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  • s. 69A, added to the Transfer of Property Act by Act XX of 1929, having abrogated s. 12
  • s. 69A introduced into the Transfer of Property Act by Act XX of 1929 (India Council)
  • Act or by ss. 6 to 19 inclusive of Act XXVIII of 1866 (India Council)
  • provisions of s. 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act,
  • s. 69 of the Transfer of Property Act (before amendment),
  • provisions of s. 98 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • s. 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act
  • cl. (a) of s. 58 of the Transfer, of Property Act
  • s. 69 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Act (Act XXVIII of 1866, India Council)
  • s. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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  • s. 69A, added to the Transfer of Property Act by Act XX of 1929, having abrogated s. 12
  • s. 69A introduced into the Transfer of Property Act by Act XX of 1929 (India Council)
  • Act or by ss. 6 to 19 inclusive of Act XXVIII of 1866 (India Council)
  • provisions of s. 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act,
  • s. 69 of the Transfer of Property Act (before amendment),
  • provisions of s. 98 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • s. 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act
  • cl. (a) of s. 58 of the Transfer, of Property Act
  • s. 69 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Act (Act XXVIII of 1866, India Council)
  • s. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a dispute regarding the legality of the appointment of a receiver by the mortgagee. The mortgagor (appellant) challenged the appointment of Mr. Baidya Nath Mukherji as receiver over mortgaged premises, contending that the appointment was illegal. The Court of first instance declared the appointment illegal and restrained the receiver from taking possession and collecting rents. However, the District Judge reversed this decision and dismissed the appellant's suit, leading to the present appeal before the court.

The mortgaged property originally belonged to Miss Mary Jones, who mortgaged it to the Administrator-General of Bengal. The appellant purchased the property subject to this mortgage and executed a mortgage bond in favor of Miss Jones. Interest was in arrears for over six months at the time the receiver was appointed. The appellant sought a declaration that the appointment was illegal and an injunction against the receiver.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the mortgage in question is an English mortgage or an anomalous mortgage, and the consequent validity of the receiver's appointment.
  2. Whether the appointment of the receiver under section 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act is valid, particularly in light of section 69A of the Transfer of Property Act which amended the law.
  3. Whether the appointment of the receiver was premature, i.e., made before the mortgage money became due and payable.
  4. Whether the procedural requirements of section 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act, especially the ten-day notice period, were complied with before the receiver's appointment.
  5. Whether the person appointing the receiver, acting under a power-of-attorney, had the authority to do so.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The mortgage is not an English mortgage, thus the appointment of the receiver under the mortgagee's power is invalid.
  • Even if it is an English mortgage, section 69A added to the Transfer of Property Act by Act XX of 1929 abrogated section 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act, making the appointment invalid.
  • The receiver's appointment was premature as the mortgage money was not yet due and payable.
  • The mandatory provisions of section 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act were not complied with, specifically the ten-day notice period was not observed.
  • The person who appointed the receiver under the power-of-attorney lacked authority to do so.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Even if the mortgage is not an English mortgage, it is an anomalous mortgage governed by section 98 of the Transfer of Property Act, meaning the parties' contract governs their rights and liabilities.
  • The mortgage contract expressly grants the mortgagee the power to appoint a receiver in accordance with the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Satya Charan Srimani v. Ramkinkar Banerjee Consideration of whether a mortgage is an English mortgage based on the mortgagor's retention of obligations and ownership rights. The court rejected the appellant's reliance on this case as binding, noting that the relevant observations were not from a Division Bench and thus not binding precedent.
Narayana Ayyar v. Venkantaramana Ayyar Distinction between English and anomalous mortgages based on ownership and rights retained by mortgagor. Referenced in support of appellant’s argument but ultimately not accepted by the court in the present case.
Satya Priya Ghoshal v. Barid Baran Mukherji Interpretation of what constitutes an English mortgage under section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act. Supported the court's view that the mortgage in question is an English mortgage despite certain obligations retained by the mortgagor.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined the nature of the mortgage instrument, noting that the mortgagor conveyed the property absolutely to the mortgagee with a proviso for reconveyance upon repayment, consistent with an English mortgage under section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the mortgage was anomalous due to clauses reserving some obligations to the mortgagor, reasoning that undertaking to pay rates and taxes does not negate absolute conveyance of ownership to the mortgagee.

The court held that the mortgage was executed before the amendment introducing section 69A to the Transfer of Property Act, and thus section 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act remained incorporated by virtue of the contract. Therefore, the appointment of the receiver under section 12 was valid and not superseded by the amendment.

Regarding timing, the court found that the power to appoint a receiver could be exercised before the mortgage money became due and payable if interest was in arrears for six months, which was the case here.

On the procedural point of the ten-day notice, the court disagreed with the District Judge's interpretation that the period ran from the date of the letter rather than its receipt, but held that the contractual clause excluding the statutory notice requirement allowed the appointment without strict adherence to the ten-day period.

Finally, the court held that the power-of-attorney granted to Mr. Deveria authorized him to appoint a receiver. Although this point was not raised below and could have been met by ratification, the court declined to consider it as a fresh ground for the appellant.

Holding and Implications

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The court upheld the legality of the appointment of Mr. Baidya Nath Mukherji as receiver over the portion of the mortgaged premises still subject to the mortgage. The decision clarifies that an English mortgage may incorporate powers under the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act even after amendments, provided the mortgage was executed prior to such amendments. The ruling affirms the mortgagee's contractual right to appoint a receiver without recourse to court under the terms of the mortgage deed and clarifies the interpretation of procedural requirements under section 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act. No new precedent beyond the direct effect on the parties was established.

    Cohen v. Baidya Nath Mukherji

    Bijan Kumar Mukherjea, Pramode Kumar Ray and Bhupendra Nath Das Gupta (jr.) for the first respondent.

    Someshwar Prasad Mukherji Amulya Chandra Sen and Amod Chandra Sen for the second respondent.
    Cur. adv. vult.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    R.C Mitter, J.:— In this appeal, which has been preferred by the mortgagor, the legality of the appointment of a receiver by the mortgagee is in question. The Court of first instance declared the said appointment illegal, and restrained the person so appointed from taking possession of the mortgaged premises and from realising rent from the tenants in possession. The learned District Judge, has, however, held otherwise and has dismissed the appellant's suit.

    Premises No. 57 (formerly No. 28), Baliganj Circular Road, which comprised an area of 10 bighâs, 10 cottâs, 13 chhittâks with buildings, orginally belonged to Miss Mary Jones. She had mortgaged the same to the Administrator-General of Bengal, who is the executor to the estate of Sagar Datta, deceased. She sold the said premises, subject to the said mortgage to the appellant. The appellant executed on July 27, 1928, a mortgage in favour of her of the said premises for a sum of rupees one lakh. One of the clauses of the mortgage bond, the terms and conditions of which will have to be examined hereafter in detail, is that the mortgagor will have the right to dispose of any portion of the mortgaged premises and the mortgagee will have to release and reconvey the said portion to the mortgagor or his nominee, provided that the price received for the same, less brokerage, was paid to the mortgagee. In pursuance of this right reserved to the mortgagor, the appellant has sold about 7 bighâs 2 cottâs odd land out of the mortgaged premises, and the remaining area of about 3 bighâs 8 cottâs odd land together with the building standing thereon is still subject to the mortgage. Interest being admittedly in arrears for over six months, Mr. Deveria, acting on behalf of Miss Jones, and acting under a power-of-attorney executed by her on February 12, 1926, appointed, under the provisions of s. 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act, the respondent No. 1, Mr. Baidya Nath Mukherji, a pleader of Alipore, receiver on June 16, 1933. This gentleman attempted to realise rent from the tenants occupying the mortgaged premises. The mortgagor, namely, the appellant, brought the suit, out of which this appeal arises, for a declaration that the said appointment was illegal, and for restraining Mr. Mukherji from taking possession of the mortgaged premises or from realising rent or from disturbing the appellant's possession.

    The appellant's counsel has presented his case before me on the following grounds:—

    (i) as the mortgage is not an English mortgage, the appointment of Mr. Mukherji by the mortgagee as receiver is invalid;

    (ii) even if the mortgage is an English mortgage, the Court can only appoint a receiver, s. 69A, added to the Transfer of Property Act by Act XX of 1929, having abrogated s. 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act;

    (iii) the appointment of a receiver could not be made at the time at which it was made according to the terms of the mortgage instrument as the mortgage money had not at that time become due and payable;

    (iv) at any rate the mandatory provisions of s. 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act have not been complied with, as Mr. Mukherji was nominated receiver by Mr. Deveria before the expiry of ten days from the time when the letter written by the latter asking the appellant to nominate a receiver reached him; and

    (v) Mr. Deveria had no power under the terms of his power-of-attorney to appoint the receiver.

    Besides meeting the points raised by the appellant's counsel, Dr. Mukherjea appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 has raised a further point. He says that even if the mortgage be not an English mortgage, it is undoubtedly an anomalous mortgage, and according to the provisions of s. 98 of the Transfer of Property Act the rights and liabilities of the mortgagor and mortgagee must be determined in accordance with their contract. He further contends that by the contract the mortgagee has been given the power to appoint a receiver in accordance with the provisions of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act. In the view I am taking of the first point raised by Mr. Carden Noad it is unnecessary to deal with this further point raised by Dr. Mukherjea, although I must admit that there is great force in his argument.

    In order to decide the first point it is necessary to recite the main terms of the mortgage instrument. The mortgagor admits receipt of one lakh of rupees and promises to repay it with interest on July 27, 1938. He expressly conveys No. 57, Baliganj Circular Road absolutely to the use of the mortgagee, but subject to the provision that on repayment of the mortgage money with interest it is to be reconveyed to him by the mortgagee. The mortgagor undertakes to pay rates and taxes and other impositions “now or hereafter to become payable” in respect of the mortgaged properties. Part payments of the principal are to be made on fifteen days' notice. The mortgagor reserves the right to substitute with the consent of the mortgagee other properties as security for the mortgagee's dues and the mortgagee cannot withhold his consent if the properties proposed to be given as substitutes are of a certain value defined in the third clause of the instrument. On such substituted security being given the premises then included in the mortgage is to be reconveyed to the mortgagor by the mortgagee. The mortgagor reserves the right to sell any portion of the mortgaged property, and the mortgagee is bound to release and reconvey the said portion so sold at the cost of the mortgagor to him or his nominee, provided that the price obtained less the brokerage commission was paid to the mortgagee. In default of payment of the mortgage money or interest on July 27, 1938, or in default of payment of any money which the mortgagor undertook to pay, the mortgagee will have the right to enter into possession and realise rents and profits. The instrument then provides that it is to be considered as an English mortgage as defined by the Transfer of Property Act and—

    “the power of sale and provisions ancillary or auxiliary thereto conferred upon the mortgagee by the said Act or by ss. 6 to 19 inclusive of Act XXVIII of 1866 (India Council) or any statutory modification thereof shall apply and be deemed to be incorporated in these presents but without the restriction of the last mentioned Act (Act XXVIII of 1866, India Council) contained as to giving notice provided also and it is hereby agreed and declared that the power of sale hereinbefore provided shall not be exercised unless and until default shall be made in the payment of the said principal sum of Rupees one lakh or any part thereof or any other money that may become for the time being due and payable together with interest, if any, thereon on July 27, 1938, or at any other time when the same may become due and/or payable.”

    It is contended by the counsel for the appellant that the clause by which the mortgagor undertook to pay taxes and rates, the clause for substitution of security and the clause for sale of portions of the mortgaged premises by the mortgagor make the mortgage which would otherwise have been an English mortgage, not an English mortgage but an anomalous mortgage. His contention proceeds upon the basis that by an English mortgage the mortgagee is made the full owner till redemption and on redemption only the title is revested in the mortgagor by the act of reconveyance by the mortgagee. In support of his contention he relies upon the cases of Satya Charan Srimani v. Ramkinkar Banerjee and Narayana Ayyar v. Venkantaramana Ayyar. I cannot accept the contention that the mortgage here is not an English mortgage.

    The mortgagor binds himself to repay the money lent on a certain day; he conveys the property absolutely to the mortgagee and there is the provision for reconveyance by the mortgagee to the mortgagor on repayment of the loan. On substitution of security the original security is to be released by the mortgagee but only through a reconveyance, and on sale of portions of the mortgaged premises, the same is to be released by the mortgagee on fulfilment of certain conditions but also through such a reconveyance. The only other thing pointed out by Mr. Noad is that by his undertaking to pay rates and taxes the mortgagor retained to himself some of the obligations of an owner. He says that indicates that absolute ownership was not really intended to be conveyed to the mortgagee. I do not quite follow this argument. The deed conveys absolutely the mortgaged premises to the mortgagee in express terms, subject to the proviso for redemption. I do not see that when by contract the mortgagor undertakes to discharge some of the liabilities which ordinarily are to be discharged by an owner, how can he be said to have retained some of the rights of the owner. To follow the contention to its logical effect when the mortgagor retains possession under a contract embodied in the mortgage, the mortgage cannot be considered to be an English mortgage even if all the three elements of an English mortgage as defined in s. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act be present, for in that case it may be urged with greater force that the mortgagor by contract retains the valuable part of ownership. In India a mortgage is the transfer of an interest in specific immoveable property; in substance it is not the transfer of the whole interest of the mortgagor to the mortgagee. In determining such questions, in my view, cl. (a) of s. 58 of the Transfer, of Property Act cannot be ignored. The view I am taking is supported by two decisions of the Division Bench, namely, in Satya Priya Ghoshal v. Barid Baran Mukherji*. In the case of Satya Charan Srimani v. Ram Kinkar Banerjee(3) the learned Judges were also inclined to follow Falakrishna Pal's case and although one of the learned Judges (Guha, J.) relied upon the fact that the mortgagor undertook to pay rents and royalties for coming to the conclusion that one of the mortgages was not an English mortgage, but the other learned Judge (Lodge, J.) did not think it necessary for the case before them to decide whether the said mortgage was an English mortgage or not. That observation of Guha, J. at the bottom of p. 33 of the report relied upon by the counsel for the appellant cannot therefore be considered to be the decision of a Division Bench and so binding on me.

    I, accordingly, hold that the mortgage, which the appellant executed in favour of Miss Mary Jones, is an English mortgage. By the terms of s. 69 of the Transfer of Property Act (before amendment), and by the contract between the parties also, s. 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act has been incorporated in this mortgage. In my judgment, s. 69A introduced into the Transfer of Property Act by Act XX of 1929 (India Council) has not repealed or modified that section, namely, s. 12 of Act XXVIII of 1866, but the only effect of the amendment in my judgment is that s. 12 of Act XXVIII of 1866 is not to be deemed to be incorporated in an English mortgage, propriore vigore, executed after the amending Act came into force. In this case the mortgage was executed before the amending Act and the terms and incidents thereof, including the terms and conditions introduced into the deed by virtue of s. 69 of the Transfer of Property Act as in force at the date of the mortgage, including the term about the appointment of receiver by the mortgagee without recourse to Court, have not been modified or affected by reason of the amendment by Act XX of 1929 by which the last paragraph of the original s. 69 has been taken out of the statute. Interest for more than six months was admittedly due at the time of the appointment of respondent No. 1 as receiver. As I construe the mortgage instrument the power of sale could not be exercised before July 27, 1938, or till the mortgagor made default in payment of taxes and rates, etc., but the power of appointment of receiver could be exercised before the said date or before the said events, if interest for six months was due.

    I, accordingly, overrule the first three points urged on behalf of the appellant.

    Regarding the fourth point, the facts are these: Mr. Deveria wrote a letter to the appellant on June 2, 1933, requiring him to nominate a person as receiver. The appellant received the letter on June 6, 1933, and did not nominate a person as receiver. Mr. Deveria appointed respondent No. 1 as receiver on June 16, 1933. The learned District Judge has held that the period of ten days mentioned in s. 12 of Act XXVIII of 1866 is to be counted from the date of the letter and not from the date of the receipt of the same by the appellant. Here he is wrong. Time is to be counted from the date of delivery of the letter to the appellant. The statute plainly gives the mortgagor a period of ten days to make his choice. But I do not think that the appointment made on June 16, 1933, is invalid, because, in my judgment, the mortgagor has by his contract as embodied in the mortgage is not entitled to ten days time as provided for in s. 12. The words there are to this effect: “but without restriction in the last-mentioned Act (Act XXVIII of 1866) contained as to giving notice” in my judgment is sufficiently comprehensive. I, accordingly, overrule the fourth point also urged on behalf of the appellant.

    Regarding the last point I hold that under cl. (2) of the power-of-attorney which Mr. Deveria held from Miss Jones he could exercise the powers he has exercised in this case. The attorney is given the power “to execute or enforce powers of sale or other rights, powers of receiving…incident to such mortgages, charges or securities.” This point, however, was not raised in either of the Courts below, and if raised in the Court of first instance could have been met by the plea of ratification by the principal, on the assumption that Mr. Deveria had not the power of appointing a receiver of the mortgaged premises. It would, accordingly, be wrong to allow the appellant to urge this point for the first time here.

    I, accordingly, overrule all the points urged on behalf of the appellant and dismiss this appeal with costs. It must be, however, made clear that respondent No. 1 is the receiver in respect of that portion of premises No. 57, Baliganj Road which is still under mortgage.

    Leave to appeal under s. 15 of the Letters Patent is refused.

    A.K.D
    Appeal dismissed.

    s. 12 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act

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    Comments

    Cohen v. Baidya Nath Mukherji
    (Jun 26, 1936)