AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Central Sales Tax Act, Section 5, Subsection (3)
  • Section 12-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957
  • Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956
  • Section in the CST Act, 1956
  • Section 8(5) of the CST Act
  • Central Sales Tax, 1956 (Central Act 74 of 1956)
  • Section [not specified], Subsection [not specified] of the [act/article name not specified]
  • Section 8 of the CST Act
  • Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 20(5) read with Section 9(2) of the CST Act
  • Section 12-A of the KST Act
  • KST Act in the Second Schedule in Serial No. 1 of Part O
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Central Sales Tax Act, Section 5, Subsection (3)
  • Section 12-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957
  • Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956
  • Section in the CST Act, 1956
  • Section 8(5) of the CST Act
  • Central Sales Tax, 1956 (Central Act 74 of 1956)
  • Section [not specified], Subsection [not specified] of the [act/article name not specified]
  • Section 8 of the CST Act
  • Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 20(5) read with Section 9(2) of the CST Act
  • Section 12-A of the KST Act
  • KST Act in the Second Schedule in Serial No. 1 of Part O
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant manufactures refined edible oil and trades in edible oil and oil cake. For Assessment Year 2002-2003 it filed a revised return declaring inter-State sales of sunflower de-oiled cake (SF DOC) and paid Central Sales Tax (CST) at 2 % relying on Karnataka Notification No. FD 119 CSL 2002(2) dated 31-5-2002 and on the production of C-Forms from purchasers.

On 29-1-2005 the Deputy Commissioner (Assessment) completed the assessment accepting the 2 % rate. A successor officer reopened the assessment under Section 12-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (KST Act) on the ground that SF DOC was taxable at 4 % and passed a reassessment order.

The assessee’s appeal to the Joint Commissioner succeeded on the ground that reassessment based on a mere change of opinion was impermissible. However, the assessee pursued a further appeal to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal seeking an express finding that SF DOC attracted only 2 %. The Tribunal allowed the appeal holding that “oil cake” in the notification included “de-oiled cake”.

The State’s revision before the High Court of Karnataka succeeded: the High Court held (i) that reassessment was valid and (ii) that oil cake and de-oiled cake are distinct commodities, the latter not covered by the notification.

The present appeal by special leave challenges the High Court’s judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether reassessment under Section 12-A of the KST Act could be initiated when the earlier assessment had accepted a lower rate of tax, i.e. whether the successor officer had “reason to believe” or merely a change of opinion.
  2. Whether “oil cake” in Notification No. FD 119 CSL 2002(2) dated 31-5-2002 includes “de-oiled cake”, thereby entitling inter-State sales of SF DOC supported by C-Forms to the concessional CST rate of 2 %.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Assessee)

  • The reassessment was prompted solely by a change of opinion; Binani Industries Ltd. v. CCT bars such reopening.
  • On commercial-parlance principles explained in Sterling Foods v. State of Karnataka, oil cake and de-oiled cake are the same commodity; hence the 2 % rate applies.

Respondent (State/Revenue)

  • Section 12-A permits reopening where turnover has been assessed at a lower rate; the phrase “reason to believe” should be read broadly.
  • The statutory Schedule and notification consciously treat oil cake and de-oiled cake as distinct commodities; the concessional rate is limited to oil cake.

Table of Precedents Cited

PrecedentRule or Principle Cited ForApplication by the Court
M/S Nagaraja Overseas Traders v. State of Mysore (1974) 33 STC 315Change of opinion cannot justify reopening.Relied on by first appellate authority; noted in Supreme Court narrative.
Mahaveer Drug House v. CCT (1994) 93 STC 51Same principle on reassessment.Cited before first appellate authority.
State of A.P. v. Ampro Food Products Ltd. (1995) 96 STC 617Limits on reassessment powers.Cited before first appellate authority.
Girdharlal & Co. v. State of A.P. (1995) 97 STC 442Limits on reassessment powers.Referenced in appellate proceedings.
C. Sathiraju and Sons v. State of A.P. (1998) 111 STC 703Limits on reassessment powers.Cited before first appellate authority.
Somani Bros. v. State of Bihar (1995) 99 STC 47Limits on reassessment powers.Cited before first appellate authority.
Eureka Forbes Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2000) 119 STC 460Limits on reassessment powers.Cited before first appellate authority.
Sterling Foods v. State of Karnataka (1986) 3 SCC 469Commodity identity determined by commercial parlance.Relied on by assessee and Tribunal; distinguished by High Court and Supreme Court.
State of Karnataka v. Goa Granites (2007) 5 VST 434 (Kar)Interpretation of notifications.Referred to by Tribunal.
Habeeb Proteins & Fats Extracts v. CCT (2005) 58 Kant LJ 155Treatment of oil cake varieties.Relied on by Tribunal; High Court held it not directly in point.
Binani Industries Ltd. v. CCT (2007) 15 SCC 435Re-assessment impermissible on change of opinion.Accepted by Tribunal; reaffirmed by Supreme Court.
CST v. Pio Food Packers 1980 Supp SCC 174Commercial-parlance test for identity of goods.Quoted in Sterling Foods discussion.
Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. Biotor Industries Ltd. (2014) 3 SCC 732Oil cake and de-oiled cake are distinct commercial products.Supreme Court followed this distinction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Construction of Section 12-A (Escaped Turnover): The Court analysed the statutory text and noted that reopening is permissible if turnover “has been assessed at a rate lower than” applicable. However, it emphasised that an earlier assessment had examined the same material (including C-Forms) and consciously adopted the 2 % rate. Reopening in such circumstances amounted to a prohibited change of opinion; the principle in Binani Industries was reaffirmed.

2. Whether oil cake and de-oiled cake are the same commodity: Relying on its own decision in Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. Biotor Industries the Court held that oil cake and de-oiled cake are commercially distinct. The wording of Notification No. FD 119 CSL 2002(2) reinforced this conclusion because “oil cake” alone was listed for the concessional rate; “de-oiled cake” was consciously omitted.

3. Effect of the Two Findings Together: Although the commodity distinction favoured the Revenue, the invalidity of the reassessment—because it was initiated only on a change of opinion—meant the assessee’s original assessment at the concessional rate had to stand.

Holding and Implications

HELD: The appeal is allowed in part. The Supreme Court affirms the High Court’s view that oil cake and de-oiled cake are different commodities under the notification, but sets aside the reassessment because reopening on a mere change of opinion is impermissible. The assessee therefore continues to benefit from the original assessment at 2 % CST.

Implications: The judgment reiterates (a) the strict bar on reassessment based solely on a change of opinion under Section 12-A of the KST Act, and (b) that commodity identity must be ascertained from the statute/notification even where a commercial-parlance argument is advanced. While no new precedent is set on the commodity issue, the decision reinforces procedural safeguards against reopening concluded assessments.

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    Ravi Prakash Refineries Private Limited v. State Of Karnataka .

    Dipak Misra, J.— Delay condoned. Leave granted.

    2. The appellant assessee is engaged in the manufacturing of refined edible oil by solvent extraction process and refining along with trading in edible oil and oil cake. For the assessment year ending 31-3-2003 the assessee had filed Revised Annual Return in Form 4, declaring the gross taxable turnovers at Rs 19,76,37,615-00 and Rs 1,60,93,055-00, respectively.

    3. As the factual narration would show, the appellant sold sunflower de-oiled cake (SF DOC) and several other goods in the course of inter-State trade and commerce and in the course of the said transaction the appellant produced C Forms obtained from the dealers in inter-State sales. The assessee had admitted the liability of tax at 2% on the sale of SF DOC in the course of inter-State trade and commerce. The Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Assessment), Chitradurga, the assessing authority, had passed an order of assessment under Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (for brevity “the CST Act”) on 29-1-2005, whereby it had expressed the view that a sum of Rs 4,75,68,764 was subjected to tax at 2%. The assessing officer had granted the benefit on production of C Form in terms of Notification No. FD 119 CSL 2002 (2) dated 31-5-2002.

    4. After the order of assessment was passed, the succeeding assessing officer formed an opinion that there was an escapement of tax due to the reason that the inter-State sales of SF DOC was actually liable to tax at 4% and not at 2%, which had been erroneously adopted by the earlier assessing authority. Following the principles of natural justice, he levied the tax at 4% on the inter-State sales of SF DOC.

    5. The aforesaid order was called in question in an appeal before the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), Davansere Division, Davangere under Section 20(5) read with Section 9(2) of the CST Act. The appellate authority noted the submissions advanced on behalf of the assessee as well as the Revenue and thereafter referred to Section 12-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (for short “the KST Act”) and referred to the decisions in Nagaraja Overseas Traders v. State of Mysore 1973 SCC OnLine Kar 248, (1974) 33 STC 315, Mahaveer Drug House v. CCT 1993 SCC OnLine Kar 324, (1994) 93 STC 51, State of A.P. v. Ampro Food Products Ltd. 1994 SCC OnLine AP 431, (1995) 96 STC 617, Girdharlal & Co. v. State of A.P. 1994 SCC OnLine AP 247, (1995) 97 STC 442, C. Sathiraju and Sons v. State of A.P. 1996 SCC OnLine AP 1268, (1998) 111 STC 703, Somani Bros. v. State of Bihar 1995 SCC OnLine Pat 516, (1995) 99 STC 47 and Eureka Forbes Ltd. v. State of Bihar 1995 SCC OnLine Pat 520, (2000) 119 STC 460 and came to hold that the change of opinion could not have been a ground for reopening of assessment in exercise of power under Section 12-A of the KST Act and, accordingly, set aside the order of reassessment.

    6. Though the assessee succeeded, yet it preferred an appeal, being STA No. 425 of 2006 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore (for short “the Tribunal”), as the first appellate authority had not expressed any opinion with regard to rate of tax on oil cake and de-oiled cake. It was contended before the Tribunal that the oil cake and de-oiled cake as per the commercial parlance are one and the same and, therefore, the rate of tax has to be at 2% and not 4%. The Tribunal after noting the submissions referred to the Schedule in the notification and the decisions in Sterling Foods v. State of Karnataka (1986) 3 SCC 469, (1986) 63 STC 239, State of Karnataka v. Goa Granites (2007) 5 VST 434 (Kar) and Habeeb Proteins and Fats Extracts v. CCT 2005 SCC OnLine Kar 47, (2005) 58 Kant LJ 155 and came to hold as under :

    “Thus, we hold that the expression oil cake in Sl. No. 6 of CST Notification No. FD 119 CSL 2002(2) dated 31-5-2002 would include also de-oiled cake and that therefore the reassessment order passed by the AA under the CST Act, 1956 for the year 2002-2003 insofar as it concerned levy of CST at 4% on inter-State sales of sunflower de-oiled cake covered by C Forms by denying the benefit of reduction in the rate of CST to 2% granted in the Notification dated 31-5-2002 is liable to be held unsustainable and set aside.
    ***
    Consequential to the decision taken by us as above, the appellate order of the learned FAA is liable for modification accordingly. As regards the reassessment order set aside by the learned FAA on the basis of lay (sic) that reassessment is not permissible by change of opinion, which is supported by the several case laws cited in the appellate order itself, it need to be placed on record that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has reiterated the said legal position that reopening of an assessment by change of opinion is not permissible in the recent judgment rendered in Binani Industries Ltd. v. CCT (2007) 15 SCC 435, (2007) 6 VST 783.”

    7. On the aforesaid analysis, the Tribunal issued the following directions:

    “(i) Reassessment order passed by the DCCT (Transition), Chitradurga under the CST Act, 1956 for the year 2002-2003 in respect of rate of CST levied at 4% on the turnover of Rs 4,75,68,764 relating to inter-State sales of sunflower de-oiled cake covered by C Forms is modified to 2% allowing the benefit of reduction in the rate of CST to 2% granted in Notification No. FD 119 CSL 2002 (2) dated 31-5-2002.
    (ii) The appellate order passed by the FAA in CST AP No. 27/2005-06 dated 20-4-2006 shall stand modified accordingly.
    (iii) Directions are issued that the AA shall accordingly issue revised demand notice.”

    8. The aforesaid order of the Tribunal was assailed before the High Court in revision petition being STRP No. 32 of 2009. Be it noted, the High Court had formulated 2011 SCC OnLine Kar 4183 the following two substantial questions of law: (Ravi Prakash case 2011 SCC OnLine Kar 4183, SCC OnLine Kar para 3)

    “(i) Whether, on the facts and in circumstances of the case, can it be held that the order dated 12-7-2007 passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal in STA No. 425 of 2006 allowing the appeal is correct and in accordance with law?
    (ii) Whether on the facts and in circumstances of the case, can it be held that the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in ignoring that under the KST Act in the Second Schedule in Serial No. 1 of Part O, oil cake and de-oiled cake are listed under two separate sub-headings as two different commodities?”

    9. After deliberating on the aforesaid two questions, the High Court referred to the provisions of the KST Act and the notification issued under Section 8(5) of the CST Act, distinguished the decisions placed reliance upon by the first appellate authority and the Tribunal as well as the decision rendered by this Court in Sterling Foods (1986) 3 SCC 469, (1986) 63 STC 239 and came to hold that there is distinction between oil cake and de-oiled cake and they are two different commodities and not one and the same. Elaborating the discussion, the Division Bench held thus: (Ravi Prakash case 2011 SCC OnLine Kar 4183, SCC OnLine Kar para 8)

    “8. The contention that the commodities will have to be understood in common parlance as understood by a common man is even harder to accept. What a common man understands need not necessarily mean what is understood in accordance with law. In the instant case, the framers of the Schedule were aware of the distinction between oil cake and de-oiled cake. Accordingly, they have treated it as two different commodities. Therefore, to hold that the view of a common man has to necessarily override the view of the legislature is difficult to accept. The distinction in law has been made which requires to be followed. Oil cake and de-oiled cake cannot stand extended to de-oiled cake. The impact of the notification reducing the tax impact was very well known when the benefit was granted. A notification has to be strictly construed. The Court cannot read into the notification what is not there. The notification is clear and unambiguous. Any attempt to read it otherwise is not only uncalled for but would amount to redrafting the notification.”

    Being of this view, it answered the two questions that were framed by it in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The said judgment and order 2011 SCC OnLine Kar 4183 is the subject-matter of challenge in this appeal by special leave.

    10. We have heard Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel along with Ms Anupama, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel along with Shri V.N. Raghupathy, learned counsel for the State.

    11. First, we shall take up the issue pertaining to Section 12-A of the KST Act. Section 12-A(1) which is relevant for the present purpose is extracted below:

    “12-A. Assessment of escaped turnover.—(1) If the assessing authority has reason to believe that the whole or any part of the turnover of a dealer in respect of any period has escaped assessment to tax or has been under assessed or has been assessed at a rate lower than the rate at which it is assessable under this Act or any deductions or exemptions have been wrongly allowed in respect thereof, the assessing authority may, notwithstanding the fact that the whole or part of such escaped turnover was already before the said authority at the time of the original assessment or reassessment but subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), at any time within a period of eight years from the expiry of the year to which the tax relates, proceed to assess or reassess to the best of its judgment the tax payable by the dealer in respect of such turnover after issuing a notice to the dealer and after making such enquiry as it may consider necessary.”

    12. On a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is limpid that it permits reopening of an assessment on the ground that if the assessee has been assessed at a rate lower than the rate at which it is assessable under the Act. The rate of tax is four per cent. The assessee had filed the return and the C Forms claiming the benefit of the Notification dated 31-5-2002 in respect of inter-State sale of oil cakes. The assessing officer had accepted the C Forms on verification and granted the benefit. The assessing officer on a proper security has accepted the C Forms on the basis of which reduced rate of tax was claimed. The assessment was reopened as there was no escapement of tax due in respect of inter-State sale in respect of SF DOC.

    13. Mr Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, would submit that once an assessment order was framed on all the materials available on record and the rate of tax was accepted, the view expressed by the first appellate authority which had got the stamp of affirmance by the Tribunal should be accepted to be correct more for the reason that the Revenue had not challenged the order of assessment and that apart the High Court has not appositely dealt with it. He would place heavy reliance on the pronouncement in Binani Industries Ltd. v. CCT (2007) 15 SCC 435, (2007) 6 VST 783.

    14. It is submitted by Mr Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel, that claiming of benefit on production of C Forms had nothing to do with the nature of product that was sold. The learned Senior Counsel would contend that the first appellate authority, as well as the Tribunal, has been erroneously guided that there has been change of opinion. The learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the words “reason to believe” have to be expansively understood to import a meaning to the provision, for when the assessment has taken place at a rate lower than the rate at which the turnover of a dealer is assessable, there can be reopening of assessment.

    15. First, we shall proceed to consider the acceptability of the opinion expressed by the High Court. The Government of Karnataka in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 8(5) of the CST Act, issued Notification No. 119 FD 119 CSL 2002(2) dated 31-5-2002 granting reduction in the rate of Central sales tax payable on inter-State sales of goods specified in Serial Nos. 1 to 11 of the Notification, subject to the condition that the dealer produces declarations in Forms C obtained from the registered dealers/Government to whom the goods are sold. Be it noted oil cake is one of the goods specified in Serial No. 6 of the notification.

    16. Submission of Mr Mehta, learned Senior Counsel is that the High Court has clearly erred in law by distinguishing the facts and by opining that the judgment in Habeeb Proteins 2005 SCC OnLine Kar 47, (2005) 58 Kant LJ 155 is not a decision in issue and an obiter. In Sterling Foods (1986) 3 SCC 469, (1986) 63 STC 239, the question that arose for consideration was whether shrimps, prawns and lobsters subjected to processing like cutting of heads and tails, peeling, deveining, cleaning and freezing ceased to be the same commodity and became a different commodity for the purpose of the Central Sales Tax Act. The Court posed the question whether they still go under the description of shrimps, prawns and lobsters or in other words, shrimps, prawns and lobsters would mean only raw shrimps, prawns and lobsters as caught from the sea or they also include processed and frozen shrimps, prawns and lobsters. After referring to the various provisions and placing reliance on the decision in CST v. Pio Food Packers 1980 Supp SCC 174 the Court held as under: (Sterling Foods case (1986) 3 SCC 469, (1986) 63 STC 239)

    “8. … when the State Legislature excluded processed or frozen shrimps, prawns and lobsters from the ambit and coverage of Entry 13(a), its object obviously was that the last purchases of processed or frozen shrimps, prawns and lobsters in the State should not be exigible to State sales tax under Entry 13(a). The State Legislature was not at all concerned with the question as to whether processed or frozen shrimps, prawns and lobsters are commercially the same commodity as raw shrimps, prawns and lobsters or are a different commodity and merely because the State Legislature made a distinction between the two for the purpose of determining exigibility to State sales tax, it cannot be said that in commercial parlance or according to popular sense, processed or frozen shrimps, prawns and lobsters are recognised as different commodity distinct from raw shrimps, prawns and lobsters. The question whether raw shrimps, prawns and lobsters after suffering processing retain their original character or identity or become a new commodity has to be determined not on the basis of a distinction made by the State Legislature for the purpose of exigibility to State sales tax because even where the commodity is the same in the eyes of the persons dealing in it the State Legislature may make a classification for determining liability to sales tax. This question, for the purpose of the Central Sales Tax Act, has to be determined on the basis of what is commonly known or recognised in commercial parlance. If in commercial parlance and according to what is understood in the trade by the dealer and the consumer, processed or frozen shrimps, prawns and lobsters retain their original character and identity as shrimps, prawns and lobsters and do not become a new distinct commodity and are as much “shrimps, prawns and lobsters”, as raw shrimps, prawns and lobsters, sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act would be attracted and if with a view to fulfilling the existing contracts for export, the assessee purchases raw shrimps, prawns and lobsters and processes and freezes them, such purchases of raw shrimps, prawns and lobsters would be deemed to be in course of export so as to be exempt from liability to State sales tax.”

    17. Relying on the said passage, it is contended by Mr Mehta that when identity of the goods on the basis of commercial parlance is similar, the High Court would have been well advised to follow the principles set out in the aforesaid decision and should not have been guided by the concept of enumeration in the Notification. In essence, the submission is that there is no distinction between the oil cake and the de-oiled cake and both should be perceived as one in commercial parlance. Thus, the emphasis is on the commercial parlance test. To bolster the said stand, reliance has been placed on Habeeb Proteins case 2005 SCC OnLine Kar 47, (2005) 58 Kant LJ 155, wherein the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka has drawn a distinction between sunflower oil cake and groundnut oil cake on the one hand and de-oiled sunflower cake and groundnut oil cake on the other. The aforesaid analysis made in the said judgment should not detain us long, for Mr Patil, learned Senior Counsel for the State has brought to our notice a recent decision of this Court in Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. Biotor Industries Ltd. (2014) 3 SCC 732 In the said case, the two-Judge Bench had posed five questions and the question pertinent for our purpose reads thus: (Agricultural Produce case (2014) 3 SCC 732)

    “13.4. (iv) Whether the Division Bench 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 275 is justified in recording the finding on the second issue (see para 7, above at p. 737 c-d) in connection with LPA No. 195 of 2006 that the respondent concern is not liable to pay any market fee on the de-oiled cakes sold by it which are stated to be the by-product in the course of manufacturing castor oil which is not one of the items enumerated in the Schedule to the Act and the notification issued by the Directorate?”

    18. Dealing with the distinction between the oil cake and the de-oiled cake, the Court referred to the process and quoted from the findings referred to by the learned Single Judge. Though the said decision was rendered in the backdrop of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 to levy of market fee, it is absolutely distinctly perceptible from the judgment that the Court has arrived at a definite conclusion that there is a distinction between the oil cake and de-oiled cake and they are two different commercial products. Thus, when the difference has been drawn by this Court, the assessee herein cannot be allowed to advance a plea that the said test should not be applied, but the commercial parlance test should be adopted to determine the said goods for the purposes of the Central Sales Tax Act. To have a complete picture, we may refer to the Notification dated 31-5-2002. The relevant part of it reads as follows:

    “In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax, 1956 (Central Act 74 of 1956), the Government of Karnataka, being satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the public interest, hereby directs that with effect from the first day of June, 2002, the tax payable by a dealer under Section 8 of the said Act on the sale of goods specified below, made in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, to a registered dealer or the Government shall be calculated at the rate of two per cent subject to production of declaration in Form C or certificate in Form ‘D’ duly filled and signed by the registered dealer or the Government to whom the said goods are sold:
    1. Cotton yarn
    2. Bicycles
    3. Chemical fertilisers and chemical fertiliser mixtures
    4. Edible oil refined and non-refined
    5. Khandsari sugar
    6. Liquid glucose, dextrine, maize starch, gluten, grits, maize, husk, oil cake, corn steep liquor, dextrose, corn oil, maize hydrol and maize germs.”

    19. From the said Notification, it is evident that the competent authority while exercising power under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the CST Act, has kept the reduction of tax qua de-oiled cake from the purview of Notification and has only provided oil cake to be taxed at the reduced rate of tax. In view of the fact that the goods have distinct and different identity which also get recognition from the Notification, we are obliged to hold that the High Court has correctly distinguished the authority in Sterling Foods (1986) 3 SCC 469, (1986) 63 STC 239 and we unhesitatingly agree with the same.

    20. Though we have agreed with the said conclusion of the High Court, yet the fact remains that the assessing authority had expressed the opinion with regard to the rate of tax on the de-oiled cake while scrutinising C Forms which is an expression of opinion on the available materials brought on record and, therefore, the first appellate authority as well as the Tribunal was justified in concurring with the said order. It is worthy to note that the Revenue had not challenged the order passed by the Joint Commissioner. The High Court has not expressed any opinion on this score. Considering the cumulative effect of the facts and law we have stated, we have not an iota of doubt in our mind that there should not have been reopening of assessment. However, the finding recorded by the High Court overturning the view of the Tribunal that oil cake and de-oiled cake are the same product and, therefore, both are liable to reduced rate of tax despite the Notification only mentions oil cake, is not defensible.

    21. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed in part. The finding of the High Court as regards oil cake and de-oiled cake being different products as per the Notification dated 31-5-2002 is correct. However, the assessee shall reap the benefit of initial assessment as the same could not have been reopened. In the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

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    Ravi Prakash Refineries Private Limited v. State Of Karnataka .
    (May 3, 2016)