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  • Sec. 36(I) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act under Article 8 of Appendix B of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.
  • 7, r. 11 and Sec. 107(2) of the Civil Procedure Code and Sec. 8B(3) and Sec. 12 (ii)(b) of the Court Fees Act
  • Sec. 6(3) of the Court Fees Act and Or. 9, r. 8 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 6 of the Court Fees Act. Sec. 8B of the Court Fees Act
  • Sec. 105A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Court-fees of 12
  • Article 8 or 9, Appendix B, Bengal Money-Lenders Act
  • Sec. 8B(3) of the Court Fees Act. The Court Fees Act
  • Rule 8, Appendix B of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.
  • Civil Procedure Code or in the Court Fees Act
  • Sec. 36 (2)(c) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.
  • Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court Fees Act,
  • Schedule 1, Article 1 of the Court Fees Act
  • Sec. 36 (I) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.
  • Sec. 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act
  • Sec. 7, cl. (iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act
  • Sec. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • Sec. 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • Sec. 8(c) of the Court Fees Act
  • Sec. 6(3) of the Court Fees Act
  • COURT FEES ACT
  • Sec. 6 of the Court Fees Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Sec. 36(I) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act under Article 8 of Appendix B of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.
  • 7, r. 11 and Sec. 107(2) of the Civil Procedure Code and Sec. 8B(3) and Sec. 12 (ii)(b) of the Court Fees Act
  • Sec. 6(3) of the Court Fees Act and Or. 9, r. 8 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 6 of the Court Fees Act. Sec. 8B of the Court Fees Act
  • Sec. 105A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Court-fees of 12
  • Article 8 or 9, Appendix B, Bengal Money-Lenders Act
  • Sec. 8B(3) of the Court Fees Act. The Court Fees Act
  • Rule 8, Appendix B of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.
  • Civil Procedure Code or in the Court Fees Act
  • Sec. 36 (2)(c) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.
  • Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court Fees Act,
  • Schedule 1, Article 1 of the Court Fees Act
  • Sec. 36 (I) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.
  • Sec. 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act
  • Sec. 7, cl. (iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act
  • Sec. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • Sec. 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • Sec. 8(c) of the Court Fees Act
  • Sec. 6(3) of the Court Fees Act
  • COURT FEES ACT
  • Sec. 6 of the Court Fees Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 2 September 1924 Manmatha took a mortgage loan of Rs. 99 from Respondent No. 1 (the mortgagee). Interest and subsequent transfers followed:

  • Manmatha's heirs later sold a portion of the mortgaged properties to Respondent No. 4; an alleged payment of Rs. 98 was made towards the mortgage.
  • Respondent No. 1 instituted a mortgage suit against Respondents Nos. 4–6 and Priyabala; on 23 November a final decree was passed; the mortgaged properties were sold and purchased by Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
  • Priyabala was added as a party as a subsequent mortgagee and executed a deed of release in favour of the Plaintiff-Appellant on 24 November 1939.

The Plaintiff-Appellant instituted the present suit seeking, inter alia:

  • Re-opening of the mortgage decree and a new decree payable in instalments;
  • An injunction restraining Respondents Nos. 1–3 from proceeding with Execution Case No. 208 of 1940;
  • Confirmation or, alternatively, recovery of possession;
  • A declaration that Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were benamdars of Respondent No. 1.

On filing the plaint, court-fee of Re. 1 was paid under Rule 8, Appendix B of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. The mortgagee (Respondent No. 1) objected that ad valorem court-fees were payable. The learned Munsif held the suit did not fall within Sec. 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act for the purpose of small fixed fee and raised the valuation to Rs. 250, directing payment of deficit court-fees; failure to pay led to rejection of the plaint on 10 July 1942 (Order No. 11). The Plaintiff appealed to the lower Appellate Court; the appeal was registered as a Title Appeal and the District Judge required payment of deficit court-fees and other formalities. The memorandum of appeal was rejected by the lower Appellate Court on 1 September 1942 for non-compliance. The Plaintiff appealed to this Court against that rejection. The present opinion disposes of that appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal to this Court is competent against an order of a lower Appellate Court rejecting a memorandum of appeal that was filed but insufficiently stamped or for which deficit court-fees were directed to be paid.
  2. Whether the lower Appellate Court was correct in rejecting the memorandum of appeal (as opposed to dismissing it for default) for non-payment of deficit court-fees under the amended Court Fees Act.
  3. Whether the trial Court's plaint rejection amounted to a decree under Sec. 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, allowing a second appeal to this Court.
  4. Whether the plaint in the present suit fell within Sec. 36(1) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act (entitling payment of the fixed fee under Appendix B) or whether ad valorem fees were payable on the memorandum of appeal under Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court Fees Act.
  5. If ad valorem fees are payable on the memorandum of appeal, what is the proper valuation procedure and what remedy should be directed by this Court (including any inquiry under Sec. 8C of the Court Fees Act)?

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent No. 1 (represented by Mr. Purushottam Chatterjee)

  • A preliminary objection: the appeal to this Court is incompetent because it is directed against an order rejecting a memorandum of appeal (i.e., not an appealable decree).
  • In the alternative: the order rejecting the memorandum of appeal was an order of dismissal for default (passed in the Appellant's absence), and no appeal lies against such an order.
  • Substantively: the Plaintiff's prayers (declaration that auction-purchasers are benamdars and for recovery or confirmation of possession) were outside the scope of Sec. 36(1) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act and thus ad valorem court-fee should have been paid on the plaint; the Munsif's valuation (Rs. 250) was relevant to this contention.
  • Relied on several cases (Jnanadasundari Shaha v. Madhabchandni Mala and others) to support the submission that the rejection of a memorandum of appeal on insufficient stamp or non-payment may not be an appealable order.

Appellant / Plaintiff

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Appellant's legal arguments beyond the procedural steps taken (filing the suit, paying Re. 1 under the Money-Lenders Act rule, pursuing the appeal and seeking relief from rejection). At a late stage the parties agreed a valuation for the subject-matter of the appeal (see reasoning and directions below).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Jnanadasundari Shaha v. Madhabchandni Mala Held rejection of a memorandum of appeal on insufficient stamp does not amount to a decree within Sec. 2 of the CPC; appeal against such rejection held incompetent in that case. Court considered the case and observed that its facts differ from the present; it was relied upon by Respondent but did not control the result here because in the present instance the trial Court's order rejecting the plaint had the force of a decree.
Sm. Annapurna Dassi v. Sarat Chandra Bhattacharji Holds that an order of rejection of the plaint by the trial Court is a decree under Sec. 2(2) CPC and thereby open to a second appeal. Court relied on this authority to hold that the trial Court's rejection of the plaint was a decree and that a second appeal to this Court was competent.
Charusila Dasi v. Abhilas Bauri Considered appeals where deficit court-fees led to dismissal by the Special Judge; the Court held appeals to be incompetent where the Special Judge's orders were regarded as rejections of memoranda of appeal. Cited by Respondent for the proposition that appeals where memoranda were rejected for insufficient stamp/court-fees can be incompetent; Court treated it as relevant precedent but distinguished facts where necessary.
Abdul Majid Mridiia v. Amina Khatun Held dismissal of an appeal for non-prosecution (in that context) could not be equated with dismissal for default under Sec. 2(b) CPC; observed that dismissals under the Court Fees Act may be appealable as decrees. Court noted that observations in this case supported the Appellant's position on appealability; however the Court did not need to fully reconcile the decisions because the trial Court's order here had decree effect under Sec. 2(2) CPC.
Jarimon Khatun v. Secretary of State for India in Council Observed that where the trial Court directed payment of deficit court-fees after enquiry under Sec. 8(c) of the Court Fees Act and rejected the plaint, the proper order might be dismissal under Sec. 8B(3); appeal to this Court was held competent. Court observed that this precedent had no direct bearing on the present controversy because, in that case, an appeal lay in any event.
Mirza Md. Anwarul Ashan v. Musstt Nazmin Begam (Allahabad High Court) Distinguished dismissal under Court Fees Act provisions from dismissal for default; held that dismissal under the Court Fees Act cannot be treated as a default dismissal under Civil Procedure rules. Cited to support the proposition that rejection/dismissal for non-payment of court-fees under the Court Fees Act is not a simple default dismissal and to justify the two-stage statutory process (rejection then later dismissal under Sec. 8B(3)).
Mahendra Chandra Ganguli v. Ashutosh Ganguli Authority regarding joinder/permissibility of parties when restoration of possession and benamdar status is in issue (as cited). Court relied on this authority to hold that joinder of Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (auction-purchasers) was permissible to determine whether they were benamdars of the decree-holder.
Kshitish Chandra Maitra v. Satish Chandra Ghosh Held that a memorandum of appeal filed against an order under the Bengal Money-Lenders Act must have court-fees paid under Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court Fees Act (i.e., ad valorem on the subject-matter of the appeal). Court applied this authority to hold that the memorandum of appeal should have been stamped with ad valorem court-fees under Schedule I, Article 1; Articles 8 and 9 of Appendix B did not govern the memorandum of appeal for Court Fees purposes.
Pran Hari Baidya v. Jogesh Chandra Choudhury Affirmation of the view that ad valorem court-fees under Schedule I, Article 1 govern appeals arising from Bengal Money-Lenders Act matters. Cited as confirming the rule applied from Kshitish Chandra Maitra; used to support the conclusion that ad valorem fees were payable on the memorandum of appeal.
Hrishikesh Mukherji v. Jagadish Chandra Roy Choudhury Held the court-fees on a memorandum of appeal are payable on the value of the property under Schedule I, Article 1 and that such value cannot be less than the auction price paid by the auction-purchaser. Court relied on this principle to reason that the subject-matter value for court-fees must reflect the practical value (including auction price) and that further inquiry under Sec. 8C might be necessary.
Taraprosonno Chongdar v. Nrisinha Murari Pal Case in which this Court ordered payment of deficit court-fees in the appellate hierarchy and directed specific payments. Cited as authority for the form of remedial order (requiring payment of deficit court-fees in the relevant courts) and for retaining the appeal conditionally while directing payments.
Nalini Nath Mallick Thakur v. Radhashyam Marwari Directed enquiry under Sec. 8C of the Court Fees Act to adjust rights of parties in payment of court-fees and retained the appeal pending the enquiry. Cited as precedent for ordering an enquiry under Sec. 8C and for the procedural option of retaining the appeal pending a report; Court discussed that option but chose a summary settlement here due to low value of subject-matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured way, addressing competence, the statutory framework for court-fees, and the proper remedy.

  1. Competence of the appeal:

    The Court first overruled the preliminary objection that the appeal to this Court was incompetent. It distinguished earlier decisions (noting factual differences) and relied on the principle in Annapurna Dasi v. Sarat Chandra Bhattacharji that the trial Court's rejection of a plaint can have the force of a decree under Sec. 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, thereby making a second appeal to this Court competent.

  2. Whether the lower Appellate Court should have rejected the memorandum of appeal or dismissed it for default:

    The Court examined the legislative amendments in Bengal (Court Fees (Bengal Third Amendment) Act, 1935) and the text of Sec. 6(2) (as inserted), Sec. 8B and related provisions. It concluded that the amended statutory scheme contemplates a two-stage process:

    • First stage (under Sec. 6(2)): the Appellate Court may accept a memorandum of appeal subject to the Appellant being directed to pay a reasonable sum (determined ex parte) within a fixed time; failure to pay in that stage permits rejection of the memorandum of appeal.
    • Second stage (under Sec. 8B as amended): once proceedings proceed, if an insufficient court-fee is found the Court may stay proceedings, fix a date for payment or security, and, if the appellant fails to give security or pay, dismiss the suit or appeal under Sec. 8B(3).

    Given this two-stage statutory scheme, the Court held the lower Appellate Court was correct to reject the memorandum of appeal for non-payment of the reasonable sum determined ex parte by the Sheristadar and accepted by the District Judge. The Court rejected the argument that rejection should have been treated as a dismissal for default merely because the Appellant or his pleader did not appear: the statutory scheme draws a clear distinction between rejection (earlier stage) and dismissal for default (later stage).

  3. Whether the plaint and/or the memorandum of appeal should have ad valorem court-fees:

    The Court examined whether the plaint was properly within Sec. 36(1) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act and the relevant Article of Appendix B. The Court found that, substantially, the plaint sought re-opening of the mortgage decree and a new decree with instalments, and that the prayer for recovery/confirmation of possession was really intended to be a restoration of possession under Sec. 36(2)(c). The Court held the plaint itself was substantially one under Sec. 36(1) and that the Re. 1 court-fee under Article 8, Appendix B was properly paid on the plaint; the Munsif was wrong to reject the plaint on that ground.

    However, the Court then observed that the memorandum of appeal is governed, for court-fee purposes, by the Court Fees Act (Schedule I, Article 1) and not by Articles 8 or 9 of Appendix B. Citing Kshitish Chandra Maitra and later authorities, the Court held that a memorandum of appeal filed against an order under the Bengal Money-Lenders Act must carry ad valorem court-fees based on the subject-matter of the appeal. In this case the subject-matter (restoration of possession and re-opening of decree) was such that ad valorem fees were payable on the memorandum of appeal; the plaint fee (Re. 1) did not relieve the memorandum of appeal from ad valorem requirements.

    The Court also noted that valuation for the purpose of calculating ad valorem fees may require further inquiry under Sec. 8C because the value of the appeal cannot be less than practical measures such as the price paid by an auction-purchaser; the Munsif's Rs. 250 figure did not necessarily represent the correct value for the appeal.

  4. Remedy and practical disposition:

    Noting precedents about making enquiries under Sec. 8C and balancing procedural economy (the subject-matter was of low value), the Court recorded the parties' agreement to value the subject-matter at Rs. 100 for fee computation. The Court calculated the consequent deficit court-fees (aggregate additional fee required in both the lower Appellate Court and this Court) as Rs. 20-8, the Appellant having already paid Re. 1 in each forum.

    Accordingly, the Court made a conditional dispositive order: the Appellant must pay Rs. 20-8 within four weeks. If the amount is paid, the appeal will be allowed, the lower Appellate Court's order rejecting the memorandum of appeal and the trial Court's order rejecting the plaint will be set aside, and the case will be remitted to the trial Court for disposal on the footing that proper court-fees had been paid on the plaint. If the amount is not deposited within the time limited, the appeal will stand dismissed.

    The Court directed no order as to costs in either this Court or the lower Appellate Court and made no further order on the office report.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The preliminary objection to competency is overruled; the lower Appellate Court was justified in rejecting the memorandum of appeal for non-payment of the deficit court-fees at the first (ex parte) stage under Sec. 6(2) of the Court Fees Act, but this Court will conditionally allow the appeal if the Appellant pays the additional court-fees directed within the time fixed.

Direct consequences and practical implications for the parties:

  • If the Appellant pays the additional court-fees of Rs. 20-8 within four weeks, this Court will:
    • Allow the appeal;
    • Set aside the lower Appellate Court's order rejecting the memorandum of appeal;
    • Set aside the trial Court's order rejecting the plaint;
    • Remit the case to the trial Court for disposal on the footing that proper court-fees have been paid on the plaint.
  • If the Appellant fails to pay the additional court-fees within four weeks, the appeal will be dismissed.
  • The Court ordered no costs either in this Court or in the lower Appellate Court.

Broader legal implications: The opinion interprets and applies the two-stage scheme created by the Bengal amendment to the Court Fees Act (distinguishing the ex parte rejection stage from later dismissal under Sec. 8B(3)), and applies established authority that memoranda of appeal arising from Bengal Money-Lenders Act proceedings are subject to ad valorem fees under Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court Fees Act. The opinion does not expressly purport to lay down a new precedent beyond these applications of statutory text and existing case law; its practical directive is limited to the disposition of the present appeal and the conditional directions given above.

    Sudhir Kumar Chtterjee v. Mohadeb Chakrabarty

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:

    1. This appeal is on behalf of the Plaintiff. The facts are that on the 2nd of September, 1924, one Manmatha took a loan on a mortgage from Defendant No. 1. The sum advanced was Rs. 99 and carried interest at the rate of Re. 1-9 as per cent per annum. In course of time Manmatha's heirs sold a portion of the mortgaged properties to Respondent No. 4. It is alleged that a sum of Rs. 98 was paid towards the mortgage. A mortgage suit was instituted by Respondent No. 1 against Respondents Nos. 4 to 6 and one Priyabala. On the 23rd of November a final decree was passed on the mortgage and the mortgage properties were subsequently sold and were purchased by Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Respondent No. 5 and Priyabala were added as parties to the mortgage suit on the allegation that they were subsequent mortgagees. On the 24th of November, 1939, Priyabala executed a deed of release in favour of the Plaintiff Appellant. The Plaintiff Appellant instituted the present suit praying for relief that the decree in he mortgage suit be re-opened and a new decree be passed and the amount of the new decree be made payable in certain instalments. It was further prayed that an injunction may be issued restraining Defendants Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 from proceeding with the Execution Case No. 208 of 1940. There was also a prayer for confirmation of possession and in the alternative for recovery of possession in case Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 took possession of the mortgaged properties. There was also a prayer for declaration that Respondents Nos. 2 and 3, the purchasers at the mortgage sale, were the benamdars of Respondent No. 1, the mortgagee decree-holder. On the plaint a court-fee of Re. 1 only was paid in terms of Rule 8, Appendix B of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. An objection was raised on behalf of the mortgagee Respondent No. 1, that the court-fees paid on the plaint was insufficient and that ad valorem court-fees should be paid. This question was heard by the learned Munsif and by his order No. 10 dated the 3rd of July, 1942, the learned Munsif held that the suit did not properly come within the purview of Sec. 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act and that as the Plaintiff had prayed for recovery of possession on declaration that Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were benamdars of Respondent No. 1, ad valorem court-fees on the value of the property was payable. The learned Munsif accordingly raised the valuation of the suit to Rs. 250 and directed the Plaintiff Appellant to pay the deficit court-fees on the plaint by the 10th of July, 1942. The deficit court-fees on the plaint not having been put in, the learned Munsif by his order No. 11 dated the 10th of July, 1942, directed that the plaint be rejected. Against the said order No. 11 dated the 10th of July, 1942, the Plaintiff preferred an appeal to the lower Appellate Court. The appeal was presented on the 17th of August, 1942, and was classed by the Plaintiff Appellant as Miscellaneous Appeal. Court-fees of Re. 1 was paid on the memorandum of appeal. The certified copy of order No. 11 dated the 10th of July, 1942, only was annexed to the memorandum of appeal. The sheristadar submitted a report that ad valorem court-fees was payable. On the 25th of August, 1942, the learned District Judge directed the appeal to be registered as Title Appeal No. 126 of 1942 and on a perusal of the office report directed the Appellant to file the deficit court-fees of Rs. 27 annas 2 as also the process-fees Rs. 3 and written-up processes and certified copy of the Munsif's order dated the 3rd of July, 1942, within a week. The Appellant was directed to take necessary steps for correction of the memorandum of appeal in the meantime. The appeal was directed to be put up on the 1st of September for orders.

    2. On the 1st of September, 1942, the Plaintiff Appellant took no steps, his pleader could not be found. The learned District Judge thereupon directed by order No. 2 dated the 1st of September, 1942, that the memorandum of appeal be rejected. Against that order the Plaintiff has preferred this appeal. This appeal was heard in part on the 4th of July, 1947. As the appeal involved questions concerning the amount of court-fees payable, a notice was issued on the learned senior Government pleader to appear in this case. Mr. Imam Hussain Choudhury, learned Assistant Government pleader, appeared at the time of the hearing of this appeal.

    3. Mr. Purushottam Chatterjee, appearing for Respondent No. 1 raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was incompetent inasmuch as it was directed against an order rejecting a memorandum of appeal. In the alternative he argued that as the order complained of was passed in the absence of the Appellant it was an order of dismissal for default and no appeal lay against the order. Mr. Chatterjee relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Jnanadasundari Shaha v. Madhabchandni Mala(1). In that case it was held that the rejection of a memorandum of appeal on the ground that it was insufficiently stamped does not amount to a decree within the meaning of Sec. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was pointed out by Mr. Justice Suhrawardy that Sec. 107 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure no doubt invests the Appellate Court with the same powers as are conferred on a Court of Original Jurisdiction, but it does not purport to give the order passed by the Appellate Court the same effect as an order passed by an original Court of a like nature. The facts of that case are, however, entirely different. In that case a decree under Or. 34, r. 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure was passed on the 23rd of December, 1930. An application for amendment of the decree was rejected by the trial Court; against the order rejecting the application a petition under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was moved in this Court but was rejected on the 5th of December, 1930. On the 23rd of December, 1930, an appeal was filed before the District Judge against the personal decree with a court-fees stamp of Re. 1 only. The lower Appellate Court thought that ad valorem court-fees was payable and directed the Appellant to pay the deficit court-fees within a certain time. The court-fees called for not having been paid within the time fixed, the lower Appellate Court rejected the memorandum of appeal by an order dated the 7th of January, 1931. This Court held that the appeal against the order of the lower Appellate Court rejecting the memorandum of appeal was incompetent.

    4. In this case, however, the trial Court has rejected the plaint; the order of rejection of the plaint by the trial Court is a decree under Sec. 2, cl. (2) of the Civil Procedure Code, as such the order of the trial Court is open to a second appeal. This view is fully supported by the decision of this Court in the case of Sm. Annapnma Dassi v. Sarat Chandra Bhattacharji(2).

    5. Mr. Chatterjee next relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Charusila Dasi v. Abhilas Bauri(3). In that case the landlord Appellant Sm. Charusila Dasi had filed three applications under Sec. 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Issues were raised under Sec. 105A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Court-fees of 12 annas was paid on each application and additional court-fees of Rs. 20 was put in for issues raised under Sec. 105A. The Revenue Officer dismissed the applications filed by the landlord. Against the order of dismissal appeals were taken to the Special Judge. The Special Judge was of opinion that ad valorem court-fees was payable on the ground that the case really came within Sec. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Time was granted to put in the deficit court-fees. This was not done within the time granted, with the result that the appeals were dismissed by the Special Judge. Against the order of the Special Judge a second appeal was preferred to this Court. It was objected on behalf of the Respondent that the appeals were incompetent. Mr. Justice Nasim Ali delivering the judgment of this Court held that though the orders of the Special Judge were orders of dismissal of the appeals, strictly speaking, those orders were made for non-payment of the deficit court-fees and must be regarded as orders rejecting the memorandum of appeals. Relying on the decision of this Court in the case of Jnanadasundari Shaha v. Madhabchandra Mala, it was held that the appeals to this Court were incompetent.

    6. The next case to which the reference has been made is the case of Abdul Majid Mridiia…Defendant, v. Amina Khatun…Plaintiff, .*(4). In this case an ex parte decree for dissolution of marriage was passed by the trial Court. Against the ex parte decree an appeal was filed before the District Judge by the Defendant on payment of a fixed court-fees of Rs. 15. The learned District Judge held that ad valorem court-fee was payable under Sec. 7, cl. (iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act and as the suit had been valued at Rs. 1,100 the learned District Judge directed the Appellant to pay the deficit court-fees. Such court-fees not having been paid, the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution. Against the order of the Appellate Court, a second appeal was taken to this Court. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the Respondent that the appeal was incompetent, first, on the ground that it was an order rejecting the memorandum of appeal and was not appealable on the authority of the cases of Jnanada Sundari Saha v. Madhab Chandra Mala and of Charusila Dassi v. Abilash Bauri and, secondly, on the ground that the order of the Appellate Court being one of dismissal for non-prosecution was really one of dismissal of the appeal for default and had not the force of a decree under Or. 2, r. (2), Civil Procedure Code and was not appealable. In dealing with the first part of the preliminary objection Mr. Justice Biswas observed that it was doubtful how far the cases cited might be regarded as covering the point which was then before the Court. His Lordship observed that the dismissal of the appeal for non-prosecution could not be regarded as an order of dismissal for default under Sec. 2(b) of the Civil Procedure Code because there was no provision either in the Civil Procedure Code or in the Court Fees Act for dismissal of an appeal for default for non-payment of court-fees. After referring to Or. 7, r. 11 and Sec. 107(2) of the Civil Procedure Code and Sec. 8B(3) and Sec. 12 (ii)(b) of the Court Fees Act his Lordship observed at p. 700 as follows:— “I see no reason, therefore, why such a decision involving the dismissal of a suit or an appeal under the Court Fees Act should not be held to be appealable as a decree. In my opinion, it should be wholly immaterial that the appeal is directed, not against the adjudication itself but against the consequent order of dismissal.” These observations support the Appellant but in the facts of this case, it is not necessary for me to consider the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that the observations made by his Lordship are opposed to the decisions in Charusila Dassi's case and the terms of Sec. 6 of the Court Fees Act as now amended. In the present case, the order of the trial Court had the force of a decree and, therefore, a second appeal lies under Sec. 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, on the authority of the decision in Annapurna Dasi v. Sarat Chandra Bhattacharji already referred to.

    7. Reference was also made to the case of Jarimon Khatun v. Secretary of State for India in Council(5). In that case the trial Court after enquiry under Sec. 8(c) of the Court Fees Act directed the Plaintiff to pay the deficit court-fees and on the Plaintiff's failure to do so, rejected the plaint. Mr. Justice R.C Mitter observed that the proper order to pass was not to reject the plaint under Or. 7, r. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure but to dismiss the suit under Sec. 8B(3) of the Civil Procedure Code; it was held that the appeal to this Court was competent. This case, in my opinion, has no bearing on the question now in controversy because in that case whether the order of the trial Court amounted to a rejection of the plaint or a dismissal of the suit in either event an appeal lay to this Court.

    8. The preliminary objection raised must, therefore, be overruled.

    9. We shall now consider the merits of the appeal. The lower Appellate Court dismissed the appeal for non-compliance with the directions given by it on the 25th August, 1942. In so far as the direction required the Appellant to file a certified copy of the order of the Munsif dated July 3, 1942, in my opinion, the direction is not proper. The appeal was filed against the final order rejecting the plaint, which was passed on the 10th July, 1942. A certified copy of that order had been appended to the memorandum of appeal filed in the lower Appellate Court. The other ground on which the lower Appellate Court rejected the memorandum of appeal was non-payment of the deficit court-fees which was directed to be paid by the Appellant.

    10. This brings us to a discussion of the question whether the proper order to pass was one for rejection of the memorandum of appeal or for dismissal of the memorandum of appeal for default. The Court Fees Act was amended in Bengal by the Court Fees (Bengal Third Amendment) Act, 1935 (Bengal Act I of 1936), Sec. 6 (2) of the Act reads as follows:— “Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (I) or in any other Act, a Court may receive a plaint or memorandum of appeal in respect of which an insufficient fee has been paid (subject to the condition that the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be rejected unless the Plaintiff or Appellant, as the case may be, pays to the Court within a time to be fixed by the Court such reasonable sum on account of court-fees as the Court may direct).” This sub-section, therefore, empowers the Appellate Court after the memorandum of appeal has been filed to direct the Appellant to pay such court-fees as seem reasonable to the Appellate Court and in default to reject the memorandum of appeal. What sum would be regarded as reasonable fees must at that stage, be determined by the Appellate Court ex parte, on the materials available to that Court. In the present case, the Sheristadar had called for the records of the trial Court and on perusal of the same had reported that the deficit court-fees of Rs. 27-2 was payable. The learned District Judge accepted the office report and made an order for payment of such deficit court-fees and in default of payment of such court-fees, rejected the memorandum of appeal. Such a procedure is amply supported by sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 6 of the Court Fees Act. Sec. 8B of the Court Fees Act contemplates a later stage. Sec. 8B as amended in 1936 is as follows:—

    “(1) In every suit in which a court-fee is payable under this Act on the plaint or memorandum of appeal the Court shall (on the date fixed for the appearance of the Opposite party or as Boon as may be thereafter), and in every case before proceeding to deliver judgment record a finding whether a sufficient court-fee has been paid.”

    (2) If the Court records a finding that an insufficient court-fee has been paid on the plant or memorandum of appeal the Court shall,

    (a) stay all further proceedings in the suit until it has determined the proper amount of such court-fee payable and the plaintiff or the appellant, as the case may be has paid such amount or until the date referred to in clause (b) as the case may be.

    Provided that if the plaintiff or appellant gives within such time as the Court may allow, security, to the satisfaction of the Court, for the payment of any additional amount for which he may be found liable the Court may proceed with the suit.

    (b) fix a data before which the plaintiff or appellant shall pay the amount of court-fee due from him, as determined by the Court under clause (a).

    (3) If the plaintiff or appellant falls to give the security referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (2) or to pay the amount referred to in clause (b) of that sub-section within the time allowed, or before the data fixed, by the Court, as the case may be, the suit shall be dismissed.”

    11. Sec. 2(4) defines a suit as including an appeal from a decree except in Sec. 8A.

    12. The effect of the amendment is that the Appellate Court will first determine ex parte a reasonable sum to be paid as court-fees. If this sum is paid the appeal is registered and further proceedings in appeal follow. A notice to the Respondent would then issue; after such notice has been served, either on the date of appearance of the Respondent or on any subsequent date but before delivering the judgment the lower Appellate Court will hear the parties and record its finding as to the amount of court-fees properly payable on the memorandum of appeal. The Court will then give the Appellant time to furnish security for such court-fees, if the Appellant is not in a position to pay the due court-fees all at once. If such security is furnished the appeal will proceed but before the appeal is taken up for hearing, the Court will direct the Appellant to put in the deficit court-fees. In default of furnishing security or of payment of the court-fees the Court will dismiss the appeal under Sec. 8B(3) of the Court Fees Act. The Court Fees Act clearly contemplates two stages so far as payment of court-fees is concerned. In the first stage, failure to pay the reasonable court-fees entails a rejection of the memorandum of appeal and at a later stage failure as aforesaid entails a dismissal of the appeal. In my opinion, the lower Appellate Court was right in rejecting the memorandum of appeal for non-payment of court-fees. It was urged that the lower Appellate Court should have dismissed the appeal for default as the Appellant or his pleader did not appear before the Court. This contention has no force and is opposed to the decision in the case of Abdul Majid Mridiia…Defendant, v. Amina Khatun…Plaintiff, .* to which I have already referred. The same view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Mirza Md. Anwarul Ashan v. Musstt Nazmin Begam(6). In that case, the Inspector of Stamps on inspection of the records made a report to the Court that the court-fees paid was insufficient. On that report the Court recorded a finding that a sum of Rs. 705 was to be paid as additional court-fees on the plaint. The Plaintiff furnished security for this sum and the suit proceeded in due course before the hearing had commenced an application was made for amendment of the plaint. The Court granted the amendment and came to a finding as to the amount of court-fee to be paid and directed the Plaintiff to pay the deficit court-fees before the final hearing. The court-fee called for was not paid within the time allowed by the Court; the Court then passed an order under Sec. 6(3) of the Court Fees Act as amended by the U.P Legislature and directed the suit to be dismissed. Thereafter the Plaintiff made an application under Or. 9, r. 9, Code of Civil Procedure on the footing that the order dismissing the suit under Sec. 6(3) of the Court Fees Act was really a dismissal of the suit for default and the application which was filed under Or. 9, r. 9 was competent. The application was dismissed by the trial Court An appeal was taken to the lower Appellate Court. The Respondent raised a preliminary objection that the dismissal could not be regarded as one under Or. 9, r 8 and, therefore, Or. 9, r. 9 did not apply and the appeal was incompetent. Verma and Bind Basini Prasad, JJ., concurred in holding that the order of the trial Court which was passed under Sec. 6(3) of the Court Fees Act was justified by the terms of the Court Fees Act and could not be regarded as dismissal of the suit for default. It was pointed out that the dismissal was occasioned not by the failure on the part of the Plaintiff to appear when the case was called on for hearing but was brought about by a failure on the part of the Plaintiff to make good the deficit court-fees for which the Court had granted time. Bind Basini Prasad, J., further observed that Sec. 6(3) of the Court Fees Act and Or. 9, r. 8 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplate different stages of the suit. Sec. 6(3) of the Court Fees Act refers to the earlier stage of the suit when the plaint is presented. Or. 9, r. 8 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates a later stage after the suit had been registered and a date for hearing of the suit had been fixed and then default was made by the Plaintiff in appearance.

    13. Having regard to the principles discussed above, it cannot be said that the lower Appellate Court should have dismissed the memorandum of appeal for default and was not right in rejecting the memorandum of appeal. This brings me to a consideration of the question as to the amount of court-fees payable on the memorandum of appeal and on the plaint. To decide this question it is necessary to consider whether the suit can be regarded as a suit under Sec. 36 (I) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. Mr. Chatterjee appearing for the Respondent argues that the Plaintiff had prayed for a declaration that Defendants Nos. 2 and 3, the auction-purchasers, are benamdars for the decree-holder Defendant No. 1; such a prayer was outside the scope of a suit under Sec. 36 (I) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. He also argues that the prayer for confirmation of possession and in the alternative for recovery of possession is outside the scope of a suit under Sec. 36(I) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. It is true that the plaint is not happily drawn. The substance of the matter is that the Plaintiff was seeking to re-open the mortgage decree and the passing of a new decree to be paid in certain instalments. The prayer which was couched for one for recovery of possession was really intended to be a prayer for restoration of possession under Sec. 36 (2)(c) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. The prayer for declaration that Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are benamdars of Defendant No. 1 was redundant in this case. The plaint alleged that Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were benamdars of Defendant No. 1 and the purchase at the mortgage sale was really made by the mortgagee decree-holder Defendant No. 1. The allegation was made with a view to get an order for restoration of possession on the ground that the possession of the mortgage properties was really with Defendant No. 1 the decree-holder and not with stranger auction-purchaser (Defendants Nos. 2 and 3) they being his benamdars. In my opinion the joinder of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 is permissible to decide this question. See Mahendra Chandra Ganguli v. Ashutosh Ganguli(7). Substantially the plaint was one under Sec. 36(I) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act under Article 8 of Appendix B of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. The court-fee of Re. 1 was properly paid on the plaint, ad valorem court-fee was not required to be paid. The Munsif was not right in rejecting the plaint on this ground. This, however, does not clear the way for the Plaintiff's success in this suit. The Plaintiff had filed an appeal against the order of rejection of the plaint which had the force of a decree. It has been held by this Court that on a memorandum of appeal filed against an order passed under the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, court-fees are payable not in terms of Article 8 or 9, Appendix B, Bengal Money-Lenders Act but under Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court Fees Act, see the case of Kshitish Chandra Maitra v. Satish Chandra Ghosh(8). In that case the decree had been re-opened by the trial Court but not to the extent desired by the borrower. The borrower preferred an appeal to the lower Appellate Court. The lower Appellate Court was of opinion that ad valorem court-fee was payable. Against the order of the lower Appellate Court an application in revision was taken to this Court. It was contended on behalf of the Petitioner that Articles 8 and 9 of Appendix B would apply the word “suit” having been defined in the Act as including an appeal. This contention, was negatived by Mr. Justice Mukherjee who held that the proper Article to govern the case was Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court Fees Act and ad valorem court-fees was payable, the sum payable being dependent on the subject-matter of the appeal. This view was affirmed in the case of Pran Hari Baidya v. Jogesh Chandra Choudhury(9). The question was again considered on a reference under the Stamp Act by Akram, J., in the case of Hrishikesh Mukherji v. Jagadish Chandra Roy Choudhury(10). In that case the decree-holder auction-purchaser had assigned his rights to a stranger. An appeal was filed by the assignee against the order of the Court below directing the restoration of possession of the auction-purchased properties. The amount payable under the decree was not, however, challenged. It was held that the court-fees on the memorandum of appeal would be payable on the value of the property under Schedule 1, Article 1 of the Court Fees Act and in any event such a value cannot be less than the price paid by the auction-purchaser for the property purchased by him.

    14. The position, therefore, is that the memorandum of appeal before the lower Appellate Court should have been stamped with court-fees payable on the value of the subject-matter of the appeal. The Plaintiff had played for re-opening the decree and for restoration of possession of the mortgaged properties. In case the suit succeeded he would get back possession of the mortgaged properties, in case he was out of possession but he would have to pay the amount of the new decree in certain instalments. The prayer for restoration of possession is ancilliary and is dependent on the prayer for re-opening the decree. The learned Munsif had found that the value of the mortgaged properties is Ra. 250. Assuming that this is a correct value of the property, this does not correctly represent the value of the subject-matter of the appeal. A further inquiry under Sec. 8C of the Court Fees Act would be necessary.

    15. The question then arises as to the form of the order to be passed in this appeal.

    16. In the case of Taraprosonno Chongdar v. Nrisinha Murari Pal(11) this Court made an order requiring the Appellant to pay the deficit court-fees on the memorandum of appeal and the plaint respectively in this Court and in the trial Court and directed the payment to be made within a certain time. In a later case of Nalini Nath Mallick Thakur v. Radhashyam Marwari(12) which was a second appeal pending in this Court. Mr. Justice Edgley held that the Plaintiff had paid deficit court-fees in the trial Court, the Defendant who was the Appellant in the lower Appellate Court and in this Court had paid deficit court-fees in the lower Appellate Court and in this Court. In order to adjust the rights of the parties in the matter of payment of court-fees his Lordship directed the trial Court to make an enquiry under Sec. 8C of the Court Fees Act as regards the amount of court-fees payable. His Lordship directed the case to be retained on the file of this Court and the appeal to be put up for further orders on receipt of the report of the trial Court under Sec. 8C of the Court Fees Act. Such a procedure, if adopted, would mean that the case will remain on file for the enquiry to be directed under Sec. 8C of the Court Fees Act. The subject-matter in dispute is not of much value. The learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the parties have agreed that the subject-matter of appeal may be valued at Rs. 100 and the court-fees payable would be Rs. 11-4. The Appellant has paid Re. 1 as court-fee in this Court and in the lower Appellate Court. An additional court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal in the lower Appellate Court and in this Court in the aggregate would be Rs. 20-8. This sum must be paid within four weeks from this date. If this sum is paid within the time so limited, this appeal will be allowed, the order of rejection of the memorandum of appeal in the lower Appellate Court and the order of rejection of the plaint by the trial Court would be set aside and this case remitted to the trial Court for disposal of the suit on the footing that proper court-fees had been paid on the plaint. If the above sum is not deposited within the time aforesaid this appeal will stand dismissed.

    17. There will be no order for costs either in this Court or in the lower Appellate Court.

    18. No further order is necessary on the office report.

    S.C.S

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