made in the election petition.
    (3) All election petitions received under sub-section (1) in which the validity of the election of members to represent the same electoral division is in question, shall be heard by the same civil court.
    (4)(a) If on the holding of such inquiry the civil court finds that a candidate has, for the purpose of election committed a corrupt practice within the meaning of sub-section (5) he shall set aside the election and declare the candidate disqualified for the purpose of election and fresh election may be held.
    (aa) If on holding such enquiry the civil court finds that—
    (i) on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified to be elected;
    (ii) any nomination has been improperly rejected; or
    (iii) the result of the election, insofar it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected by improper acceptance of any nomination or by any corrupt practice committed in the interest of the returned candidate by an agent other than his election agent or by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void or by any non-compliance with or violation of the provisions of the Constitution of India or of this Act, or any rules or orders made under this Act, election of such returned candidate shall be set aside and fresh election may be held.;
    (b) If, in any case to which clause (a) or clause (aa) does not apply, the validity of an election is in dispute between two or more candidates, the court shall after a scrutiny and computation of the votes recorded in favour of each candidate, declare the candidate who is found to have the largest number of valid votes in his favour, to have been duty elected: Provided that after such computation, if any, equality of votes is found to exist between any candidate and the addition of one vote will entitle any of the candidates to be declared elected, one additional vote shall be added to the total number of valid votes found to have been received in the favour of such candidate or candidates, as the case may be, elected by lot drawn in the presence of the Judge in such manner as he may determine.
    (5) A person shall be deemed to have committed a corrupt practice—
    (a) who with a view to induce a voter to give or to refrain from giving a vote in favour of any candidate, offers or gives any money or valuable consideration, or holds out any promise of individual profit, or holds out any threat of injury to any person; or
    (b) who, with a view to induce any person to stand or not to stand or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate at an election, offers or gives any money or valuable consideration or holds out any promise or individual profit or holds out any threat of injury to any person; or
    (c) who hires or procures whether on payment or otherwise, any vehicle or vessel for the conveyance of any voter (other than the person himself, the members of his family or his agent) to and from any polling station.
    Explanation 1.—A corrupt practice shall be deemed to have been committed by a candidate, if it has been committed with his knowledge and consent by a person who is acting under the general or special authority of such candidate with reference to the election.
    Explanation 2.—The expression “vehicle” means any vehicle used or capable of being used for the purpose of road transport whether propelled by mechanical power or otherwise, and whether used for drawing other vehicles or otherwise.”

    Sub-section (1) of Section 176 clearly specifies a period of 30 days from the date of the declaration of the results of the election within which an election petition has to be filed. There is no provision for condoning delay or for extending the period of limitation.

    7. In Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133, while considering whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J., speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this Court held thus:

    “18. …The applicability of these provisions has, therefore, to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Act relating to the filing of election petitions and their trial to ascertain whether it is a complete code in itself which does not admit of the application of any of the provisions of the Limitation Act mentioned in Section 29(2) of that Act.”

    This Court held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act do not govern filing of election petitions or their trial.

    8. In Charan Lal Sahu v. Nandkishore Bhatt (1973) 2 SCC 530, a two-Judge Bench held that there is no common law right to challenge an election since it is purely a matter of regulation by the terms of the statute. The right being statutory, the terms of the statute must be complied with.

    9. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Lal (1999) 8 SCC 532, construed the provisions of Section 81(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which prescribes a period of 45 days to file an election petition. Dr A.S. Anand, C.J. speaking for the Court, held thus:

    “7. On its plain reading, Section 81(1) lays down that an election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of Section 100 and Section 101 of the Act to the High Court by any candidate at such election or by an elector within forty-five days from, but not earlier than, the date of election of the returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned candidates at the election and the dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates. The Act is a special code providing a period of limitation for filing of an election petition. No period for filing of an election petition is prescribed under the Indian Limitation Act. The Act insofar as it relates to presentation and trial of election disputes is a complete code and a special law. The scheme of the special law shows that the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Indian Limitation Act do not apply. If an election petition is not filed within the prescribed period of forty-five days, Section 86(1) of the Act, which provides that the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117, is straightaway attracted.”
    (emphasis in original)

    10. The Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 is a complete code for the presentation of election petitions. The statute has mandated that an election petition must be filed within a period of 30 days of the date of the declaration of results. This period cannot be extended. The provision of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would clearly stand excluded. The legislature having made a specific provision, any election petition which fails to comply with the statute is liable to be dismissed. The High Court has failed to notice both the binding judgments of this Court and its own precedents on the subject, to which we have referred. The first respondent filed an election petition in the first instance to which there was an objection to maintainability under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Confronted with the objection under Order 7 Rule 11, the first respondent obviated a decision thereon by withdrawing the election petition. The grant of liberty to file a fresh election petition cannot obviate the bar of limitation. The fresh election petition filed by the first respondent was beyond the statutory period of 30 days and was hence liable to be rejected.

    11. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 11-8-2017 2017 SCC OnLine P&H 4793. We hold that the election petition filed by the first respondent shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

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    Suman Devi v. Manisha Devi And Others
    (Aug 21, 2018)