[497] Blair and Burkitt, JJ.:— This is an application under s. 492 of the Code of Civil Procedure to obtain an injunction of a temporary character to restrain the sale of certain property which is alleged by the applicants to be in danger of being wrongfully sold in execution of a decree. The suit in which this application was made is a First Appeal in this Court. In it the plaintiffs desire to establish their title to certain property, that property being the property attached and within measurable distance of sale under an execution under the decree of the Collector passed in a suit under s. 93 of Act No. XII of 1881. In that case the father of the present applicants was the defendant, and the issue of the suit was a decree against him, in execution of which the property claimed in the present suit was attached. The suit was one against the father for profits, and the land seized was seized as being his personal and exclusive property. The applicants commenced a suit in the Civil Court to establish their right to an equal interest in the property attached in the Court of first instance. They were defeated, and it is in the first appeal from that decree that the present application was made. The words of s. 492, so far as they apply to this case, are these:— “If in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree,” the Court may, by order, grant a temporary injunction to prevent the evil apprehended. Now the word “decree” is defined in the second section of Act No. XIV of 1882 as being the formal adjudication in a Civil Court. The execution in the present case is an execution arising out of a decree in the Court of the Collector. We were invited by Mr. Ram Prasad to put upon the word “decree” in s. 492 an interpretation larger than that which it bears in the definition clause in the same Act so as to include the Revenue Court in the category of Civil Court. No judicial authority in these provinces has been cited in support of that contention, and the different constitution of the Courts dealing with suits such as are provided by the N.W.P Rent Act, renders impossible the drawing of any sound inference from cases cited from the Calcutta Reports. We are of opinion that “decree” in the Code of Civil Procedure means [498] a decree in a Civil Court, and that a Civil Court does not include a Revenue Court. We find in Revenue Courts that when the Civil Procedure Code is to be applied it is expressly so provided, so that as a general rule they are outside the scope of the Code of Civil Procedure.
We need not examine the cases in which the question has been raised whether the property can be said to be in danger of being wrongfully sold in execution of a decree when that decree is a good and legal decree. We find that the application under s. 492 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an application to us to exceed our jurisdiction; we decline to do so, and the application is dismissed.
We are confirmed in the view we have taken because we are satisfied that in the Revenue Courts themselves an adequate remedy can be obtained by the present applicants.
Application dismissed.