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Comprehensive Summary — Extracted Judicial Committee Opinions (as contained in the provided text)

Factual and Procedural Background

This document contains portions of at least two Judicial Committee reports appearing in the provided text. The principal, detailed opinion concerns a family dispute between three brothers (the surviving sons of Raghub Ram Gossain of Serampore) over distribution of their father's property, notably a talook called "Lot Harit". The parties in that case are the two younger brothers (Appellants) and the eldest brother (Respondent).

Key factual features (as stated in the opinion):

  • Raghub Ram Gossain died some time before 1840 leaving considerable property across jurisdictions (Serampore under Danish rule and areas within Calcutta jurisdiction).
  • The three surviving sons disputed distribution; several suits and decrees followed: two decrees in the Danish court at Serampore (6 Nov 1840 and 14 May 1841) and one decree in the Zillah Court at Calcutta (31 Aug 1841). Those three decrees were in favour of the present Appellants, adjudicating entitlement (including shares of Lot Harit) and a large sum alleged due from the eldest son.
  • Efforts at an amicable settlement culminated in a Ruffanamah (deed of compromise) dated 4 August 1842, which contained an express clause that "all ancestral property should be equally divided into four shares" and detailed monetary arrangements to settle claims.
  • Following the Ruffanamah, in February 1843 the Respondent executed mortgage-style bonds (referred to in the opinion as "mortgage bonds") by which he purported to secure sums to his brothers and to allot one-fourth shares of specified properties (including Lot Harit) to them by certain dates.
  • Despite these instruments and the compromise, the Respondent prosecuted an appeal to the Sudder Court against the Zillah decree of 31 August 1841; the Sudder Court (on 30 March 1843) made an order that, because certain sums were not deposited within a prescribed time, effectively amended the earlier decision and granted the Respondent relief that the Appellants contend was inconsistent with the compromise and prior adjudications.
  • The Appellants challenge the Sudder decree as having been obtained improperly — the Judicial Committee characterises the appeal and the Sudder adjudication as pursued by the Respondent "against all propriety" and, in effect, obtained by fraud.

Procedural posture:

  • Original adjudication in favour of the Appellants (Zillah Court of Hooghly / Calcutta original jurisdiction).
  • Appeal(s) led to different decrees in the Danish court and in the Sudder (Supreme) Court at Calcutta; the Sudder Court's decree of 30 March 1843 amended the Zillah decision in the Respondent's favour on conditions which the Appellants did not satisfy.
  • The present appeal is to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (reported in Moore's Indian Appeals). The Judicial Committee reviewed the sequence of the Ruffanamah, the subsequent mortgage-bond documents, the Sudder Court's decree, and the pleadings insofar as they impeached the Sudder adjudication.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. How should the term "ancestral" (in the Ruffanamah clause "all ancestral property should be equally divided into four shares") be construed — whether limited to property derived from the father's ancestors or broader in meaning?
  2. Whether the Respondent retained a valid pecuniary charge, mortgage or lien upon Lot Harit that would defeat the Appellants' claim to two-fourths of that talook, as claimed by the Respondent.
  3. Whether the Sudder Court decree of 30 March 1843 (obtained after the compromise) legitimately amended the prior Zillah adjudication or whether that decree was obtained improperly (fraudulently) and should be set aside and the earlier decree restored.
  4. What orders as to costs and repayment of sums paid under the contested Sudder decree should follow from the Court's determination regarding the validity of that decree?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Appellants (two younger brothers) claimed two-fourths of Lot Harit by virtue of the earlier adjudications and the Ruffanamah/mortgage bonds which allotted those portions to them.
  • They denied that the Respondent had actually paid the purchase-money for the estate (or, if paid, that any enforceable charge remained outstanding), and they relied on prior adjudications (Zillah and Serampore decrees) and the settlement to show their title was finally determined.
  • They asserted that the subsequent Sudder decree was improperly obtained after the compromise, and that the original Zillah decree which had been set aside by the Sudder should be restored.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The Respondent (the eldest brother) admitted that two-fourths of Lot Harit belonged to the Appellants subject to an important qualification: he claimed a substantial pecuniary charge on the property, asserting that he had paid the purchase price (the estate having been purchased in his name) and remained a creditor on that basis.
  • He relied upon the Sudder Court decree of 30 March 1843 (obtained on appeal) which, because the Appellants had not deposited the prescribed sum within the six months, placed the appellants in a position where the Respondent could treat the property as his in a manner analogous to foreclosure, though he professed willingness to accept redemption.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as stated in the provided text)
Bai Mo&ivahoo v. Bai (cited as L.R. 24 Ind. App. 104) The citation appears as a cross-reference in the material dealing with a will and joint-family declarations. Referenced in a footnote-style manner in connection with a Judicial Committee report about the construction of a will and joint-family property; the provided text gives no detailed explanation of its application beyond the citation.
8 Moo. Ind. App. 131 Statement: "In the case of damage occasioned by a wrongful act, though such as the law esteems an injury, malice is not a necessary ingredient to the maintenance of an action." Quoted in the subsequent portion of the provided text (Rogers v. Rajendro Dutt) as a statement of law on torts; the Court in that later section records it as an established proposition.
8 Moo. Ind. App. 135, 136 Statement: "It is essential to an action in tort that the act complained of should be legally wrongful as regards the party complaining; the fact that it will, however directly, do him harm in his interests is not enough." Used in the Rogers v. Rajendro Dutt portion to state the elements of an actionable tort; the opinion records and applies the principle to the facts of that subsequent case.
8 Moo. Ind. App. 133, 134 Principle: An official act (here an order of the Superintendent of marine) depriving an owner of temporary profits, in the absence of malice, is not necessarily a wrong actionable against the official. Appears in the Rogers v. Rajendro Dutt section where the Court treats the Superintendent's order as non-actionable in the absence of malice and reverses the Supreme Court at Calcutta's judgment on that ground.
8 Moo. Ind. App. 120 Reference to procedural practice: an important point of law being involved, special leave to appeal was granted by petition. Mentioned in the Rogers v. Rajendro Dutt narrative as explaining why special leave to appeal was granted in that matter; the provided text does not elaborate further.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Judicial Committee's analysis (as recorded in the provided text) proceeds in discrete legal and factual steps:

  1. Construction of "ancestral": The Committee held that the word "ancestral" in the Ruffanamah was not to be narrowly confined to property derived from earlier ancestors of the father. Instead, in the context of the document and as understood by the Respondent in his own conduct, "ancestral" was used in the sense of "paternal" — i.e., property of the father however acquired (at least in respect of immoveable property). This construction supports the effect of the compromise that such paternal/ancestral property be divided into four shares.
  2. Documentary effect (Ruffanamah and subsequent bonds): The Committee examined the Ruffanamah of 4 August 1842 and the mortgage-style instruments of February 1843. Those documents (the Committee said) plainly allotted to the two younger sons two-fourths of Lot Harit (among other properties). The Committee found that the totality of the documents contradicted the Respondent's later contention that he retained a pecuniary charge or lien that would defeat the appellants' title. The Committee described any construction that would leave the Respondent with such a continuing pecuniary charge on Lot Harit as "unreasonable and inadmissible."
  3. On appeal prosecuted after compromise and characterisation of the Sudder decree: The Committee noted that despite the settlement and the mortgage bonds, the Respondent prosecuted an appeal to the Sudder Court that resulted in the 30 March 1843 decree. The Committee viewed the prosecution of that appeal — after having insisted upon and benefited from the compromise — as conduct "against all propriety."
  4. Fraud and impeaching the Sudder adjudication: The Committee said (expressly) that even if one assumes (without deciding) that the Sudder decree of 1843 operated as an adjudication against the Appellants' title, the decree was obtained "not only with great impropriety, but, in effect, by fraud." The Committee further held that the fraudulent nature of the Respondent's conduct in obtaining the decree had been sufficiently put in issue by the Appellants' pleadings (the plaint and the replication) and was properly impeached so as to support setting aside the Sudder adjudication.
  5. Consequences of the foregoing analysis: Because the documents and the circumstances contradicted the Respondent's asserted continuing charge and because the Sudder decree was obtained by conduct amounting to fraud (as impeached in the pleadings), the Committee concluded the Zillah Court's decree (which had been in favour of the Appellants) was rightly treated as a nullity against the Appellants' title and should be restored. The Committee further considered costs and repayment of sums paid pursuant to the Sudder decision.

The Court's reasoning thus emphasises documentary construction (the Ruffanamah and the bonds), the effect of obtaining a later adjudication after a compromise, and the sufficiency of pleadings to impeach and set aside a decree obtained by improper/fraudulent conduct.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Their Lordships concluded that the Sudder Court decree of 30 March 1843 was obtained improperly (in effect by fraud) and that the Zillah Court decree in favour of the Appellants should be restored. The Committee recommended that:

  • The Zillah Court's decision in favour of the Appellants be restored (i.e., the Appellants' title to two-fourths of Lot Harit, and account for wassilat, as originally decreed).
  • If the Appellants had paid any costs under the Sudder Court decision, those costs should be repaid to them.
  • The Appellants should recover their costs of the proceedings in the Sudder Court and of the appeal to the Judicial Committee from the Respondent.
  • The Committee would make a humble recommendation to Her Majesty accordingly.

Implications: The direct effects stated in the opinion are restoration of the original adjudication favouring the Appellants and costs orders (including repayment of costs erroneously paid pursuant to the Sudder decree). The opinion expressly treats the Sudder decree as set aside for impropriety/fraud and does not purport to lay down any broader new legal doctrine beyond its application of ordinary principles of construction, finality of settlement, and the Court's power to set aside adjudications obtained by fraud. In the text provided there is no statement that a new precedent of general application was created; the Court's orders are confined to restoring the prior decision and awarding costs arising from the circumstances of this litigation.

Additional material appearing in the provided text

The provided extract also includes (earlier in the text) a separate Judicial Committee report and Her Majesty's Order concerning the construction of a Testator's will and the entitlement of a widow (Sreemutty Jugutsoondree Dossee) to a share of property in particular circumstances. That report declared that the Testator's property was given to his four sons and their male-line issue as a joint family, subject to performance of ceremonies and provisions for maintenance; it declared how a particular son's share passed to his widow; and it directed that the Supreme Court at Calcutta's order of 28 July 1857 be continued until further order. The provided text also contains the beginning of a different appeal (Thomas Eales Rogers v. Rajendro Dutt) with separate statements of tort law principles (cited authorities) used in that later opinion.

If any specific part of this summary should be expanded (for example, to extract verbatim passages from the Ruffanamah, the mortgage bonds, or the Sudder decree language as quoted in the opinion), indicate which document or paragraph to be reproduced and the requested level of verbatim detail; the summary above reflects only the material explicitly stated in the provided opinion extract.

    Rajmohun Gossain and Jugmohun Gossain v. Gourmohun Gossain (India)

    VI11 HOORE IND. UP., 89 RAJMOHUN GOSSAEN V. ~ O U R ~ O H ~ ~ GOYSAIN f 18 5 91

    Rs. 100, a month, that Order must be continued, and she will account for what she

    has received under that Order as against what may be coming to her upon the account

    to be taken. The better course would be, to discharge the Order which has been

    made by the Court below, and simply to make the declarations which X have sug-

    gested with a limit and a direction to continue the ~ a i n t e n a n ~ e , and that she shall

    account for what she may have received under it.

    Their Lordships think that the costs of the appeal may very p r o ~ e r i y be given

    out of the estate.

    The following report was made by the Judicial Committee, and confirmed by Her

    Majesty's Order [89] in Council. '' Their Lordships are of opinion that it ought to

    be declared that, according to the true construction of the Will of the Testator, the

    whole of the Testator's moveable and imnioveable property was, and is, well and

    effectually given for the benefit of the Testator's four sons in his Will named, and

    their offspring in the male line, as a joint family, so long as the family continues

    joint, subject, however, to the p e r f o r ~ a n c e of the acts, business, ceremonies and festi-

    vals, and to the provisions for ~ a i n t e n a n c e in the Will contained, and that the

    surpIus income of the property after answering such performance and provision was

    and is, in like manner, well and effectually given €or the benefit of the four sons and

    their offspring in the male line, as a joint family, so long as the family continues

    joint. And, it appearing, that Krishnomungle Bysack, one of the four sons, died

    leaving three sons$ their Lordships report as their opinion, that it ought to be de-

    clared by Your ~ a j e s t y , that each of the three sons became entitled to a third part

    of one-fourth part of the property, and of the accumulation thereof. And, it ap-

    pearing, that Hurrymohun Bysack, one of the three sons of Krishnomungle Bysack,

    died leaving no male offspring, and that the family continued joint up to the tinie

    of his death and still continues joint; their Lordships do further report as their

    opEnion, that it ought to be declared by Pour Majesty, that upoa the death of Hurry-

    muhun Bysack, the third par t of the fourth part of the property and accumulations

    to which he became entitled as aforesaid passed to the Respondent, S r e e ~ ~ i t t y Jug-

    ~utsoondree Dossee, as his widow and heir, and ~reemut ty Jug~utsoondree Dossee

    accordingly became and is entitled as such widow and [Wf heir, to the third part of

    the fourth part of the property and accumulations. And their Lordships are

    further of opinion, that Sreemutty J u ~ ~ u t s o o n d r e e Dossee ought to be a t liberty to

    apply to the Supreme Court a t Calcutta a8 to the accounts and otherwise as she may

    be advised; and their Lordships are of opinion, that the Order made in this cause

    by the Supreme Court of Calcutta, bearing date the 28th of July, 1857, ought to be

    cnntinued until further order. And their ~~ordships do further report, that in case

    Pour Majesty should be pleased to approve of thiR report and to Order accordingly,

    such Order ought to be without prejudice to any question as to the rights of Sree-

    mutty cJuggutsoondree Dossee of and when the joint; family shall be separated."

    '[See Bai Mo&ivahoo v. Bai ' ~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ , 1897, L.R. 24 Ind. App. 104.1

    [SI] R A J ~ O ~ U N GOSSAIN and J ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ H U ~ ~ O S S ~ I ~ , - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ : GOCR-

    MOIWN GOSSAIN,--Eespolur'ent * [Rec. 2 and 3, 18591.

    O m ~~~~~~ from tPIe S'ttdder ~~~~a~~~ Aduwtrrf, ~ ~ ~ c u ~ ~ ~ .

    In a Ruffanamah, or deed of compromise of a suit between three sons, members

    of a Hindoo family, respecting the distribution of their father's estate, it was

    stipulated, that all " ancestral ') property should be equally divided into four

    shares, Held, that the sense in which the word " ancestral " was employed

    * Present : Members of the Judicial Committee,-The Right Hon. Lord Chelms-

    ford, the Right Hon. the Lord Justice Knight Bruce, the Right Non. Sir Edward Ryan,

    and the Right Hon. The Lord Justice Turner. Assessor,--The Right Hon. Sir James

    Pi. Colvile.

    1--1 -I" II___ ~ __ - ii

    464

    was not confined to such property au the father had derived from his ances-

    tors, bat included ’‘ paternal ’) property, or such as had been acquired by the

    father by whatever title, and was possessed by him at the time of his decease.

    -4 decree of an appellate Court in India, obtained after a compromise, held, in

    the circu~~stances, fraudulent, and set aside with costs.

    The facts of this case, and the arguments, sufficiently appear in the judgment.

    The appeal was argued by Sir IIugh Cairns, Q.C., and Mr. Maude, for the Ay>-

    Tlieir ~ , ~ r d s h i p ~ ~ judgment was delivered by

    pellants; and Mr. E. Palmer, Q.C., and Mr, Leith for the Respondent.

    The Lord Justice Enight Brute.-The parties to this litigation are three brothers,

    e921 the surviving sons of a Hindoo named Ragliub Barn Gossain of Sera~i~pore, who

    appears to have been a person of considerabIe wealth. The Appellants here are the

    two y o u n ~ e r of those ttiree sons, the ~espondent being the eldest. The object of the

    suit in which the appeal arises was to obtain possession of two-four~~~s of a landed

    property, called Lot Haritl which, a t the time when Seramyore was a Dairish settle-

    ment, was out of that jurisdiction, and was, as it still is, within the jiIrisdiction of

    the Calcutta Courts, the decea,sed h a ~ i n ~ had considerable property, and probably

    the bulk of his property, within the jurisdiction of the then Danish Court of Serani-

    pore.

    The Respondent, the eldest son, admits the title of the Appellants to two-fourths

    of this estate which they claim, subject only to the important, ~ua l i f ica t~on that he

    olaims to have a pecuniary charge on the property to a considerable amount, in

    respect of having, as he says, paid the price of it, the fact being that the estate was

    purchased by the father in the name of the eldest son ; and the question raised is,

    whether the money, which was in fact paid to the seller, was or was not advanced by

    the eldest son (in whose name the purchase was made) for the father.

    IEe alleges that the money was paid by him, and that, he i s still a creditor of the

    father for it ; and the alleged charge in respect of it, is, as has been said, the only ob-

    jection which he makes to the claim of the appellants. The Appellants deny that the

    money was paid by the R e s p o ~ d e ~ ~ t , and further insist that, whether it was or was

    not paid by him, all questions relating to that alleged payment were formerly the

    subject of dispute, and settled by Edjudication : and, 1931 therefore, that if anything

    was ever due to him on the security of that property, nothing has remained due.

    This, the only substantial point in dispute, was decided, in the first instance, in

    favour of the Appe~lants, by the proper Court of original ~urisdiction, the Zillah

    Court of Rooghly ; but on appeal to the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, that decision was

    reversed, and j u d ~ m e n t given in favour of the Respondent, which has brought the

    Appellants here.

    The c~rc~ ims ta~ces in which the claim axose were these. The eldest son, the Respon-

    dent here, appears on the death of his father, which took pIace some time before the

    y e q 1840, to have taken possession of all his property: a t least, he was believed to

    have done so, and treated as having done so. In co~ise~uence, I i t ~ g a t ~ o I ~ f various

    kinds arose in the family, on the part of the present Appellants, on their own behalf,

    and also on behalf of the widow of a brother, and probably of their sisters also, on

    one side, and the present Respondent, the eldest, son, on the other. Two of these

    suits were brought in the Danish jurisdiction at Serampore ; the third, relating to

    the irnmoveable property out of that jurisdiction, namely, the property now in dis-

    pute, Lot Harit, was within the Calcutta jurisdiction. The result of these three

    ~ ~ t i ~ a t ~ o n s were three decrees, one in the Danish Court at Serampore, of the 6th of

    November, 1840, another in the same jurisdiction of the 14th of May, 1841, and the

    other in the Zillah Court of ~ ~ l c u t t a , of the 31st of August, 1841. They were all

    in favour of the preseDt Appellants, including not only the adjudioation that a large

    sum of money was due from the eldest son, but also deciding for their title to [%]

    shares of Lot Harit, the estate within the ~ a ~ c u t t a ,jurisdi~tion.

    One of these decrees, that of the 14th of May, 1841, relating, it seems. to family

    jewels and other such specific goods, was not capable of appeal, or was not appealed

    from, and i s out of the question ; but the eldest son, the Respondent here, did appeal

    from the decree of the 6th of ~ovember , 1840, to the proper Court in Denmark, and

    465

    VIII MOORE IND. APP., 96 RBJMOHUN GOSSAIN U. GOURMOHUN GOSSAIN [1859]

    did appeal froin the decree of the Zillah Court of the 31st of August, 1841, to the

    proper Sudder Court a t Calcutta.

    A family quarrel on so estensive a scale excited general attention, ai,d an en-

    deavour was made in a friendly and kind manner by the Governor of Seraillpore

    then under the Danish rule, or a gentleman of considerable station there, to effect a

    settlement of the disputes, and at last it was done. The settlement was effected by

    an agreement, or Ruffanarriah, made on the 4th of August, 1842, in these words:-

    (' Serampore, A z i p s f i th , 1812.-The long-pending dispute between Baboo Gour-

    inohun Gossain and his brothers having occasioned great scandal and inconvenience,

    the Honourable Mr. Hansen, the Governor of Serampore, being exceedingly anxious

    to terminate these differences, called both parties before him on the above-mentioned

    date, and having required them mutually to explain their wishes, prevailed upon

    them to agree to a settlement in the following terms :-

    " I . That all ancestral property should be equally divided into four shares.

    " 2 . That the sum of Rs. 15,000, be paid to the elder brother, Rajmohun.

    " 3. That the sum of Rs. 15,000, be paid to the [95] third brother, Jugmohun,

    from which is to be deducted the sum of Rs. 5640. already paid him for the purchase

    of a house.

    " 4. That in reference to the share of the fourth brother, deceased, which amounts

    to Rs. 15,000, Gourmohun agrees to pay his widow monthly interest a t the rate of five

    per cent. per annum, and also to give a bond in the Serampore Court for the pay-

    ment of the principal of Rs. 15,000, if she should adopt a son, when that son comes

    of age. Should she die without adopting a son, the sum of Rs. 15,000 will be

    divided according to law into three parts among the three brothers, or their sur-

    viving families; and as security for this bond, will pledge property in Serampore

    to the satisfaction of the Court.

    " .5. That the sum of C. Rs. 10,000, be paid t o the widow of the late Raghob Ram

    (:ossain, to be disposed of according to her own wishes, in full of all claim; and in

    case of her dying without making any disposition of it, Gourmohun relinquishes all

    claim to it.

    " 6. That the sum of C. Rs. 12,500, be paid by Gourmohun Gossain, on account

    of the house built by him after the death of his father ; and that the house, together

    with the piece of ground in front of the house, do, after the payment of this sum,

    remain his sole and entire property; his brothers and their family agreeing to quit

    it, including Hurree Chootar's ground, consisting of fourteen cottahs.

    '' The sum which Gourmohun Gossain thus engages to pay, to settle all differences

    with his family. stands thuR :-

    Rs.

    '' To Rajmohun Gosaaiii . . 15,000

    " To Jugmohun Gossain . . . 15,000

    *' Less for the house according to the deed of sale . 5640

    C96l

    .

    - 9360

    " To the widow of the late Raghob Ram Gossain . . . 10,000

    '' To the sisters . . 10,000

    I ' For the house in full . 12,000

    Rs. 56,860

    '' Of this sum Gourmohun Gossain engages to pay in cash the sum of Rs. 35,000,

    within thirty days from the signing of this document, arid the remainder of this sum,

    namely. Rs. 21,860, a t the end of eighteen months from this date, with interest at

    the rate of 5 per cent. per annum, giving security for the same.

    '' In witness thereof the parties have hereunto set their hands this 4th of August,

    1842, Gourmohun Gossain, Rajmohun Gossain, Jugmohun Gossain. Signed in our

    presence, P. Hansen, John Marshman, Hurchunder Laheree, Krishno Coinar Laheree."

    Before proceeding to mention the next document, it should be observed as to the

    remarks which have been made upon the word " ancestral," contained in the first

    clause after the introductory part of the Ruffanamah, that their Lordships are of

    opinion that " ancestral," as here used, is not confined to such property, if any, as

    the father had drrired froin his father, or fioni any ancestor; but that " ancestral"

    466

    RAJMOHUN GOSSAIN v. GOURMOHTJW GOSSAIN [185Y] 'VIII MOORE IND. APP., 97

    is here employed (and so the Respondent himself, upon more than one occasiou, has

    shown that he [97] understood it), in the sense of '' paternal," that is, as rnealiing

    property of the father, in whatsoever manner, or by whatsoever title, the father

    had acquired i t ; and, therefore, that " ancestral property " means property derived

    from the father ; a t least, inimoveable property.

    Some months after this agreement, namely, in February of the year 1843,

    mortgage bonds, as we may call them, were executed by the Respondent, to his

    brothers respectively: one (in the same form, nmtatis m,~utand&, as the other) was

    thus :-" Know all men by these presents, that according to agreement concluded

    (;n the 4th August, 1842, between ine and my brother, Juginohun Gossain and others,

    I have been bound to pay to Jugmohun Gossain, as his share of ready money belong-

    ing to our late father's estate, the sum of Rs. 15,000, besides one-third of a sum

    of Rs. 12,500, that according to the agreement was to be paid by me on account

    of the dwelling-house in this town; and Jugmohun Gossain having on the 15th

    ,January, this year, from the Court of Serampore, received this one-third of the

    above sum of Rs. 12,500 on account of the dwelling-house, and in part of the above

    Rs. 15,000, the sum of Rs. 8442, partly by value of a house, and partly out of the

    sum of Rs. 35,000, deposited by me in Court on the 2nd of September, 1842. I

    herewith, iii conformity with the agreement, execute to him the present deed of

    mortgage, whereby I promise to pay to him the remaining part of the last-mentioned

    sum, being Rs. 6558, on or before the 4th of February, 1844, together with interest

    a t five per cent. from the date of the agreement, 4th August, 1842, and until the

    day of payment ; and to secure him the payment [98] thereof, I pledge and mortgage

    to hiin, as second mortgage, the whole of my landed property, with building and

    appurtenances, situated within this settlement, nest after the sum of Rs. 6558, for

    which I have this day executed a deed, a mortgage to Rajmohun Gossain. Further,

    I do herewith, in ccjnformity with the agreement, bind myself to allot to him,

    Jugmohun Gossain, before the 4th of August, 1843, his one-fourth share of our

    ancestral landed property, with appurtenances and buildings, that is to say :-

    " 1st. A11 property situated within the settlement of Serainpore, which a t present

    stands registered in the joint name of mine and either of my brothers, Rajmohun

    Gossain and Jugmohun Gossain, or the late Nundoiiioliuri Gossain, including the

    services of the family deity, Sree Sree Radharnadhubjee Thakoor, with the exception

    of the dwelling-house mentioned in the agreement, together with the ground belong-

    ing thereto, as per pottah No. 1379, and also the ground formerly belonging to

    Hurry Chootar, obtained by the decree of the Serainpore Court of the 28th o f ,

    August, 1841.

    " 2nd. The ancestral Talook, called Hooda Gopaulsingpore, in Umursee in the

    Zillah of Midnapore.

    " 3rd. The patrimonial Talook, called Lot Harit, in the Zileah of Hooghly,

    together with the profits from the 4th of Sugust, 1842.

    " 4th. Our patrimonial share of the house called Bassabautee, in Burabazar,

    Calcutta. (Signed) Gourmohoun Gosaain. Serampore, February 6, 1843."

    It need not be said that the property named in clause 3, Lot Harit, is that of

    which two-fourths are now in dispute; and by the effect of the agreement, [99] and

    these two mortgage bonds, two fourths of that property, among others, were allotted

    to the two younger sons.

    It seems that some time after this, the Respondent was desirous of obtaining,

    and, almost of course, perhaps, for that reason, the Appellants were desirous of not

    giving, a release, and accordingly, the Respondent instituted a suit for the purpose

    of compelling them to give i t ; and he obtained a decree against them in the Court

    of First instance. The adjudicating par t of the decree being in these words:-

    " It is, therefore, directed, that when the Plaintiff, Gourmohun Gossain, coniplies

    with the conditions of the Ruffananiah, of the 4th of August, of the year 1842, filed

    in the present suit, and besides pays to Puddomonee Dabee, Rs. 138. 14a., the costs

    of suit, No. 109, of the year 1838, arid pays to Oornopoorrio Dabee, Rajmohuri Gossain,

    Jugmohun Gossain, Ruddurnbenee Dabee. Dimla Dabee, Madhobee Dabee, Proshunno

    Dabee, C. Rs. 2003. 2a., the costs of civil suit, No. 969, of the year 1838, then he will

    be exonerated from the claims of the said individuals on account of the paternal

    4G7

    property which they have inherited as the heirs of their father, Raghub Ram Cossain,

    deceased.

    The present Appellants appealed from that decision, and the decision was

    a ~ r m e d in the year 1849. The judgment of the Court is in these words:----(‘ No

    attempt has been made to show that the settlement was partial or unfair. The mere

    Fact of ~ ~ m ~ r o n ~ i s e for 8 less a n ~ o ~ n t than \vas l e ~ a l ~ y due, cannot of itself i ~ p u ~ ~ ~

    the settlements; for it is in evidence that great ~ i ~ c u l ~ y was e ~ p e r i e ~ ~ ~ e ~ iu [lW]

    executing the decree, and an appeal from i t to Denmark, attended with ruinous

    expense, had been preferred ; and it was ordered, that the decision of the Court of

    Serarnpore shouId be affirmed, and the appeal disn~issed ; and in consideratiori

    of the speeiaI c ~ r c u ~ s t a n c ~ s of tbis case, each party pays his own costs of the suit.”

    Xow, i t is with documents such as tlzese, altogether unimpeached, hefore us, that,

    the ~ e s p o r ~ d e n ~ contends that the true m e a n i ~ i ~ of what took place in the years 1842

    and 1843 was this: that though he was to divide Lot Harit, yet he was to divide

    it ~ ~ i t h o u t prejudice to his claim as an alleged n~ortgagee, or holder of a lien, as we

    should calk it, and that all that he was to give up was what we should call the

    equity of r e d e ~ p t ~ o n , subject to that. Their Lorddips, however, are of opinion,

    that the documents t ~ e ~ s e l v e s , whetcher the rest of the eridence be or be not coI~sidered~

    afford a plain and complete contradict~or~ to that allegation.

    Their r~ordsh~ps are of opinion, that such a co~istruct~on of the documents as

    would leave the ~espondent in possessio1~ of a pecuniary charge upon Lot Warit i s

    unreaso~~able and inadmissible.

    If, therefore, there were no other difficulty in the case, the title of the Appel-

    lants would be plain and clear, viz., to have two-fourths of Lot Harit, and an account

    of the wassilat in cori~e~uence, as originally decreed. But this d~fficu~ty has arisen.

    Not~~ths tanding the a r r a n ~ e i ~ e n t s of August, 1842, and February, 1843, the Re-

    spondent t h o u ~ l ~ t fit, but as their ~ o r d s ~ i ~ s think against all propr~ety, to prosecute

    an appeal against the Zillah decree of tbe 31st of August, 1841, which had given to

    the Appe~~ant’s shares of [lQl] Lot Harit. Accordingly, that appeal having been

    brought up, and substantially unopposed, the Respondent obtained from the Sudder

    Court, on the 30th of March, 1843, a decree, the ordering par t of wXiic!i i s in these

    words : -

    “ here fore i t is finally ordered, that the ~ ~ p e 1 1 a ~ i ~ ’ s appeal be decreed, and the

    decision of the Judge amended ; and the ~ l a ~ n t ~ ~ s , ~esponden t s~ on the cond~t~o!i

    that i f they deposik ia the t r e ~ $ ~ ~ y of the CTourk from this date, within the period

    of six months, the purc~ase- none^ of a 12 annas share of Talook Rarit, then they

    are to be put in possession of a 12 annas share, without wassilat, and the whole o f

    the costs of this Court, according to the account of Hhurcha Nuvees (Accountant of

    costs), with interest thereon, from this date up to the date of r e a ~ i ~ a t ~ o n , be entered

    against ~espondents. And if the A p ~ e ~ ~ a n t has deposited the costs of the Zillab

    Court, then he is to present a petition for its r e t ~ r ~ , and the order for its payment,

    with interest, up to the date of realization, according to the general Order of this

    Court dated the 3rd of June, 1837, will be passed.”

    Of course the ~ ~ ~ o n ~ y was not paid, and the contention of the present ~espondent

    is, that the decree of 1843, establ~shed the title which he afleges, and that as the

    nioney was not paid within the period prescribed by the decree, he i s entitled ta

    claim the property as his own in a manner anal~gous to a title by foreclosure; but,

    he says, that he i s willing to submit to what we shoutd call redemption.

    Their ~ordships , however, are of op in~or~ , that the claim i s entirely untenable.

    A s s u ~ ~ n g (though tbeir Lordsh~ps do not decide) that the decree of 1843, a ~ a u n t e d

    to an adjudication ClOZ] against the present Appellant’s title, we think, that it was

    an adjudication obtained not only with great impropriety, but, in effect, by fraud ;

    for i t was plainly the duty, in every sense the duty of the present Respondent after

    the com~rom~se (a c o ~ p r o ~ i s e ins~sted upon by him) not to prosecute that appeal.

    Doing SO, he did it a t his own peril, for success could by no poss~bi~ity benefit him,

    if his title, by reason of that success, should be properly i ~ p e a c ~ ~ e d ,

    It is said that, on the assump~~on that the decree of 1843, is an adjudicat~on

    against the present Appe~~ant’s title, the fraudulent nature of the decree has not

    been put in issue, and it has not been in a proper manner sought to be set arjide.

    Their Lordships arenot of that opinion. They are of opinion, that the fraudulent

    Both the parties will pay their respective costs of the present suit.”

    46%

    ROOERS v. RAJENDRO DUTT [1860] VIII MOORE IND. APP., 103

    nature of the Respondent's conduct in obtaining the adjudication is sufficiently put

    in issue by the original plaint in the case, and by the replication, in both of which

    i t is impeached, and, as their Lordships view the matter, in a 'proper manner im-

    peached, for fraud; and the decree of the Zillah Court treating it as a nullity against

    the title of the present Appellants was, as their Lordships consider, properly made,

    with costs, and ought to be restored.

    If the Appellants have paid any costs under the decision of the Sudder Court,

    those costs should be repaid; and the present Appellants should have their costs of

    the proceedings in the Sudder Court, and of the appeal here, from.the Respondent.

    The humble recommendation of their Lordships to Her Majesty will be made

    accordingly.

    .

    [103] THOMAS EALES ROGERS,-Appellant; RAJENDRO DUTT, and Others,-

    Respondenk" [June 27, 28, 18601.

    O n appeal from tJhe Supreme Court at Calcutta.

    In the case of damage occasioned by a wrongful act, though such as the law

    esteems an injury, malice is not a necessary ingredient to the maintenance

    of ail action [8 Moo. Ind. App. 1311.

    I t is essential to an action in tort that the act complained of should be legally

    wrongful as regards the party complaining, i.e., it must prejudicially affect

    him in some legal right. The fact that it will, however directly, do him harm

    in his interests is not enough [8 Moo. Ind. App. 135, 1361.

    An order issued by the Superintendent of marine, in his official capacity, to the

    Bengal Pilot service, employed by the East India Company on the Hooghly

    river prohibiting them from allowing a particular steam tug to take any

    ship in tow of which such pilots should have pilotage charge, made in con-

    sequence of what the Superintendent deemed an exorbitant demand on the

    part of the owner of the steam tug, whereby such owner was deprived for PI

    time of the profits of being employed by the pilots in charge of ships going

    up n r down the river Hooghly; in the absence of malice, alleged or to be

    inferred, is not such a wrong as would sustain an action by the owner of the

    tug against the Superintendent of marine, the officer of the Government,

    issuing such order.

    Upon appeal the judgment of the Supreme Court a t Calcutta maintaining the

    action, reversed, on the ground that the Government had the same rights as

    a private individual in declining to employ the tug if the charges were too

    high [S Moo. Ind. App. 133, 1341.

    In the action, the Court a t Calcutta gave damages, the amount of which was

    under the appealable value prescribed, by the Calcutta charter. As an im-

    portant point of law was invohed, special leave to appeal was upon petition,

    granted [S Moo. Ind. App. 1201.

    This was an action brought in the Supreme Court a t Calcutta, by the Respondents

    against the Appellant, under the following circumstances : -

    The appellant was the Superintendent of marine a t Calcutta, an official Govern-

    ment situation under [104] the East India Company, and in that capacity had the

    control of the whole of the Marine department under Government, including the

    superintendence and control of the Bengal pilots employed by the Government, who

    were the only pilots who are engaged in piloting vessels on the river Hooghly. There

    was no legal obligation to employ a pilot, but from the dangerous nature of the

    river no ship could be safely navigated up or down unless in charge of a pilot. Tugh

    were required for bringing vessels up the river. The Respondents were the owners,

    o r par t owners, of a steam tug called the Underwr4tei; which was employed in tow-

    * Present : Members of the Judicial Committee,-The Right Hon. Dr. Lushington,

    the Right Hon. Sir Edward Ryan, and the Right Hon. Sir John Taylor Coleridge.

    Assessor,-The Right Hon. Sir Lawrence Peel.

    469

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    Rajmohun Gossain and Jugmohun Gossain v. Gourmohun Gossain (India)
    (Dec 3, 1859)