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  • Section 33(2)(b) of the the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for short Act,
  • Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Industrial
  • Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.7.
  • Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • SECTION 10 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • Section 33(2)(b),
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  • Section 33(2)(b) of the the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for short Act,
  • Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Industrial
  • Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.7.
  • Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • SECTION 10 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • Section 33(2)(b),
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner-employer initiated disciplinary proceedings against the respondent-workman for misconduct involving verbal abuse of the shift supervisor. A domestic enquiry was conducted, providing the respondent a reasonable opportunity to be heard, resulting in a report holding the charges proved. The Disciplinary Authority, after reviewing the material, found the respondent guilty and dismissed him from service by order dated 1.12.2006. Concurrently, the petitioner filed an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, registered as Serial Application No. 10/2006 in AID No. 1/2006 before the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore. The Tribunal found the domestic enquiry fair and the charges proved but interfered with the punishment order on two grounds: (i) that the punishment was influenced by consideration of unauthorized absence for which enquiry was pending, and (ii) that dismissal was grossly disproportionate to the misconduct. The Tribunal dismissed the application by order dated 12.3.2010. The petitioner challenged this decision by filing the present petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Industrial Tribunal, exercising jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, was correct in interfering with the dismissal order based on the alleged consideration of unauthorized absence and disproportionality of punishment.
  2. The scope and limits of the Industrial Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) in approving disciplinary dismissal orders.
  3. Whether the decision in Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd. and Bisra Stone Lime Company Limited v. Industrial Tribunal were correctly applied to the facts of this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner-Employer's Arguments

  • The Industrial Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) is limited to determining whether a prima facie case exists regarding the validity of the domestic enquiry, not to reassess the punishment or substitute its own judgment.
  • The dismissal was based solely on the proved charge of verbal abuse, and the unauthorized absence was not a relevant consideration for punishment.
  • The decision of the Industrial Tribunal to interfere with the punishment was illegal and based on a misunderstanding of the scope of Section 33(2)(b).
  • The precedents relied upon by the Tribunal, including Ved Prakash Gupta and Bisra Stone Lime Company cases, are inapplicable or distinguishable on the facts.

Respondent-Workman's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent-workman's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Martin Burn Ltd. v. R. N. Bangerjee, AIR 1958 SC 79 Defines the limited jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) to a prima facie validity check of domestic enquiry without substituting Tribunal's own judgment. Applied to confirm that the Industrial Tribunal's role is to determine if a possible view on evidence supports the enquiry's validity, not to reappraise the entire case.
Cholan Roadways Limited v. G. Thirugnanasambandam, 2005 3 SCC 241 Reiterates the limited scope of jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) compared to Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Followed to emphasize that the Tribunal's approval jurisdiction is limited and not equivalent to adjudicatory powers under Section 10.
Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd., 1984 1 LLJ 546 Involves jurisdiction under Section 10(1)(c) related to dismissal for misconduct and abuse of language. Distinguished and held inapplicable as the present case involves Section 33(2)(b) jurisdiction, not Section 10.
Bisra Stone Lime Company Limited v. Industrial Tribunal, 1965 I LLJ 246 Held that dismissal based on composite charges including uninvestigated charges is improper. Distinguished on facts since in the present case dismissal was based solely on the proved charge of verbal abuse, not on unauthorized absence pending enquiry.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the scope of the Industrial Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, emphasizing that it is limited to determining whether a prima facie case exists regarding the validity of the domestic enquiry. The Court relied on the authoritative precedent of Martin Burn Ltd. v. R. N. Bangerjee, which clarifies that the Tribunal must not substitute its own judgment for that of the disciplinary authority but only assess whether the enquiry and findings are a possible view on the evidence.

The Court observed that the Industrial Tribunal erred in interfering with the punishment order on the basis that the dismissal was influenced by unauthorized absence, as the dismissal order explicitly showed the charge of verbal abuse alone warranted dismissal. The unauthorized absence was noted but not a relevant consideration for punishment, distinguishing it from the Bisra Stone Lime Company case where dismissal was based on uninvestigated charges.

The Court further held that the Industrial Tribunal's reliance on Ved Prakash Gupta was misplaced because that case involved jurisdiction under Section 10(1)(c), which is broader than the limited jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) exercised here.

Accordingly, the Court quashed the impugned order to the extent it interfered with the dismissal and confirmed the fairness and validity of the domestic enquiry and the charges proved.

Holding and Implications

The petition is allowed. The order dated 12.3.2010 of the Industrial Tribunal dismissing the application under Section 33(2)(b) is quashed insofar as it interfered with the disciplinary dismissal order.

The domestic enquiry is held to be fair and proper, and the charges against the respondent are confirmed as proved. The approval application filed by the petitioner under Section 33(2)(b) is allowed.

This decision restores the disciplinary authority's dismissal order and clarifies the limited scope of the Industrial Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b). No new precedent is set beyond reaffirming established principles.

    M/S. Elastrex Polymers Pvt. Ltd. v. Sri. Janardhana

    Ram Mohan Reddy, J.:— Petitioner-employer initiated disciplinary proceeding against the respondent-workman for certain acts of misconduct of verbal abuse of the shift Supervisor, followed by a domestic enquiry, extending reasonable opportunity of hearing to the respondent and a report holding the charges proved. The Disciplinary Authority too, after considering the material on record held the respondent guilty of the charges, and by Order dated: 1.12.2006, dismiss the respondent from service while simultaneously, filed an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for short Act, registered as Serial Application No. 10/2006 in AID No. 1/2006, before the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore. Parties let in evidence and the Industrial Tribunal on the material on record held the domestic enquiry as fair and proper, as also the charges proved. However, interfered with the order of punishment, on (i) that the punishment was actuated by reckoning the unauthorised absence over which an enquiry was pending (ii) that the punishment of dismissal was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct proved: by invoking Section 11(A) of the Act to dismiss the application, by Order dated: 12.3.2010 Hence, this petition by the employer.

    2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner is correct in his submission that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Industrial Tribunal is required to see whether a prima facie case is made out as regards the validity of the domestic enquiry held into the allegations of misconduct, keeping in view the fact that if the approval is granted, the order of dismissal, which may be passed against the employee would be liable to be challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding, before the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore, the dismissal of the approval application is illegal.

    3. The jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b), it cannot be disputed is limited and not equated to one under Section 10 of the Act, since consideration necessary for grant of approval under Section 33(2)(b), is whether a prima facie case is made out as regards the validity of the domestic enquiry, since if the dismissal is approved, the same would be liable to challenge in terms of Section 10 of the Act. This is the law laid down in Martin Burn Ltd. v. R. N. Bangerjee . AIR 1958 SC 79, which reads thus.

    “27. A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be established if the evidence which is led in support of the same were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion, which could be arrived at on that evidence. It may be that the Tribunal considering this question may itself have arrived at a different conclusion. It has, however, not to substitute its own judgment for the judgment in question. It has only got to consider whether the view taken is a possible view on the evidence on the record. (See Buckingham & Carnatic Company limited v. The Workers of the Company (1952) Lab. Accused 490(F)).”

    4. The Apex Court in Cholan Roadways Limited v. G. Thirugnanasambandam . 2005 3 SCC 241, following the aforesaid decision, observed thus:

    “13. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is a limited one. The Jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) cannot be equated with that of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this case admittedly an enquiry has been held wherein the parties examined their witnesses.”

    AND FURTHER:

    “18. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal while considering an apvlication for grant of approval has succinctly been stated by this Court in Martin Burn Ltd. v. R. N. Bangerjee . While exercising jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the Industrial Tribunal is required to see as to whether a prima facie case has been made out as regards the validity or otherwise of the domestic enquiry held against the delinquent keeping in view the fact that if the permission or approval is granted, the order of discharge or dismissal which may be passed against the delinquent employee would be liable to be challenged in an appropriated proceeding before the Industrial Tribunal in terms of the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act”. In Martin Burn Case (Supra).

    5. The decision of the Apex Court in Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd. . 1984 1 LLJ 546 relied upon by the Industrial Tribunal to dismiss the petition, was based on incorrect understanding of the observation therein. That was a case of dismissal of a chargemen security for use of abusive language, leading to loss of confidence and in the adjudication of the Industrial Dispute, the Labour Court exercised a jurisdiction under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore, that decision was inapplicable to the facts of this case, since exercise of jurisdiction by the Industrial Tribunal was under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act.

    6. So also the Industrial Tribunal pressed into service, the decision in Bisra Stone Lime Company Limited v. Industrial Tribunal . 1965 I LLJ 246, of the High Court of Judicature, Orissa over the proposition that the Disciplinary Authority had taken into consideration some other charge of reckless driving being more serious, to impose the punishment of dismissal, calling for interference and therefore dismissed the serial application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

    7. In the facts of that case, the High Court of Judicature, Orissa noticed that the order of dismissal from service was based on a composite sentence of three charges of assault, driving without permission and driving in reckless manner, of which latter two charges were offences of a serious nature. The Court noticed that there was neither notice nor enquiry over the latter two charges and therefore held that the refusal to accord approval by the Tribunal was justified.

    8. The Labour Court at paragraph 16(v) of the order impugned observed that though the Order dated: 1.12.2006 of dismissal left no manner of doubt that there was no aggravating situation to hand over the order of dismissal for proved acts of misconduct, nevertheless, the Disciplinary Authority considered the charge of unauthorised absenteeism to impose the punishment of dismissal. Abare perusal of Ex.O 4, the Order dated: 1.12.2006, imposing the punishment of dismissal, does makes reference to a fact that during the pendency of the enquiry over the charge of verbal abuse, the respondent remained absent from work unauthorisedly for 71 days, which indicated the indifference shown towards work and attitude. However that the fact was not a relevant consideration for imposition of the punishment of dismissal. Since it is recorded that the Disciplinary Authority while agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, holds the chargres of verbal abuse of the Supervisor, proved against the workman being serious in nature, warranted the imposition of punishment of dismissal. In that view of the matter, the Industrial Tribunal mis-directed itself to hold that the Disciplinary Authority had imposed the punishment of dismissal by taking into consideration the allegation of misconduct of unauthorised absence, assuming the charge to be more serious than verbal abuse. The order of dismissal from service was not based upon a composite sentence including the charge of unanthorised absence over which enquiry was pending. In that view of the matter, the decision in Bisra Stone Lime Company's Case (Supra), has no application.

    9. In the result, petition is allowed. The Order dated: 12.3.2010 insofar as it relates to the aforesaid findings and conclusions is quashed. The finding that the domestic inquiry is fair and proper and that the charges are proved are confirmed. Having regard to the reported opinion of the Apex Court in the decision marked Martin Burn's Case Supra, the Serial Application No. 10/2006 in AID No. 1/2006 filed by the petitioner is allowed.

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    Comments

    M/S. Elastrex Polymers Pvt. Ltd. v. Sri. Janardhana
    (Aug 19, 2011)