Sri F.M Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.:— Appellant is the wife of one Sri P. Periyasamy who was employed as a line inspector in the respondent-Board and who died-in-harness on 15 November, 1996. After his death, an application was made by the appellant for compassionate appointment for her elder son by an application, dated 7 April, 1997. After calling for details through a communication, dated 9 July, 1997, the third respondent rejected the claim for compassionate appointment for the elder son by a communication, dated 5 December, 1998, on the ground that the elder son of the appellant was over aged.
2. Thereafter, on 11 November, 1999, the appellant applied for compassionate appointment for her younger son. The said application was forwarded to the second respondent. Her younger son by name Navamani himself made an application on 1 April, 2000, along with no objection letters from his other brothers, seeking compassionate appointment. In the said application, details were again called for by the respondent-Board through its communication, dated 10 April, 2000. It is relevant to note that though appellant's younger son Navamani applied for compassionate appointment on 11 November, 1999 he became major only on 15 March, 2000. Nevertheless, his application, dated 11 November, 1999, was renewed by a personal application made by Navamani himself on 1 April, 2000. The claim for such compassionate appointment came to be rejected by the second respondent by a communication, dated 24 September, 2001, on the ground that the present claim for compassionate appointment for the younger son cannot be considered since he had not completed 18 years within three years period and he had not satisfied the educational qualification of a pass in the 8th standard. It was also stated therein that the application was not made within three years.
3. The third respondent also reiterated the same reasons while rejecting the claim for compassionate appointment in his communication, dated 12 July, 2002. The appellant preferred the present writ petition challenging the above communication and the learned Single Judge of this Court, by relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2005 (1) L.L.N 25 (National Hydroelectric Power Corporation v. Nanak Chand) held that the claim of the appellant cannot be considered as it was belated in point of time.
4. Sri Chitharanjandas, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the appellant's case cannot be construed as one of belated claim since immediately after the death of her husband, an application was preferred on 7 April, 1997 for her elder son and since the same was rejected on the ground that he was over aged, the appellant made a subsequent application for her younger son on 11 November, 1999, who became major only on 15 March, 2000. According to the learned counsel since the appellant was diligently agitating her representation for compassionate appointment right from 7 April, 1997 till the filing of the last application on 1 April, 2000 for her younger son, the respondents were not justified in rejecting the said claim on the ground of delay as well as on the ground that her younger son also did not become major at the time of the second application. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court as well as that of a learned Single Judge, reported in—
(1) 2005 W.L.R 256 (Chief Engineer/Personnel, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. K. Lakshmi);
(2) 2002 (4) L.L.N 1132 (P. Ravi v. Chief Engineer (Personnel), Tamil Nadu Electricity Board); and
(3) 2004 (4) M.L.J 238 (T. Meer Ismail Ali v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai).
Learned counsel further contended that the decision relied upon by the learned Single Judge, reported in 2005 (1) L.L.N 25 (vide supra), is distinguishable.
5. As against the above submission, Sri Patturajan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Board contended that as per the rules prevailing as on date, since an application for appointment on compassionate ground should be made within three years from the date of death of the employee and since the last application was made only on 1 April, 2000, the respondent-Board was justified in rejecting the said application on the ground of delay. According to the learned counsel, even if the application stated to have been sent on 11 November, 1999 can be held to be within time namely 14 November, 1999, since the person for whom the appointment was sought for namely the last son of the appellant had not attained the age of 18 years by that date, that application cannot be said to have been made within time. Learned counsel, therefore, contended that applying the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2005 (1) L.L.N 25 (vide supra), the order impugned in the writ petition cannot be interfered with.
6. Having heard the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents, we are not able to appreciate and accept the stand of the respondents. We hasten to state that the very purport of extending a helping hand to a destitute on the death of her husband by way of compassionate appointment would get defeated if such claims are turned down on such hypertechnical ground. In the case on hand, as noted earlier, after the death of the appellant's husband on 15 November, 1996, an application was made on 7 April, 1997 for compassionate appointment for her elder son. Therefore, there was an application for compassionate appointment within five months from the date of the death of her husband. It was unfortunate that the said application came to be rejected on the ground that her elder son was over aged. Such rejection was made only on 5 December, 1998. Therefore, the appellant had to necessarily wait for some more time in order to renew her claim for appointment of her younger son who was running 18 years as on 11 November, 1999. The said younger son completed his 18 years on 15 March, 2000. Nevertheless, the appellant wanted to ensure that an application was made on 11 November, 1999 itself for that son in order to confirm that an application for compassionate appointment was made well within time, i.e, before 14 November, 1999 by which time the three years period from the date of death other husband would come to an end. Subsequently, on 1 April, 2000, her younger son himself renewed the application preferred by the appellant on 11 November, 1999 by making another application along with the no objection letters of his other brothers. Therefore, all the above steps taken by the appellant go to show that she was diligently pursuing her claim for com-passionate appointment over the death of her husband right from the year 1997 till 1 April, 2000. In such circumstances, when the appellant being a widow and since she had no other source of livelihood, the respondents should have been much more sympathetic and practical in considering the claim of the appellant for compassionate appointment to her younger son based on the application dated 11 November, 1999 and 1 April, 2000. In this context, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant reported in 2004 (4) M.L.J 238 (vide supra) and 2002 (4) L.L.N 1132 (vide supra), as well as the decision of the Division Bench reported in 2005 W.L.R 256, (vide supra), fully supports the claim of the appellant. As far as the decision reported in 2005 (1) L.L.N 25 (vide supra), is concerned, that was a case where the application came to be made nearly after 10 years after the death of the deceased employee. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has noted that the application was made to the appellant-Corporation therein which was not answerable to the claim of the applicant for compassionate appointment. Therefore, the facts involved in that case have no application to the facts of the case on hand. The ratio laid down therein cannot, therefore, be applied to the facts of this case.
7. For all the above reasons, we are convinced that the claim of the appellant for compassionate appointment for her younger son Navamani ought to have been favourably considered by the respondent-Board. The rejection of the appellant's claim by the communication, dated 24 September, 2001, by the second respondent as well as the communication, dated 12 July, 2002, by the third respondent are therefore not justifiable and accordingly, the same are set aside. The writ appeal stands allowed. The respondents are directed to entertain the application of the appellant, dated 11 November, 1999, along with the application of her younger son Navamani, dated 1 April, 2000, and pass appropriate orders for granting compassionate appointment to the younger son of the appellant expeditiously, preferably within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Appeal allowed.