Citation Codes

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Case Number

C.W.P No. 4618 of 1985

Judges

Kang, JJ.
Prem Chand Jain, C.J
Sukhdev Singh

Acts

SECTION 5 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY ACT 1948
provisions of Punjab Civil Services (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1952,
rule 7.2 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules,
rule 14 of the 1959 Rules. The 1959 Rules
ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
sub-sections (c) and (k) of Section 79
rule 4(6) of the 1980 Regulations,
rule 14 of the 1959 Rules.

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Smart Summary

Court Opinion Summary — Sukhder Singh Kang, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Shri Ramesh Chander Chug, filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the legality and validity of his suspension as Sub‑Divisional Officer (Assistant Engineer) by the Haryana State Electricity Board (the Board), directions requiring him to mark attendance at his office daily, and his entitlement to the annual increment in pay.

Background facts recited in the opinion: A departmental inquiry was initiated against the petitioner and 14 other officers/officials regarding acts connected with construction of a Power House on the Western Yamuna Canal. The Inquiry Officer was appointed on 28 December 1982 and the inquiry remained pending at the time of the judgment. The petitioner was suspended by order dated 23 February 1985. In August 1985, the Chief Accounts Officer issued an order stating that the petitioner would be granted subsistence allowance only if he reported for duty daily at the headquarters fixed by the competent authority.

The petitioner made representations to the Chairman and Secretary of the Board against the suspension but received no reply. Although the applicable rules required review of suspension cases every six months, the petitioner's case was not reviewed as required (allegedly). The petitioner challenged the suspension order, the attendance direction, and the withholding of his annual increment by way of this writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the order of suspension of the petitioner was legally valid and within the powers of the authority that made it.
Whether the direction requiring the suspended petitioner to mark his attendance at the office daily (as a condition for subsistence allowance) was lawful and within the respondents' jurisdiction.
Whether the petitioner was entitled to his annual increment as of 31 July 1985 and whether withholding an increment during suspension amounted to a punishment requiring procedural compliance under the 1980 Regulations.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Shri Malik)

The suspension order was invalid (contention that the powers to suspend an Assistant Engineer were delegated to the Chairman and that the Chairman could not further delegate to Member Administration).
The Chief Accounts Officer's order requiring daily attendance at headquarters as a condition for subsistence allowance was arbitrary, illegal and beyond jurisdiction because suspension suspends the relationship of master and servant for purposes of work; a suspended officer cannot be compelled to perform duties or attend office daily.
The rule requiring review of suspension every six months (rule 4(6) of the 1980 Regulations) was not complied with; the failure to review rendered the suspension vitiated.
The decision to suspend five officers but not others facing similar charges was discriminatory.
The petitioner was entitled to the annual increment due on 31 July 1985 and withholding of increment amounted to punishment which could not be imposed without following the 1980 Regulations' disciplinary procedure.

Respondent's Arguments (Board / written statement)

The charges against the petitioner and others were of a grave nature, involving an alleged loss of Rs. 20 lakhs; the inquiry had been pending since 1983 and certain officers had been delaying the inquiry.
The petitioner was suspended by competent authority (Member Administration) with prior approval; the Member Administration had been assigned functions by the Chairman under office order No. 1049.HSEB-62 dated 24 September 1984.
Member Administration was competent to inflict minor punishments on officers up to the rank of Executive Engineer (and equivalent), and to place Assistant Engineers under suspension to facilitate an expeditious inquiry.
The attendance requirement was justified: in accordance with rule 7.2 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume I, Part I, the authority making the suspension must be satisfied that the suspended employee is not engaged in other employment, and physical presence at the office could enable that satisfaction.
The case had been considered in August 1985 (subsistence allowance increased from 50% to 75%), showing that the authority applied its mind and that some review/action had occurred.
No order had been passed withholding increment; the question of increment would be decided after completion of the inquiry and might depend on its result.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
U.P. State Electricity Board v. Abdul Sakoor Hashmi etc., (1980) 3 SCC 278; AIR 1981 SC 1708	Permissibility of assigning/allocating powers and functions within a Board under statutory rules (Section 79 and corresponding rules) and validating internal assignment of disciplinary functions.	The Court applied the case to uphold the Chairman's assignment under rule 14 of the 1959 Rules that invested Member Administration with disciplinary functions; it supported the view that such assignment did not amount to unlawful delegation of the Board's powers.
Khem Chand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 687	General principle that a suspended government servant continues to be in service and is entitled to subsistence allowance in lieu of pay; suspension means not permitted to work.	Relying on this authority, the Court recognized that suspension does not terminate service and that the suspended officer is normally not expected to render service during suspension.
V.P. Gindroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1970) 1 SCC 362; A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1494	Similar principle about the effect of suspension on the service relationship and entitlement to subsistence allowance.	Used to support the proposition that a suspended officer cannot be compelled to attend office or perform duties during suspension.
Zonal Manager, Food Corporation of India v. Khaleel Ahmed Siddiqui, 1982 (2) S.L.R. 779	Held that when an employee is debarred temporarily from service (suspension), he could not be compelled to attend office and mark attendance daily; administrative instructions inconsistent with rules cannot compel attendance.	The Court relied on this decision to hold that the Chief Accounts Officer's direction requiring daily attendance for subsistence allowance was inconsistent with the legal effect of suspension and therefore invalid.
Chitranjan Ghose v. I.G. of Police W.B., 1979 (2) S.L.R. 194	During suspension pending inquiry, a government servant is not liable to render service or be compelled to attend roll-call.	The Court cited this case as closely analogous and supportive of the conclusion that a suspended officer cannot be compelled to attend daily.
Gangavathi S.S. v. Chairman and M.D. Karnataka Land Army Ltd., 1984 (3) S.L.R. 493	Authority for the view that suspended officers are not liable to render service or attend roll-call during suspension.	Cited to reinforce the principle that suspended employees cannot be forced to attend office daily.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise analysis grounded in the statutory framework, office orders of the Board, and analogous authority:

Scope of authority to suspend: The Court examined the Board's statutory powers (Sections 15, 78 and 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948) and the 1959 Rules (rule 14) which empower the Chairman to distribute duties and functions among Members and officers. The Chairman's office order No. 1049.HSEB-62 dated 24 September 1984 assigned to Member Administration the power to deal finally with certain administrative cases, including infliction of minor punishment.
Delegation argument rejected: The petitioner argued that powers delegated to the Chairman could not be further delegated. The Court found this argument fallacious because the Chairman's assignment of functions to a Member flowed from rule 14 of the 1959 Rules (a statutory rule), and was not an impermissible delegation of the Board's powers. The Court relied on U.P. State Electricity Board v. Abdul Sakoor Hashmi to support that internal allocation of functions under statutory rules is permissible and valid.
Competence to suspend: Under Regulation 4(1)(a) of the Haryana State Electricity Board Employees (Punishment and Appeal) Regulations, 1980, and the Board's office order, Member Administration was competent to place the petitioner under suspension (particularly to facilitate an expeditious disciplinary inquiry where obstruction or delay was alleged).
Discrimination claim: The Court considered the contention that suspension of only some officers was discriminatory. It accepted the respondent's explanation that the five suspended officers, including the petitioner, had been obstructing or delaying inquiry proceedings, and that suspension was ordered to ensure a speedy and fair inquiry. The Court noted it is not disputed that a delinquent employee can be suspended in contemplation of or during departmental inquiry.
Validity of attendance requirement: The Court carefully evaluated the contention that a suspended officer could be required to attend daily so as to enable the competent authority to certify that the employee was not engaged in other employment (citing rule 7.2 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules). The Court found this requirement objectionable: suspension does not terminate service but debarred the employee from working, and a requirement to attend or perform duties during suspension would negate the effect of suspension. The Court relied on Khem Chand, V.P. Gindroniya, Zonal Manager v. Khaleel Ahmed Siddiqui, Chitranjan Ghose and Gangavathi S.S. to hold that forcing attendance was impermissible and amounted to an administrative instruction inconsistent with the legal effect of suspension.
Alternative administrative ways: The Court observed that the competent authority can devise other proper and legal methods to satisfy itself that a suspended employee is not engaged in other employment; compelling daily attendance and imposing travel burdens is not permissible.
Review every six months (rule 4(6)): The petitioner relied on the mandatory wording ("shall") of the review provision. The Court held that despite the mandatory language the rule is directory (not mandatory) and does not prescribe consequences for non-compliance. The written statement averred that the petitioner's case had been considered in August 1985 and subsistence allowance adjusted, indicating application of mind and substantial compliance.
Annual increment claim: The Court found no order had been passed withholding the increment; therefore the increment issue was undecided and would be taken up after completion of the inquiry and might depend on its result. The petitioner could not claim grant of the increment during the pendency of suspension.

Holding and Implications

PETITION PARTLY ALLOWED

The Court's direct rulings were:

The order of the Chief Accounts Officer (Annexure P.5) directing the petitioner to mark his presence at his headquarters daily (as a condition for subsistence allowance) is quashed — that direction was held to be without jurisdiction.
The order of suspension itself is sustained — the suspension was validly made by Member Administration pursuant to the Chairman's office order under rule 14 of the 1959 Rules and the applicable Regulations.
There shall be no order as to costs.

Implications:

Direct effect: The petitioner is relieved of the requirement to attend and mark daily presence at headquarters while under suspension, but remains under suspension pending completion of the departmental inquiry.
Increment issue: No determination was made on the petitioner's entitlement to the annual increment; that matter remains to be decided after the inquiry and may depend on its outcome.
Precedential impact: The Court applied existing statutory provisions, Board office orders and prior authorities to resolve the dispute; the judgment interprets and applies established principles regarding (a) permissible internal allocation of disciplinary functions under statutory rules and (b) the legal consequences of suspension (notably that a suspended officer should not be compelled to attend office). The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel or broad new precedent beyond the application of those authorities.

No additional information beyond what appears in the provided opinion has been added.

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Ramesh Chander Chug, Assistant Engineer (Civil) (Petitioner) v. The Haryana State Electricity Board ().

Sukhder Singh Kang, J.:— At issue, in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Shri Ramesh Chander Chug, petitioner, is the legality and validity of the orders of his suspension as Sub-Divisional Officer and directions requiring him to mark his attendance in the office daily, and his entitlement to the annual increment in his pay.

2. Facts giving rise to the filing of the writ petition may be recapitulated briefly:

A departmental inquiry was initiated against|Ramesh Chander Chug, petitioner, and 14 other officers/officials of the respondent Haryana State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) for various acts of omission and commission in relation to the construction of a Power House on the Western Yamuna Canal. The Inquiry Officer was appointed on 28th December, 1982. The inquiry is still in progress and has not been completed as yet.

On 23rd February, 1985, the petitioner was suspended under the orders of the Secretary of the Board. In the month of August, 1985, the Chief Accounts Officer of the Board issued orders that the petitioner shall be granted subsistence allowance only if he reported himself for duty daily at his headquarters fixed by the competent authority. The petitioner made a number of representations to the Chairman and the Secretary of the Board against the orders of his suspension, but did not receive any reply. Although the rules and regulations applicable to the petitioner required that the cases of all the officials of the respondents-Board under suspension should be reviewed every six months. Yet the case of the petitioner was never reviwed by the competent authority. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the orders of his suspension and directions for making attendance daily and withholding of his annual increment.

3. The respondent-Board das resisted the writ petition and has filed written statement broadly controverting the main pleas raised in the writ petition. It is averred that the allegations against the petitioner and other officers/officials contained charges of very grave nature resulting in a loss of Rs. 20 lacs due to wrong levelling for excavation work of about 18 Kms. of Hydel Channel. It is pleaded that the petitioner was suspended by the orders dated 23rd Feb., 1985, with the prior approval of Member Administration of the Board and not by the Secretary of the Board. The Member Administration has been invested with the powers of inflicting minor punishment including the issuance of warning etc. to officers/officials upto the rank of Executive Engineer, Senior Accounts Officer and other officers of equivalent rank/statute, vide office order No. 1049.HSEB-62, dated 24th September, 1984, issued by the Chairman of the Board. The petitioner was holding the post of Assistant Engineer and hence was below the status of Executive Engineer. The Member Administration being the punishing authority of the petitioner for purpose of infliction of minor punishment was competent to place him under suspension. The suspension order was communicated by ‘the Secretary of the Board. The petitioner and some of the other officers were making persistent efforts to delay and stall the inquiry proceedings and had been able to delay it considerably. Since the charges against the petitioner and his colleagues were of serious and they were obstructing the smooth and expeditious conduct of the inquiry, the petitioner and other four officers/officials were suspended in the interest of speedy inquiry which was for the benefit of all concerned. The petitioner was required to report himself daily at the headquarters fixed with Executive Engineer (Operation), City Division, Rohtak. This condition was incorporated in the order dated 23rd February, 1985, for the reasons that even during suspension period, the relationship of master and servant subsists and the officer under suspension is duty bound to abide by the lawful orders of the employer. Further, it was urged that according to Haryana Government instructions, duly adopted by the respondent-Board on 2nd June, 1971, the suspended employee can be required to mark daily attendance during his suspension. A copy of these instructions is appended as Annexure R-3 to the written statement. In accordance with rule 7.2 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume I. Part I, the authority which makes the suspension order of an employee is to be satisfied that the suspended employee is not engaged in any other employment, business, profession or vocation. This satisfaction can be achieved if the suspended employee comes present once for a while is the day in the office to which he is attached. This attendance is, therefore, necessary for the satisfaction of the competent Authority. It was further averred that the case of the petitioner for reinstatement had been kept pending so that the inquiry can be concluded expeditiously. The Haryana State Electricity Board has been constituted by the Haryana Government under Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (for short ‘the Act’). Under Section 15 the Board has been empowered to appoint a Secretary and such other officers and employees as may be required to enable the Board to carry out its functions under the Act. Section 78 of the Act authorises the State Government to frame rules to give effect to the provisions of the Act. Under Section 79 of the Act, the Board has been invested with powers to frame regulations in relation to the matters specified therein. In exercise of the powers conferred on it by Section 78 of the Act, the Punjab Government framed Punjab State Electricity Board (Chairman's Powers) Rules, 1959 (for short, ‘1952 Rules’) to define and regulate the powers and functions of the Chairman of the Board. rule 14 of the 1959 Rules empowers the Chairman to distribute duties and functions between Members. Secretaries and other officers of the Board. It reads as under:—

“R. 14. Distribution of Duties and Functions:

Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Chairman shall distribute the duties and functions between members, secretaries and other, officers of the Board and matters partaining to the disposal of the case work in the secretariate of the Board on such subjects that are not to be included in the agenda of the Board's meeting.”

4. The Chairman, vide office order No. 1049.HSEB/62, dated 24th September, 1984, assigned, inter alia, the following functions and duties to the Member Administration:

“1. Administration and Establishment:

The following nature of cases upto the rank of Xen/Sr. Accounts Officers and Officers of equivalent rank/status shall be disposed of finally by the Member Administration:—

(i) xxxxxxxxx

(ii) xxxxxxxxx

(iii) xxxxxxxxx

(iv) xxxxxxxxx

(v) Inflicting of minor punishment including issue of warning after investigation inquiry and a copy of this is to be placed in CR file except Under Secretaries/Administrative Officers or any Non-Technical Officers of corresponding rank/status. However, Member Administration would be the appellate authority for Under Secretaries/Administrative Officers etc.”

5. According to Regulation 4(1)(a) of the Haryana State Electricity Board Employees (Punishment and Appeal) Regulations, 1980 (for short, ‘the Regulations), framed under Section 79 of the Act, the appointing Authority or other higher Authority to which it is subordinate or the punishing Authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the Board by general or special order, may place an employee under suspension. By office order dated 24th September, 1984, Member Administration has been made the Punishing Authority of the Assistant Engineer's for the purpose of inflicting minor punishments. The Member Administration was, therefore, fully competent to pass orders of the petitioner's suspension. The plea of Shri. Malik, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that no inquiry is necessary for inflicting a minor, punishment and, consequently, there was no occasion for the member Administration to order the petitioner's suspension, cannot be accepted. Clause 1(v) of the office order dated 24th September, 1984, reproduced above, talks of investigation/inquiry. So, in cases where inquiry is initiated, the order of suspension can be passed by the Member Administration in order to facilitate an expeditious and fair inquiry unhindered by the influence or mechanisation of a delinquent officer/official in office.

6. Shri Malik had strenuously argued that the powers to suspend an Assistant Engineer had been delegated by the Board to the Chairman. The Chairman as a delegate could not further delegate these powers to the Member Administration. There is a fallacy in this argument. The Chairman had not delegated these powers to the Member Administration under the Regulations. He had passed the office order in exercise of statutory powers invested in him under rule 14 of the 1959 Rules. The 1959 Rules had specifically and clearly authorised the Chairman to distribute any of the duties and functions of the Board or the Chairman amongst the Members, Secretaries or officers of the Board. Member Administration was admittedly a member of the Board. He could be assigned any of the functions of the Board or the Chairman under rule 14 of the 1959 Rules. This will not amount to delegation of powers of the Board by the Chairman to his delegate. When the Chairman assigns duties and functions to a Member or an Officers under rule 14 of the 1959 Rules, he performs duties and obligations placed on him by the Rules. He does not delegate the powers belonging to the Board or the Chairman. The Board is an enormous undertaking with thousands of employees on its rolls. “It would be virtually impossible for the Board to carry on its functions, if every time every minion under it, were to be subjected to disciplinary action only by the Board, which is the op-body acting as a Corporate entity. We do not think that the, provisions of the Act can be interpreted into an impossible position for the Board. On the other hand, a more viable construction is what we have indicated above”. These observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in U.P State Electricity Boar v. Abdul Sakoor Hashmi etc, (1980) 3 SCC 278 : AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1708 squarely apply to the present case. In that case Regulations framed by the U.P Electricity Board under sub-sections (c) and (k) of Section 79 laying down the mode of appointment to various posts, the appointing Authority competent to terminate their services were held to be not invalid on the ground that the Board had no power to delegate in that regard. It was held: “Section 79(k) is a residuary provision, which embraces the power to make Regulations in regard to tike functions of the Board. Concerned “anguage used in this clause is sufficient to cover making up of provisions to terminate employment. Section 79(k) takes within its sweep the power to maintain or to take disciplinary action.” So, the Member Administration had been validly invested by the Chairman with powers to take disciplinary action against certain category of officers including Assistant Engineers for inflicting minor punishments. He was also competent to suspend the petitioner, who is an Assistant Engineer, during the course of disciplinary enquiry.

7. It is indeed true that the Chairman had been clothed with the powers of punishing Authority mentioned in 1980 Regulations/corresponding provisions of Punjab Civil Services (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1952, in relation to disciplinary cases of Gazetted Officers for major punishments vide office order No. 5.REG-22.L-1, dated 27th July, 1981. This, however, is in no way in derrogation to the powers of the Chairman derived from the 1959 Rules. In exercise of those powers, the Chairman had specifically assigned Member Administration the duties and functions of taking disciplinary action for inflicting minor, punishment on the Assistant Engineers. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. By office order No. 5, ibid, the powers to take action against Gazetted Officers including Assistant Engineers for inflicting major punishments have been conferred on the Chairman of the Board. The Chairman while exercising powers under rule 14 of the 1959 Rules can legally and validly confer these powers on the Member Administration. This power flows from statutory rules and the principle that the Delegatee cannot further delegate its powers, cannot negate the exercise of this statutory power.

8. It was then argued by Shri Malik that the Authority had issued charge sheet to 15 officers/officials. Only 5 out of them have been suspended. The charges against the petitioner were similar to those/against certain other officers, who had not been suspended. The action of the Board in picking and chosing officers for suspension is discriminatory and liable to be quashed. The argument has not appealed to us. The Authorities have taken conscious decisions regarding the suspension of the five officers. It has been explained in the written statement that these officers were employing dilatory tactics and were not allowing the inquiry proceedings to progress. The same was pending since 1983. The charges against the petitioner and his colleagues who had been suspended were of serious nature. The petitioner and others have been suspended in order to make it possible for the inquiry to be completed expeditiously and fairly. It is not disputed even by Mr. Malik that a delinquent employee facing charges of misconduct, attracting a penalty can be suspended in contemplation of or during the pendency of departmental inquiry. So, there is no discrimination.

9. It was then argued that the orders of the Chief Accounts Officers (Annexure P. 5) directing that the petitioner shall be granted subsistence allowance only if he reported himself for duty daily at the headquarters is wholly arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction. It is urged by the learned counsel that with the suspension of the delinquent officer, the relationship between the employer and the employee is suspended. The employer could not issue any directions in the nature of Annexure P. 5 to the delinquent employee. Such an employee cannot be asked to perform any duties or to attend the office. The employer does not pay full pay and allowances to the delinquent officer. Only a subsistence allowance, which is just sufficient to keep the body and soul of the concerned official together is paid during the course of the inquiry. The employer cannot take any work out of the suspended employee nor can be insist on the latter's attendance in a office daily. There is merit in this contention. An order of suspension of a government servant, does not put an end to his service under the Government. He continues to be a member of the Service in spite of order of suspension. The real effect of the order “of suspension is that though he continues to be a member of the government service he is not permitted to work and further during the period of his suspension he is paid some allowance—called substance allowance, which is normally less than his salary—instead of the pay and allowance, he would have been entitled to it if he had not been suspended, (See in this connection Khem Chand v. Union of India, A.I.R 1963 S.C 687 and V.P Gindroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1970) 1 SCC 362 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1494). After the suspension of the relationship of master and servant, the suspended employee cannot be asked to perform any official duties or to appear in and attend any office daily. If such an officer is required to be present in the office, it will amount to issue orders to him and asking him to perform certain duties which will not be permissible during the period of suspension. The, matter is not res integra. In Zonal Manager, Food Corporation of India v. Khaleel Ahmed Siddiqui, 1982 (2) S.L.R 779, it was held:—

“………………We fail to understand how when an employee is debarred temporarily from service, he could be compelled to attend office and mark his attendance daily and also be visited with penalty if he does not mark, his attendance. The instructions, in our view cannot be regarded as merely filling up the gaps in the regulations when they are inconsistent with the rules. It is unnecessary to refer to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court which have held that it is not open by way of administrative instructions. In this connection, it has to be noted that the person under suspension is entitled to all allowances referred to in Reg. 66(6) other than conveyance allowance. This clearly indicates that a person under suspension is not expected to attend office or claim conveyance for his attendance………………………………….”

10. The same view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in Chitranjan Ghose v. I.G of Police W.B, 1979 (2) S.L.R 194. It was held: “that during the course of his suspension), pending an inquiry, a government servant is not liable to render any service or perform any duty. The police officer, while under suspension cannot be compelled to attend roll-call. This case is closest to the case in hand. The Karnataka High Court also has taken a similar view in Gangavathi S.S v. Chairman and M.D Karnataka Land Army Ltd., 1984 (3) S.L.R 493.

11. The plea of the respondents that the competent Authority had to be satisfied that the employee under suspension is not engaged in any other trade, business or profession during the course of suspension and has to issue a certificate and that without physical presence of the employee before such Authority, it will be impossible to issue such a certificate, cannot be accepted. Simply in order to facilitate the competent Authorities in the discharge of his duties an employee under suspension cannot be forced to undergo harassment of attending office daily and incurring expenses on his journey to and from the place of his residence. For this purpose, the competent Authority has to devise some other proper and legal method. So, we are of the considered view that directions of the Chief Accounts Officer directing the petitioner to attend the office alt his headquarters daily is without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed.

12. It was then urged by Shri Malik that under rule 4(6) of the 1980 Regulations, the case of every suspended employee has to be reviewed every six month. It has not been pleaded in the written statement that for some exceptional circumstances, it was necessary to keep the government servant under suspension for a period beyond six months. So the order of suspension is vitiated. We are not impressed. Despite the use of word “shall” the rule is only directory. It is not mandatory. It does not provide for any consequences for non-compliance thereof. There has been a substantial compliance with this rule. It has been averred in the written statement that the case of the petitioner was considered in August, 1985 and his subsistence allowance had been increased from 50% to 75% of his pay. This clearly shows an application of the mind. The competent Authority wanted the inquiry to continue and the petitioner to remain under suspension. The petitioner cannot raise any grievance on this score. It was lastly contended by Mr. Malik that the petitioner was entitled to annual increment which was due as a matter of course on 31st July, 1985, and the same has been with-held under the Service Rules, but with-holding of an increment is a punishment. This could not be inflicted without following the procedure prescribed under the 1980 Regulations. The argument has not commended itself to us. No order has been passed with-holding the increment. Since the petitioner is under suspension so the question regarding increment has not been decided one way or the other. This will be taken up after the completion of the inquiry and may depend upon the result thereof. So, the claim of the petitioner for the grant of annual increment during the pendency of the suspension cannot be granted.

13. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is partly allowed and the order of the Chief Accounts Officer (Annexure P. 5) requiring the petitioner to mark his presence at his headquarters daily is quashed. The order of suspension is sustained. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

14. Petition partly allowed.

Ramesh Chander Chug,... v. The Haryana State El...