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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 172(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act
  • Section 149 of the Penal Code
  • Section 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 27 of the Arms Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Sections 3, 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908
  • Article 136 of the Constitution of India
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 172(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act
  • Section 149 of the Penal Code
  • Section 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 27 of the Arms Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Sections 3, 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908
  • Article 136 of the Constitution of India
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 19 January 1991, Askari, the nephew of the informant (PW-14), was tending his grocery shop when the appellants arrived armed with bombs and firearms. Sheikh Shamsul and Sheikh Ashfaq successively hurled bombs at Askari, killing him instantly. When another nephew, Mohammad Asad, ran to the scene he too was struck by a bomb thrown by Sheikh Gheyas and later died in hospital. A by-stander (PW-1) sustained injuries. The alleged motive was a prior case under Section 307 IPC filed by PW-14 against the appellants, who had threatened retaliation.

PW-14 lodged a fardbeyan the same night; an FIR (CR No. I-69/2009) was registered at Shahkund Police Station. After investigation, Sessions Case No. 309/22 of 1993/1999 was tried in the court of the First Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur. On 4 February 2003 the trial court convicted several accused: Sheikh Shamsul and Sheikh Gheyas were sentenced to death; others received life or lesser sentences.

The High Court of Patna, in judgment dated 5 October 2007 (2007 SCC OnLine Pat 219; (2008) 1 PLJR 737), confirmed all convictions, rejected the death reference, and commuted the death sentences to life imprisonment. The present appeals by the convicted persons challenge that High Court decision before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, applying the standards for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution (as explained in Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar), the concurrent findings of the courts below warranted reversal.
  2. Whether contradictions between the fardbeyan and deposition of PW-14, alleged improvements, and delay in lodging the report undermined the credibility of prosecution witnesses.
  3. Whether liability under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC could be sustained when some appellants were allegedly only standing outside the shop with firearms and did not hurl bombs.
  4. Whether the absence of recovery of guns or additional physical evidence created reasonable doubt sufficient to acquit the appellants.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • PW-14’s trial testimony materially expanded upon the original fardbeyan, constituting significant improvements and casting doubt on reliability.
  • No specific overt act was attributed to some appellants; mere presence with guns cannot attract Section 149 IPC liability (relying on K.M. Ravi v. State of Karnataka and Bhimrao v. State of Maharashtra).
  • The alleged dying declaration of Asad was uncorroborated: neither the investigating officer (PW-15) nor other witnesses confirmed that Asad regained consciousness and named the assailants.
  • Post-mortem findings did not exclusively support bomb-blast injuries, and the absence of gun recovery weakened the prosecution case.
  • Under Jodhan v. State of M.P. and Hem Raj v. State of Haryana, testimony from interested witnesses requires corroboration, which was allegedly lacking.

Respondent State’s Arguments

  • The eyewitnesses (PW-14, PW-4, PW-5, PW-9) were found trustworthy by both courts; minor discrepancies did not impair core prosecution evidence.
  • Appellants with firearms actively facilitated the bombing and prevented relatives from rescuing the victims, establishing participation in the common object even without throwing bombs.
  • Authorities cited by the defence were distinguishable; in the present facts the appellants’ conduct satisfied Section 149 IPC requirements.
  • Capture of one appellant with a hot cartridge tied in his clothing, corroborated by multiple witnesses, further linked the appellants to the offence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar Parameters governing Supreme Court interference under Article 136. Framework used to decide whether concurrent findings required disturbance; Court concluded interference was unwarranted.
Habeeb Mohd. v. State of Hyderabad, 1954 SCR 475 Police diary cannot be substantive evidence; prior statements not put to witness cannot be used. High Court relied on this to reject defence attempt to impeach witnesses through police diary entries.
Shambhu Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 SC 725 Scope of Section 149 IPC and overt act requirement. Distinguished by High Court; held prosecution need not show identical overt act by each member when common object is proved.
Ram Dular Rai v. State of Bihar, (2003) 12 SCC 352 Interpretation of unlawful assembly and common object. High Court distinguished factual matrix; maintained convictions under Section 149.
State of Bihar v. Sanjeet Rai, 2006 SCC OnLine Pat 455 Application of “rarest of rare” doctrine in death penalty cases. Relied on to commute death sentences to life imprisonment.
State of Bihar v. Prajeet Kumar Singh, (2007) 2 PLJR 656 Similar guidance on death penalty commutation. Supported High Court’s refusal to confirm death reference.
K.M. Ravi v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 16 SCC 337 Mere presence does not create liability under Section 149 IPC. Cited by defence; Supreme Court held facts here showed active facilitation, making the precedent inapplicable.
Jodhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2015) 11 SCC 52 Need for corroboration of interested witnesses; participation in unlawful assembly. Both sides cited; Supreme Court quoted para 33 to affirm that active participation, even without throwing the bomb, sustains conviction under Section 149.
Hem Raj v. State of Haryana, (2005) 10 SCC 614 Credibility of injured witness testimony. Referenced by defence; Court reiterated that credible injured witness evidence carries great weight and was present here.
Bhimrao v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 3 SCC 37 Limiting liability to original common object when assembly later changes object. Defence relied; Court found factual scenario distinct because appellants actively enabled the bombing.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court began by restating the limited scope of review under Article 136 and found no perversity in the concurrent factual findings. It endorsed the High Court’s treatment of four key areas:

  • Section 172 CrPC: Consistent with Habeeb Mohd., the police diary could not be used to contradict prosecution witnesses because their attention had not been drawn to prior statements.
  • Credibility of Witnesses: Minor inconsistencies and the failure to rush to the police station immediately were held immaterial. The testimonies of PW-14, PW-4, PW-5 and PW-9 were found internally consistent and corroborated by medical evidence.
  • Section 149 IPC: The Court accepted that appellants who did not hurl bombs still shared the common object: they brandished firearms, prevented assistance to victims, and fled while firing shots. Hence individual overt acts were unnecessary for conviction.
  • Alleged Evidentiary Gaps: Lack of gun recovery and the unexamined hospital witnesses did not create reasonable doubt. Conviction may rest on the sole testimony of a trustworthy eyewitness, and here multiple reliable witnesses existed.

After analysing the defence precedents, the Court concluded that each was factually distinguishable and did not dilute Section 149 liability in the present circumstances. Accordingly, the Court found no miscarriage of justice and upheld the findings of the trial court and the High Court.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS DISMISSED.

The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the commuted life sentences imposed by the Patna High Court. No further sentence alteration was ordered. The decision reinforces: (i) the limited scope of Article 136 review where concurrent factual findings exist; (ii) the principle that active facilitation of a crime can attract Section 149 IPC liability even without identical overt acts; and (iii) the weight accorded to consistent eyewitness testimony. No new legal precedent was set, but existing jurisprudence on unlawful assembly and evidentiary assessment was applied and endorsed.

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    Juman And Another v. State Of Bihar .

    Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.— These appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated 5-10-2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in State of Bihar v. Samsul 2007 SCC OnLine Pat 219, (2008) 1 PLJR 737, whereby the High Court while confirming the conviction of the appellants and the sentence of life term, commuted the death sentence of Sheikh Shamsul and Sheikh Gheyas, to imprisonment for life and dismissed the appeals.

    2. The brief facts necessary to dispose of these appeals are that on 19-1-1991 at about 6.00 p.m, one Askari (since deceased), who happened to be the nephew of the informant (PW 14) was at his grocery shop when appellants armed with bomb explosives and guns came near his shop. Appellant Sheikh Shamsul hurled a bomb at the deceased and as a result of the explosion Askari fell down on the gaddi of the shop. In the meanwhile, appellant Sheikh Ashfaq also attacked him by a bomb which hit him on the chest and exploded and consequently Askari died at the gaddi itself. The informant's another nephew, namely, Mohd. Asad, who was at the flour mill just opposite to the shop of Askari, hearing the sound of explosion came running to the shop and he was also attacked by a bomb by accused Sheikh Gheyas. Due to explosion Mohd. Asad sustained severe injury, fell down near the shop and became unconscious. Md. Vasir (PW 1) who was standing there was also injured. On hearing the sound of the bomb explosion, villagers assembled there and the appellants fled away towards North, firing shots in the air. Injured Mohd. Asad was taken to Bhagalpur Hospital by the villagers in a critical condition but he succumbed to the injuries at the hospital on the same day.

    3. Motive of the occurrence, according to first information report (FIR), is that two years prior to the occurrence, a case under Section 307 IPC was filed by the informant against the appellants and they were threatening the informant to withdraw the case, otherwise they would eliminate the whole family.

    4. The law was set into motion upon lodging of FIR by PW 14 (informant) arising out of fardbeyan being Ext. 7 on the same day at 10.00 p.m, at Shahkund Police Station. The FIR was registered as CR No. I-69 of 2009. The post-mortem of the deceased was performed by Dr H.I Ansari (PW 13). Looking to the post-mortem note of deceased Mohd. Askari, marked Annexure A-13, there were found explosive blast injuries on chest cavity deep, face; both lungs and heart were lacerated. As per the post-mortem report of deceased Mohd. Asad, there were found blast explosive injury on abdominal cavity; lacerated and bruised skin and liver. Both the deceased died due to injuries caused by powerful bomb blast as per abovestated post-mortem reports marked Exts. 13 and 13/13.

    5. Upon completion of investigation and submission of the charge-sheet, Sessions Case No. 309/22 of 1993/1999 was registered against the accused. Thereafter, the Court of First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur, framed charges against the accused persons for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 302 read with Section 149 IPC, Sections 3, 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Section 27 of the Arms Act. After they denied the said charges in their statements, the evidence of prosecution witnesses was recorded.

    6. After recording the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and considering all the relevant facts, the trial court vide its judgment and order dated 4-2-2003 convicted Accused 3, 8 and 9 for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and Sections 3, 4 of the Explosive Substances Act and sentenced Accused 3 and 9 (Sheikh Shamsul and Sheikh Gheyas) to death since the Court did not want to give them opportunity to commit a third homicide as they had already been convicted previously in some other homicidal death case. Accused 8 was sentenced to imprisonment for life. Accused 7 Sheikh Chengwa was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. Rest of the accused were convicted for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years.

    7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of the trial court, the accused persons filed appeals before the High Court. While the first Additional Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur, made Death Reference No. 2 of 2003 vide letter dated 18-2-2003 for confirmation of death sentence, Criminal Appeals Nos. 92, 98, 122-126 of 2003 were preferred by the accused persons seeking acquittal.

    8. The High Court vide its judgment and order dated 5-10-2007 2007 SCC OnLine Pat 219, (2008) 1 PLJR 737, rejected the death reference and also dismissed the aforesaid appeals filed by the accused persons and confirmed their conviction. However, the death sentence of accused Sheikh Samsul and Sheikh Gheyas was commuted to imprisonment for life. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the High Court, the accused persons have sought to challenge the same before us in these appeals.

    9. Keeping in mind the position of law as enunciated in Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar (2005) 6 SCC 211, pertaining to the principles for exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and settled by a series of decisions of this Court, we shall now examine the evidence adduced by the parties and the materials on record and see that in view of the nature of offence alleged to have been committed by the appellants, whether the concurrent findings of fact call for interference in the facts and circumstances of the case.

    10. In the present case, there are concurrent findings of both the courts below as to the guilt of the accused persons. The High Court has discussed basically four issues in its judgment viz. (a) interpretation of Section 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (b) veracity of the evidence adduced; (c) relevance of overt act in conviction under Section 149 of the Penal Code; and (d) rarest of the rare cases theory for confirming death sentence.

    11. On the first issue, the High Court has observed that police diary cannot be used as evidence in the case but to aid it in such inquiry or trial, while relying upon the judgment of this Court in Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1954 SC 51, 1954 SCR 475, 1954 Cri LJ 338, wherein it was held that when attention of a witness is not drawn to his previous statement during the course of investigation, same cannot be looked into in exercise of powers under Section 172(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Apropos second issue, it was observed by the High Court that failure of witness to go to police station and lodge the report on time without delay, and minor contradictions pertaining to presence of customers at the shop, in no way affects the case of the prosecution.

    12. The High Court further found distinction between judgments given in Shambhu Nath Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1960 SC 725, 1960 Cri LJ 1144 and that of Ram Dular Rai v. State of Bihar (2003) 12 SCC 352, though both the judgments discuss Section 149 IPC pertaining to unlawful assembly. With regard to third issue, it was observed by the High Court that merely because informant (PW 14) was left unharmed or that all appellants did not enter into the shop, the prosecution case cannot be rejected, since overt act of acting and omitting with regard to common object was proved after appraisal of the evidence in the court below. In support of the fourth issue, the High Court while relying upon its earlier judgments in State of Bihar v. Sanjeet Rai 2006 SCC OnLine Pat 455, (2006) 4 PLJR 479 and State of Bihar v. Prajeet Kumar Singh 2007 SCC OnLine Pat 442, (2007) 2 PLJR 656, rejected the death reference holding that the case was not falling in the category of rarest of rare cases.

    13. While upholding the judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial court, the High Court has primarily relied upon the evidence of eyewitnesses, PW 14, PW 4, PW 5 and PW 9 who were found to be trustworthy and reliable. The High Court held that the accused were sharing the common object of doing away with the deceased. However, from a perusal of the cross-examinations of PW 4 and PW 5, it appears that there was personal enmity and PW 3, PW 4, PW 14 were made accused in a case of murder of Asfak, son of Sheikh Samsul, appellant herein. PW 14 had also filed a case under Section 307 IPC against the appellants two years prior to the date of the incident which was still pending.

    14. Further, looking to the evidence given by PW 9, though not an eyewitness, the factum of assault with a bomb on deceased Mohd. Asad was corroborated. According to him he is also a witness to the seizure of empty cartridge from Sheikh Ishteyaque.

    15. Mr Huzefa Ahmadi, learned Senior Counsel for appellants contended that both the courts below have committed an error in convicting the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, along with other accused. He submitted that there were material improvements made by PW 14 in his deposition when compared to the fardbeyan given to the police on the date of the incident and no specific role has been attributed to the present appellants. But after careful analysis of the fardbeyan (Ext. 7), we have an entirely different opinion. It is true that deposition is somewhere literally larger than the fardbeyan, however, it is nowhere contrary to it. It may rightly be said that the deposition of PW 14 is merely an elaborated form of statement recorded before the police, with minor contradictions. Oral evidence of a witness could be looked with suspicion only if it contradicts the previous statement.

    16. Mr Huzefa Ahmadi, learned Senior Counsel further submitted that narration of the incident by the deceased Asad to PW 3, as stated by PW 3, is only to falsely implicate the present appellants. According to him, such deposition is improbable since PW 15 investigating officer of the case and PW 12 did not narrate that deceased had regained consciousness and named the accused and no other witness was examined to prove the fact that deceased regained consciousness, and most importantly no recovery of gun has been made. Thus, the prosecution case is shrouded with reasonable doubt. It was further argued that in the light of judgment of this Court in K.M Ravi v. State of Karnataka (2009) 16 SCC 337, the appellants holding (sic guns) outside the shop cannot be held guilty, wherein it was held that:

    “10. … Mere presence or association with other members alone does not per se be sufficient to hold every one of them criminally liable for the offences committed by the others unless there was sufficient evidence on record to show that one such also intended to or knew the likelihood of commission of such an offending act.”

    17. Reliance was further placed on the judgment of this Court in Jodhan v. State of M.P (2015) 11 SCC 52, wherein it was held in paras 25 and 26 that if the testimony is of an interested witness who has a motive to falsely implicate the accused then the Court before relying upon his testimony should seek corroboration in regard to material particulars. In paras 28 and 29 also it was held that the testimony of the injured witness stands on a higher pedestal than other witnesses and reliance should be placed on it unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence. (See also Hem Raj v. State of Haryana (2005) 10 SCC 614.)

    18. Finally, it has been argued by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants that the post-mortem report does not support the prosecution story that injury was caused only by a powerful bomb. It was submitted that both the deceased were not close to each other and deceased Asad was running towards the shop when a bomb was allegedly thrown at him. Other accused were standing with guns in their hands but they did not share the common object and hence cannot be held liable. In support of this, the learned Senior Counsel relied on Bhimrao v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 3 SCC 37, wherein it was observed:

    “8. … In the absence of any material to the contrary, it should be presumed that those members of the original unlawful assembly who only shared the common object of assaulting deceased Prabhakar cannot be attributed with the subsequent change in the common object of some of the members of the assembly who entered the house of Prabhakar and caused grievous injuries to him. So far as the present appellants are concerned, who stood outside the house of the deceased and who could not have known what actually transpired inside the house, the act of those members of the original unlawful assembly who entered the house, cannot be attributed, hence, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants at the most these appellants will be liable to be punished for sharing the original common object which was only to assault the deceased, therefore, they can be held guilty of an offence punishable under Section 352 read with Section 149 only.”

    19. Mr Ravi Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent State, on the other hand, supported the order of conviction and sentence passed by both the courts below. He submitted that the judgments cited by the counsel for the appellants have no point relevant to the present case. The judgment given in K.M Ravi (2009) 16 SCC 337, is not relevant in whatsoever manner to the present case, as in the present case, there was facilitating the act of hurling of bombs by the other accused persons as well as captivating the relatives of the deceased so as to prevent them to come to his rescue. This shows their active participation in the crime though having overt act of merely holding guns outside the place of occurrence.

    20. It was further argued that the position cited in Bhimrao case (2003) 3 SCC 37 is different from that of the present case. PW 14 and other witnesses present with him were prevented from saving the victims while bombs were hurled at the deceased. While relying upon the evidence of PW 4, PW 5, PW 6 and PW 16 and other witnesses, it is corroborated that after hurling of bomb by Shamsul and Ashfaq the appellants fled away by firing in the air. One of the appellants was caught with hot cartridge tied in his lungi by PW 16 and this fact has been corroborated by PW 7, PW 9, PW 14, PW 15 and PW 16. Therefore, the prosecution case leaves no room for doubt whatsoever about the commission of offence by the appellants.

    21. We have seen in the instant case that the witnesses have vividly deposed about the genesis of the occurrence, the participation and involvement of the accused persons in the crime. The non-examination of the witnesses, who might have been there on the way to hospital or the hospital itself when deceased narrated the incident, would not make the prosecution case unacceptable. Similarly, evidence of any witness cannot be rejected merely on the ground that interested witnesses admittedly had enmity with the persons implicated in the case. The purpose of recording of the evidence, in any case, shall always be to unearth the truth of the case. Conviction can even be based on the testimony of a sole eyewitness, if the same inspires confidence. Moreover, prosecution case has been proved by the testimony of the eyewitness, since corroborated by the other witnesses of the occurrence. We are constrained to reject the submissions made on behalf of the appellants.

    22. Keeping the facts and circumstances of the present case in mind, we wish to emphasise the judgment of this Court in Jodhan case (2015) 11 SCC 52 and the relevant part of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:

    “33. On the bedrock of the aforesaid pronouncement of law, the submission canvassed by Mr Sharma does not merit any consideration inasmuch as the prosecution has been able to establish not only the appellant's presence but also his active participation as a member of the unlawful assembly. He might not have thrown the bomb at the deceased, but thereby he does not cease to be a member of the unlawful assembly as understood within the ambit of Section 149 IPC and there is ample evidence on record to safely conclude that all the accused persons who have been convicted by the High Court had formed an unlawful assembly and there was common object to assault the deceased who succumbed to the injuries inflicted on him. Thus analysed, the submission enters into the realm of total insignificance.”

    23. In the instant case, the witnesses, as the High Court has found and we have no reason to differ, are reliable and have stood embedded in their version and remained unshaken. They have vividly deposed about the genesis of occurrence, the participation and involvement of the accused persons in the crime and the injuries inflicted on the deceased, and on each of them.

    24. Thus, in the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that the present appeals are devoid of merits and the judgment 2007 SCC OnLine Pat 219, (2008) 1 PLJR 737 passed by the High Court does not warrant interference. These appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

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    Juman And Another v. State Of Bihar .
    (Feb 23, 2017)