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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for recovery of Rs. 13,77,416.10 paise and interest, asserting that goods were sold, supplied and delivered by the plaintiffs to the defendants from time to time. The plaint relied in part on three letters dated 10 April 1990, 15 April 1992 and 10 April 1993, in which the defendants' accounts purportedly showed amounts due to the plaintiffs (Rs. 6,12,295.71 for year ended 31 March 1990; Rs. 7,86,689.70 for year ending 31 March 1992; and Rs. 8,91,476.20 for year ending 31 March 1993). A Form No.16-A (certificate of deduction of tax at source) dated 24 April 1995 certified that Rs. 14,932/- was paid and deposited with tax authorities on behalf of the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs served a notice on 12 July 1993 demanding payment. Defendants did not reply. Defendants appeared and contested the suit. Plaintiffs applied under the procedure for summary judgment (summons for judgment) on the basis that the claim was an ascertained, admitted and liquidated amount arising from "accounts stated" and hence a summary decree should be granted. Affidavits were filed by both parties and a rejoinder by the plaintiffs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the three letters/entries (khatapete) sent by the defendants constitute "accounts stated" or a written acknowledgment/contract sufficient to maintain a summary suit under Order XXXVII (i.e., whether they create an express or implied obligation enforceable by summary procedure).
  2. Whether the three letters are merely acknowledgements (not amounting to a written contract) and thus insufficient as a basis for a summary suit.
  3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation because the letters are dated 1990, 1992 and 1993 while the suit was filed on 31 March 1998.
  4. Whether the three letters are inadmissible because they are not properly stamped under the Stamp Act.
  5. Whether the letters were sent by a person lacking authority, raising an issue of the sender's authority to bind the defendants.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The claim is an ascertained, admitted and liquidated amount based on goods supplied and the entries/letters (including the three letters sent by the defendants) which reflect the defendants' books stating amounts due to plaintiffs.
  • Plaintiffs relied on the three letters and the Form No.16-A (tax deduction certificate dated 24-4-1995) to show payment/credit and to counter the limitation plea (argument by Shri Kadam that limitation runs from 24-4-1995 or the date of payment 31-3-1995).
  • Plaintiffs relied on case law (including AIR 1953 SC 225 and related authorities) establishing that an unconditional acknowledgment implies a promise to pay and can furnish a cause of action; they also relied on Single Judge decisions recognizing "Khata Pete" receipts as containing implied promises to repay and being enforceable by summary suit when they create a written obligation.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The three letters (khatapete) do not amount to "accounts stated" and therefore a summary suit is not maintainable; they are mere acknowledgements and not an express written contract.
  • The letters do not constitute a written contract; they are not express or implied terms creating payment obligations under the Rule governing summary suits.
  • The suit is time-barred: the suit was filed on 31 March 1998 but is based on letters dated 10 April 1990, 15 April 1992 and 10 April 1993; limitation therefore had expired.
  • The three letters are improperly stamped and thus inadmissible in evidence under the Stamp Act.
  • The letters were signed/sent by a person without authority to bind the defendants, creating a triable issue on authority.
  • Accordingly, defendants sought unconditional leave to defend and relied on various precedents to support that summary procedure was inappropriate in this factual matrix.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
1883 ILR Vol VIII p.194 Question of proper stamp on an acknowledgement in writing (held one anna sufficient in that case). The Court found this decision of no help to the defendants on the issues before it.
AIR 1938 Bom 460 Considered acknowledgement of debt after the period of limitation had expired. The Court held this case was not helpful because the present case did not involve an acknowledgement made after limitation had expired.
1885 ILR Vol IX Plaintiff relied on his own khata/account; treated only as evidence and not as "accounts stated". The Court distinguished it because in the present case the defendants (not the plaintiffs) had stated the amounts due in their own books.
21(b) 201 (Full Bench, 1895) Whether an acknowledgement of debt requires stamp under Indian Stamp Act of 1879 and its admissibility. The Court found the ratio did not lend support to the defendants' position in this case.
ILR Vol XLV 374 Plaintiffs relied on accounts in their own books; issue of proper stamp arose. The Court found it inapplicable to present facts where defendants' own letters recorded the amounts.
AIR 1919 Nag 141 Held that acknowledgements are inadmissible under section 35 of the Stamp Act (as interpreted in that case). The Court noted the point was different and did not treat it as controlling here.
AIR 1967 SC 1058 Entries in one's own books of account cannot by themselves charge a person with liability; further evidence required to prove payment. The Court distinguished this authority because in the present case the plaintiffs relied on letters addressed by the defendants themselves showing the position of accounts in defendants' books.
AIR 1953 SC 225 Holds that an unqualified/unconditional acknowledgement implies a promise to pay and such an acknowledgement (together with accounts stated) can furnish a cause of action; authority discussed in para 11 of that judgment. The Court relied on this authority as a principal precedent supporting that an unconditional acknowledgement implies a promise to pay and can sustain a suit; the Court considered it directly persuasive.
Maniram v. Seth Rupchand, 33 Ind. App. 165 (PC) Privy Council: an unconditional acknowledgement implies a promise to pay. Cited within AIR 1953 SC 225 and applied by the Court to support the plaintiffs' position that such acknowledgements create an obligation.
Fateh Mahommed v. Ganga Singh (reported as AIR 1920) Supports view that unconditional acknowledgement can form basis of suit on balance. Cited in AIR 1953 SC 225 and relied on by the Court to support plaintiffs' contention.
Kahanchand Dularam v. Dayaram Amritlal, AIR 1929 Lah 263 Holds that expressions like "balance due", "account adjusted" and "balance struck" can amount to "accounts stated" under Article 64, Limitation Act. Used in AIR 1953 SC 225 and treated by the Court as supporting the proposition that acknowledgements can amount to accounts stated.
Division Bench — Appeal No. 902 of 1990 (Summons for Judgment No. 205 of 1990 in Summary Suit No. 551 of 1990) Held that two acknowledgements/receipt did not make an agreement in writing and thus the suit was outside Order XXXVII; defendant entitled to unconditional leave to defend. The Court considered this decision but distinguished it on facts; it did not change the Court's conclusion in the present matter.
Division Bench — Appeal No. 712 of 1986 (Summons for Judgment No. 274 of 1986 in Summary Suit No. 2506 of 1985) Held that an item relating to bill discounting where the bank maintained an account could not be pursued by summary suit; such a defence may be substantial. The Court noted the authority but found it distinguishable and not persuasive for the facts before it.
1969 Mh.L.J 698; 1969 BLR Vol LXXI p.370 (K.K. Desai, J.) Held that a "Khata Pete" receipt is more than mere receipt: it typically contains an implied promise to repay and can create a written obligation enforceable in a summary suit where it creates an express or implied written obligation. The Court expressly agreed with and relied on these observations, treating them as a correct and complete reply to defendants' contentions.
Single Judge — Summons for Judgment No. 278 of 1995 in Summary Suit No. 797 of 1995 (S.H. Kapadia, J.) Entries in books maintained by defendants themselves were held admissible/supportive; the defence that books were inaccurate was not meritorious. The Court relied on and cited this decision to support the view that entries in defendants' books, when asserted by defendants, can be the basis of a summary suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in the following analytical steps, based on the materials and authorities before it:

  1. Identification of the core factual foundation: the three letters written by the defendants themselves showing amounts as payable by the defendants to the plaintiffs (entries reflected in defendants' books), together with the Form No.16-A tax certificate dated 24-4-1995.
  2. Consideration of defendants' contentions and precedent relied upon: the Court examined the authorities cited by the defendants (various ILR reports, Full Bench decisions and other cases) and found most of them factually distinguishable or not directly applicable (for example, decisions about stamps, acknowledgements after limitation, or where plaintiffs relied on their own books).
  3. Analysis of controlling principle from higher authority: the Court placed particular weight on AIR 1953 SC 225 (and the authorities discussed therein such as Maniram v. Seth Rupchand and Fateh Mahommed v. Ganga Singh), which recognizes that an unconditional acknowledgement implies a promise to pay and can furnish a cause of action; the Court treated that principle as directly applicable.
  4. Reliance on Single Judge and Division Bench precedents that interpret "Khata Pete" writings and entries in ledgers: the Court agreed with the reasoning in the 1969 K.K. Desai J. decision that a "Khata Pete" receipt/entry may contain an implied promise to repay and therefore can constitute a written obligation admissible for summary enforcement. The Court also relied on the S.H. Kapadia decision where entries in the defendants' books were accepted as sufficient in a summary proceeding.
  5. Evaluation of defendants' specific defences: the Court found the defendants' objections (that the letters were mere acknowledgements, unstamped, signed by unauthorized persons, or time-barred) to be either factually distinguishable, legally insufficient or technical in nature. On limitation the Court accepted plaintiffs' argument that the deduction-certificate (Form 16-A) dated 24-4-1995 (or the date of payment 31-3-1995) was a relevant date from which limitation could be assessed, making the suit (filed 31-3-1998) not clearly barred.
  6. Conclusion on summary judgment suitability: applying the legal principles and distinguishing unfavorable authorities, the Court concluded that the defendants had not disclosed sufficient facts to entitle them to defend the suit in a full trial. The Court characterized the defences raised as technical, frivolous or vexatious rather than substantial.
  7. Moral and policy remarks: the Court additionally observed—drawing on broader social considerations—that accepting a narrow or pedantic construction would foster dishonesty and immorality, and that a straightforward written admission by a debtor should not be allowed to be defeated by technicalities.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The Court made the summons for judgment absolute and decreed the suit as prayed in terms of paragraph 14 of the plaint.

Direct consequences and administrative directions stated by the Court:

  • The suit and summons for judgment were disposed of in favor of the plaintiffs by decree as prayed.
  • Issuance of a certified copy of the judgment and decree was expedited.
  • The office was directed to issue execution before sealing of the decree upon the plaintiffs' advocate furnishing the draft of the decree within three months.
  • Refund of institution fees was ordered as per rules.
  • Concerned parties were authorized to act upon an ordinary copy of the judgment and order authenticated by the Chamber Registrar of the Court.

The opinion does not assert that it creates any novel legal precedent; its decision rests on application and extension of existing authorities (notably AIR 1953 SC 225 and the Single Judge decisions cited) to the facts where the defendants themselves recorded and communicated the amounts due.

    R. Kumar & Co. v. Chemicals Unlimited

    1. The plaintiffs have prayed for a judgment and decree against the defendants ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of Rs. 13,77,416.10 ps. and further interest at the rate of 15% per annum or at such other rate as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit on Rs. 8,78,453.20 from the date of the filing of the suit till payment and costs of the suit.”

    2. From the averments in the plaint the suit claim appears to have been based on goods sold, supplied and delivered by the plaintiffs to the defendants from time to time. By three letters dated 10th April, 1990, 15th April 1992 and 10th April, 1993 addressed by the defendants to the plaintiffs, the defendants had stated that in their account books in the account of the plaintiffs during the year ended 31st March, 1990 a sum of Rs. 6,12,295.71 was due and similarly for the next two years i.e year ending 31st March, 1992 and 31st March, 1993 an amount of Rs. 7,86,689.70 and Rs. 8,91,476.20 were shown due to them. By another document which is form No. 16-A, i.e a certificate of deduction of tax at source dated 24-4-1995, it was certified that an amount of Rs. 14,932/- was paid and deposited with the tax authorities on behalf of the plaintiffs. On the aforesaid basis, the plaintiffs sent a notice on 12th July, 1993 to the defendants for payment of the aforesaid amount mentioned in the three letters addressed by the defendants to the plaintiffs. There was no reply to the said notice. Failure to make payment of the aforesaid amount has given rise to the present suit.

    3. The defendants on receipt of writ of summons entered their appearance to contest the suit claim. The learned Advocate for the plaintiffs Page: 688have, thereafter, taken out the above summons for judgment for a decree on the basis that the suit claim was an ascertained, admitted and liquidated amount under the “accounts stated” to be implied as a written contract and that there was no defence of any nature available to the defendants.

    4. In support of the summons for judgment, the plaintiffs have filed an affidavit of one Shri Ramesh Shah, partner of the plaintiffs' firm. On behalf of the defendants an affidavit of Shri Sameer Shah, their partner, is filed. The plaintiffs have filed a rejoinder on 8th August, 2000.

    5. Shri Doshi on behalf of the defendants has submitted that his clients are entitled to get unconditional leave to defend the suit as there are following triable issues.

    (i) Khatapete is not accounts stated and therefore, such a suit on the basis of the three letters addressed by the defendants to the plaintiffs is not maintainable. Those letters were only acknowledgements of the debt and no summary suit can be maintained on the basis of only acknowledgement of debt as it does not amount to an express written contract.

    (ii) The letters addressed by the defendants do not constitute a written contract:

    (iii) These letters are neither expressed or implied contract or terms to pay and therefore, no summary suit will lie.

    (iv) The suit is barred by limitation as it is filed on 31st March, 1998 for recovery of a debt on the basis of the 3 letters dated 10th April 1990, 15th April, 1992 and 10th April, 1993. The suit is, therefore, clearly barred by limitation, says the learned Advocate for the defendants and the limitation which was already expired, cannot be extended.

    (v) The aforesaid three letters are mere acknowledgements and they are not properly stamped and, therefore, they cannot be used as evidence before the Court.

    (vi) The aforesaid three letters were sent by the signatory having no authority to do so.

    6. Shri Doshi, therefore, submitted that evidence will have to be recorded on the point of limitation as also on the point of authority of the sender of the said letters. He has, therefore, prayed for an unconditional leave to defend. The learned Advocate has placed reliance on the following judgments:—

    (i) 1883 ILR Vol. VIII page 194. (ii) AIR 1938 Bom 460. (iii) 1885 ILR VOL. IX (iv) 21 (b) 201 (FB). (v) ILR Vol. XLV 374 (vi) AIR 1919 Nag 141 (vii) AIR 1967 SC 1058.

    In the case of 1883 ILR Vol. VIII the point before the Full Bench of this Court was totally different, i.e what should have been the proper stamp fixed on an acknowledgement in writing. The learned Judges have taken a view that Page: 689stamp of One Anna was sufficient. This judgment is of no help to the learned counsel for the defendants.

    In the case reported in AIR 1938 Bom. 460, the learned Judges were considering the question of acknowledgement of debt after the period of limitation had expired. It is not so in our case and therefore, this judgment is also of no help to the defendants.

    In the case of 1885 ILR Vol. IX, it was a case where the plaintiffs had relied upon his own Khata i.e account and that was treated only as a evidence available with the plaintiffs and such Khata was not held as account stated. In our case it is the defendants who have stated what amounts were due and payable to the plaintiffs as reflected from their accounts books.

    In the case of 21(b) 201 (FB), this judgment was delivered in a reference in the year 1895. The question was whether the acknowledgement of a debt require stamp under the Indian Stamp Act of 1879 and whether it was admissible in evidence. The ratio of this case also does not lend support to the learned Counsel for the defendant.

    In the case of ILR Vol. XLV 374, the plaintiffs had relied upon the account in his own books as evidence. Even in this case, the question of proper stamp was raised and decided. This also cannot be applied in the present case.

    The judgement reported in AIR 1919 Nag. 141 holds that acknowledgement are inadmissible under section 35 of the Stamp Act. The point in the referred case is again different.

    The last judgement on which reliance is placed is reported at AIR 1967 SC 1058, where the plaintiffs had relied upon their own entries in their own books. It was observed by the Supreme Court that no person can be charged with liability more particularly on the basis of entries in books of account, even where such books of account were kept in the regular course of business. It was further observed that there has to be further evidence to prove payment of the money appearing in the accounts book. In our case the plaintiffs have relied upon the letters addressed by the defendants themselves showing the exact position of the plaintiffs' accounts in the books of the defendant. The defendants have informed the plaintiffs that they have to pay to the plaintiffs the amounts mentioned in the books of account of the defendants.

    7. The learned Advocate also relied upon the judgment of our Division Bench in Appeal No. 902 of 1990 in Summons for Judgement No. 205 of 1990 in Summary Suit No. 551 of 1990. The learned Judges have observed as under:—

    “There are two acknowledgements. Neither the receipt nor the acknowledgements make for an agreement in writing. The suit is, therefore, outside the purview of Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Page: 690Procedure and the Appellant was entitled to unconditional leave to defend the suit.”

    The above referred suit was based upon receipt of Rs. 37,000/- as a loan. It was held that the summary suit did not lie within the purview of Order XXXVII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

    8. The learned Advocate also drew my attention to another judgment of our Division Bench dated 11th August 1986 in Appeal No. 712 of 1986 in Summons for Judgment No. 274 of 1986 in Summary Suit No. 2506 of 1985. The learned Judges have held that the suit on the item of a bill discounting facility in respect of which there was an account maintained by the bank could not be filed as a summary suit. Such a defence was held to be a substantial defence.

    9. As far as the question of limitation is concerned, Shri Kadam has pointed out that the certificate of deduction of tax at source under section 203 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is dated 24-4-1995. This payment is made by the defendants on behalf of the plaintiffs to the tax authorities for the amounts held in the credit of the plaintiffs in the books of accounts of the defendants. According to Shri Kadam, the limitation would run from 24-4-1995 or from the date of the payment i.e 31-3-1995. Filing of the suit, therefore, is not barred by limitation, according to Shri Kadam. As far as merits of the contention, Shri Kadam has placed reliance on the judgments reported in AIR 1953 SC 225. Para 11 of the judgment lays down the law on the point after discussing the whole case law in earlier paragraphs. The Supreme Court says:

    “Mr. Bindra next urged that the plaintiffs' suit should have been dismissed because it could not be maintained merely on the basis of an acknowledgement of liability, that such an acknowledgement could only save limitation but could not furnish a cause of action on which a suit could be maintained. The Judicial Commissioner took the view that an unqualified acknowledgement like the one in the suit, and the statement of the account under which the entry had been made, were sufficient to furnish a cause of action to the plaintiffs for maintaining the present suit. We are satisfied that no exception can be taken to this conclusion. It was held by the Privy Council in Maniram v. Seth Rupchand, 33 Ind. App. 165 (PC) (c) that an unconditional acknowledgement implies a promise to pay because that is the natural inference if nothing is said to the contrary. It is what every honest man would mean to do. In Fateh Mahommed v. Ganga Singh, AIR 1920 the same view was taken. It was held that a suit on the basis of a balance was competent. In Kahanchand Dularam v. Dayaram Amritlal, AIR 1929 Lah. 263 (E). the same view was expressed and it was observed that the three expressions “balance due”, “account adjusted” and “balance struck” must mean that the parties had been through the account. The deft there accepted the statement of account Page: 691contained in the plaintiffs' account book, and made it his own by signing it and it thus amounted to an “accounts stated between them” in the language of Article 64, Limitation Act. The same happened in the present case. The acknowledgement which forms the basis of the suit was made in the ledger of the plaintiffs in which earlier mutual accounts had been entered and truly speaking, the suit was not based merely on this acknowledgement but was based on the mutual dealings and the accounts stated between them and was thus clearly maintainable.”

    In my humble opinion, the Supreme Court has considered the similar point which is urged before me. It is held that an unconditional acknowledgement implies a promise to pay because that is the natural inference, if nothing is said to the contrary. The Supreme Court has further gone on say “It is what every honest man would mean to do.” Nothing more is required, to be stated as the judgment is a complete reply to the contentions raised on behalf of the defendants.

    10. According to me, to take any other narrow, pedantic or technical view of the matter would be to encourage dishonesty and immorality in life. I fail to understand how the defendants having written to the plaintiffs that certain amounts were shown payable by the defendants to the plaintiffs, can now turn about and say that no suit will lie for recovery of the said amounts shown to be the liability of the defendants towards the plaintiffs. To accept such contention would amount to encourage and accept dishonesty and immorality. Times have changed. Courts of law have to watch with utmost care that the social life is not drifted to dishonesty and immorality and the people are not driven to anti-social elements and parallel machinery of muscle power for recovery of genuine claims of honest people. The law is based on morals and if the foundation of the law is shaken or removed, there will be utter chaos in the society and in life. 1 may add here that such dishonest contentions by the debtors have given rise to parallel machinery of muscle power for recovery of the debts by the creditors.

    11. Shri Kadam has also placed reliance on a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court (K.K Desai, J.) reported in 1969 Mh.L.J 698 : 1969 BLR Vol LXXI page 370. The learned Judge was also called upon to decide the point which I am required to decide. The following paragraphs are important.

    “Now, the writing relied upon on behalf of the plaintiffs, in my view, is what is ordinarily known as a “Khata Pete receipt”. This kind of writing has been known and understood to continue not only an acknowledgement for receipt of the money but to contain an implied promise that the money having been received “Khata Pete” i.e “on account” would be repaid by the debtor signing the writing.”

    “The question is as to whether the Khata Pete receipt in this case is not a written contract within the meaning of Rule 2 cited Page: 692above. In this connection it may at once be noticed that the writing does not contain express promise to repay the sum of Rs. 13,000/- mentioned in the writing. Even so it is apparent that the writing contains an implied promise to repay the sum of Rs. 13,000/- mentioned therein. This is so because the writing is made in lender's book by the debtor and the debtor states that the amount is received on Sarafi account and is credited to the account of the creditor in the ledger of the debtor. The rate of interest is also mentioned. The writing relates to a fresh loan and has no reference to adjustment or otherwise of accounts of previous dealings. It bears a 4 anna revenue stamp. It is quite clear that the parties did not intend the writing to be and it is not merely a receipt. The writing was executed to create an obligation and promise to repay the amount mentioned therein.”

    “Now, it is true that prior to the amendment of rule 2 a summary suit could be instituted in all cases where a debt or liquidated demand in money arose on contract, express or implied. It is quite clear that previously a written contract was not a necessary condition for institution of a summary suit to recover debt or liquidated demand in money. Where express or implied obligation to pay debt or liquidated demand in money arose, even on an oral contract, a summary suit could be instituted. Under the amended Rule, summary suits cannot be instituted when such debt or demand in money arises on oral contracts. Mr. Karanee, however, is not right in his submission that the deletion of the phrase “express or implied” from amended rule 2 indicates that when implied obligation to pay debt or liquidated demand in money arises on a written contract, a summary suit cannot be filed. Obligations arising on a written contract can in some parts be express and in other parts be implied by law or otherwise. Such implied obligations, if they create a liability to pay debt or liquidated demand in money, can be enforced by instituting a summary suit having regard to the language of the amended rule 2. In my view, it is not correct that implied obligations to pay debt or liquidated demand in money when they arise on a written contract cannot be good causes of action for institution of summary suits.”

    12. I am in complete agreement with the observations of the learned Judge that such implied obligations, if they create a liability to pay debt or liquidated demand in money, can be enforced by instituting summary suit. This judgment is also a correct and complete reply to the contentions raised.

    13. A similar situation had arisen before another learned Single Judge of this Court (S.H Kapadia, J) in Summons for Judgment No. 278 of 1995 in Summary Suit No. 797 of 1995. The suit was based on the entries reflected in the books of the defendants. By way of defence it was contended on behalf of the defendants that the books of accounts of the defendants were not accurate Page: 693and that they were numbered on hawala. It was, therefore, contended that suit was on accounts and therefore, summary suit would not lie. The learned judge has observed as under:—

    “I do not find any merit in the above defences. The above entries are reflected in the books maintained by the defendants themselves. The defendants have credited T.D.S and they also credited interest in the Account of the plaintiffs for tax purposes. In the above circumstances, I do not find any merit in the above defences put up by the defendants.”

    14. In our case, the defendants have themselves addressed the three letters to the plaintiffs pointing out to the plaintiff's the amount stated in their books of accounts to be their liability towards the plaintiffs. I fail to understand why this admission cannot be taken as the basis of a summary suit as an admitted or liquidated claim. The defendants on their own. voluntarily, informed the plaintiffs that the balance in the plaintiff's account as shown vas payable by the defendants to the plaintiffs. An honest and straight forward businessman writes to the creditor that the latter is entitled to receive a certain amount from the former. In these circumstances, I am at loss to understand why no summary suit would lie on such a clear cut admission. To take any other view would be contrary to the honest and moral view of the aw. I am fully satisfied that the defendants have not disclosed any facts which can be deemed to be sufficient to entitle them to defend the suit. According to me, the defendants have no good defence to the claim of the plaintiffs, though they have raised the above stated technical points, which are lot sufficient to entitle them to defend the suit. The aforesaid defence raised by the defendants, is not a substantial defence but is only frivolous or vexatious to grant leave to defend the suit to the defendants. The plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment in their favour. There is no dispute about the documents annexed as Exhibits to the plaint. The learned Counsel has produced original documents which are taken on record and marked as Exh. B colly. I, therefore, make the summons for judgment absolute and decree the suit as prayed in terms of para 14 of the plaint. The suit and summons for judgment both are disposed of accordingly.

    Issuance of certified copy of this judgment and decree is expedited. Office to issue execution before sealing of the decree on the learned Advocate for the plaintiffs furnishing draft of the decree within a period of three months. Refund of institution fees as per rules is granted. Concerned parties to act on an ordinary copy of this judgment and order authenticated by the Chamber Registrar of the Court.

    Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    R. Kumar & Co. v. Chemicals Unlimited
    (Nov 15, 2000)