The question in this case is whether certain properties belong to the tarwad or the 1st defendant. The learned District Judge has interpreted the decision in Govinda Panikher v. Nani, as laying down that there cannot be any presumption that the properties were tarwad properties unless the 1st defendant is shown to have had no private means or the family is shown to have had funds at the time of the acquisition of the properties in question which disappeared after the acquisition. This appears to us to be going much further than the learned Judges do in I.L.R, 36 Mad. Before that, there were certain cases which decided that if property stood in the name of an Anandravan, the presumption was that it belonged to the tarwad. As we understand, the learned Judges in I.L.R, 36 Mad., merely lay down that the right way to approach the case is to look at all the facts and circumstances of the particular case and to raise a presumption accordingly. We do not think that they intended to go as far as the District Judge did. The view of the District Judge is opposed to a very recent decision of the Privy Council in Parbati Dasi v. Baikuntha Nath De which has been cited before us. There as regards joint Hindu families the general proposition is laid down that, in the absence of evidence, that a junior member of a Hindu family had any separate funds or that the properties were acquired with money belonging to himself, the presumption is that they were not his self-acquired properties.
As regards the finding of the District Judge as to two items it appears that his finding as to one item has proceeded upon the basis that the property covered by Exhibit XXI was joint family property and that his finding as regards the other item has proceeded upon the basis that it was not joint family property but the separate property of the 1st defendant. The property covered by Exhibit XXI is admittedly included in Exhibit B which the learned Judge in paragraph 2 of his judgment has held to be tarwad property. We think that this inconsistent finding vitiates his judgment.
We must therefore reverse his decree and remand the case to be disposed of according to law. Costs will abide the result. This will be the order in Second Appeal No. 853 of 1915 also.
M.RCase remanded.