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  • section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 91 of the Trusts Act.
  • General Clauses Act and the Transfer of Property Act
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  • section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 91 of the Trusts Act.
  • General Clauses Act and the Transfer of Property Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Ray, J. (with G.K. Mitter, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee owned East Kajora Collieries and held a registered lease dated 15 December 1939 in respect of 400 bighas of colliery lands. On 22 February 1940 the assessee entered an agreement to pay commission to a third party for coal raised. On 20 July 1947 the assessee acquired certain surface rights under a Mokarari patta; subsequently, by agreements dated 6 and 27 December 1946 and later by an agreement dated 16 April 1947, the assessee agreed to sell the East Kajora Collieries to purchasers (who formed East Kajora Collieries Ltd., incorporated 2 May 1947). Possession was delivered by the assessee on 1 January 1947. A sale deed was executed and registered in favour of East Kajora Collieries Ltd. on 25–26 February 1948, with consideration shown and certain additional immovable properties included in that deed which were not in the April 1947 agreement.

For the assessment year relevant to calendar year 1947 (assessment year 1948–49), the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner included capital gains arising from the transaction in that year on the ground that possession and, it was asserted, title had passed on 1 January 1947. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal affirmed that decision. The question referred to the court was whether the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the capital gains were chargeable under section 12B in assessment year 1948–49.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the capital gains arising from the sale of the East Kajora Collieries were chargeable to tax under section 12B in the assessment year 1948–49 (i.e., whether title for taxation purposes passed as from 1 January 1947 or only on later conveyance)?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • Possession was given on 1 January 1947 pending negotiation, but the written agreement of 16 April 1947 did not itself pass title to any movable or immovable property.
  • The sums received prior to execution of the conveyance were earnest money, defeasible if the sale was not completed.
  • By delivery of possession no title in fact passed (and no title could pass) prior to the actual conveyance dated 25 February 1948.
  • The April 1947 agreement used future-oriented language (“shall sell, transfer, etc.”), indicating that transfer was intended to occur later; the agreement did not sever the price between movables and immovables but treated price as a single composite sum.
  • The assessee held leasehold rights which required superior landlord's consent before transfer; such consent was not present on 1 January 1947, so title could not pass then.
  • The company purchaser was not incorporated on 1 January 1947; therefore, there could not have been an intention to pass title to the company on that date.

Commissioner of Income-tax's Arguments

  • Title to movable property passed by delivery of possession on 1 January 1947.
  • Title to immovable property also passed on 1 January 1947 because possession was delivered on that date and the parties intended title to all properties to pass as from that date.
  • Three facts support the parties' intention: (a) possession given on 1 January 1947; (b) the assessee omitted income from that date in his return (treating the property as parted with); and (c) the transferee declared income for the period from 1 January 1947 onward.
  • Counsel emphasised clause 2 of the April 1947 agreement which states that the vendor "shall sell, transfer, assign and convey ... as and from the 1st day of January, 1947" and relied on recitals in the 1948 conveyance stating the transfer was "with effect from the 1st January, 1947."
  • Relied on authorities said to support that the date of transfer may be the date intended by the parties even if execution and registration occur later.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramananda Paul v. Pankaj Kumar Ghosh, A.I.R. 1938 Cal. 417 That the "date of transfer" ordinarily means when the deed of transfer takes effect according to law — typically the date of execution unless the document specifies otherwise. The Court records the department's reliance on the case to argue that the parties intended the transfer to take effect from 1 January 1947; the opinion cites the case for the proposition that a deed may take effect from a date other than its execution if so specified.
Mitchell v. Mathura Das (including Mathura Das v. Mitchell 1882 I.L.R. 4 All. 206) Considerations concerning the effect of registration and confirmation bonds where earlier unregistered conveyances are referred to by later registered documents; the Registration Act's purpose as a check against forged documents. The Court distinguishes that case: Mitchell concerned confirmation of an unregistered deed by a later registered instrument; here the April 1947 document is only an agreement to sell and not a conveyance, so Mitchell does not assist in determining when title passed in the present case.
Karalia Nanubhai Mahomedbhai v. Mansukhram Vakhatchand That where possession and payment are made a purchaser may have rights (including a charge) even if registered conveyance has not been executed; reliance placed on section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 91 of the Trusts Act. The Court notes the department's reliance on this case to show transferee's rights vis-à-vis attaching creditors, but finds the facts in that Bombay decision not helpful because the present question is whether, by construction of the April 1947 and Feb 1948 deeds, title was intended to pass prior to the deed of sale.
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bhurangya Coal Co. (Supreme Court) That delivery of possession pursuant to an agreement for sale before actual conveyance does not by itself determine that title to immovable property passes; the court distinguished movables and immovables in that case and held immovable title passed only on the registered sale deed. The Court relies on this Supreme Court decision as an authority for the proposition that delivery of possession under an agreement does not automatically pass title to immovable property; it applies this principle to hold that title to immovable property in the present case passed only on the sale deed dated 25 February 1948.
T.V. Sundaram Iyengar and Sons Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax Applied for the principle that, where price becomes payable forthwith under an agreement, the right to receive price may vest immediately. The Court notes the Commissioner's reliance on this decision but distinguishes it: in the present case the April 1947 agreement made price payable at execution of the conveyance and was subject to title being made out, so the instant facts differ from T.V. Sundaram Iyengar and Sons.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a construction of the April 16, 1947 agreement and the subsequent sale deed of 25 February 1948, applying the legal principles drawn from the authorities cited and the facts of the transaction. The Court's analysis proceeded in the following steps (stated in the language of the opinion):

  1. The Court accepted as authoritative the principle (from the Bhurangya Coal Co. decision) that delivery of possession pursuant to an agreement for sale, before actual conveyance, does not by itself determine that title to immovable property passes thereby.
  2. On examining the April 1947 agreement the Court found no severance between movable and immovable property: the agreement treated the sale as a single composite transaction at a single price of Rs. 9,25,000. There was no delineation in that agreement as to which part of the price related to movables or immovables.
  3. The Court observed that the April 1947 document was an agreement to sell and "does not create any title or interest in land." The agreement was subject to the vendor making out a marketable title and to the payment of the balance consideration; thus, the price was not payable immediately in such a way as to vest full rights prior to completion.
  4. The moneys received prior to the conveyance had been agreed to be "earnest" and, in the Court's view, were not conclusive of a transfer of title. The Court emphasised that it was only at the execution of the deed of sale that separate values were assigned to movable and immovable properties and that the deed clearly effected conveyance by itself.
  5. The Court treated the recitals in the later conveyance (which referred back to an agreement "with effect from the 1st January, 1947") as insufficient to control the clear operative words of the conveyance or the surrounding circumstances indicating that property was not to pass until completion. In short, a recital cannot override the operative effect of the deed where the operative part is clear.
  6. The Court distinguished the other authorities relied upon by the Commissioner (e.g., Mitchell and Karalia Nanubhai) on factual and doctrinal grounds: Mitchell concerned confirmation of an unregistered deed by a later registered instrument, and Karalia Nanubhai's facts involved payment of the whole purchase money and subsequent registered conveyance; neither supported the construction that title passed on 1 January 1947 in the present case.
  7. Finally, the Court dealt with the Commissioner's reliance on T.V. Sundaram Iyengar and Sons Ltd. and held that that case was materially different: there the price was payable forthwith; here the April 1947 agreement made the price payable at conveyance and subject to the vendor performing his obligations (making out title).

On these considerations and strictly by reference to the documents and facts before it, the Court concluded that:

  • Title to immovable property passed only by the sale deed dated 25 February 1948.
  • The Court also stated that "title to movable properties also passed on the date of the execution of the agreement" — reflecting the Court's construction that movables and immovables were treated differently in operation once the operative documents were examined (but noting that the April 1947 agreement did not make a severance and the overall price was composite).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The question referred to the Court was answered in the negative: the Appellate Tribunal was not right in holding that the capital gains arising from the sale of the East Kajora Collieries were chargeable under section 12B in the assessment year 1948–49.

Implications and consequences as stated in the opinion:

  • For taxation and title purposes, the Court held that title to the immovable property passed only on execution of the sale deed dated 25 February 1948 (i.e., not as from 1 January 1947).
  • The Court stated that title to movable properties passed on the date of execution of the agreement (as the Court construed the documents), and importantly emphasised that the April 1947 agreement treated price as a composite and was subject to making out title and payment at conveyance.
  • As a direct practical outcome of the ruling, the assessee succeeded on the referred question: the capital gains were not chargeable in assessment year 1948–49 on the basis that title had already passed on 1 January 1947.
  • The assessee was awarded costs and a certificate for two counsel.
  • No broader new legal precedent beyond these specific constructions was proclaimed; the opinion primarily applied established principles and distinguished prior authorities on the facts before the Court.

Disposition: Question answered in the negative. Costs to the assessee. Certificate for two counsels.

    K.C Pal Chowdhury v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Calcutta.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Ray, J.:— The assessee Was the owner of the East Kajora Collieries. An indenture of lease dated December 15, 1939, was made between Girija Sankar Chatterjee, a minor represented by his mother and certificated guardian Sm. Nirupama Devi, being the lessor of the one part and the assessee being the lessee of the other part. It was a registered lease for 09 years in favour of the assessee in respect of 400 bighas of colliery lands in Chaks Madhur Band and Damari Band. On February 22, 1940, the assessee entered into an agreement with Narendra Kumar Roy Choudhury for payment of commission to him at the rate of 6 pies per ton on all coal raised and despatched from the said colliery during the period of the lease. On July 20, 1947, the assessee acquired surface right in the lands under an instrument of Mokarari patta dated July 20, 1947, from the Ukra Estate Zamindaries Ltd. for a period of 99 years in respect of certain lands fully described in the second schedule of the deed of sale dated February 25, 1948. The assessee carried on business under the name of East Kajora Collieries on the leasehold interest on the said 400 bighas of coal lands and the said surface lands.

    2. On December 6, 1946, and on December 27, 1946, there were two agreements for sale between the assessee on the one part and Jogesh Chandra Dutt, Abdul Malik Nagi and Abdul Qayoom Khan on the other. On January 1, 1947, the assessee delivered possession of East Kajora Collieries together with underground rights etc. and all lands, buildings and structures to the said Jogesh Chandra Dutt, Abdul Malik Nagi and Abdul Qayoom Khan. On April 16, 1947, there was an agreement for sale in writing. The agreement was between the assessee called the vendor of the one part and the said Jogesh Chandra Dutt, Abdul Malik Nagi and Abdul Qayoom Khan on behalf of a company to be formed in the name of East Kajora Collieries Ltd. called the purchasers of the other part. By the April 1947 agreement, the two aforesaid December agreements of the year 1947 were cancelled.

    3. By the April 1947 agreement the assessee agreed to convey to the said purchasers all the vendor's right, title and interest in the East Kajora Collieries together with the leasehold land in the coal lands and premises described in the schedule to the said agreement on terms and conditions mentioned therein. The said terms and conditions, inter alia, were mainly, first, that by mutual consent the 6th December, 1946, and the 27th December, 1946, agreements were cancelled and the sum of Rs. 4,50,000 paid to the vendor under and in pursuance of the December 1946 agreements were to be deemed and treated as earnest and in part payment of the consideration money agreed upon as the price or consideration for the sale, transfer, assignment and conveyance by the vendor to the purchaser of the said colliery. Secondly, it was stated in the April 1947 agreement that in consideration of the sum of Rs. 4,50,000 which had been already paid to the vendor and the sum of Rs. 1,00,000 paid by the purchasers to the vendor at or before the execution of the April 1947 agreement and a further sum of Rs. 3,75,000 being the balance of the consideration money to be paid at or before the execution of the sale, transfer, assignment and conveyance making together the sum of Rs. 9,25,000 the vendor shall sell, transfer, assign and convey to the purchasers or to their nominee or nominees all his right, title and interest to the said East Kajora Collieries as and from January 1, 1947, together with the leasehold coal lands and hereditaments and premises described in the schedule to the agreement free from all incumbrances subject to making out a marketable title. The other terms and conditions were, inter alia, that the purchase should be completed on or before July 31, 1947, and the balance of the consideration money should be paid to the vendors whereupon the vendor and all necessary parties would execute and register and assign and convey in favour of the purchasers or their nominees of the company to be incorporated. If the vendor desired completion of the conveyance earlier than July 31, 1947, the purchasers would obtain conveyance from the vendor and thereafter execute a document in favour of the proposed company when incorporated and the vendor in that case would bear and pay the amount of stamp duty and registration fees payable on documents assigning the colliery by the purchasers in favour of the company. If the purchasers in spite of the vendor's making out a marketable title failed to pay the balance of the consideration money and to complete the purchase, the sum of Rs. 5,50,000 shall be forfeited or the vendor shall be at liberty to enforce specific performance of the agreement and claim damages. If the vendor failed to make out a marketable title or failed to procure the consent of the superior landlord the purchaser shall be entitled to hold the vendor liable for all losses and expenses. The schedule to the agreement of April 16, 1947, comprised the underground coal mining rights of the 400 bighas of land situated in Chaks Madhur Band and Damari Band held by the vendor as the lessee under the aforesaid lease dated December 15, 1939, together with all machinery, tools, implements, stores, furniture, motor trucks, buildings, etc. The East Kajora Collieries Ltd. was incorporated on May 2, 1947. In that company shares of the value of Rs. 1,25,000 were allotted to the assessee. On February 25, 1948, a sale deed was executed by the assessee in favour of the East Kajora Collieries Ltd. and the same was registered on February 26, 1948. The balance sum of Rs. 2,50,000 was paid by a cheque dated February 25, 1948. The memo of consideration of the sale deed shows the amount of the said cheque, the value of the said shares allotted as Rs. 1,25,000 and a further sum of Rs. 1,50,030 as being already paid aggregating Rs. 5,25,030. In the said deed the value of the immovable properties was shown as Rs. 5,25,030 and the value of the movable properties was shown as Rs. 3,99,970. Some of the immovable properties conveyed by the deed of sale were not included in the April 1947 agreement.

    4. In the calendar year 1947, the relevant assessment year being 1948–49, the question arose as to whether the capital gains relating to the sale of East Kajora Collieries should be assessed in that year or in the subsequent year. The assessee contended that inasmuch as the sale was on February 25, 1948, the assessment should be in the assessment year 1949–50. The Income-tax Officer stated that the recital in the deed of registration showed that possession of the properties was delivered by the assessee on January 1, 1947, and further that the assessee did not in his return include or show the profit from the collieries for assessment and, therefore, the Income-tax Officer included the capital gains in the assessment year 1948–49. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner agreed with the assessment made by the Income-tax Officer. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal held that the capital gains had been rightly included in the assessment because possession was handed over in January, 1947, when both the parties treated the assets in question as having passed to the buyer.

    5. The question of law which has been referred is as follows:

    “Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the capital gains arising from the sale of the East Kajora Collieries were chargeable to tax under section 12B in the assessment year 1948–49?”

    6. Counsel for the assessee contended first that pending negotiation delivery of possession had been given on January 1, 1947, and the agreement to sell which was entered into in writing on April 16, 1947, did not pass any title or interest to any property movable or immovable. Secondly, it was contended that the money which was received by the assessee was earnest money which was defeasible in the event of sale not being completed. Thirdly, it was contended that by delivery of possession no title to any property in fact passed or could pass prior to the actual conveyance dated February 25, 1948.

    7. Counsel on behalf of the Commissioner of Income-tax contended first that title to movable property passed by delivery of possession on January 1, 1947, and secondly, that title to the immovable property also passed on January 1, 1947, because possession was given on that date and further that parties intended that title to all the properties should pass on that date. As to the intention of the parties, it was contended that there were three reasons for supporting such intention. First, that possession was given on January 1, 1947. Secondly, the assessee did not include in his return the income since January 1, 1947, for he had parted with the property and thirdly, that the transferee showed income of the period since January 1, 1947, as his income.

    8. Counsel on behalf of the Commissioner of Income-tax laid considerable emphasis on clause 2 of the agreement dated April 16, 1947, and the recitals in the conveyance dated February 25, 1948, to illustrate the intention of the parties that title was to pass as and from the 1st day of January, 1947. In clause 2 of the April 1947 agreement, it is stated that “the vendor shall sell, transfer, assign and convey to the purchaser all right, title and interest in the East Kajora Collieries as and from the 1st day of January, 1947.” In the recital of the conveyance dated February 25, 1948, it is stated that by an agreement dated the 8th February, 1947 (sic), made between the vendor of the one part and the said Jogesh Chandra Dutt, Abdul Malik Nagi and Abdul Qayoom Khan of the other part the vendor (meaning thereby the assessee) in consideration of Rs. 9,25,000 agreed to sell all his right, title and interest in the said 400 bighas of lands and his business known as the East Kajora Collieries Ltd. including the surface rights with effect from the 1st January, 1947 free from all incumbrances. It was, therefore, contended on behalf of the Commissioner of Income-tax that the intention was that title to both movable and immovable properties passed on January 1, 1947, and in any event title to movable property passed on January 1, 1947.

    9. Reliance was placed by counsel for the Commissioner on the decision in Ramananda Paul v. Pankaj Kumar Ghosh A.I.R 1938 Cal. 417. on the observation appearing at page 421 of the report that the expression “date of transfer” must mean when the deed of transfer has been actually registered, the date when the transfer takes effect according to law and that is the date of the execution of the deed unless the document itself specifies some other date from which it takes effect. In the present case, it was contended on behalf of the department that the first day of January, 1947, is the date when the transfer takes effect according to the intention of the parties though both, the execution and the registration happened later.

    10. The decision in Mitchell v. Mathura Das was also relied on by counsel for the Commissioner in support of his contention. In that case the question arose as to whether the house in suit was or was not the property of William Mitchell at the time of its attachment by the plaintiff. At the time of attachment William Mitchell was in occupation of and carrying on business at the premises to all external appearances as the proprietor and owner. Alexander Mitchell contended that he was the owner. Alexander produced two documents, one being a deed of conveyance dated September 25, 1873, and the other a confirmation bond dated December 31, 1878. The 1873 document was unregistered. In March, 1879, the confirmation bond was presented to the Collector for registration. The confirmation bond referred to the deed of April, 1873, which was set out in a schedule as a part of the deed of 1878. The memorandum of registration was written not on the first sheet of the deed of 1878 but at the end of the deed of 1873 which was annexed as a schedule to, and was consequently a part of, the deed of 1878. The Allahabad High Court, from where the appeal went up to the Judicial Committee, in the decision in Mathura Das v. Mitchell 1882 I.L.R 4 All. 206. held that as a matter of fact the confirmation bond of 31st December, 1878, was not registered, whereas that of the year 1873 contained the registration certificate, and further held that neither of the documents was admissible in evidence. The Judicial Committee held that though the deed of 1873 could not be given in evidence that was no reason why the deed of 1878 should not be given in evidence and that the deed of 1878 referring to the deed of 1873 was proved to have been duly executed and registered. The Judicial Committee observed that the Registration Act was not passed to avoid the mischief of allowing a man to be in possession of real property without having a registered deed, but as a check against the production of forged documents and in order that subsequent purchasers or persons to whom the subsequent conveyance of the property was made should not be affected by previous conveyance unless those previous conveyances were registered. In Mitchell's case it was further found by the Judicial Committee as a fact that the deed of the year 1878 not only confirmed the deed of 1873 but stated that parties did grant convey and assign the property which was the subject-matter of the dispute in that case. In Mitchell's case the question was as to whether an unregistered conveyance confirmed by a later bond which had also the effect of conveyance operated to pass the property. In the present case the April 1947 agreement is not a conveyance but a mere agreement to sell. Because the April 1947 agreement did not have the character of passing the property by that deed itself no aid can be derived from the above-mentioned decision in determining the intention of passing of property in the present case.

    11. Counsel on behalf of the department relied on the decision in Karalia Nanubhai Mahomedbhai v. Mansukhram Vakhatchand in support of the contention that if possession had been given and conveyance not made the transferee would have higher rights over attaching creditors of the transferors. In that case, the plaintiff sought for a declaration that the fields in dispute could be attached and sold as belonging to his judgment-debtor Jiwanlal. Jiwanlal had in 1893 sold those fields to the defendant at Rs. 900 which sum was paid at the time when possession was given to the purchaser. Transfer, however was not effected as the necessary registered conveyance had not been executed. It was held that since there was possession and payment of the whole purchase money the purchaser was entitled to a charge on the property for the amount of purchase money and reliance was placed on section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 91 of the Trusts Act. Furthermore, before the case was decided by the court of the first instance, a registered conveyance had been executed so that the purchaser's title was perfected. The facts in the Bombay decision are not of any help in the present case, because the question raised here is that on construction of the April 1947 and February 1948 deeds, intention is sought to be gathered that title to property passed anterior to the deed of sale.

    12. Counsel on behalf of the assessee construed the April 1947 agree ment and the 1948 conveyance as indicating in clear words that the transfer was not intended by the agreement of April 16, 1947, and that in fact the immovable properties were conveyed and transferred by the deed of February 25, 1948. He laid emphasis on clause 2 of the agree ment which stated that “the vendors shall sell, transfer, etc.” These words according to counsel for the assessee showed that this transfer or assignment was to be on a future date. He further contended that the operative part in the sale deed showed beyond doubt that the convey ance or the transfer was made by the deed itself. It was secondly contended that the schedule to the agreement dated April 16, 1947, described the coal and mining rights together with machinery, tools, implements, stores, furniture, etc., with the result that the assessee did not make any distinction either between movable and immovable properties or in regard to passing title to movable or immovable properties. Thirdly, it was contended that the entire purchase price was Rs. 9,25,000 as mentioned in the April 1947 agreement and this price was not severed into two parts specifying as to which portion was for movable and which portion was for immovable property and, therefore, it could not be predicated that there was any intention to pass title to either movable or immovable property on January 1, 1947. Fourthly, it was contended that inasmuch as the assessee was holding leasehold right which he could not transfer without the consent of his superior landlord and since on January 1, 1947, there was not such consent the assessee could not impart title. The words “shall sell transfer as from the 1st January, 1947, or with effect from the first January, 1947” were construed by counsel for the assessee to mean that the purchaser would have the assessee's title as from the 1st January and not that the purchasers would have their title as from the 1st January, 1947. Fifthly, it was contended that the company which ultimately was the purchaser was not incorporated on January 1, 1947, and, therefore, there could not be any intention of passing the property to the company on that date.

    13. Counsel for the assessee relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Bhurangya Coal Co. . In that case the firm of Bhurangya Coal Co. entered into an agreement to sell the colliery lands machinery and fixture to a company called Bhurangya Coal Co. Ltd. In the agreement for sale, the properties were described in the schedule in two parts. The first part included lands, buildings and structures and the second part consisted of movables. The values of the properties were separately shown in two parts. The agreement for sale was dated March 16, 1946. The company was incorporated on March 18, 1946. The directors of the company adopted the transaction as a resolution dated March 29, 1946. On March 30, 1946, all the properties movable and immovable were put in the possession of the company. On May 17, 1946, a sale deed was executed and registered. The actual conveyance under the deed was in respect of the immovable properties mentioned in part I of the agreement for sale. On these facts, the question arose as to whether any tax was payable in respect of profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange or transfer of the capital asset effected after March 31, 1946, and before April 1, 1948. As to immovable properties it was held in that case that the title passed only when the sale deed was executed on May 17, 1946, and not when the agreement was concluded on March 16, 1946. So far as the movable properties were concerned, it was contended that property passed on March 30, 1946, and, therefore, they were not assessable. It was held by the Supreme Court that there were two sale transactions and that different prices were fixed therefor and the actual conveyance under the sale was only in respect of immovable properties. On behalf of the department, it was contended that the parties really intended to sell under the deed dated May 17, 1946, not merely the immovable properties mentioned in part I of the agreement of the sale but also the properties mentioned in part II thereof. This contention was negatived by holding that it would be rewriting the whole document. The department also contended that some of the properties mentioned in part II of the schedule were really fixtures though described as movables and were immovable properties as defined in the General Clauses Act and the Transfer of Property Act and, therefore, properties passed under the sale deed dated May 17, 1946. It was held that fixtures could be held to be movables only if they were intended to be served and sold separately. But that was not the intention of the parties and, therefore, the fixtures passed along with the land.

    14. The decision of the Supreme Court is an authority for the proposition that delivery of possession pursuant to an agreement for sale and before the actual conveyance does not by itself determine that title to immovable property passes thereby. On the construction of the deeds in the present case, the contentions on behalf of the assessee are sound. There was never any severance of movable and immovable property in the agreement for sale. The price in the agreement for sale was one composite unit. The agreement for sale does not create any title or interest in land. The agreement of April, 1947, showed that property is not to pass until the consideration money is paid. The moneys which were received were agreed to be paid as and by way of earnest. It is only at the time of execution of the deed of sale that separate values were put on movable and immovable properties. New lands were included in the sale deed. The deed of sale clearly states that the conveyance is effected by the deed. A recital does not control the operative part of a conveyance where the operative part is clear. On these considerations and on the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of opinion that title to immovable property passed by the sale deed dated February 25, 1948, and title to movable properties also passed on the date of the execution of the agreement. It is true that the deed of 1948 states that movable properties are not thereby intended to be conveyed but that does not show that movable properties were conveyed on January 1, 1947. I have already indicated that in the April 1947 agreement, there was no division between the movables and the immovables and the agreement was for the sale of all the properties mentioned therein together at the entire price of Rs. 9,25,000. The intention of the parties was that property in movables was not to pass until the price was paid. Counsel for the Commissioner finally contended that on January 1, 1947, the assessee had the right to receive money and it was not necessary that the assessee should have received the money then. He relied on the decision in T.V Sundaram Iyengar and Sons Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax. On the facts of that case, it was held that there was nothing to show that price was to be paid at any future time and the price became payable forthwith. In the present case, the agreement of April, 1947, is entirely different. The price became payable at the time of the execution of the conveyance. The agreement for sale was subject to acceptance of title. It was not until the assessee performed his part of the agreement that he would have the right to receive the price. The question is, therefore, answered in the negative. The assessee is entitled to costs. Certificate for 2 counsels.

    G.K Mitter, J.:— I agree.

    15. Question answered in the negative.

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    Comments

    K.C Pal Chowdhury v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Calcutta.
    (Dec 13, 1961)