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Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit instituted by the Plaintiff (Monohar Mookerjee) for construction of a Will, administration of a private debatter (trust) created by that Will, removal of the trustee (shebait), appointment of a new trustee or Receiver, a declaration that an execution sale of a portion of the trust estate (the four-fifth share of lot Bahirgora) held on 14 January 1913 and purchased by the son of the shebait (Bhupendra Nath) was invalid and inoperative, and for related reliefs including proper investment of Rs. 11,500 alleged to form part of the trust estate.

The underlying trust was created by Jaga Mohan Mookerjee by Will dated 11 September 1840 and had a complex history of succession disputes among descendants. Various suits and appeals concerning entitlement to the shebaitship and accounts were litigated over decades, producing decrees in the Subordinate Court, the High Court and ultimately the Privy Council (including execution proceedings which led to the sale of Bahirgora on 14 January 1913).

The present suit was filed on 17 February 1913 by a grandson of the founder. The Subordinate Judge made findings for and against the Plaintiff on multiple issues and dismissed the suit on the basis that allegations of misconduct were not established and the Plaintiff was not entitled to removal of the shebait. The Plaintiff appealed. The High Court heard the appeal and considered primarily (i) the Plaintiff's competence to sue; (ii) the legal effect of the execution sale and the nature of the purchase by Bhupendra; and (iii) whether sufficient grounds existed for removal of the shebait.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Is the Plaintiff competent to maintain the present suit (i.e., does he have locus standi to sue for administration of the debatter and for removal of the shebait)?
  2. What is the true nature of the purchase of Bahirgora in execution by Bhupendra and what is the legal effect of that purchase upon the debatter estate?
  3. Have sufficient grounds been established for the removal of the shebait (first Defendant) from office?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff — Monohar Mookerjee)

  • Contended that the sale of Bahirgora in execution, though purchased by the shebait's son with funds supplied by the shebait, should be regarded in law as still part of the debatter estate (i.e., the sale is inoperative as against the debatter estate).
  • Argued that in view of the shebait's past conduct and present conflict of duty and self-interest, the shebait should be removed from office and a Receiver or new trustee appointed.

Respondents (Raja Peari Mohan — the shebait; and Bhupendra Nath — purchaser/son)

  • The shebait disputed the Plaintiff's contentions on validity of sale and argued, among other things, that the Plaintiff was not competent to maintain the suit (relied on reasoning by analogy to sec. 92 CPC governing suits concerning public charitable trusts).
  • Bhupendra Nath (the purchaser) contended that he had purchased Bahirgora for himself with his own money and therefore the property in his hands could not be declared trust property; also sought protection as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and denied being a mere benamdar/agent for his father.
  • Respondents generally challenged the Plaintiff's factual allegations and the sufficiency of misconduct to justify removal of the shebait.

Table of Precedents Cited

The table lists each case mentioned in the provided opinion, the rule or principle for which it was cited in the opinion, and how the Court applied or referred to it in its reasoning. Entries reflect only the function attributed to the authority in the opinion text.

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Peary Mohan v. Narendra Krishna Earlier litigation concerning title to shebaitship and debatter estate. Referred to as part of the historical litigation record leading up to the present dispute.
Peari Mohan v. Narendra Nath Confirmation of earlier decree relating to the debatter estate. Used to describe the appellate history and finality of prior orders against Raja Peari Mohan.
Sajedur Raja v. Gour Mohan Authority cited in discussion of sec. 92 CPC and restriction on suits in respect of public charities. Respondents relied on it to argue restrictions applicable to suits about charitable trusts; Court rejected extending that restriction to private trusts.
Budreedas v. Chuni Lal Illustrative authority about restraining reckless suits against trustees of public charities under sec. 92. Referred to in rejecting extension of sec. 92 principles to private trusts.
D'Cruz v. D'Silva Illustrative authority regarding suits about public trusts and sec. 92. Cited by Respondents; Court noted these were confined to public charitable trusts and did not bar heirs of private founders from suing.
Mohiuddin v. Sayiduddin Authority cited by Respondents to argue the need for an existing interest to sue. Cited in argument but Court did not accept extension to private founder-heir suits.
Budh Singh v. Niradbaran Authority referenced on interest required to maintain suit. Reliance placed by Respondents; Court rejected the contention as inapplicable to private trust founders/heirs.
Sital Das v. Pratap Chandra Principle that founder or his heirs may have rights in relation to a charitable/private trust. Used to support the proposition that founder/heirs can enforce and manage private trusts.
Raj Krishna v. Bepin Behari Analogy for founder/heir's rights in charitable/private trust administration. Cited as supporting authority that founder/heeirs may invoke judicial assistance for trust administration.
Gauranga Sahu v. Sudemalai Similar principle about rights of founder/heirs. Referred to in establishing the founder/heirs' right to sue in private trusts.
Bhurruck v. Golam Series of cases recognizing founders' or heirs' rights to enforce trusts. Listed among authorities that support founder/heiress' right of suit in private trusts.
Mohesh v. Koylash Same series: enforcement rights of founders/descendants. Cited as authority in the line of cases preserving founder/heir rights.
Biddia Sundari v. Durganund Authority recognizing founder/heir's right to bring suit to enforce trust. Included among the settled authorities relied upon to uphold Plaintiff's competence to sue.
Shoratan v. Ram Pargas Authority in the same category of founder/heir rights. Referenced as part of the jurisprudential foundation for the Plaintiff's locus to sue.
Samsundra v. Kandasami Authority on founder/heir rights to invoke court assistance. Referred to as supporting the right of heirs to enforce private trusts.
Sathappayyar v. Periaswami Authority on similar subject-matter. Listed among cases reinforcing the founder/heir's remedial rights.
Gajapati v. Bhagaban Same theme: rights of founder/descendants in trust matters. Included in the authorities supporting the Court's conclusion on competence to sue.
Ganapati v. Savithri Similar authority for founders/heirs enforcing trusts. Referred to in upholding Plaintiff's entitlement to maintain the suit.
St. John's College v. Todington English authority quoted on the nature of charitable foundations and founder's rights. Used to draw analogy: founder's reserved functions and rights to prevent perverting the charity.
Phillips v. Bury Quoted as support for Lord Holt's view about protecting charities from perversion. Used to reinforce the doctrinal background for founder/heir rights.
Green v. Rutherford Authority cited for origin of founder's rights in property and direction of its application. Appealed to for doctrinal support that the donor's property rights justify reserved functions.
Advocate-General v. Gaunt Illustration of visitatorial power devolving on Crown where private founder's line extinct. Referenced while explaining English law analogies for private founders' powers.
Advocate-General v. Dedham School Same doctrinal family on visitatorial power in England. Supported the Court's analogy and reasoning on founders/heirs.
Biddia v. Durganund Authority cited in the context of remedial powers available to heirs. Used to support the proposition that heirs may seek removal of trustees.
Kazi Hassan v. Sagan Balkrishna Listed among authorities permitting founder/issue to seek judicial relief for trust mismanagement. Relied on to sustain the Plaintiff's right to proceed.
Prasanna v. Kunja Behari Same doctrinal grouping. Referred to as supportive precedent for Plaintiff's standing to sue.
Nam Narayan v. Ramoon Another analogous authority concerning enforcement by founders/descendants. Cited in the same context to uphold Plaintiff's entitlement to judicial intervention.
Campbell v. Walker One of the authorities cited on the rule that a trustee cannot purchase trust property from himself or at his own sale. Listed among cases supporting the principle that trustees are disabled from buying trust property.
Exp. Lavy Equity principle forbidding trustee purchasing trust property. Relied on as an authority for the absolute rule in equity against such purchases.
Exp. James Authority on the underlying reason for disallowing trustees to purchase (difficulty of detection of improper advantage). Quoted for the proposition that despite apparent fairness, trustee purchases must be disallowed.
Exp. Bennett Authority cited for the same equitable rule. Used to illustrate the rationale that a trustee's purchase is voidable to protect beneficiaries.
Randall v. Erringt Listed among cases establishing the rule against trustees purchasing trust property. Included in the body of authorities supporting the Court's adoption of the rule.
Sanderson v. Walker Authority on the same equitable principle. Referred to in support of the proposition that disqualification applies even to judicial sales.
??? v. Grazebrook The opinion text cites this case in the list of authorities on trustee purchases (name garbled in source). Placed among the precedents relied upon for the trustee-disability principle; the Court treated it as supporting authority in that group.
Farrar v. Farrar Authority cited among cases restraining fiduciaries from buying trust property. Included as part of the precedent base for the no-purchase rule.
Baroda Prosad v. Gajendra Nath Listed among authorities relevant to the rule preventing fiduciary purchase. Referred to as part of the comparative jurisprudential support.
Denton Donner Case cited in contrasting view (that purchases at execution sales may be jealously scrutinised rather than ipso facto void). Identified as a case representing a narrower, scrutinising approach; Court analysed this distinction and rejected it for trustees/shebaits.
Luff v. Lord Another case cited for the narrower approach to trustee purchases at execution sales. Cited by Respondents to urge a less absolute rule; Court did not accept that narrower approach for shebaits.
Dougan v. Macpherson Authority on the narrower principle that, where not absolutely prohibited, trustee purchases should be jealously scrutinised. Referred to in the discussion of competing doctrines; Court preferred the absolute disqualification.
Willams v. Scoot Quoted (spelling in source) for the difficulty of detecting improper advantage by fiduciaries. Used to explain the policy reasons for the absolute rule against trustee purchases.
Jagadindra Nath v. Hemanta Kumari Authority explaining that a shebait effectively controls dedicated property and stands in a custodial relation. Quoted to show that when a shebait purchases debatter property he is effectively a custodian purchasing for himself, bringing rule application within the no-purchase doctrine.
York Buildings Co. v. Mackenzie House of Lords decision applying the rule to a Court agent/common agent who purchased at judicial sale — sale set aside. Held up as a leading authority demonstrating the Court's power to set aside purchases by fiduciaries even at public judicial sales; relied upon in support of the Court's conclusion.
Grover v. Hugell Case where a rector (fiduciary) bought at sale through another — sale could not be sustained. Cited to show the decisive application of the no-purchase principle to religious/trust incumbents.
Stratford v. Twynan Discussed the limits of the trustee-disability rule and an execution creditor's capacity to purchase. Referred to in differentiating execution creditors from persons in fiduciary relations.
Guest v. Smythe Decisions recognising the general rule against fiduciaries buying trust property. Used to underline the general equity position on these purchases.
Nugent v. Nugent Affirmed that a Receiver cannot purchase property of which he is Receiver without leave of the Court. Cited to show that fiduciaries appointed by Court are disqualified from purchasing the assets they manage.
Alven v. Bond Purchase by a trustee at Court-ordered sale invalid if made without sanction and concealed. Used to support the rule that leave must be obtained and purchases must be open and disclosed.
White v. Tommy Decision aligning with the prohibition on fiduciaries purchasing trust property without sanction. Referred to among other authorities confirming the strict approach of equity.
Boddington v. Langford Irish authority cited in the same context of fiduciary disqualification. Included to show the breadth of the no-purchase rule across jurisdictions.
Hamilton v. Young Referenced as part of the authorities showing courts' severity in these matters. Used to illustrate judicial reluctance to allow fiduciaries to place themselves in conflict of interest.
Lewis v. Hillman Statement that covert purchases in the name of agents without disclosure cannot stand. Quoted to emphasize that any permitted purchase by fiduciary must be open, fair and disclosed before the sale.
Macpherson v. Watt Attorney purchasing client's property is at peril and must demonstrate complete fairness if he does so. Invoked to analogize that fiduciaries who purchase bear the burden of proving fairness; covert purchases are condemned.
Luddy v. Peard Example of case law referenced regarding fiduciary purchases. Included among authorities stressing caution when fiduciaries purchase trust assets.
Farmer v. Dean Similar authority on fiduciary transactions and the high standard of proof required. Referred to in support of the Court's strict approach.
Davoue v. Fanning Chancellor Kent's classic authority that a trustee cannot purchase at judicial foreclosure sale without Court leave. Adopted as leading American authority mirroring the English equitable rule; the Court relied upon it in forming its rule.
DeCaters v. DeChaumand Reinforcement of the rule in U.S. jurisprudence that trustee purchases at judicial sales are barred without leave. Cited to demonstrate consistent American precedent supporting the absolute rule.
Chapin v. Weed Held that trustee cannot become purchaser for own benefit at judicial sale without express permission. Referred to as part of U.S. authorities upholding the prohibition.
Michoud v. Girod U.S. Supreme Court decision affirming the rule that executor purchasing through a third person is void. Used to show the rule's force even when sale was public and price was fair.
Magruder v. Drury Later U.S. case affirming the trustee-purchase rule. Referred to as subsequent supporting authority.
United States v. Garter Another U.S. decision cited supporting the rule. Included to show the continued acceptance of the principle in U.S. courts.
Allen v. Gillette Texas cases holding that quasi-trustees might in some limited circumstances purchase at judicial sales. Noted as a jurisdictional deviation from the rule; Court treated it as limited and not controlling.
Starkweather v. Jenner Texas authority in the same vein as Allen v. Gillette. Referred to as an exception-type approach, which the Court regarded as restricted and not applicable to trustees proper.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court structured its analysis in three principal parts which correspond to the main issues framed by the parties:

  1. Competence to sue: The Defendants argued by analogy to sec. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (which limits suits about public charitable trusts) that the Plaintiff lacked a present interest to maintain the suit. The Court rejected any extension of sec. 92 to private trusts. Relying on a line of authorities (both Indian and English), the Court held that the founder or his heirs of a private debatter retain the right to invoke judicial assistance to enforce the trust, to remove a trustee for misconduct and to secure proper administration. Because the Will placed the Plaintiff next in order after the present shebait to succeed to the shebaitship, he had sufficient interest to sue and was competent to maintain the action.
  2. Nature and legal effect of the Bahirgora purchase: The Court examined (a) who supplied the purchase money; (b) whether a sale bought by the trustee (or his agent or relation) is voidable/inoperative as against the trust; and (c) on what terms the property should revert if the sale is set aside as to the trust.
    • On the factual question of who supplied the purchase money, the Court found that the Raja (shebait) supplied the whole purchase consideration to his son Bhupendra. Documentary and testimonial materials (chalan entries, bank endorsements, pledging of securities that bore the Raja's name, admissions by both son and father) led the Court to conclude incontrovertibly that the Raja furnished the funds.
    • On the legal question, the Court surveyed English and American equity jurisprudence and concluded that a shebait or trustee who is subject to a decree and an execution sale is not competent, without the leave of the Court, to purchase the trust property in his personal capacity. The Court declined Respondents' suggestion that purchases at public judicial sales should be treated more leniently (i.e., merely jealously scrutinised) and instead adopted the orthodox equitable rule that prohibits trustee/fiduciary purchases — including purchases at execution sales — unless leave of Court has been obtained and the transaction is fully open and fair. The Court relied on authorities such as York Buildings Co. v. Mackenzie, Davoue v. Fanning and other English and American cases to support this absolute disability.
    • Because the Raja had furnished the funds by which his son purchased Bahirgora, the Court held that, as between the debatter estate and the nominal purchaser, the sale was inoperative against the debatter estate. The Court did not unsettle the position of the execution creditor (whose decree had been satisfied), but held that the property must be treated as reverting to the debatter estate and the shebait would be deemed to have satisfied the decree to the extent of the purchase; the precise amount to be reimbursed to the shebait must be determined in a supplementary inquiry by the lower Court (record materials were insufficient to fix the sum at once).
  3. Removal of the shebait: The Court observed that removal of a trustee is a matter of judicial discretion guided by the welfare of beneficiaries and the trust estate and should be exercised only where necessary to save trust property. Considering the long history of the shebait's conduct — including seizing the estate in 1890, prolonged litigation, repudiation of the Will, the series of suits and appeals culminating in heavy liabilities and eventual sale of the most valuable trust asset — the Court concluded that the shebait's connexion with the estate had resulted in serious detriment to the trust. Moreover, a present conflict between duty and self-interest existed because the shebait stood both to claim reimbursement from the estate for sums he asserted he had satisfied and remained in a position to influence the administration and accounting of those claims (including dealings with Government securities of Rs. 11,500 alleged to belong to the trust). Given these circumstances, the Court held that the shebait must cease to be shebait and a Receiver must be appointed to manage the debatter estate; the precise date and financial adjustments were to be determined by the subordinate Court in supplementary proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the appeal. The essential operative rulings were:

  • The appeal is ALLOWED and the decree of the Subordinate Judge is set aside.
  • The sale of Bahirgora held on 14 January 1913 is declared not operative against the debatter estate (on the ground that the shebait supplied the purchase money and a shebait/trustee cannot buy trust property at such a sale without leave).
  • The first Defendant (Raja Peari Mohan) is entitled to be reimbursed, but the precise amount recoverable by him is to be investigated in subsidiary proceedings in the Court below.
  • Steps will be taken to place the debatter estate in the hands of a Receiver to be appointed by the Court, and the first Defendant will cease to be shebait from the date when the Receiver takes possession.
  • The first Defendant must pay the Plaintiff his costs both in the High Court and in the Court below.
  • The cross-appeal was not pressed and stands dismissed.

Implications: The decision directly impacts the parties by (a) restoring the trust character of the sold property as against the debatter estate, subject to a detailed accounting and adjustment procedure; (b) removing the incumbent shebait and vesting management in a Court-appointed Receiver; and (c) ordering costs against the shebait. The ruling applies established equitable principles (as collected in English and American jurisprudence) that a fiduciary — here a shebait/trustee — is disqualified from purchasing trust property at a sale without Court leave, and it confirms the availability of remedies to the founder's heir to enforce administration and to seek removal of a trustee where necessary to protect the trust. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general precedent beyond applying and reaffirming the extant equitable rule in the circumstances presented; it directs supplementary proceedings to determine financial adjustments and reimbursement.

End of summary. This document reflects only the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not explicitly stated therein.

    Monohar Mookerjee v. Raja Peary Mohan Mookerjee

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    This is an appeal by the Plaintiff in a suit for the construction of a Will, for the administration of a trust (private debatter) created thereby, for the removal of the trustee, for the appointment of a new trustee or Receiver, for declaration that an execution sale of a portion of the trust estate held on the 14th January 1913, when it was purchased by the son of the trustee, was invalid and in-operative, for proper investment of a sum of Rs. 11,500 alleged to form part of the trust estate, and for other incidental reliefs. The Subordinate Judge has found in favour of the Plaintiff upon several of the questions in controversy, but he has dismissed the suit on the ground that the allegations of misconduct had not been established and the Plaintiff was not entitled to ask for the removal of the trustee. To appreciate the substantial points in dispute between the parties (whose relationship will appear from the annexed genealogical table), it is necessary to consider briefly the history of the trust which, since its foundation, has formed the subject of many proceedings in Court.

    Jaga Mohan Mookerjee, the common ancestor of the parties to this suit, made a testamentary disposition of his properties on the 11th September 1840, and died a week later. By this Will, he dedicated certain properties to the sheba or worship of two Thakurs, Sridhar and Gopaleswar Siva, established by him, the annual celebration of Durga Puja, the sradh of ancestors, and other pious acts such as the maintenance of childless widows, the construction of roads for public use and the excavation of tanks. The testator also provided for the order of succession to the office of shebait among his own descendants. The first shebaits were his eldest son, Joy Krishna Mookerjee and Hara Nath Chatterjee (not a member of the family). Hara Nath died on the 29th January 1862, and thereafter Joy Krishna continued as sole shebait till his death on the 19th July 1888. Raj Krishna who, according to the Will, was to have followed Joy Krishna had died in 1880. Consequently, Joy Krishna was succeeded by his step brother Naba Krishna who died on the 11th September 1890. On his death, the succession opened to his brother Bejoy Krishna. Raja Peari Mohan, the second son of Joy Krishna, opposed Bijoy Krishna and threw every possible difficulty in the way of his obtaining possession of the debatter estate and collecting the rents. After the usual preliminary contest in the Revenue and Criminal Courts, on the 10th June 1892, Bijoy Krishna instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Hooghly to establish his title to the Office of shebait under the Will of the founder. The suit was defended by the Raja, who denied the genuineness of the Will and the existence of the debatter. On the 29th January 1894, the Subordinate Judge decreed the suit; and on that very day Bijoy Krishna died. Raja Peari Mohan preferred an appeal to this Court on the 25th January 1895 (as apparently some considerable time was taken up by proceedings for amendment of the decree) and joined as Respondents the sons of Bijoy Krishna who had been appointed executors to the estate of their father under his Will. In the Memorandum of Appeal, he challenged the factum and validity of the debatter and completely repudiated the trust created by his grandfather. The appeal came to be heard before Maclean, C.J, and Banerjee, J., on the 24th August 1898, when the Raja took up the position that he had succeeded as shebait upon the death of his uncle Bijoy Krishna on the 29th January 1891, and, that, consequently many of the questions raised in the suit had ceased to be of practical importance. The result was that the decree of the Court below was confirmed subject to modifications. One important variation made was that the then Respondents, the executors to the estate of Bijoy Krishna, could not proceed with the enquiry into the accounts of the debatter estate as directed by the Subordinate Judge. But the litigation thus brought to an end, did not and obviously could not terminate the controversy between Raja Peari Mohan and the representatives of Bijoy Krishna. Raja Peari Mohan had successfully kept Bijoy Krishna out of the debatter estate from the 11th September 1890, when Bijoy Krishna became entitled to succeed as shebait, up till the 29th January 1894, when Bijoy Krishna died. Bijoy Krishna had not been able to collect more than Rs. 4,607 during his incumbency; he had, on the other hand, spent considerable sums of money in protecting the debatter estate and in performing his obligations as shebait during all the time that Raja Peary Mohan was in possession and enjoyment of the income. The consequence was that even before the Raja's appeal in the previous suit was heard in the High Court, the representatives of Bijoy Krishna had, on the 25th January 1897, instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Hooghly to recover the sum of Rs. 77,964 from the debatter estate to which Raja Peari Mohan had succeeded as shebait, or in the alternative, from him personally. The Subordinate Judge made a preliminary decree for accounts on the 17th February 1899. The Defendant appealed to this Court, and on the 28th November 1900. Banerjee and Brett, JJ., directed the plaint to be amended, and remanded the case to the Court below for a fresh trial [Peary Mohan v. Narendra Krishna (1)]. The suit was retried with the result that a preliminary decree for accounts was again made on the 10th February 1902. This was followed on the 30th June 1903, by a final decree for Rs. 45,960 against the debatter estate. Raja Peari Mohan appealed to the High Court, with the result that the decree of the Subordinate Judge was confirmed on the 24th February 1905 by Ghose and Pargiter, JJ., [Peari Mohan v. Narendra Nath (2)]. The Raja was not satisfied and appealed to the Privy Council. On the 16th December 1909 the Judicial Committee dismissed the appeal and the judgment delivered by Lord Macnaghten commented upon his wrongful acts, Peary Mohan v. Narendra Nath (3). The decree-holders promptly applied for execution on the 1st May 1910 to realise a sum of Rs. 83,548 inclusive of interest and costs in all the Courts. They claimed that the costs of the Court of first instance were realisable out of the debatter estate, while the costs of the appeals to the High Court and the Privy Council were realisable from the judgment-debtor personally. Raja Peari Mohan took various objections to the execution on the 27th July 1910, including an objection that he was not personally liable to pay the costs of the High Court and the Privy Council. These objections were overruled by the Subordinate Judge on the 3rd December 1910, Raja Peari Mohan appealed to the High Court against the decision imposing a personal liability on him, and obtained an order for stay of proceedings during ‘the pendency of the appeal. No appeal was preferred against the order overruling his objections to execution against the debatter estate. The result was that while execution against him personally was held up by the order of the High Court, it proceeded against the debatter estate and an order for sale was made by the Subordinate Judge on the 10th January 1913. Further objections were taken to the execution on the 13th January 1913 with a view to vary the order in which the attached properties were to be sold, but they proved infructuous. On the 14th January 1913, the most valuable of the properties comprised in the debatter estate, namely, a four-fifth share of lot Bahirgora was put up to auction and was purchased by Bhupendra Nath, one of the Raja's sons, for a sum of Rs. 1,56,600. The appeal preferred by Raja Peari Mohan against the order for personal execution was heard in this Court by Jenkins, C.J, and Bay, J., on the 28th March 1913, and was dismissed on the ground that, under the terms of the decree of the High Court and of the Privy Council, he was personally liable for the costs awarded thereby. The Court pointed out that there was nothing inconsistent in the fact that the claim sought to be enforced had been decreed against the debatter estate with the direction that shebait should be personally liable for the costs of the litigation conducted by him on behalf of the Thakurs.

    Meanwhile, on the 17th February 1913, that is, about a month after the sale of Bahirgora in execution and its purchase by the son of the shebait, Monohar Mookerjee, a grandson of the founder and the eldest surviving son of Raj Krishna, had instituted the present suit for administration of the trust estate. The principal Defendants were Raja Peari Mohan in his capacity as shebait as also in his personal capacity and Bhupendra Nath, his son, who had purchased Bahirgora. The Plaintiff further joined as pro formâ Defendants members of the various branches of the family, all descendants of the founder Jaga Mohan Mookerjee. The suit was defended by the Raja and Bhupendra Nath. The former challenged all the material allegations in the plaint, while the latter alleged that as he had purchased Bahirgora for himself with his own money, the property in his hands could not be declared to be trust property. The fourth Defendant, Pratap Narain, the eldest son of Naba Krishna, also filed a written statement which does not require further consideration, no relief is claimed against him and he has died during the pendency of this litigation. The following thirteen issues were raised on these pleadings:—

    1. Has the Plaintiff right of suit and cause of action?

    2. Has this Court jurisdiction to try this suit? Is the suit maintainable in the way it has been framed?

    3. Has the Plaintiff the right to maintain this suit under sec. 66 of the Procedure Code?

    4. Is the plaint sufficiently stamped?

    5. Is the suit barred by limitation, estoppel and acquiescence?

    6. Is the Plaintiff as the next presumptive shebait for the time being entitled to the declaration sought for by him, and was Bhupendra Nath Mookerjee (Defendant No. 3) colluding with Raja Peari Mohan Mookerjee (Defendants Nos. 1 and 2) in the purchase of the debatter property or was he an innocent purchaser for value without the knowledge of the Raja's wrong doings?

    7. Are the allegations of misconduct made by the Plaintiff against Defendant No. 1 true? If so, are they sufficient to justify the latter's removal from the shebaitship?

    8. Is the Plaintiff entitled under the terms of the Will of late Jaga Mohan Mookerjee to ask for the removal of the Defendant No. 1 from the shebaitship and for the appointment of another trustee in his place, and to have a scheme for the execution of the trust prepared by the Court?

    9. Whether the Defendant No. 3 purchased the debatter property at the auction sale as a mere benamdar for Raja Peari Mohan Mookerjee?

    10. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the declaration that 12 annas 16 gandas of Bahirgora with chakran purchased by Defendant No. 3 at auction is debatter property still?

    11. Whether the Defendant No. 1 can be restrained from withdrawing the surplus sale proceeds deposited in Court in Execution Case No. 52 of 1910?

    12. What relief, if any, is the Plaintiff entitled to?

    13. Which of the parties has under the terms of the Will of late Jaga Mohan Mookerjee the best claim to the shebaitship of the Thakurs and the debatter estate? Is Defendant No. 4 the best entitled to claim them as of the ?

    The Subordinate Judge has found against the Plaintiff on the second part of Issue No. 1, on the first part of Issue No. 6, and on Issues Nos. 7, 8 and 10, but in his favour on the first part of Issue No. 1, Issues Nos. 2, 3 and 5, second part of Issue No. 6, Issues Nos. 9 and 13. On these findings, the Subordinate Judge has dismissed the suit with costs.

    In support of the present appeal, preferred by the Plaintiff, two substantial grounds have been urged, namely, first, that in the circumstances disclosed in the evidence, notwithstanding the sale of Bahirgora in execution and its purchase by the son of the shebait with funds supplied by his father, the property should in law be still regarded as part of the trust estate, and, secondly, that in view of the past conduct of the shebait in relation to the debatter estate and his present position which involves a clear conflict of duty and self interest, he should be removed from the office of shebait. On behalf of the Respondent shebait, the validity of these contentions has been questioned, and it has been urged in addition that the Plaintiff is not competent to maintain the present suit. On behalf of Bhupendra, the son of the shebait, the finding of the Subordinate Judge that he was not the real purchaser has been assailed and an endeavour has been made to support the decree on the ground that he is entitled to the protection enjoyed by a bonâ fide purchaser for value. The reasons assigned by the shebait to justify the decree made by the Subordinate Judge have also been reiterated on behalf of Bhupendra Nath, though as purchaser he is not directly concerned with the matters raised therein. The questions which emerge from the elaborate arguments addressed to us by the several parties may be conveniently examined in the following order:—

    (i) Is the Plaintiff competent to maintain the present suit?

    (ii) What is the true nature of the purchase of Bahirgora in execution by Bhupendra and what is the legal effect thereof on the debatter estate?

    (iii) Have sufficient grounds been established for the removal of the shebait?

    As regards the first question, the Defendants have contended that as the Plaintiff has no present interest in the debatter estate, he is not competent to maintain this action. No authority has been cited in support of this argument, but reference has been made to sec. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. That section, it is conceded, is applicable only to trusts created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature; suits in respect of alleged breaches of such public charities may be instituted, either by the Advocate-General or by two or more persons having an interest in the trust who have obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate-General. The Defendants-Respondents have laid stress on the fact that the object of such restriction was to prevent the institution of an indefinite number of reckless and harassing suits against the trustees of a public charity by individuals interested in the trust [Sajedur Raja v. Gour Mohan (4), Budreedas v. Chuni Lal (5) and D'Cruz v. D'Silva (6)] and they have pressed us to extend, to private trusts by way of analogy, the rule embodied in sec. 92 and to hold that, as in the case of public trusts so also in the case of private trusts, the interest of the Plaintiff in the trust, sufficient to qualify him to maintain his suit, must be an existing interest, not a mere contingency nor the mere possibility of succession to the managership of the trust properties Mohiuddin v. Sayiduddin (7) and Budh Singh v. Niradbaran (8). But we cannot accept the contention of the Respondents as well-founded either on authority or on principle. In the case before us, according to the Will of the founder, the Plaintiff stands, after Raja Peari Mohan, the next in order among persons entitled to succeed to the office of shebait, as the eldest male member among the descendants of Jaga Mohan Mookerjee; as such, he is clearly competent to maintain this suit. It is not necessary for our present purpose to recapitulate all the rights of the founder of a charitable trust or of his heirs in relation to the trust. The authorities are clear upon the point that, in certain events, for instance, where the line originally indicated by the founder fails, the founder or his heir has the right to nominate the shebait or has vested in him the shebaitship, and this principle is applicable equally to private and public trusts. [Sital Das v. Pratap Chandra (9), Raj Krishna v. Bepin Behari (10) and Gauranga Sahu v. Sudemalai (11).] Analogous to this doctrine is the principle that the founder or his heirs may sue for the enforcement of the trust, for the removal of the old trustee, for the appointment of a new one and may thereby secure the proper administration of the trust and its properties. Whatever restriction may have been prescribed by the legislature as to the mode of institution of such suits in respect of public trusts the rights of the founder of a private trust or of his heirs remain unimpaired. Such right of suit by the founder or his heirs is recognised in a long series of decisions: Bhurruck v. Golam (12), Mohesh v. Koylash (13), Biddia Sundari v. Durganund (14), Shoratan v. Ram Pargas (15), Samsundra v. Kandasami (16), Sathappayyar v. Periaswami (17), Gajapati v. Bhagaban (18) and Ganapati v. Savithri (19). As Lord Mansfield observed in St. John's College v. Todington (20), a charitable foundation, so far as it is charitable, that is, so far as it is formed to give effect to a charitable purpose in reference to property provided by the founder, is the creature of the founder. He has the right to determine, when the charitable foundation is established, the mode in which the foundation shall be governed and its revenue applied, and the law reserves to him and his heirs or appointees certain permanent functions with a view to prevent what is called by Holt, C.J, “all perverting of the charity” [Phillips v. Bury (21)]. This right, according to Lord Hardwicke, has its origin in “the property of the donor and the power which every one has to dispose, direct and regulate his own property,” Green v. Rutherford (22). Under the law of England, it is well-settled that if a private person is the founder of a charitable corporation, then he and his heirs are the visitors, and it is only where the line of heirs of a private founder has become extinct, or where they cannot be found or are incompetent to act, that the visitatorial power devolves on the Crown [Advocate-General v. Gaunt (23) and Advocate-General v. Dedham School (24)]. We are of opinion that on the analogy of this well-recognised principle, the view may be maintained that in respect of a debatter in this country, the founder or his heirs may invoke the assistance of a judicial tribunal for the proper administration thereof on the allegation that the trusts are not properly performed; and the case is strengthened when the management would, under the terms of the trust, vest in the Plaintiff as the founder's heir, on a vacancy caused by the removal of the actual incumbent for misconduct [Biddia v. Durganund , Kazi Hassan v. Sagan Balkrishna (25), Prasanna v. Kunja Behari (26) and Nam Narayan v. Ramoon (27)]. We hold accordingly that the Plaintiff is entitled to maintain the present suit.

    As regards the second question, three points require examination, namely, first, who supplied the purchase money; secondly, if the purchase money was supplied by Raja Peari Mohan, can the validity of the sale be successfully impeached, as between the debatter estate on the one hand and the nominal purchaser on the other; and, thirdly, if the sale can be impeached, on what terms should the property be restored to the debatter estate.

    As regards the first of these points, it has, in our opinion, been conclusively established that the purchase money was supplied by the Raja. The property was knocked down to Bhupendra on his bid of Rs. 1,56,600. Rs. 40,000, which was slightly in excess of one-fourth of the purchase money, was deposited on his behalf forthwith. The chalan shows that the deposit was made by Kanti Chandra Rarhi, the Raja's am-mukhtear. Bhupendra admits that he received on the date of sale Rs. 37,400 from his father. Raja Peari Mohan confirms this statement and adds that this was part of money which had been received by him about that date from his zemindari in Sagar Islands. Bhupendra states that, in order to make up the sum of Rs. 40,000, he borrowed Rs. 2,600 from an officer of his cousin, Probal Chandra Mookerjee, who confirms the allegation and adds that he was repaid the loan two or three days later. The balance of the purchase money, Rs. 1,16,600, was deposited on the 28th January 1913 with a chalan which sets out the numbers of the currency notes. There were ten notes of Rs. 10,000 each and sixteen notes of Rs. 1,000 each, besides sixty notes of Rs. 10 each. The whole of this money has been traced to the Raja. It is proved that Bhupendra obtained Rs. 1,16,000 from the Bank of Bengal on a deposit of Government securities for Rs. 1,30,000. These securities stood in the name of Raja Peari Mohan up to the 9th January 1913, and were thereafter endorsed by him in favour of Bhupendra who pledged them with the Bank on the 25th January 1913. An account was opened by the Bank with Bhupendra on that date; this was closed on the 3rd February 1914. There is thus no escape from the position that the whole of the purchase money was supplied by the Raja to Bhupendra. Bhupendra states in the course of his deposition, that he had in his possession Rs. 55,000 which he had kept concealed from his father. If this be true, his position is certainly not improved; if he applied money which belonged to his father, to make the purchase, the property would clearly belong to his father. There is also the significant circumstance that Bhupendra had no separate funds of his own and that father and son lived as members of a joint family. On these facts, it is not very material to discuss the motive which actuated Raja Peari Mohan when he made over to his son. Bhupendra this sum of money with a view to purchase the property Bahirgora. An elaborate story has been developed to the effect that this payment was made in pursuance of a scheme for a special testamentary gift in favour of Bhupendra contained in a Will executed by Raja Peari Mohan on the 5th June 1912. But this Will has been superseded, and after the institution of the present suit Raja Peari Mohan has executed a deed of settlement on the 27th October 1913. We cannot also overlook. She fact that the theory of a special gift in favour of Bhupendra who was to receive the zemindari of Sagar Islands (a property which, it is alleged, might, for its preservation, entail heavy and unexpected expenditure on the owner) does not fit in exactly with the gift of a large sum of money for investment in the way of purchase of a property for more than its full value. But whatever motive may have inspired the Raja, the facts remain incontestable that he was the shebait of this property, that it was brought to sale in execution of a decree liable to be satisfied partly from the debatter estate and partly from himself, and that at the execution sale which took place it was purchased by his son Bhupendra with funds entirely supplied by him.

    As regards the second point, the Plaintiff-Appellant has contended that, as between the debatter estate and the shebait, the sale of Bahirgora is inoperative in law, on well-recognised principles of equity jurisprudence. In support of this position, reliance has been placed upon the cases of Campbell v. Walker (28), Exp. Lavy (29), Exp. James (30), Exp. Bennett (31), Randall v. Erringt (32), Sanderson v. Walker (33), ??? v. Grazebrook (34), Farrar v. Farrar (35) and Baroda Prosad v. Gajendra Nath (36) These cases, it has been argued, recognise what must now be regarded as ??? elementary rule, namely, that a trust ??? cannot purchase trust property from himself or at his own sale. The law does ??? stop to enquire into the fairness of ??? sale or the adequacy of the price, ??? stamps its disapproval upon a ??? which creates a conflict between the ??? interest and in the integrity of the ??? The Respondents have not disputed ??? correctness of this rule, but have ??? that a trustee for the sale of property can not himself be the purchaser of it, because no person can at the same time fill the ??? opposite characters of vendor and ???, chaser, and that consequently the ??? ability does not apply to a case where, ??? here, the property is publicly sold by ??? Court in execution of a decree. The Respondents have further contended that, cases of purchase at execution sales, ??? same principle should be applied as ??? a purchase of trust property by a ??? from his cestui que trust; [Denton Donner (37) and Luff v. Lord (38)] other words, such a transaction should not be pronounced inoperative, but should only be jealously scrutinised, so that if ??? impeached by the cestui que trust, ??? must show that there has been no ??? or concealment or advantage taken ??? him of information acquired by him in ??? character of trustee and that the consideration paid was adequate [Dougan v. Macpherson (39)]. The question thus ??? is of great importance and require ??? examination.

    It is regarded as a principle of fundamental importance in English Equity ??? that a trustee for sale is, absolutely and entirely, disabled from purchasing the trust property, directly or indirectly. The rule is universal that however fair the transaction, the cestui que trust is at liberty to set aside the sale and ??? back the property. Weighty reasons have been assigned by eminent Judges in support of this rule. If a trustee were permitted to buy in an honest case, he might buy in a case having that appearance, but which, from the infirmity of human testimony, might remain undetected. [Exp. Bennett ] per Eldon, L.C in other words, the ground of the rule is that though you may see in a particular case that the trustee has not made an advantage, it is impossible to examine sufficiently in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred whether he has made an advantage or not [Willams v. Scoot (40)]. It is equally well-settled that a trustee for other purposes than for sale cannot purchase the property where the purchase would conflict with his duty respecting it or his position in regard to it; but in this class of cases, there is no absolute rule against his purchasing the trust property from his cestui que trust, although Courts of Equity always regard such transactions with the utmost jealousy and will not hesitate to set them aside if their fairness is not conclusively established. The controversy before us has centered round the question, which of these principles governs the present case. Now, it is perfectly plain that the sale in this case was not by a cestui que trust to the trustee. As Sir Arthur Wilson pointed out in delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee in the case of Jagadindra Nath v. Hemanta Kumari (41) though there is no doubt that an idol may be regarded as a juridical person, capable as such of holding property, it is only in an ideal sense that property is so held, for the possession and management of the dedicated property must, in the nature of things, belong to the shebait, whether the religious dedication is of the completest kind known to the law or is of a less strict character. Consequently, when a shebait purchases debatter property, it is a, purchase by a person who is the custodian of the property and who is charged with the duty to preserve it for the benefit of the endowment. In a case of this description, if the purchase were allowed, precisely the same mischiefs would result as have been apprehended by eminent Judges in cases of purchases of trust properties by trustees for sale. Indeed, the mischief might be of a more aggravated character, less likely to be discovered and rectified, as, unless the shebait was removed, it might be impossible to determine the impropriety of the transaction and the injury inflicted thereby on the debatter estate. If the contrary view prevailed, it is not inconceivable that an unscrupulous shebait, anxious to seize a particular portion of the debatter estate for his personal use, might, notwithstanding ample funds at his disposal, be encouraged to borrow money in the character of shebait, allow a decree to be passed against him, acquiesce in the consequent execution sale, and ultimately Purchase the ??? in ??? private capacity. The true nature of a scheme of this character elaborately planned and carefully carried out would never be unravelled except probably by a person intimately acquainted with the minutest details of the administration of the debatter estate. On the other hand, if the shebait were allowed to bid, his interest would be to secure the property at the lowest price, and if he became the purchaser, an application to set aside the sale on the ground of irregularities in the proceedings would obviously be out of the question. In our opinion, no difference should, in this class of cases, be made in the application of this principle, by reason of the fact that the purchase is made at a sale publicly held or held at the instance of a Court in execution of a decree against the debatter estate. This view is supported by principles adopted in cases of the highest authority.

    Reference may be made, for instance, to the decision of the House of Lords in York Buildings Co. v. Mackenzie (42). The Appellants in that case were an insolvent Company and their estates were sold, by order of the Court of Sessions, at a public judicial sale to satisfy creditors. The procedure at such sales was to set up the property at a value fixed upon by the Court, which is called the upset price and which is founded on information procured by the common agent of the Court, who has the management of all the outdoor business of a cause. The Respondent was the common agent in that cause, and he purchased for himself, at the upset price, no person appearing to bid more, and the sale was confirmed by the Court. In the course of eleven years, the purchaser in possession expended large sums for building and improvements. There was no question as to the fairness and integrity of the purchase but the Appellants sought to set aside the sale and to have the estate sold a new on the ground that the Respondent (the common agent in Court on behalf of all parties to procure information and attend the sale) was in the nature of a trustee and so disabled to purchase. The case was argued before the House of Lords for sixteen days, by Counsel of the highest eminence, with exceptional ability and learning. The Appellants contended that the common agent was under a disability to purchase, arising from his office; that the rule was founded on reason and nature and prevailed wherever any well-regulated administration of justice was known; that the disability rested on the same principle which dictates that a person cannot be both Judge and party and serve two masters; that he who is entrusted with the interest of another cannot be allowed to make the business an object to himself, because, from the frailty of human nature, one who has power will be too readily seized with the inclination to serve his own interest at the expense of those for whom he is entrusted; that the danger of temptation does, out of the mere necessity of the case, work a disqualification, because nothing less than incapacity is able to shut the door against temptation where the danger is imminent and the security against discovery great; “that the wise policy of the law had therefore put the sting of disability into the temptation, as a defensive weapon against the strength of the danger which lies in the situation”: that the parts which the buyer and seller have to act stand in direct opposition to each other in point of interest, and the conflict of interest is the rock for shunning which the disability has obtained its force, by making that person, who has the one part entrusted to him incapable of acting on the other side. This argument was fortified by references to the Roman Law, showing clearly that the same principle had a deep and firm foundation in that system and was most extensively applied, as for instance, to guardians, tutors, curators, procurators, judicial officers and all other persons who had a concern in the disposition and sale of the property of others, whether the sale was public or private, judicial or otherwise (Dig. Lib. 18 tit, 1, Ch. 34, lib. 18, tit. 1, Ch. 46 and lib. 26, tit. 8, Ch. 5). The Respondent admitted the general principle, but denied its application. The House of Lords set aside the sale and ordered the purchaser to account for the rents and profits, with a liberal allowance to him for his permanent improvements. The judgments delivered by the House of Lords are not set out in the report by Brown but the opinions of Lord Thurlow and Lord Loughborough, L.C, as also the interlocutors of the Scotch Judges whom they reversed will be found in the report by Paton. This decision carried the doctrine to its full extent and later decisions, as will presently appear, do not depart therefrom.

    In Grover v. Hugell (43) Sir John Leach, M.R, had to deal with a case where, on the sale for redemption of land tax of the glebe of a rectory, the rector himself had become the actual purchaser in the name of his curate. He held that the sale could not be sustained in a Court of Equity and observed as follows: “the general rule in equity is that a man cannot place himself in a situation in which his interest conflicts with his duty. The duty of the rector was to obtain the best possible price for the land sold; and his interest as purchaser was to pay the least possible price. It is no answer to say that the superintendence of the Commissioners would secure a full price. The sale is to be by public auction and before two of the Commissioners or some person appointed by them; and their approbation of the sale is required by the Act; but still the duty of the rector was to give his aid to the procuring of the best possible price.” The same principle had been enunciated by Sir Thomas Plumer, M.R, in Stratford v. Twynan (44) though he held that an execution creditor was not a trustee within the meaning of the rule and was not incompetent to purchase at the sale held by the Sheriff of the property seized in execution. The decision in Guest v. Smythe (45) recognises the same rule, though the Court of appeal did not adopt the view of the Master of the Rolls (Lord Romilly) that the purchaser in that case (the solicitor not of a party to the suit but of some creditors of the mortgagee, one of whom had obtained a decree for administration of the mortgagee's estate) stood in a fiduciary relation and was disqualified in the same way as a trustee would have been. An instructive case came before the Court of appeal in Nugent v. Nugent (46). The Court of appeal unanimously affirmed the decision of the primary Court, Nugent v. Nugent (47) that a Receiver appointed by the Court cannot purchase the property of which he is Receiver, without leave of the Court, even where the sale is made, not in the action in which he was appointed, but by a mortgagee selling with leave outside the action. Cozens Hardy, M.R, observed that the Receiver was in a fiduciary position and held that, in dealing with this class of cases, the Court does not proceed upon the footing that there has been fraud or improper concealment or any special advantage taken by the Receiver; it proceeds upon the general rule that in cases of this kind, the purchase ought not to be allowed at all, because it is a dangerous thing to allow, as in most cases it is impossible to ascertain whether the Receiver has or has not taken undue advantage of his position. The Master of the Rolls declined to go into the question, whether, under the special circumstances of the case, there was any great probability of fraud. Fletcher Moulton, L.J, observed that the general principle which actuates the Court in deciding its procedure in matters of this kind is that nobody must allow himself to get into a position where his interest conflicts with his duty. The Court carries out this principle, not by examining each particular case and weighing the details of the conflict between interest and duty, but by certain prohibitions with regard to persons who hold positions in which such a conflict might arise, and the Court has been very severe in past times in the rules which it has made for this purpose, Buckley, L.J, adopted the same view and observed that a person standing in a fiduciary relation cannot be allowed to put himself in a position in which his interest and his duty may conflict, if he does so, it is not necessary to show that he acted contrary to his duty; the Court will not allow him to buy, if the position is such that he might be guilty of a breach of his duty. Reference was made in support of this view to the decision of Sir Michael O'Loghlen, M.R, in Alven v. Bond (48). It was ruled in that case that a purchase by a trustee at a sale, under the decree of the Court, of property with which he is connected by virtue of his office, cannot be sustained, if made without the sanction of the Court or the assent of the parties interested, but concealed from both. In answer to the argument that the proposed order for cancellation was one which no other Judge had ever ventured to make, the Master of the Rolls replied that it was not the introduction of a new doctrine into a Court of Equity and referred to Exp. James where Lord Eldon, L.C, had pronounced against the validity of such a transaction on the ground “that no Court is equal to the examination and ascertainment of the truth in much the greater number of cases.” Precisely the same view had been taken by Sir William McMahon, M.R, in White v. Tommy (49) and by Sir Edward Sugden, when Lord Chancellor of Ireland, in Boddington v. Langford (50), [see also Hamilton v. Young, (51)].

    It will be observed that reference is made in some of these judicial decisions to purchases by persons in a fiduciary relation with the leave of the Court. It is important to bear in mind that even in cases where the transaction, is not absolutely prohibited, this leave of the Court must be obtained before the sale takes place. In Lewis v. Hillman (52), Lord St. Leonards said: “I should lay it down as a rule that ought never to be departed from, that if an attorney or agent can show that he is entitled to purchase, yet if instead of openly purchasing, he purchases in the name of a trustee or agent, without disclosing the fact, no such purchase as that can stand for a single moment. Such a transaction, to stand, must be open and fair and free from all objection.” These observations were referred to with approval by Lord Cairns in Macpherson v. Watt (53); “an attorney is not affected by the absolute disability to purchase which attaches to a trustee. But, for manifest reasons, if he becomes the buyer of his client's property, he does so at his peril. He must be prepared to show that he has acted with the completest faithfulness and fairness; that his advice has been free from all taint of self-interest; that he has not misrepresented anything or concealed anything; that he has given an adequate price and that his client has had the advantage of the best professional assistance, which, if he had been engaged in a transaction with a third party, he could possibly have afforded. And although all these conditions have been fulfilled, though there has been the fullest information, the most disinterested counsel, and the fairest price, if the purchase be made covertly in the name of another without communication of the fact to the vendor, the law condemns and invalidates it utterly” [see also Luddy v. Peard (54) and Farmer v. Dean (55)].

    The principles thus recognised by English Equity Jurisprudence have been adopted by the Courts of the United States as founded on manifest reasons of justice and good conscience, and one of the most familiar doctrines of the law of trusts recognised there is stated to be that a trustee cannot in his private capacity purchase trust property at a sale held in execution of a decree made against himself as trustee. The leading decision on the subject is the classical judgment of Chancellor Kent in Davoue v. Fanning (56), where he held that a trustee cannot become the purchaser at a judicial foreclosure sale of the trust property, unless he is expressly allowed to do so by the Court; it makes no difference in the application of the rule that the sale is at public auction bonâ fide and for a fair price. This was emphasised by Chancellor Walworth in DeCaters v. DeChaumand (57), where, in answer to the contention that if the trustee did not bid, the price would not have been enhanced, he quoted the language of Lord Eldon in Exp. James : “it is better for the general interests of justice that in some cases a loss should be sustained by the cestui que trust than that a rule should be established which would occasion loss in much more numerous cases.” The same rule was affirmed in Chapin v. Weed (58) where the principle was stated to be that a trustee cannot become the purchaser for his own benefit of the property assigned to him in trust, and he cannot become such purchaser even though the sale is a judicial one, made without the contrivance or procurement of the trustee, unless by the order of sale he is expressly allowed so to purchase. The question was elaborately examined by the Supreme Court of the United States in Michoud v. Girod (59), and the rule was affirmed that a purchase by an executor, through a third person, of property of the testator is void, though the sale was held at a public auction, judicially ordered, and the evidence showed that fair price was paid. The Court has approved of this doctrine in later cases [Magruder v. Drury (60) and United States v. Garter (61)]. But in one jurisdiction (Texas) the view has been maintained that the trustee may purchase the trust property at a judicial sale, which has been brought about by a third party, which he has taken to part in procuring and which he could not have controlled [Allen v. Gillette (62) and Starkweather v. Jenner (63)]. This, however, is regarded as in the nature of a deviation from the well-settled rule; it has been restricted to cases of quasi trustees and has not been applied to trustees proper. (Story on Equity Jurisprudence, 1918, 446 and Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, 1918, secs. 958, 1052, 1078). We hold accordingly that where a decree has been obtained against a shebait as representative of the debatter estate, he is not competent without the leave of the Court to purchase the debatter property in his personal capacity.

    In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary for us to investigate whether the debatter estate has suffered a pecuniary loss by the sale of the property in question; but were may state that there is no reason to apprehend that the property has not been sold for its full value. The assertion of the Defendants that the property has been sold for about double its real value is, however, not so clear. Reference has been made to the anual income of the property stated to be about Rs. 4,500 a year, and on this basis the contention has been put forward that the price paid at the sale is much in excess of its market value; but it must be remembered that the bid sheet makes it abundantly clear that the competition was keen and more than one bidder, including the representative of the Mahanta of Tarakeswar, offered sums in excess of a lakh and a quarter. Indeed, a nephew of the Defendant offered Rs. 1,29,400. It thus seems probable that we do not know enough about the property and that its potential value is much higher than what is indicated by its present income.

    The question next arises as to the terms on which the property should be directed to be held as part of the debatter estate, notwithstanding the sale. It is manifest that the sale cannot be set aside in so far as the execution creditor is concerned. His decree has been satisfied and there was no misconduct on his part which could prejudice his position. When the property reverts to the debatter estate, the surplus sale proceeds must plainly be returned to the shebait. The consequence will be that the shebait will be deemed to have satisfied the decree obtained by the representatives of Bijoy Krishna and will be entitled to be reimbursed out of the debatter estate on this basis. The materials on the record are, however, not sufficient to enable us to determine this matter finally, and the question of the precise amount which the shebait is entitled to realise out of the debatter estate on the footing that he has satisfied the claim of the execution creditor, must be investigated in a supplementary proceeding; when such enquiry is held, it must be borne in mind that the decree for costs of the High Court and the Privy Council was realisable from the shebait personally.

    We have finally to deal with the third question, namely, whether sufficient grounds have been established for the removal of the shebait. No useful purpose would be served by an examination of decided cases to determine what constitutes a sufficient reason for removing a trustee. The matter is peculiarly within what is called the sound judicial discretion of the Court. The Court is guided by considerations of the welfare of the beneficiaries and of the trust estate; and there must be a clear necessity for interference to save trust property. In the case before us, the Plaintiff-Appellant has urged that the conduct of the shebait, during many years past, has been detrimental to the best interests of the debatter estate. Stress has been laid on the circumstances that upon the death of Naba Krishna on the 11th September 1890, Raja Peari Mohan seized the debatter estate in assertion of a hostile title and successfully kept Bijoy Krishna, the lawful shebait, out of possession. The result was that the debatter estate became involved in ruinous litigation. The suit instituted by Bijoy Krishna on the 10th June 1892, did not terminate in the trial Court till the very date of his death; and though thereupon Raja Peari Mohan himself became entitled to succeed as shebait, he still persisted in his repudiation of the Will of his grandfather and of the debatter created thereby, and preferred and prosecuted an appeal in the High Court on that basis. Good sense prevailed, however, in the end and the decree of this Court, made on the 24th August 1898, recognised the validity of the debatter. But it was impossible that the debatter estate could be freed from the risk of litigation by this belated repentance on the part of the Raja. The representatives of Bijoy Krishna instituted their suit on the 25th January 1897 for enforcement of their claim against him and the debatter estate in his hands. This was inevitable and their claim had to be resisted. This expensive litigation lasted, as we have seen, for very nearly thirteen years, till it was terminated by the decree of the Privy Council on the 10th January 1910. Then followed as a corollary the equally inevitable execution proceedings which ended in the sale of the most valuable property included in the debatter estate on the 14th January 1913, and we cannot overlook the fact that the sale was precipitated, as the execution against the Raja personally was held up. It is indisputable that this misfortune is ultimately traceable to his inveterate hatred of Bijoy Krishna, the result we were told of an old family feud. But whatever motives might have actuated him, we are concerned only with the result of his acts. The consequence has been that, while during the time of his father out of the receipts of the debatter estate, savings were steadily effected and were invested in Government securities and landed properties, so as to raise the annual income from Rs. 4,000 to Rs. 10,000, during his time, by reason of his unwise acts, the debatter estate has been involved in successive protracted litigations, is now burdened with heavy debts, and has lost the most valuable portion of its assets. We are thus driven to the conclusion that his connexion with the debatter estate has been singularly unfortunate and has led to the most unhappy results. But this is not all. Events have so shaped themselves that a situation has arisen which involves him in clear conflict of duty and self-interest. In the view we have taken, the property sold in execution must be restored to the debatter estate, while the shebait must be reimbursed to an extent which requires judicial determination. Further, the evidence shows that the shebait has set up a claim to realise from the debaitter estate considerable sums of money on account of litigation expenses. On the other hand, the dealings of the shebait with the Government securities for Rs. 11,500, which, in the litigation of 1892 were found to form part of the debatter estate, must be forthwith investigated. It is plain that a person in this position cannot be allowed to hold the office of shebait in the best interests if the debatter estate. We hold accordingly that the first Defendant should cease to be shebait from a date to be fixed hereafter and the management of the debatter estate should be vested in a Receiver to be appointed by this Court.

    The result is that this appeal is allowed and the decree of the Subordinate Judge set aside. It is declared that the sale of Bahirgora held on the 14th January 1913 is not operative against the debatter estate, but the first Defendant is entitled to be reimbursed, the precise amount recoverable by him to be investigated by the. Court below. Steps will be taken forthwith to place the debatter estate in the hands of a Receiver to be appointed by this Court and the first Defendant will cease to be shebait from the date when the Receiver takes possession. Liberty is reserved to both parties to apply. The first Defendant must pay the Plaintiff his costs both here and in the Court below.

    The cross-appeal has not been pressed as such and will therefore stand dismissed.

    N.G
    Appeal allowed.

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    Monohar Mookerjee v. Raja Peary Mohan Mookerjee
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