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    Messrs Lachhman Das Moti Ram v. Shori Lal .

    Chopra, J.:— These three petitions for revision are directed against an order of Mr. Ved Parkash Aggarwal, Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Delhi, holding that the applications presented by the tenants for fixation of standard rent under Section 8 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, were within limitation by application of section 14(2) of the Limitation Act.

    2. The Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (No. XXXVIII of 1952) (and hereinafter to be referred as the Act) came into force on 9th June, 1952. Section 11 of the Act provided six months' limitation for presentation of applications for fixation of standard rent in cases where the premises were let prior to the coming into force of the Act. The applications in such cases were thus to be presented before 9th December, 1952. The respondents, to whom different premises belonging to the same landlord, Lachhman Dass petitioner, were Jet prior to the enforcement of the Act, presented three separate applications in the Court of the Additional Judge of Small Causes on 29th October, 1952. On an objection regarding the jurisdiction of the Court having been taken, it was held that the Court of Small Causes had no jurisdiction to deal with the applications for fixation of standard rent under the Act. This order was made on 10th March, 1953, and the applications were in fact returned to the respondents on 12th March, 1953. The same day the applications were presented in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi, who transferred them to the Court of a Subordinate Judge 1st Class Delhi, for disposal.

    3. The applications were consolidated and one of the issues raised in the case was whether the applications were within time. The issue was treated as preliminary and decided in favour of the tenants. It was held that a large number of such applications had been presented in the Court of Small Causes because of the wrong notion that Court continued to have the jurisdiction to deal with them as previously. The mistake was regarded as bona fide and the time spent in that Court was excluded. In this view of the matter, the applications were held to be within time by order of the learned trial Judge dated 13th June, 1955. It is against this order that the present petitions are directed.

    4. A preliminary objection is taken on behalf of the tenants that an appeal against the interlocutary order of the Subordinate Judge was provided by section 34 of the Act and, therefore, no revision would be competent. These revisions are filed under section 35 of the Act which lays down that ‘the High Court may at any time call for the record of any case under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decision made therein is according to law and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit.’ It follows that this Court may interfere in revision even in a case where an appeal may be competent. The revisional power of this Court under the Act is not confined to cases where an appeal would not be competent, as provided by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Apart from it, I do not think the present can be regarded as ‘an order of a Court passed under this Act’ against which alone an appeal would lie under section 34 of the Act. Section 11 merely prescribes limitation for presenting an application for fixation of standard rent. The proviso to the section authorises the Court to entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the application in time. The present is certainly not an order under the proviso. The order, on the other hand, holds that the applications are within time under section 11 of the Act by application of the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act and it cannot, therefore, be regarded as an order under the proviso or the Act. The preliminary objection is accordingly disallowed.

    5. On merits, Mr. R.S Narula, learned counsel for the petitioners, contends that the Act is a complete code by itself and that the provisions regarding limitation for applications for fixation of standard rent contained in section 11 exclude the application of section 14 of the Limitation Act to such applications. Reliance is particularly placed on the proviso to the section which lays down that the Court may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the application in time. The argument is that the proviso expressly makes the principles of section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to the applications for fixation of standard rent under the Act, meaning thereby that the application of other similar previsions of the Limitation Act is excluded. Reference has also been made to section 38 of the Act, which reads:—

    “The provisions of this Act and of the rules made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.”

    In my opinion, the contention is without substance.

    6. Sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act lays down inter alia that for the purposes of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18 and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. It follows that the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act shall apply in determining the period of limitation for applications for fixation of standard rent provided by section 11 of the Act, unless the application of the provisions is expressly excluded by anything contained in the Act. In order that the exclusion may be express, the particular section or sections of the Limitation Act, which are intended to be excluded, must be specifically indicated by the special or local law. The mere fact, that the principles of section 5 of the Limitation Act are made applicable to the applications for fixation of standard rent by the proviso to section 11 of the Act, does not mean that the application of the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act was intended to be excluded. The provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act would not have applied to the applications unless they were expressly made applicable, and that is why the proviso to section 11 of the Act was added. The case for the application of the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act is just the reverse, they are necessarily to apply unless their application is expressly excluded. Not only that there is no express exclusion in the Act, I do not find anything in the Act which even impliedly excludes the application of section 14 of the Limitation Act. Section of the Act gives an over-riding effect to its provisions and the rules made thereunder only where there is any inconsistency between them and the provisions contained in any other law for the time being in force. There is certainly no inconsistency between the provisions of section 11 of the Act and those of section 14 of the Limitation Act. A similar view has already been taken by Falshaw J. in Ram Sarup v. Nathu Ram . 1956 58 P.L.R 133. and I am in respectful agreement with that view. Decision in Ajudhya Parsad v. The Chief Commissioner of Delhi (C.W No. 432 of 1958, decided on 12th October, 1959) relied upon by Mr. Narula, is based on the interpretation of sections 19 and 30 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, and has no application to the facts of this case.

    7. It is then submitted that the counsel for the tenants was not shown to have acted in good faith and with due diligence in presenting the applications to the Court of the Additional Judge of Small Causes, which evidently had no jurisdiction to entertain them under the Act. Under the repealed Act (No. XXIX of 1947) such applications could be entertained and decided by the Judge of Small Causes, as provided by Rule 3 of the Delhi Rent Copt of Procedure Rules, 1947. The Act came into force on 9th June, 1952. According to section 33 of the Act, any Civil Court in the State of Delhi or Ajmer which has jurisdiction to hear and decide a suit for recovery of possession of any premises shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide any case under the Act relating to such premises if it has pecuniary jurisdiction and is otherwise competent to hear and decide such a case under any law for the time being in force. The provision is no doubt abundantly clear to take away the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes to deal with cases under the Act. All the same, there is sufficient evidence on the record to show that some sort of confusion or doubt did exist in the minds of the majority of the lawyers here as to the jurisdiction of the Judge of Small Causes having been taken away by the Act in these matters it appears that thousands of such applications were in fact instituted in the Court of Small Causes alter the enforcement of the Act, and ultimately they had all to be returned for being presented to the Court of competent jurisdiction. Not only that, about two thousand of such applications instituted in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge were transferred by that Court for disposal to the Judge of Small Causes. In the circumstances, I do not see any particular reason to differ with the finding that the tenants were entitled to the exclusion of the period between 29th October, 1952, and 12th March, 1953, under section 14 of the Limitation Act while computing the limitation of six months provided by section 11 of the Act.

    8. In the result, the petitions fail and are dismissed. In view of the facts of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.

    Petitions dismissed.

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    Messrs Lachhman Das Moti Ram v. Shori Lal .
    (Jan 8, 1960)