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  • provisions of sec. 7, sub-sec. (IV), cl. (f) and sec. 11 of the Courts fees Act of 1870 and sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act of 1887. Sec. 7, sub-sec. (IV), cl. (f) of the Court-fees Act
  • SUITS VALUATION ACT
  • 10, cl. (d) of the Court-fees Act, 1870,
  • Sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
  • Civil Courts Act,
  • COURT FEES ACT
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  • provisions of sec. 7, sub-sec. (IV), cl. (f) and sec. 11 of the Courts fees Act of 1870 and sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act of 1887. Sec. 7, sub-sec. (IV), cl. (f) of the Court-fees Act
  • SUITS VALUATION ACT
  • 10, cl. (d) of the Court-fees Act, 1870,
  • Sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
  • Civil Courts Act,
  • COURT FEES ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiffs-Appellants instituted a suit in the Court of the Munsif for accounts and recovery of account papers (papers valued at Rs. 50; accounts valued at Rs. 150). The plaint stated that if the amount due exceeded Rs. 150 the plaintiffs would pay further court-fees on the excess. The suit was at first heard ex parte and a preliminary decree for accounts was made.

The Defendants applied under section 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.C.P.) to set aside the ex parte decree; that application failed in the Court of first instance, but on appeal the District Judge directed a rehearing on the merits in the defendants' presence. By agreement the case was referred to arbitrators to submit an award on 3 November 1905. On that date the plaintiffs applied for the records to be sent to the arbitrators and for an extension; the Court refused and proceeded to hear the suit. The defendants were not represented and the case was again heard ex parte, resulting in a preliminary decree for accounts.

The defendants made another application under section 108 which was not pursued and was dismissed for default. A Commissioner examined the accounts and reported Rs. 8,424 due to the plaintiffs. The Munsif held he could not make a decree in excess of Rs. 1,000 (the pecuniary limit of his jurisdiction). The plaintiffs paid additional court-fee to bring the claim up and a decree for Rs. 1,000 was passed in their favour.

Both parties appealed to the Subordinate Judge. The Defendants contended the Munsif should not have proceeded to trial on 3 November 1905 because no order had fixed that date as the final hearing if arbitrators failed to make an award. The Plaintiffs complained the Munsif should not have limited the decree (the text records that he limited it to Rs. 1,600 in the appeal complaint) and should have decreed the full amount found by the Commissioner (approximately Rs. 8,424 or Rs. 8,428 as alternatively recorded). The Subordinate Judge allowed the defendants' appeal, dismissed the plaintiffs', and remitted the case to the Court of first instance for retrial from the stage of the remand order made by the District Judge; parties were left free to re-refer to arbitration or to continue trial. The Plaintiffs appealed to the present Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction in an appeal against the final decree to set aside or question the preliminary (ex parte) decree, given that no appeal was preferred against the preliminary decree and an application under section 108 had been dismissed for default.
  2. Whether the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction under section 591, C.C.P., to question the preliminary decree and to review the order dismissing the section 108 application.
  3. Whether the Munsif (a Court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction) was competent to pass a decree in a suit for accounts for any amount in excess of the pecuniary limit of his jurisdiction (the Munsif being limited to Rs. 1,000), notwithstanding the rules on valuation for court-fees and the plaintiff's initial approximate valuation of the relief sought.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The Subordinate Judge lacked jurisdiction to set aside the preliminary (ex parte) decree in an appeal against the final decree because no appeal had been preferred specifically against the preliminary decree and the section 108 application had been dismissed for default.
  • The Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction under section 591, C.C.P., to question the preliminary decree.
  • The question whether the Munsif could pass a decree in excess of Rs. 1,000 should have been left open; alternatively, if decided, it ought to have been determined in favour of the plaintiffs (i.e., the Munsif should have been held competent to decree the full amount found by the Commissioner). The appellants relied on provisions of the Court-fees Act (sec. 7(IV)(f) and sec.11) and the Suits Valuation Act (sec.8) and on decisions such as Rameswar v. Dilu and Arogya v. Appachi to support the contention that valuation for court-fees could determine jurisdiction or entitle the Munsif to decree the larger amount subject to payment of additional fees.
  • The appellants' counsel relied on Caussanel v. Soures to argue that an unsuccessful or abandoned section 108 proceeding should preclude a later challenge to the ex parte decree in the appeal.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The Court of first instance ought not to have proceeded with the trial of the suit on 3 November 1905 because no order fixed that date as the final hearing in the event of the arbitrators' failure to submit an award; this ground was treated as patent on the face of the record and formed the basis for setting aside the ex parte decree on appeal.
  • Implicitly, the defendants relied on the availability of an appeal under section 540 and on the right to challenge procedural irregularity apparent on the record even though a section 108 application had been made earlier but not prosecuted to final adjudication.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Caussanel v. Soures Relied on by appellants to support the proposition that an unsuccessful proceeding under section 108 precludes later challenge to the ex parte decree. The Court distinguished Caussanel: in that case the defendants had obtained an adverse decision on the merits under section 108 and then raised the same question in the appeal against the ex parte decree; here the section 108 application was not prosecuted and no adjudication on the merits occurred, so Caussanel did not bar a challenge in the appeal.
Khadem Hossein…Defendant No. 1, v. Emdad Hossein…Plaintiff Shows that in an appeal against the final decree the propriety of a preliminary decree may be questioned. The Court relied on this authority to confirm that an appeal under section 540 can embrace questions about the preliminary decree.
Radha Raman v. Pran Nath and Khagendra v. Ptan Nath Illustrates that even after an unsuccessful application under section 108, an ex parte decree can be challenged in a proper proceeding (e.g., regular suit on ground of fraud) if the question was not finally determined in the prior proceeding. The Court invoked these authorities to support the proposition that an unsuccessful or unadjudicated section 108 application does not necessarily bar subsequent challenges where the issue was not finally decided.
Prannath v. Mohesh Chandra Establishes that dismissal of an application under section 108 or omission to appeal such dismissal does not bar other remedies on suitable grounds; omission to appeal leaves the decision valid "for what it is worth." The Court cited this to show that failure to prosecute section 108 does not make the defendants' position worse and does not prevent raising other appropriate remedies.
Monilal v. Khiroda and Taylor v. Sarat Chandra Referenced in relation to whether a second appeal can review a matter of discretion; indicates divergence of judicial opinion. The Court noted the divergence but held it unnecessary to resolve whether the Subordinate Judge's exercise of discretion could be reviewed in second appeal; it nevertheless found no substantial procedural defect to impeach the Subordinate Judge's decision.
Rameswar v. Dilu Cited by appellants to support argument about valuation for court-fees and possible entitlement to larger decree after investigation of accounts. The Court considered and distinguished Rameswar v. Dilu, indicating it did not establish the broader proposition for which the appellants relied; the Court did not adopt Rameswar as supporting an entitlement to decree beyond the pecuniary jurisdictional limit.
Arogya v. Appachi Madras High Court decision cited by appellants as apparently supporting their contention about jurisdiction after amendment based on commissioner's report. The Court examined Arogya v. Appachi and concluded it did not support the proposition that the Munsif could make a decree in excess of his pecuniary jurisdiction; the case directed striking out an amendment and did not hold the Munsif could decree beyond his jurisdictional limit.
Clarke v. Denure Foreign authority used to illustrate the rule that where a verdict or award exceeds the court's pecuniary jurisdiction, the excess is to be treated as remitted and judgment is limited to the jurisdictional cap. The Court relied on Clarke v. Denure (and similar authorities) in support of the principle that a Court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction cannot give a valid decree for an amount exceeding its statutory limit; the excess must be deemed remitted and judgment confined to the limit.
Husseny v. King; Hill v. Wilkinson; Bodget v. Nicholls Additional authorities showing like treatment of excess verdicts or awards in other jurisdictions and English law. These cases were cited to show consistency of the Court's view with other legal systems: a court confined by pecuniary limits cannot validly give judgment beyond its statutory jurisdiction.
Ijjatulla v. Chandra Mohan Referenced as having doubted the decision in Rameswar v. Dilu. The Court mentioned this to note that Rameswar has been questioned and to justify not following it on principle in the present context.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the three principal grounds raised by the appellants in turn.

First and Second Grounds (jurisdiction to question preliminary decree)

  1. The Court observed that section 540, C.C.P., made the ex parte (preliminary) decree appealable and that earlier decisions (e.g., Khadem Hossein…) show that an appeal against the final decree may properly raise questions about the preliminary decree.
  2. The appellants argued that the defendants' election to apply under section 108 (and their subsequent failure to prosecute that application) precluded them from raising the same question in an appeal under section 540. The Court rejected this: where a section 108 application is heard on the merits and decided, that decision would be final as between the parties on questions determined; but in the present case the section 108 application was not prosecuted, there was no inquiry on the merits, and therefore no adjudication which could preclude the question being raised on appeal.
  3. The Court explained that the ground relied upon by the defendants — that the Court on 3 November 1905 should not have proceeded because no order fixed the date for final hearing in case of arbitrators' failure — was a ground patent on the face of the record and therefore competent to be taken against the validity of the ex parte decree in the appeal.
  4. Citing authorities (Radha Raman; Khagendra; Prannath), the Court reasoned that an unsuccessful or unadjudicated section 108 application does not bar subsequent relief if the question was not finally determined in those proceedings.
  5. The Court also considered (but found it unnecessary finally to decide) whether the Subordinate Judge had exceeded jurisdiction under section 591 by reviewing discretionary matters in second appeal; even assuming review of discretion were permissible, the Court found no substantial procedural error in the Subordinate Judge's reversal to justify interference.
  6. Conclusion: first and second grounds were overruled (i.e., the appellants' contention that the Subordinate Judge lacked jurisdiction failed).

Third Ground (power of Munsif to pass decree in excess of pecuniary limit)

  1. The Court rejected the appellants' initial submission that the matter should be left open, observing the issue had already been raised by the plaintiffs in the lower courts and could not consistently be left unresolved at this stage.
  2. The Court considered statutory provisions relied upon by the appellants: sec. 7(IV)(f) and sec. 11 of the Court-fees Act of 1870 (concerned with valuation and payment of fees in suits for accounts) and sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act of 1887 (linking value for fee-computation and value for jurisdiction).
  3. The Court observed that these provisions require the plaintiff to state the amount at which he values the relief and to pay fees on that basis, and that if the decree exceeds the stated valuation the decree is not executable until the differential fee is paid. However, the Court held these provisions do not determine the fundamental question of the highest amount for which a court of restricted pecuniary jurisdiction is competent to make a decree.
  4. The Court explained the legal principle that jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be expanded by consent. A court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction (here, the Munsif whose jurisdiction extends to suits the value of which does not exceed Rs. 1,000 under sec. 19 of the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1887) cannot validly give a decree exceeding that statutory pecuniary limit; any such judgment would be void.
  5. The Court reasoned that although plaintiffs suing for accounts may be permitted to value their claim approximately at the outset, when they choose a court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction they must be presumed to accept the highest sum that court can award as capped by statute; if the substantive result shows entitlement to an amount in excess of that limit, the plaintiff must be called upon to relinquish the excess or the court may presume the excess to be remitted.
  6. The Court illustrated the practical anomalies that would follow if the plaintiff could obtain an excessive decree in a lower court merely by an initially low valuation (effects on forum of appeal and appellate routes), and rejected the contention that the Suits Valuation Act or Court-fees provisions permitted such a result.
  7. The Court found support for its position from authorities in other jurisdictions (Clarke v. Denure, Husseny v. King, Hill v. Wilkinson, Bodget v. Nicholls), all favoring limitation of a judgment to the court's pecuniary jurisdiction where a verdict exceeds that jurisdiction.
  8. The Court distinguished the authorities cited by the appellants (Rameswar v. Dilu; Arogya v. Appachi), explaining why they did not support the broader proposition that the Munsif could decree beyond his pecuniary limit; the Court also noted that Rameswar had been doubted in Ijjatulla v. Chandra Mohan.
  9. Conclusion: the Munsif had no power to make a decree in excess of Rs. 1,000; the plaintiffs' third point failed.

Holding and Implications

Final Disposition: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The judgment of the Subordinate Judge (allowing the defendants' appeal and remitting the case for retrial from the stage of the earlier remand) is sustained.
  • The plaintiffs' appeals are dismissed with costs; the Court assessed the hearing fee at two gold mohurs.

Broader legal implications as stated in the opinion:

  • The opinion affirms the principle that an ex parte preliminary decree may be challenged on grounds patent on the face of the record in an appeal against the final decree, particularly where a prior application under section 108 was not prosecuted and did not result in adjudication on the merits.
  • The Court pronounces the legal rule that a Court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction (here, a Munsif limited to Rs. 1,000) has no power to give a decree exceeding its statutory pecuniary limit; excess amounts must be treated as remitted or the plaintiff must relinquish them. Valuation for court-fees does not expand the statutory jurisdiction of the court.

No other remedies, orders or costs beyond those specified in the opinion were indicated in the provided text.

    Golap Singh v. Indra Coomar Hazra

    The litigation of which the present appeal arises has been prosecuted by the parties during the last five years with Varied fortune. The Plaintiffs-Appellants commenced an action for accounts and recovery of account papers from the Defendants-Respondents who are alleged to have been their agents for the management of certain immoveable properties. The claim for account papers was valued at Rs. 50 and that for accounts at Rs. 150. The suit was instituted in the Court of the Munsif, and as usual, the Plaintiffs stated in their plaint that if the amount due from the Defendants was ascertained to be in excess of Rs. 150 court-fees would be paid on such excess amount. The Defendants resisted the claim of the Plaintiffs on various grounds, to which it is not necessary to refer in detail for our present purpose. The suit was heard ex parte and a preliminary decree for accounts made. The Defendants then applied under sec. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 to have the ex parte decree set aside. This application was unsuccessful in the Court of first instance, but on appeal the District Judge directed the case to be reheard on the merits in the presence of the Defendants. The case then came on for trial, and, by agreement of parties, an order was made for reference to arbitrators, who were directed to submit their award on the 3rd November 1905. On that date, the Plaintiffs made an application that the records might be sent to the arbitrators and the time for submission of the award extended. The Court refused this application and proceeded then and there to hear the suit on the merits. The Defendants, however, were not represented before the Court, and the case was heard ex parte again, with the result that a preliminary decree for accounts was made. The Defendants subsequently applied, under sec. 108, C.C.P, to have the ex parte decree set aside; but they did not proceed with this application which was dismissed for default. The accounts were then examined by a Commissioner appointed in accordance with the preliminary decree and his report was to the effect that Rs. 8,424 were due to the Plaintiffs from the Defendants. The Munsif in dealing with this report held that it was not competent for him to make a decree in excess of Rs. 1,000, the pecuniary limit of his jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs thereupon paid the balance of the court-fee to bring up the claim to the full amount of Rs. 1,000 and a decree for that sum was finally passed in their favour. Both parties were dissatisfied, with this decree and two appeals were preferred to the Subordinate Judge. The Defendants complained that the, Court of first instance ought not to have proceeded with the trial of the suit on the merits on the 3rd November 1905, upon the failure of the arbitrators to submit their award, inasmuch as no Order had been made fixing that date for the final hearing of the case in the event of the failure of the arbitrators to submit their award. The Plaintiffs denied the validity of this objection and complained in their appeal that the Munsif ought not to have limited the decree to Rs. 1,600 but should have passed a decree for the whole sum of Rs. 8,428. The Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal of the Defendants and dismissed that of the Plaintiffs, with the result that he directed the case to be remitted to the Court of first instance for retrial from the stage of the remand order made by the District Judge when he set aside the first ex parte decree on the nth May 1905. He also left the parties at liberty to refer the matter to arbitration again, or if they liked, to go on to trial in Court. The Plaintiffs have now appealed to this Court, and on their behalf the decision of the Subordinate Judge has been challenged substantially on three grounds, namely, first, that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction in an appeal against the final decree to set aside the preliminary decree, as no appeal had been preferred against the latter, and an application to vacate it under sec. 108 had been dismissed for default; secondly, that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to question the preliminary decree under sec. 591, C.C.P, and, thirdly, that the question whether the Munsif could pass a decree for any sum in excess of Rs. 1,000, should have been left open, and if it was decided at all, it should have been determined in favour of the Plaintiffs.

    As regards the first two contentions it was argued by the learned vakil for the Appellants that, inasmuch as the Defendants did not proceed with their application under sec. 108, they could not at a subsequent stage be allowed to challenge the validity of the preliminary decree, and in support of this view reliance was placed upon the case of Caussanel v. Soures(1). In our opinion, this contention is unsound and must be overruled. It is clear from the provisions of sec. 540, C.C.P, that the ex parte decree was appealable and it is further clear from the decisions of this Court in the cases of Khadem Hossein…Defendant No. 1, v. Emdad Hossein…Plaintiff, .(3), that in an appeal against the final decree, the propriety of the preliminary decree might also be questioned. What then are grounds upon which the preliminary decree could be questioned? The learned vakil for the Appellants contended that the preliminary decree could either be questioned by an appeal under sec. 540 or set aside under sec. 108; but inasmuch as the remedies given by these two sections are alternative and not cumulative and as the Defendants made their election when they applied under sec. 108, upon failure to prosecute such application, they could not avail themselves of the benefit of an appeal under sec. 540. In our opinion there is no foundation for this contention. It may be assumed that, if the Defendants had prosecuted their application under sec. 108, if it had been heard on the merits, and if a decision had been given thereon either by the Court of first instance or by the Court of Appeal below, that decision would have been final and binding upon the parties in the sense that any question directly determined in those proceedings could not be raised again in the appeal under sec. 540. This was in fact what happened in the case of Caussanel v. Soures. The Defendants there got an adverse decision in the proceeding under sec. 108, and then in the appeal against the ex parte decree raised precisely the same question as had been, at their invitation, decided in the proceedings to set aside the ex parte decree. In the case before us, however, the position is entirely different. The application under sec. 108 was not prosecuted. There was no enquiry into the merits and no adjudication by the Court as to whether the Defendants were prevented for sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. They were, therefore, in our opinion, in the position which they would have occupied if there had been no application under sec. 108. But apart from this, the ground upon which they now challenge the propriety of the ex parte decree is one which could not have been urged under sec. 108. They now contend that before the Court could proceed to hear the suit on the merits, a date ought to have been fixed for the trial. Apparently, so far as we can gather from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, this had not been done. The Munsif had recorded an order that the arbitrators were to submit their award on the 3rd November 1905. That order, however, did not state what would happen upon the failure of the arbitrators to carry out the order of the Court it appeared, no doubt, that the Munsif had warned the parties on the previous day that the case might be heard if the arbitrators failed to decide the dispute; but no entry was made to this effect in the order-sheet; and on this ground the learned Subordinate Judge held that the Court ought not to have proceeded with the trial of the suit on the day fixed for the submission of the award by the arbitrators. This was a ground of attack patent on the face of the record, and in our opinion, it could be, and was rightly, taken against the validity of the decree-As was pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Radha Raman v. Pran Nath and Khagendra v. Ptan Nath, in spite of the fact that an application under sec. 108 has been unsuccessful, an ex parte decree may be challenged if there are good grounds, in a proper proceeding, for instance, in a regular suit on the ground of fraud. The test is whether the refusal of the application under sec. 108 has already determined the question raised in the subsequent proceeding. In the first of these cases, it had been pointed out by this Court [Prannath v. Mohesh Chandra(6)] that the dismissal of an application under sec. 108 or omission to prefer an appeal against such order of dismissal, does not bar another remedy on suitable grounds, and that, when, the law provides ait appeal against a decision, the effect of the omission to appeal is that the decision holds good for what it is worth. So far, therefore, as concerns any other mode of relief available, the person who does not appeal, is in no worse position than if he had appealed and failed. In the case before us, the ground upon which the Subordinate Judge was invited to vacate the ex parte decree was one apparent on the face of the record, and we must hold that it was competent to him to set it aside on that ground. It was, however, suggested to us by the learned vakil for the Appellants that the Subordinate Judge has not exercised a proper discretion in reversing the decision of the Court of first instance. But even if we assume that we are entitled in second appeal to enter into questions of discretion, a matter upon which there is apparently some divergence of judicial opinion [Monilal v. Khiroda(7) and Taylor v. Sarat Chandra(8)], we do not think that it can be successfully contended that the decision of the Subordinate Judge can be challenged on the ground that there has been a substantial error or defect in the procedure which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the Subordinate Judge would have been competent under sec. 591 of the Code of Civil Procedure to enter into the question of the propriety of the order of dismissal of the application to set aside the ex parte decree. The first and second grounds taken on behalf of the Appellants must therefore be overruled.

    In support of the third ground taken on behalf of the Appellants it was suggested in the first place that the matter ought to have been left open. But this is obviously a position which they cannot consistently take up. The question was raised at their instance in the Court of first instance as well as in the Court of Appeal below, and after an adverse decision had been given, they could hardly invite the Court to leave the matter open for future controversy. It was suggested in the second place, though very faintly, that the question ought to have been decided in favour of the Plaintiffs. As we have already stated, the Plaintiffs valued their claim at Rs. 200 approximately, as they were entitled to do under sec. 50, C.P.C After the ex parte decree had been made and the accounts investigated by a Commissioner duly appointed, the Commissioner's report showed that the Plaintiffs would be entitled, subject to the objection of the Defendants, to a sum of Rs. 8,424. The question thus necessarily arises, was it competent to the Court of the Munsif to give a decree for this sum? Our attention was invited to the provisions of sec. 7, sub-sec. (IV), cl. (f) and sec. 11 of the Courts fees Act of 1870 and Sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act of 1887. Sec. 7, sub-sec. (IV), cl. (f) of the Court-fees Act provides that the amount of court-fee payable in a suit for accounts is to be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint and that in such a suit the Plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought. Sec 11 then provides that, in a suit for accounts, if the amount decreed is in excess of the amount at which the Plaintiff valued the relief sought, the decree shall not be executed until the difference between the fee actually paid and the fee which would have been payable, had the suit comprised the amount so decreed, shall have been paid to the proper officer. Sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act lays down that in all cases where in suits other than those referred to in sec. 7, paragraphs 5, 6, and 9 and para. 10, cl. (d) of the Court-fees Act, 1870, court-fees are payable ad valorem the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. Besides these statutory provisions, our attention was also invited to the decision of this Court in Rameswar v. Dilu, and of the Madras High Court in Arogya v. Ap-pachi. After a careful consideration of the arguments addressed to us on both sides, we are of opinion that the statutory provisions as well as the judicial decisions referred to, do not support the contention of the Appellants. No doubt, under the Court-fees Act, in a suit for accounts, the Plaintiff has to state the amount at which he values the relief sought and has to pay court-fees on that footing. He cannot also execute the decree for an amount in excess of the amount claimed, until he pays the court-fees upon the difference. These provisions, however, do not touch the fundamental question which arises in the present case, namely, what is the highest amount for which a Court of restricted pecuniary jurisdiction is competent to make a decree. The provision of the Suits Valuation Act to which reference was made only shows that, for purposes of jurisdiction, the value of the suit must be taken to be determined by the value determinable for the computation of court-fees. This does not by any means lend support to the contention of the Appellants. In the first place the section does not; say expressly that the value determinable for purposes of jurisdiction is the value determinable for the purpose of the initial payment of court-fees. In the second place, even if we assume that this was the intention of the Legislature, the section taken along with the provisions of the-Court-fees-Act to which we have referred, only shows that the jurisdiction of the Court as determined by the value stated, is regulated by the amount at which the Plaintiff values the relief sought. But, this does not conclude the question whether a Court of restricted pecuniary jurisdiction like the Court of the, Munsif, is competent to make a decree in a suit for accounts, valued at less than Rs. 1,000, for an amount in excess of Rs. 1,000 which is the pecuniary limit of its jurisdiction. Upon first principles, we are of opinion that the Munsif has no power to do this. The jurisdiction of a Court is the authority to hear and, determine a cause. Such authority is, conferred by the Sovereign power which organises the Court and is to be sought for in the general nature of the powers of the Court or in statutory provisions specially enacted for the purpose. To render the jurisdiction of a Court complete, it must have jurisdiction over the subject-matter, that is, it must have power to deal with the subject involved in the action. This jurisdiction over the subject-matter can be given only by law and cannot be conferred by consent. If a Court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction, therefore, took cognizance of a suit in which the sum claimed was larger than the amount over which the Court had jurisdiction, any judgment it might give would be void. Now in the case before us, what is the extent of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court? Sec. 19 of the Bengal Civil Courts Act of 1887 provides that the jurisdiction of a Munsif extends to all suits of which the value does not exceed Rs. 1,000, the word “value” being then defined as meaning —see sec. 3, cl. (13) of the since repealed General Clauses Act of the same year—“the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit.” If therefore the claim had been initially valued at more than Rs. 1,000, the Munsif would not have been entitled to entertain the suit. He would not therefore have been in a position to make a decree for a larger sum than Rs. 1,000. The uncertainty as to the amount which a Plaintiff suing for an account is entitled to recover doubtless makes a difference, in view of which the Legislature allows him to value his suit at an approximate amount in the first instance; but does it follow that he can, by reason of this circumstance, ultimately obtain from the Munsif a decree for a sum in excess of the limit of the Munsif's pecuniary jurisdiction? In our opinion it does not. In a case of this description it is manifestly just on principle that if the result shows, that the Plaintiff is entitled to a sum in excess of the limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court in which he has instituted his suit, the judgment ought to be only for the sum which limits the jurisdiction. In other word the Plaintiff ought to be called upon to relinquish the excess and thus place the case formally within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of his deliberate choice; the Court may in such a case remit the excess, or presume the excess to be remitted. To put the matter in another way, when a Plaintiff values his suit at an approximate amount and institutes it in a Court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction, he must be presumed to seek a decree for a sum which in no event will exceed the highest amount which limits the jurisdiction of the Court. To take any other view would enable the Plaintiff to commit a fraud upon the Court and upon the law which regulates its jurisdiction and would forthwith lead to extraordinary complication. For instance, it would be open to a Plaintiff to value his claim for accounts at an insignificant sum, to have his case tried-in the Court of the lowest jurisdiction, and then to obtain a decree for a sum much in excess of the amount which the Legislature has fixed as the highest limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court: and the anomaly would not stop here; for, once such a decree has been obtained, how is the forum; of appeal to be determined? Under the-Bengal Civil Courts Act, an appeal from the decision of a Munsif lies under sec. 21 to the Court of the District Judge, and this rule will have to be applied, no matter how small or how large the sum decreed by him may be. This would obviously lead to extremely anomalous results. If a suit for accounts is valued at Rs. 6,000, tried in the Court of a Subordinate judge, and a decree obtained for, say, Rs. 8,000, a first appeal lies to this Court. If the same suit is capriciously valued at Rs. 150, tried by a Munsif, and a decree made for Rs. 8,000, a first appeal lies to the District Judge, and only a second appeal to this Court. The Legislature can hardly be taken to have anticipated consequences of this character. We think it is a manifestly reasonable view of the matter to take, that, although a Plaintiff is almost ex necessitate permitted at the initial stage to value his claim approximately, and to obtain in the end a decree for a higher sum than what he had expressly claimed when he instituted his suit in a Court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction, he must by implication be taken to have restricted the highest sum for which he could possibly obtain a decree at the limit fixed by the Legislature as the limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. The view we take is supported by the rule which has been followed in other systems of jurisprudence. For instance, in the case of Clarke v. Denure(11), a suit for damages was instituted in a Court, the pecuniary jurisdiction of which was restricted to. twenty-five dollars. The jury returned a verdict in favour of the Plaintiff for damages for thirty-four dollars. The Supreme Court of New York held that the Plaintiff must be taken to have remitted the amount in excess of the amount of the pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of the Court, and that he was consequently entitled to a judgment for the residue only. A similar view has been taken in Husseny v. King(12), Hill v. Wilkinson(13), and in various other cases which will be found collected in the Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice, Vol. I, p. 709. Substantially the same view has been taken in England as is clear from the case of Bodget v. Nicholls(14). The cases of Rameswar v. Dilu Mahto, and Atogya v. Appachi, to which reference was made on behalf of the Appellants are clearly distinguishable. In the first of these cases, the amount of mesne profits for which the Munsif made a decree had accrued entirely after the institution of the suit and depended upon the length of time during which the Defendant might manage to keep the Plaintiff out of possession in spite of the decree in his favour. We must not, however, be taken to approve of the decision in that case on principle, and we observe that it has already been doubted in the case of Ijjatulla v. Chandra Mohan(15). As regards the decision of the Madras High Court in Arogya v. Appachi, although it appears at first sight to lend some support to the contention of the Appellants, on closer examination, it turns out to be of no avail to them. In that case, the Plaintiff valued his claim for accounts at Rs. 1,400, instituted his suit in the Court of the Munsif, and got a preliminary decree. The Commissioner who examined the accounts, reported that the sum due was Rs. 8,000 whereupon the Plaintiff obtained leave to amend the plaint. As soon as this was done, the Munsif returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. When, however, the Plaintiff took the plaint to the Subordinate Judge, he declined to entertain it, as in his opinion the jurisdiction of the Munsif had not been ousted. The High Court held that the latter view was correct, and directed the Munsif to strike out the amendment and resume the trial of the suit; but the learned Judges did not hold either expressly or by implication that the Munsif when he tried out the suit would have authority to make a decree for Rs. 8,000 or for any sum in excess of the amount which defined the highest limit of his pecuniary jurisdiction. This case, therefore, cannot be rightly treated as an authority for the proposition which the Appellants seek to establish. We must consequently hold, on all these grounds that the third point urged on their behalf completely fails.

    The result is that this appeal cannot be supported, and must be dismissed with costs. We assess the hearing fee at two gold mohurs.

    S.C.S
    Appeal dismissed.

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    Golap Singh v. Indra Coomar Hazra
    (Jan 28, 1909)