1. This appeal is by the plaintiff Ajabrao in a suit for possession of two fields Nos. 148 and 217 situated at mouza Dahegaon Joshi, tahsil Ramtek, district Nagpur, and for injunction. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court on the ground that it was barred under Section 47 of the CPC.
2. The facts of the case go back to the year 1879. The plaintiff's case is that he was a mortgagee from one Ganesh in respect of these two fields. This mortgage was executed by Ganesh in the year 1879 and Ajabrao filed a suit on foot of this mortgage and obtained a decree in 1913. Ajabrao then purchased these fields in his own decree and obtained possession in 1924. Ganesh had executed a subsequent mortgage in favour of the malguzar of the village, Sadasheorao. Sadasheorao also brought a suit on his mortgage and obtained a decree and purchased these fields subject to Ajabrao's mortgage. Ajabrao had not joined Sadasheorao, the subsequent mortgagee, in his first suit. Ajabrao thereupon brought a second suit against Sadasheorao on the basis of his mortgage of 1879. That was Civil Suit No. 227 of 1925. In that suit Ajabrao obtained a decree (Ex. P-8) against Sadasheorao. By that decree Sadasheorao was given the chance of redeeming the mortgage on payment of Rs. 1,582/-. On failure to pay that amount, Ajabrao's suit against him for possession was to be decreed. It appears that Sadasheorao did not redeem the mortgage of Ajabrao and as a result, possession of these fields was given to Ajabrao on 31st March 1933. Exhibit P-11 is the receipt of possession in favour of Ajabrao.
3. Sadasheorao thereafter interfered with the possession of Ajabrao and dispossessed him and leased out field No. 217 to one Chindhu. Ajabrao was forced to file another suit (Civil Suit No. 32-A of 1935, decided on 17th December 1936) for possession and injunction. This suit was decreed in favour of Ajabrao. Exhibit P-6 is the judgment of the Court. A warrant for possession was taken out by Ajabrao (Ex. P-9) and on 21st May 1939 possession was again handed over to Ajabrao. Exhibit P-10 is the receipt of possession.
4. We now come to the happenings which furnished the cause of action in the present suit. Ajabrao's allegation is that he was again dispossessed of these two fields by Sadasheorao on or about 1st May 1942. Sadasheorao also leased out the fields to defendants 4 and 5 (Krishnarao and Laxman who are father and son). The present suit (Civil Suit No. 3-A of 1944) was accordingly brought by Ajabrao on 7th February 1944. Before the suit was brought, it appears, Sadasheorao had died and the suit was therefore directed against his two minor sons who are the first two respondents and Sadasheorao's widow who is the third respondent in this appeal.
5. The defendants in the case contested all the facts pleaded by Ajabrao. They also pleaded that the suit was barred under Section 47 of the CPC. A question of limitation was also raised by the defendants.
6. The learned Judge of the Court below found all the facts in favour of Ajabrao but held on the authority of — ‘Sachi Prasad v. Amar Nath Roy’, AIR 1919 Cal 674 (A), that the present suit was incompetent because remedy by way of execution of the decree in Civil Suit No. 32-A of 1935 was available. On the question whether the plaint should be treated as an application for execution, the learned Judge did not allow it to be so treated, holding that the application could only be made to another Court.
7. Against this decision Ajabrao appeals. During the pendency of this appeal the fourth respondent Krishnarao died. An application for substitution of the name of his widow Satyabhamabai was made 790 days after his death. Together with the application for substitution of the name, the appellant applied for setting aside the abatement and also for condonation of the delay in making the application for setting aside the abatement. These applications came for hearing before the Honourable the Chief Justice on 2nd September 1952. The learned Chief Justice passed the following order on all the applications:
“Let the widow of the deceased respondent No. 4 be brought on the record of this case, and the question whether or not in the circumstances of this case the appeal or any portion of it abates will be determined at the hearing of the appeal itself.”
8. Notice of the application for substitution or of setting aside the abatement or of condonation of the delay in making these applications was not sent to Satyabhamabai. Notice of the appeal on merits was, however, sent to her. The office also got the cause title corrected and Satyabhamabai's name is shown in place of the deceased Krishnarao. We mention these facts because the respondents argue that the appeal has abated in so far as Krishnarao is concerned and this has caused a total abatement of the entire appeal. We shall take this question at the end.
9. There can be no doubt that Ajabrao is a very ill-used man. He has been required to bring a succession of suits and has been unable to enjoy the fruits of his decree obtained as far back as 1913. The learned counsel for the respondents argue that the findings given by the first Court are erroneous and Ajabrao has failed to prove his title to these two fields. Their contention is that since the suit is one for possession after dispossession by the defendants, it is incumbent upon Ajabrao to establish his title and also that he was dispossessed within three years of the filing of the suit as in a suit falling under Article 142, Limitation Act.
10. As regards the title of Ajabrao, there can be no doubt that as between him and Sadasheorao, the title is established. Both Sadasheorao and Ajabrao were purchasers of these two fields in their two decrees. Ajabrao had not joined the subsequent mortgagee Sadasheorao in his suit and was thus bound to afford him a chance of redeeming his mortgage. Sadasheorao, on the other hand, had obtained a decree on his mortgage and obtained possession of the property subject to the mortgage of Ajabrao. Ajabrao's suit, therefore, against Sadasheorao on the basis of his mortgage clearly established the title which the learned counsel for the respondents say ought to have been proved in the case. Ajabrao was in the position of a mortgagee and Sadasheorao was set to redeem the mortgage, which he failed to do. As a result, Ajabrao obtained possession from Sadasheorao in 1933. These matters being ‘inter partes’ cannot now be reopened and Ajabrao has, therefore, successfully established his title to the property as against Sadasheorao.
11. Sadasheorao thereafter took the law into his own hands and dispossessed Ajabrao, but Aiabrao established his right to the property in the second suit which he filed in 1935. In that suit again Ajabrao obtained possession in May 1939 and also obtained a perpetual injunction against Sadasheorao.
12. The only questions which arise in this case are whether the present suit is within time and, secondly, whether it is barred under Section 47 of the CPC. The learned Judge of the trial Court has given a finding that the suit is not barred by time. The evidence of Kushaba (P.W 1) who has attested the receipt of possession and of Mahadeo (P.W 2) who was the process server shows that actual possession was delivered to Ajabrao on 21st May 1939. Both these witnesses have stated that Ajabrao obtained possession of these fields by actually ploughing them. We see no reason to doubt their testimony, particularly as it has not been controverted by any evidence on the side of the defendants.
13. It would thus appear that in 1939 Ajabrao obtained actual possession of tnese two fields and Sadasheorao was prohibited by a perpetual injunction from interfering with his possession. The present suit was filed on 7th February 1944. We have therefore to see whether within three years of that date Ajabrao was in possession and was dispossessed by an ace of Sadasheorao and defendants 4 and 5. Ajabrao led evidence on this point. His witnesses are Ramkrishna (P.W 3), Anandrao (P.W 4) and Sardar (P.W 5). These witnesses establish that in 1941 Ajabrao had ploughed these fields and had sown ‘juar’ and ‘tur’ crop in them. The learned Judge of the Court below has accepted the evidence of these witnesses and we find nothing to reject that finding. It is obvious that during the years which followed the grant of possession in 1939 these fields were lying fallow. The defendants have filed Jamabandis up to the year 1936–1937 and from 1942–1943 onwards. They have purposely refrained from filing any Jamabandi or document for the intervening years. The evidence of the defendants' witnesses also shows no act of cultivation or possession by Sadasheorao during these vital years. The possession, which Ajabrao obtained in 1939, thus remained undisturbed till the summer of 1941, when, one of the witnesses for Ajabrao states, the summer operations had been done by some other person.
14. There is no evidence of any act of dispossession on the part of Sadasheorao during the years following the agricultural year 1936–1937 up to the agricultural year 1942–1943. Since we have held that Ajabrao established his title against Sadasheorao in the two suits which had gone before, possession of these fallow lands will be referable to the lawful title in Ajabrao. In the absence of any evidence to show that Ajabrao had been dispossessed, we cannot hold that Ajabrao was dispossessed at any time prior to the summer of 1941. Even if we accept the evidence of the witness who states this, the suit which has been brought in 1944 (February) would be well within limitation. Further, Ajabrao also obtained possession when he cultivated the lands during 1941–1942. The suit is, therefore, not barred by limitation.
15. This brings us to the main controversy in the case, namely, whether the decree which had been passed in Civil Suit No. 32-A of 1935 ought to have been executed by Ajabrao and whether the present suit is barred under Section 47 of the CPC because Ajabrao did not resort to execution but brought the present suit. The learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3 argues that Order 21, R. 32, applies to all grants of injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory. His contention is that under sub-rule (5) of R. 32 the Court could, while punishing Sadasheorao, also grant possession, to Ajabrao. He argues, therefore, that Ajabrao ought to have applied for execution of the decree in Civil Suit No. 32-A of 1935 and asked for possession and not brought this suit. He refers to — ‘Arjun Singh v. Sahu Maharaj Narain’, AIR 1950 All 415 (B) and contends that the principle in that case should be applied to the present matter.
16. That case was concerned with a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale and possession was considered as an ancillary matter. The present case is one of perpetual injunction and the reasoning in the Allahabad case does not apply to the present facts. A decree of perpetual injunction can only be executed by looking up the recalcitrant judgment-debtor in a civil jail by proceedings under the law of Contempt of Courts. sub-rule (5) of R. 32 covers only mandatory injunctions and not prohibitory injunctions. The ruling in — ‘Sachi Prasad v. Amar Nath Roy (A)’ (cit. sup.) is itself no authority for the proposition which the learned Judge has enunciated. In that case, of the two learned Judges Richardson J. took the view which has appealed to the learned Judge of the Court below, while the other learned Judge, Beachcroft J. expressed no opinion.
17. The decision in — ‘Sachi Prasad v. Amar Nath Roy, (A)’ (cit. sup.) was expressly dissented from in that very Court in — ‘Hemchandra Naskar v. Narendra Nath’, AIR 1934 Cal 402 (C), and also in — ‘Angad v. Madho Ram’, AIR 1938 All 416 (D) and — ‘Chinnabha Chetty v. Chengalroya’, AIR 1950 Mad 237 (E). A contrary reasoning is also to be found in — ‘Toon Lal v. Sonoo Lall’, AIR 1938 Pat 522 (F). With all due respect, the much dissented dictum of Richardson J. does not appeal to us. The words of sub-r. (5) of R. 32 clearly indicate that they are apposite only to mandatory injunctions & not to prohibitory injunctions. The earlier sub-rules may contemplate both kinds of injunctions, but the wording in those sub-rules is not the same as in sub-rule (5). This matter has been elaborated in the rulings to which we have referred and we need not therefore go more elaborately into this matter. We accordingly hold that the earlier decree did not afford the relief of possession by way of execution which Ajabrao seeks in the present case.
18. After Ajabrao's suit for possession was decreed and execution of that decree was had and Ajabrao obtained possession, that decree was exhausted and was incapable of execution a second time. All that remained was only a prohibitory injunction against Sadasheorao and that injunction could only be enforced against Sadasheorao by the penalty of commitment to detention. That remedy was inappropriate to a case in which possession had been lost. Once Ajabrao had lost possession of these fields at the instance of Sadasheorao, he could only obtain possession by bringing a fresh suit. In our opinion, the learned Judge of the Court below was in error in holding that the present suit was barred under Section 47 of the CPC.
19. Once we reverse that decision, the entire decision is in favour of Ajabrao and a decree for possession must therefore follow. It was pointed out that Ajabrao has again asked for a perpetual injunction against the defendants in the case. There was no perpetual injunction against the first three defendants because that injunction was against Sadasheorao personally. Similarly, there was no perpetual injunction against the other defendants in the earlier suit because they were not parties thereto. The relief of perpetual injunction was therefore correct in the present case. We accordingly reverse the decision of the lower Court and decree the entire claim of Ajabrao for possession as well as perpetual injunction against the defendants in the case. This, of course, is subject to our decision on the question of abatement.
20. As regards abatement, it is unfortunate — and we say it respectfully — that no notice of the application for substitution etc., was sent to Satyabnamabai before her name was brought on the record of the case. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that since the name of satyar bnamabai is on the record of the case it must be held that substitution has already been effected and no question of abatement can now arise. The learned counsel for the respondents contend the opposite. It is clear that the learned Chief Justice intended substituting the name of Satyabhamabai subject to any objection at the time of hearing. The order which has been passed cannot be interpreted differently. Of course, the appropriate course was to make the order about substitution prior to bringing the legal representative on the record and not leave it to be considered at the hearing. Perhaps the learned Chief Justice did not wish to join her but merely brought her on record to afford her an opportunity to state what she wished. Satyabhamabai was sent a notice of this appeal but has not cared to put in an appearance. She was personally served with the notice and her son was represented before us.
21. We also examined this matter from the point, of view of the application itself. We are of opinion, that the affidavit which has been filed by the appellant explaining the delay in making the application for substitution should be accepted. A long time has now elapsed and the learned counsel, for the respondents have not attempted to controvert that affidavit. Even at the hearing no effort was made to controvert it or to challenge the affidavit of Ajabrao in any way. In view of this, even if the matter were open to us, we allow the applications for substitution, for setting aside the abatement and for extending the time for making the application for setting aside the abatement. Since Satyabhamabai has had an opportunity of contending the contrary, we see no reason to issue a fresh notice to her. It may also be pointed out that the fourth and fifth defendants, are father and son, and the son is already on the record of the case representing such interest as Satyabhamabai may have obtained under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act. However, we need not go into that question because we think the application for substitution should be allowed and the abatement set aside. In view of this, we see no reason to order the abatement of the appeal. The judgment and decree of the Court below are reversed and in place thereof the claim of the plaintiff for possession and injunction is decreed. The respondents, shall bear the entire costs of this appeal as also of the Court below.
B/D.R.R
22. Appeal allowed.